Showing papers in "Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement in 2016"
TL;DR: A more complete understanding of a dynamic, interactive, contextual, and use-based conception of language better reveals what actually happens in museums and the nature of the meaning we find there as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: We often think of works of art as possessors of meaning, and we think of museums as places where that meaning can be exhibited and encountered. But it is precisely at this first step of thinking about artistic meaning that we too easily import a conceptually entrenched model or picture of linguistic meaning that then constrains our appreciation of artistic meaning and what museum exhibitions actually do. That model of linguistic meaning is atomism: the notion that the single, self-contained word is the ultimate building block of meaning. This picture was excavated with exacting precision in Wittgenstein's sustained reflections on the nature of meaning, and the new way of seeing linguistic meaning that those reflections usher in holds direct significance for our understanding of artistic meaning, as we see here in examples from Rembrandt, Rietveld, and others. A more complete understanding of a dynamic, interactive, contextual, and use-based conception of language better reveals what actually happens in museums and the nature of the meaning we find there.
11 citations
TL;DR: In this article, a lecture was designed as an introduction to the theory of forms in the context of Plato's dialogues, but no guidance on further reading was offered, and numerous controversies about the theory's interpretation were left in the background.
Abstract: This lecture was designed as an introduction to Plato's theory of Forms. Reference is made to key passages of Plato's dialogues, but no guidance on further reading is offered, and numerous controversies about the theory's interpretation are left in the background. An initial sketch of the theory's origins in the inquiries of Plato's teacher Socrates is followed by an explanation of the Forms’ primary characteristic, Plato's metaphysical separation of them from the sensible world. Other aspects discussed include the Forms’ metaphysical relation to sensible particulars, their ‘self-predication’, and the range of items that have Forms. Finally, the envisaged structure of the world of Forms is illustrated by a look at Plato's famous Cave simile.
8 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, a synoptic view of Kant's Critique of the Power of Judgement and its reception by the German Idealists is presented, and the authors reconstruct Kant's defence of his claim to philosophical finality.
Abstract: This paper offers a synoptic view of Kant's Critique of the Power of Judgement and its reception by the German Idealists. I begin by sketching Kant's conception of how its several parts fit together, and emphasize the way in which the specifically moral motivation of Kant's
project of unification of Freedom and Nature distances it from our contemporary philosophical concerns. For the German Idealists, by contrast, the CPJ's conception of the opposition of Freedom and Nature as defining the overarching task of philosophy provides a warrant and basis for bold speculative programmes. The German Idealist development therefore presupposes Kant's failure in the CPJ to resolve the problem of the relation of
Freedom and Nature. What is fundamentally at issue in the argument between Kant and his successors is the question of the correct conception of philosophical systematicity and in this context I reconstruct Kant's defence of his claim to philosophical finality.
7 citations
TL;DR: In this article, a kind of reading of Wittgenstein's crucial aphorism on this topic is presented, which states that progress is its form rather than making progress being one of its features.
Abstract: ‘You can’t stop progress’, we are endlessly told. But what is meant by “progress”? What is “progress” toward? We are rarely told. Human flourishing? And a culture? That would be a good start – but rarely seems a criterion for ‘progress’. (In fact, survival would be a good start…) Rather, ‘progress’ is simply a process, that we are not allowed, apparently, to stop. Or rather: it would be futile to seek to stop it. So that we are seemingly-deliberately demoralised into giving up even trying. Questioning the myth of ‘progress’, and seeking to substitute for it the idea of real progress – progress which is actually assessed according to some independent not-purely-procedural criteria – is a vital thing to do, at this point in history. Literally: life, or at least civilisation, and thus culture, may depend on it. Once we overcome the myth of ‘progress’, we can clear the ground for a real politics that would jettison the absurd hubris of liberalism and of most ‘Leftism’. And would jettison the extreme Prometheanism and lack of precaution endemic to our current pseudo-democratic technocracy. The challenge is to do so in a way that does not fall into complete pessimism or into an endorsement of the untenable and unsavoury features of conservatism. The challenge, in other words, is to generate an ideology or philosophy for our time, that might yet save us, and ensure that we are worth saving. This paper is then a kind of reading of Wittgenstein’s crucial aphorism on this topic: ‘Our civilization is characterized by the word progress. Progress is its form rather than making progress being one of its features.’
7 citations
TL;DR: The authors argue that museums have lost the capacity to generate big ideas that characterize epistemic shifts, such as evolution, the labour theory of value, or relativity, and they have become mere echo chambers for ideas proposed elsewhere.
Abstract: Although museums of all kinds continue to proliferate, they have lost the capacity to generate big ideas that characterize epistemic shifts, such as evolution, the labour theory of value, or relativity. They have become mere echo chambers for ideas proposed elsewhere. How might museums regain their capacity to generate big ideas? The development of a Tangible Turn in scholarly thinking is leading to a reinvigoration of knowledge claims derived from material things. Museums are well placed to participate in such a reinvigoration, and in some instances – notably in the natural sciences – already are. Yet to do so they must overcome the taxonomic and systematic divisions that in the nineteenth century stimulated but now inhibit creative thinking. How can disciplinary ossification associated with collection definition be overcome? Two possible models are artists' interventions and arrangement according to philosophical principles, yet neither is sufficient. Curatorial scholars should acknowledge the physical and cultural instability of tangible things, and work with these properties to combine things in revelatory ways, eschewing stable categories. This can be accomplished most effectively in museums associated with universities through collaboration among the scholarly staffs of university collections and with university faculty.
6 citations
TL;DR: The authors consider the prospects for the current revival of interest in Hegel, and the direction it might take, arguing for a middle way between these extremes of optimism and pessimism, proposing an Aristotelian reading which is more metaphysical than Bernstein recognizes, but not as at odds with thinking in current analytic philosophy as Gardner suggests, finding a counterpart in the work of Philippa Foot, Michael Thompson, Rosalind Hursthouse and others.
Abstract: This paper considers the prospects for the current revival of interest in Hegel, and the direction it might take. Looking back to Richard J. Bernstein’s paper from 1977, on ‘Why Hegel Now?’, it contrasts his optimistic assessment of a rapprochement between Hegel and analytic philosophy with Sebastian Gardner’s more pessimistic view, where Gardner argues that Hegel’s idealist account of value makes any such rapprochement impossible. The paper explores Hegel’s account of value further, arguing for a middle way between these extremes of optimism and pessimism, proposing an Aristotelian reading which is more metaphysical than Bernstein recognizes, but not as at odds with thinking in current analytic philosophy as Gardner suggests, as it finds a counterpart in the work of Philippa Foot, Michael Thompson, Rosalind Hursthouse and others.
5 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the ontological basis of the educational value of various objects commonly displayed in Holocaust museums is analyzed, and the epistemic, or knowledge-creating, function of Holocaust museums are considered.
Abstract: Holocaust museums record and memorialize deeply affecting historical events. They can nevertheless be described and criticized using standard categories of museum analysis. This paper departs from previous studies of Holocaust museums by focusing not on ethical or aesthetic issues, but rather on ontological, epistemic, and taxonomic considerations. I begin by analysing the ontological basis of the educational value of various objects commonly displayed in Holocaust museums. I argue that this educational value is not intrinsic to the objects themselves, but rather stems from the extrinsic relations established between objects in museum exhibitions and displays. Next, I consider the epistemic, or knowledge-creating, function of Holocaust museums. I argue that the structure of public displays in such museums reflects the particular, document-based epistemology that continues to characterize Holocaust historiography and other fields of Holocaust research. Finally, I turn to examine taxonomic features of Holocaust museums. As I explain, both professional and ‘artefactual’ networks link the activities and display strategies of national, regional, and local Holocaust museums. A brief conclusion sketches some implications of my analysis for ongoing debates about the ethical function of Holocaust museums.
5 citations
TL;DR: This paper argued that the importance of the provenance of artworks is relative to the specific purposes of any given exhibition or museum and that those that are primarily educational (such as encyclopaedic ones) are in many cases best served with high-quality replicas.
Abstract: This essay brings together questions from aesthetic theory and museum management. In particular, I relate a contextualist account of the value of copies to a pluralistic understanding of the purpose of museums. I begin by offering a new defence of the no longer fashionable view that the aesthetic (as opposed to the ethical, personal, monetary, historical, or other) value of artworks may be detached from questions regarding their provenance. My argument is partly based on a distinction between the process of creating a work of art and the artwork in question. Next, I defend a pluralism about the purpose of museums and their exhibitions. I combine this with a pluralist account of the value of replicas which falls out of the above argument, exposing our preference for originality as being frequently fetishistic. I maintain that the importance of the provenance of artworks is relative to the specific purposes of any given exhibition or museum. Those that are primarily educational (such as encyclopaedic ones) are in many cases best served with high-quality replicas. This view may be extended to artefacts that are not artworks, such as fossils and dinosaur skeletons. Finally, I expound the variety of roles that replicas may play in museums and relate these to notions of authenticity.
5 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that much could be gained from exploring participatory art, as it raises fundamental challenges to our understanding of issues in aesthetics, such as the nature of aesthetic experience, the value of art, and the role of the spectator.
Abstract: Abstract This chapter introduces the participatory art museum and discusses some of the challenges it raises for philosophical aesthetics. Although participatory art is now an essential part of museological programming, an aesthetic account of participatory art is still missing. The chapter argues that much could be gained from exploring participatory art, as it raises fundamental challenges to our understanding of issues in aesthetics, such as the nature of aesthetic experience, the value of art, and the role of the spectator. Moreover, participatory art fundamentally questions the status of the museum as an exhibition space for contemporary art practices.
4 citations
TL;DR: For example, the authors argues that the history of philosophy is epistemologically flawed and argues that our attachment to history with a teleological flavour can be explained by the emotional investments that guide our interest in the philosophical past.
Abstract: Historians of philosophy are well aware of the limitations of what Butterfield called ‘Whig history’: narratives of historical progress that culminate in an enlightened present. Yet many recent studies retain something of this teleological outlook. Why should this be? To explain it, I propose, we need to take account of the emotional investments that guide our interest in the philosophical past, and the role they play in shaping what we understand as the history of philosophy. As far as I know, this problem is not currently much addressed, but it is illuminatingly explored in the work of Spinoza (1632-77). He aspires to explain the psychological basis of our attachment to histories with a teleological flavour. At the same time, he insists that such histories are epistemologically flawed. To study the history of philosophy in a properly philosophical fashion we must overcome our own Whiggish leanings.
4 citations
TL;DR: The authors argue that it is a mistake to think of the meaning of an exhibit as either determined by the individual viewer's narrative or as determined by a conception as presented in the museum's "authoritative" narrative.
Abstract: Museums establish specific contexts, framings, which distinguish them from viewing the world face-to-face. One striking aspect of exhibition in so-called participatory museums is that it echoes and transforms the limits of its own frame as a public space. I argue that it is a mistake to think of the meaning of an exhibit as either determined by the individual viewer's narrative or as determined by the conception as presented in the museum's ‘authoritative’ narrative. Instead I deploy the concept of a model of comparison to illuminate the philosophical significance of perspective in understanding the idea of objectivity in museum narratives.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors show how, esteemed theologian though he is commonly taken to be, Thomas Aquinas adopts a strongly different line of thinking according to which we seriously do not know what God is.
Abstract: It is often said that if God exists, he is strongly comparable to what is not divine. In particular, it has been claimed that for God to exist is for a person to exist. In what follows I show how, esteemed theologian though he is commonly taken to be, Thomas Aquinas adopts a strongly different line of thinking according to which we seriously do not know what God is. In doing so, I draw attention to his use of nominal definitions in his arguments for ‘God exists’. I also highlight his teachings that God is simple and that words used to talk about God in subject-predicate sentences always ‘signify imperfectly’.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors propose a triangular framework for understanding the duty of care museums have, according to which it is shaped by the need to negotiate an object's transit from past to future in such a way as to secure that object's future significance.
Abstract: Museum codes of ethics stress the importance of preservation, knowledge and access, but they remain silent on the justificatory framework of the duty of care museums have to the objects in their collections and on museums' obligations towards their public. In this essay I propose a triangular framework for understanding the duty of care museums have, according to which it is shaped by the need to negotiate an object's transit from past to future in such a way as to secure that object's future significance. The account provided of transit to the future is underwritten by a model of trust as entrusting. Hence, museums' duty to care for the objects in their collections is found to be grounded on the demands of the trust relationship, complemented by the respect that is necessary for effective negotiation of the transit from past to future.
TL;DR: In this paper, the origins of analytic philosophy in the work of Frege and Russell are elucidated, and the revolutionary significance of their methods of logical analysis is explained, as well as the differences in their approaches.
Abstract: Analytic philosophy, as we recognize it today, has its origins in the work of Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell around the turn of the twentieth century. Both were trained as mathematicians and became interested in the foundations of mathematics. In seeking to demonstrate that arithmetic could be derived from logic, they revolutionized logical theory and in the process developed powerful new forms of logical analysis, which they employed in seeking to resolve certain traditional philosophical problems. There were important differences in their approaches, however, and these approaches are still pursued, adapted, and debated today. In this paper I shall elucidate the origins of analytic philosophy in the work of Frege and Russell and explain the revolutionary significance of their methods of logical analysis.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors explore Descartes's responses to the problems of theodicy posed by various forms of sensory error and argue that natural judgements involved in our visual perception of distance, size and shape pose a problem of error that resists his usual solutions.
Abstract: Descartes first invokes the errors of the senses in the Meditations to generate doubt; he suggests that because the senses sometimes deceive, we have reason not to trust them. This use of sensory error to fuel a sceptical argument fits a traditional interpretation of the Meditations as a work concerned with finding a form of certainty that is proof against any sceptical doubt. If we focus instead on Descartes’s aim of using the Meditations to lay foundations for his new science, his appeals to sensory error take on a different aspect. Descartes’s new science is based on ideas innate in the intellect, ideas that are validated by the benevolence of our creator. Appeals to sensory error are useful to him in undermining our naive faith in the senses and guiding us to an appreciation of the innate ideas. However, the errors of the senses pose problems in the context of Descartes’s appeals to God’s goodness to validate innate ideas and natural propensities to belief. A natural tendency to sensory error is hard to reconcile with the benevolence of our creator. This paper explores Descartes’s responses to the problems of theodicy posed by various forms of sensory error. It argues that natural judgements involved in our visual perception of distance, size and shape pose a problem of error that resists his usual solutions.
TL;DR: The question of how to affirm one's life in view of suffering and loss is central to Nietzsche's philosophy as discussed by the authors, and it is shown that one can take joy or find beauty in -one's life as a whole, conceived as necessary in all its elements.
Abstract: The question of how to affirm one's life in view of suffering and loss is central to Nietzsche's philosophy. He shows, I claim, that one can affirm – take joy or find beauty in – one's life as a whole, conceived as necessary in all its elements, while also despising parts of it. Yet he mostly pictures such life-affirmation as achievable only via an atheistic theodicy that relies on a key ambition of the very system of morality that he famously attacks: namely to explain or justify suffering in terms of a higher end to which it is essential. I argue that affirmation of one's life is more powerful without the crutch of any theodicy, and point to Job as a paragon of one who can affirm his life without seeking an answer to the question of the meaning or value of suffering – indeed who can dispense altogether with that question.
TL;DR: Locke's emphasis on the limits of knowledge and the mediocrity of our epistemological equipment is well understood; it is rightly seen as integrated with his causal theory of ideas and his theory of judgment as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: Abstract Locke's insistence on the limits of knowledge and the ‘mediocrity’ of our epistemological equipment is well understood; it is rightly seen as integrated with his causal theory of ideas and his theory of judgment. Less attention has been paid to the mediocrity theme as it arises in his theory of moral agency. Locke sees definite limits to human willpower. This is in keeping with post-Puritan theology with its new emphasis on divine mercy as opposed to divine justice and recrimination. It also reflects his view that human beings are (probably) essentially material machines.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine the nature and grounds of the title principle and its relation to manifest contradictions in the conclusion to Book I of A Treatise on Human Nature and show that if the causal inferences that undermine the belief in external world are not "lively" nor mixed with some propensity, then they have grounds for thinking that they have no normative authority (they have no "title to operate on us".
Abstract: Abstract This paper examines Hume’s ‘Title Principle’ (TP) and its role in a response to one of the ‘manifest contradictions’ he identifies in the conclusion to Book I of A Treatise on Human Nature. This ‘contradiction’ is a tension between two ‘equally natural and necessary’ principles of the imagination, our causal inferences and our propensity to believe in the continued and distinct existence of objects. The problem is that the consistent application of causal reason undercuts any grounds with have for the belief in continued and distinct existence, and yet that belief is as ‘natural and necessary’ as our propensity to infer effects from causes. The TP appears to offer a way to resolve this ‘contradiction’. It states Where reason is lively, and mixes itself with some propensity, it ought to be assented to. Where it does not, it never can have any title to operate upon us.’ (T 1.4.7.11; SBN 270) In brief, if it can be shown that the causal inferences that undermine the belief in external world are not ‘lively’ nor mixed with some propensity’ then we have grounds for think that they have no normative authority (they have no ‘title to operate on us). This is in part a response to another ‘manifest contradiction’, namely the apparently self-undermining nature of reason. In this paper I examine the nature and grounds of the TP and its relation to these ‘manifest contradictions’.
TL;DR: The authors argue that the attraction of museums are varied but are best explained affectively and in terms of the orectic (appetitive, desiderative, wishing) rather than cognitively conatively (willing, deciding).
Abstract: The first part of this essay asks: What is the function, purpose and value of a museum? Has any museologist or philosopher given a credible account of philosophical problems associated with museums? Is there any set of properties shared by the diverse entities called museums? Overgeneralization is the principal problem here. The essay then examines a central kind of museum experience; one that invokes and relies upon nostalgia. I argue that the attraction of museums are varied but are best explained affectively and in terms of the orectic (appetitive, desiderative, wishing) rather than cognitively conatively (willing, deciding). Although this need not be taken as conflicting with the idea that museums are focused on scholarship, it is more consonant with the claim that exhibitions are central. Museums may at times both pique and satisfy our curiosity. However it is a mistake to see ‘curiosity’ as merely, or even primarily, a matter of cognition.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors look at Descartes' and Spinoza's views about wonder and the uses and disadvantages of wonder as a learning tool, in the sense of spaces that link objects both to feeling and to knowing.
Abstract: Recent museum practice has seen a return to ‘wonder’ as a governing principle for display and visitor engagement. Wonder has long been a contentious topic in aesthetics, literary studies, and philosophy of religion, but its adoption in the museum world has been predominantly uncritical. Here I will suggest that museums draw on a concept of wonder that is largely unchanged from seventeenth-century philosophy, yet without taking account of early modern doubts about wonder's efficacy for knowledge. In this paper I look at Descartes' and Spinoza's views about wonder and the uses and disadvantages of wonder as a learning tool. This examination is extended to consider Descartes' and Spinoza's likely views about ‘museums’, in the sense of spaces that link objects both to feeling and to knowing. Finally, I suggest that there are resources in Spinoza's philosophy for bringing knowledge-enhancing feelings into the museum without resorting to the problematic concept of wonder.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors focus on non-art museums and argue that while these may house aesthetically valuable objects, that is not their primary purpose, and at least some of the objects they house might not be particularly aestheologically valuable at all.
Abstract: I address two related questions. First: what value is there in visiting a museum and becoming acquainted with the objects on display? For art museums the answer seems obvious: we go to experience valuable works of art, and experiencing valuable works of art is itself valuable. In this paper I focus on non-art museums, and while these may house aesthetically valuable objects, that is not their primary purpose, and at least some of the objects they house might not be particularly aesthetically valuable at all. Second: to what ontological type or category do museum objects belong? What type of item should be featured on an inventory of a museum collection? I distinguish between typical objects and special objects. While these are different types of object, both, I argue, are abstracta, not concreta. The answer to the second question, concerning the ontological category of special objects, throws new light on various philosophical questions about museums and their collections, including the question about the value of museum experiences. But it also throws light on important questions concerning the preservation and restoration of museum objects.
TL;DR: For Plotinus, the matter that underlies all perceptible objects, is essentially obscure and describable only in the negative terms of what it lacks by way of inherent properties as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: Modern science is not linguistically original in hypothesizing the existence of dark matter. For Plotinus, the matter that underlies all perceptible objects, is essentially obscure and describable only in the negative terms of what it lacks by way of inherent properties. In formulating this theory of absolute matter, Plotinus took himself to be interpreting both Plato and Aristotle, with the result that his own position emerges as a highly original and equivocal synthesis of this tradition. Plotinus did not claim that matter is nothing, but the puzzling status he attributes to it can be aptly compared to Berkeley's doctrine that material substance is a self-contradictory notion.
TL;DR: In this article, the basic responsibility of museums to collect "things" and to communicate information about them in a truthful way brings their collecting practice into the epistemological domain of testimony and into the normative domain of ethics.
Abstract: This paper argues that any museum's collecting policy must face up to the problem of vulnerability. Taking as a starting point an item in the collections of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, I argue that the basic responsibility of museums to collect ‘things’, and to communicate information about them in a truthful way brings their collecting practice into the epistemological domain of testimony and into the normative domain of ethics. Museums are public spaces of memory, testimony, representation and interpretation that at once enable humanity to hold to account those who transgress while at the same time holding to account those who witness these transgressions. By virtue of this, museums can be considered spaces of ethics wherein testimonial and hermeneutic injustice can be confronted and challenged.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors of the essays "Moral considerations on the destination of works of art" and "The Origin of the Work of Art" argue that the description of art these authors propose defeats their own claims against museums, arguing that a work of art can be the centre of this type of network in a museum.
Abstract: This chapter first analyzes two texts in the tradition of essays which associate museums with the notion of displacement: Moral Considerations on the Destination of Works of Art, by Quatremere de Quincy, and ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’, by Heidegger. Both authors claim that a work of art is not only a material object but also a centre of practices, values, beliefs, traditions, memories, and so on. I argue that, insofar as a work of art can be the centre of this type of network in a museum, the description of art these authors propose defeats their own claims against museums. In the second part, I suggest that Heidegger's and Quatremere's descriptions of the role of art can be articulated with the help of Donald Davidson's understanding of the interconnection between the material world and human concepts. As Davidson sees it, things and people can only be described in relation to the other particular persons, objects, events and places they are connected to. From this perspective, the subjective, the objective and the intersubjective cannot be grasped independently. Museums stage this interconnection and can, therefore, be regarded as philosophical instruments that may help us describe things and, by extension, also ourselves.
TL;DR: In this paper, the philosophy of museums is defined as "a philosophical culture in which members or citizens engage in (ideally) fair-minded debate and shared reflection, presenting and evaluating reasons for different positions particularly as these have relevance for matters of governance".
Abstract: Borrowing from the title and some of the content of Karl Popper's The Open Society and its Enemies (1945), it is argued that museums have great value as sites for what may be called a philosophical culture. A philosophical culture is one in which members or citizens engage in (ideally) fair-minded debate and shared reflection, presenting and evaluating reasons for different positions particularly as these have relevance for matters of governance. In a philosophical culture, persuasion is almost always a matter of seeking to provide reasonable grounds for adopting some position without resorting to violence or physical force (though, of course, force may be necessary to constrain those who themselves resort to violence). A philosophical culture is, in turn, an important foundation for a democratic culture and republic. A philosophy of museums emerges, a model we shall call the Philosophical Culture Museum Model. This concept is stipulative and ideal in the sense that it presents a paradigm of a museum with great virtue and promise. It must be confessed, however, that, historically, this is an emerging concept of the role of museums and one not evident in many of the museums in the early modern era or today. Reasons are offered as to why the time may be right to recognize the philosophy of museums as a particular sub-field in the overall practice of philosophy.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors consider how far the original sacred context of a painting or other artefact should be acknowledged in modern galleries and museums and argue that such institutions should be concerned with rather more than the fostering of aesthetic experience.
Abstract: Abstract This essay considers how far the original sacred context of a painting or other artefact should be acknowledged in modern galleries and museums. It is argued that such institutions should be concerned with rather more than the fostering of aesthetic experience. An educational role is also important, and this entails that, although nothing should be done to encourage religion, contextualizing painting and artefact will also open up the possibility for concomitant religious experience. Although various formal distinctions are noted, the argument is conducted by means of a large number of specific examples.
TL;DR: This article explored a range of paradoxes in museums and in the museological literature which may serve as starting points for conversations with philosophers, including questions of definition and mission, intrinsic versus instrumental value, whether museums actively shape society or serve as a passive reflection, whether their main function is to produce liberating knowledge or express communal identities, whether traditional or progressive museums are the most ‘traditional' and whether museums are trying to serve idealized or real visitors.
Abstract: This chapter is written from the perspective of a practitioner and explores a range of paradoxes in museums and in the museological literature which may serve as starting points for conversations with philosophers. These include questions of definition and mission, intrinsic versus instrumental value, whether museums actively shape society or serve as a passive reflection, whether their main function is to produce liberating knowledge or express communal identities, whether traditional or progressive museums are the most ‘traditional’, whether museums are trying to serve idealized or real visitors and, ultimately, whether museums are rational or ritual institutions.