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Showing papers in "Southern Journal of Philosophy in 2023"


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Grouchy as mentioned in this paper argues that economic inequality chips away at the bonds of accountability in society and prevents people from seeing one another as moral equals, and proposes to expand property ownership, thereby giving each person a stake in the community and ensure access to education and redirect its aims, to provide people with the necessary tools to reason about the common good.
Abstract: In this article, I consider Grouchy's critique of economic inequality and her proposed solution to what she perceives as this grave social ill. On her view, economic inequality chips away at the bonds of accountability in society and prevents people from seeing one another as moral equals. As a step toward restoring these bonds between people, Grouchy argues that: first, we should expand property ownership, thereby giving each person a stake in the community; second, we should ensure access to education and redirect its aims, to provide people with the necessary tools to reason about the common good. In so doing, Grouchy claims, we can reawaken the sense of accountability that people have to one another in community.

1 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors discuss the relationship between Lordean rage and other negative anger types that I describe, as well as the limits of the anger of rage renegades, and they end with a brief note about love and Lordean emotions.
Abstract: My commentators have brought a set of claims and questions to bear on my analytical distinctions and normative arguments. Alice MacLachlan is interested in the relationship between Lordean rage and the other, more negative anger types that I describe, as well as the limits of the anger of rage renegades. Lidal Dror wonders if we should have Lordean rage, to what extent my account of resssentiment rage is in fact Lordean, and whether it is enough to only experience Lordean rage. And Nic Bommarito wonders if my other anger types could be good in certain ways and if there are other “Lordean emotions.” So, in my replies, I will address each of these in turn. And I end with a brief note about love and Lordean rage.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Germaine de Staël (1766-1817) as discussed by the authors argued that society and education should be used to correct (alleged) natural weaknesses instead of reinforcing them.
Abstract: Germaine de Staël (1766–1817), despite having published a considerable body of work, is seldom regarded as a feminist philosopher. Unlike, for instance, Mary Wollstonecraft of the same period, Staël is not directly arguing for the equality of the sexes. She even, at times, makes surprisingly derogatory remarks about women's nature. I argue that she is nevertheless putting forward a brand of difference feminism, which deserves our attention as a contribution to feminist reflections on gender norms in the early modern era. Staël's contribution takes the form of a plea for the improvement of women's lives that engages with the combined action of nature and society. I clarify the meaning that we should ascribe to Staël's frequent appeals to nature and argue that, for her, society and education should be used to correct (alleged) natural weaknesses instead of reinforcing them. I also give an overview of Staël's political proposals toward the improvement of women's lives, which call for a better form of political regime than the one she lived in, as well as a better access to education and a more egalitarian conception of marriage.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper , the authors argue that antiracist anger is useful, fitting, and (in some sense) permissible, and that it should be of a (somewhat) specific intensity.
Abstract: In The Case for Rage, Myisha Cherry demonstrates that antiracist rage can be instrumentally valuable, a fitting response to racism, and, therefore, wrong for us to dismiss. That is, on Cherry's account, antiracist anger is useful, fitting, and (in some sense) permissible. In this article, I argue that we should go beyond saying that this antiracist rage is permissible, that the correct thing to say is that people should have antiracist anger, and that anger should be of a (somewhat) specific intensity. I further argue that this antiracist anger must also involve action, because the mere experiencing of Lordean rage is not a sufficient act of “resistance.” I lastly argue that we should countenance more “destructive” forms of antiracist rage as permissible, including what Cherry calls “ressentiment rage.”



Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors argue that domination is a matter of being in a dependency relation, in other words, to be dependent upon others (whether a particular other or group of others) is sufficient for being dominated.
Abstract: Jean-Jacques Rousseau's works are often a touchstone and inspiration for many when it comes to thinking carefully about domination. We find Rousseau-inspired analyses across a wide range of political theories centering the concept of domination, from republicanism, liberalism, and Marxism to critical theory, feminisms, and beyond. This article aims to raise questions about a powerful, prevailing, and compelling reading of Rousseau's conception of domination. Beyond that, I hope to offer further insight into the components of his view of domination by centering his account of sexuality as a domination/subordination relation. Ultimately, I suggest that Rousseau's considered view is that domination is a matter of being in a dependency relation. In other words, to be dependent upon others (whether a particular other or group of others) is sufficient for being dominated. However, not all domination relations are illegitimate. Both sexuality and the specific case of forming a social compact are sites of domination relations that can be rendered legitimate under certain conditions.

OtherDOI
TL;DR: The Southern Journal of Philosophy Volume 61, Issue 1 Issue InformationFree Access Issue Information First published: 19 May 2023 https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12463 as mentioned in this paper .
Abstract: The Southern Journal of PhilosophyVolume 61, Issue 1 Issue InformationFree Access Issue Information First published: 19 May 2023 https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12463AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Volume61, Issue1March 2023 RelatedInformation

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Theories of collective intentionality and theories of relational autonomy share a common interest in analyzing the social dynamics of agency as discussed by the authors , and the question raised by this difference in view is whether social theorizing that overlooks the effects of nonvoluntary social group membership on individual and joint agency overlooks crucial aspects of the social dynamic of agency.
Abstract: Theories of collective intentionality and theories of relational autonomy share a common interest in analyzing the social dynamics of agency. However, whereas theories of collective intentionality conceive of social groups primarily as intentional and voluntarily willed, theories of relational autonomy claim that autonomous agency is both scaffolded and constrained by social forces and structures, including the constraints imposed by nonvoluntary group membership. The question raised by this difference in view is whether social theorizing that overlooks the effects of nonvoluntary social group membership on individual and joint agency overlooks crucial aspects of the social dynamics of agency. To explore this question, this article first evaluates Michael Bratman's planning analysis of individual agency from the perspective of relational autonomy theory and compares it with a narrative self-constitution account of temporally extended agency. It then evaluates Bratman's analysis of shared agency and discusses Shaun Gallagher and Deborah Tollefsen's concept of we-narratives, which extends the notion of narrative construction to shared agency. Overall, the argument aims to show that if we are interested in understanding the social dynamics of agency, it is critical to attend to the way that agents exercise their intentional agency in relation to internalized and external social constraints.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This article examined Francisco Suárez's (1548-1617) account of freedom and how this relates to his views on efficient causality, and pointed out that the family resemblance that might be noted between early modern positions could be traced back to the reception of a common late scholastic background and to the tensions and potential nestled there.
Abstract: The goal of this article is to suggest that in early modern discussions of agency and causal efficacy it is possible to detect an attempt at pushing to its extreme consequences a specific account of agency and causality that was developed in late scholastic thought. More specifically, the article examines Francisco Suárez's (1548–1617) account of freedom and how this relates to his views on efficient causality. Despite Suárez's careful way of differentiating between natural (necessary) and human (free) agents, his view can be exploited to drive home occasionalist positions that deny causal efficacy for natural agents lacking reason. The family resemblance that might be noted between early modern positions could be traced back to the reception of a common late scholastic background and to the tensions and potential nestled there.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The cosmopolitan instrumentalist theory of secession as mentioned in this paper argues that a group has a right to secede only if this would promote cosmopolitan justice, and it is preferable to other theories of secession because it is an entailment of cosmopolitanism.
Abstract: I defend the cosmopolitan instrumentalist theory of secession, according to which a group has a right to secede only if this would promote cosmopolitan justice. I argue that the theory is preferable to other theories of secession because it is an entailment of cosmopolitanism, which is independently attractive, and because, unlike other theories of secession, it allows us to give the answers we want to give in cases like secession of the rich or secession that would make things worse for minorities. I defend the view against the objections that it allows for colonialism and annexation, that it is not a distinct theory, and that it is impractical.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors argue that a capacity-based account of blameworthiness and praiseworthness is superior to an account based on quality of will, and they focus on four types of cases about which the two accounts disagree and show that the capacitybased view offers a better treatment.
Abstract: I argue that a capacity-based account of blameworthiness and praiseworthiness is superior to an account based on quality of will. I focus on four types of cases about which the two accounts disagree and show that the capacity-based view offers a better treatment. As part of my argument, I motivate the distinction between an assessment of a person's moral character, as reflected by her action, and an assessment of her blameworthiness or praiseworthiness for that action.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Gournay and Amo as mentioned in this paper developed a view of prejudice as a kind of epistemic and moral viciousness that damages both the prejudicial person and their socio-epistemic neighbors.
Abstract: Marie de Gournay and Anton Wilhelm Amo, though thinking and writing in different social contexts, each offer an account of prejudice which bears a deep philosophical resonance to that of the other. This resonance is striking and mutually illuminating: Gournay and Amo develop a view of prejudice as a kind of epistemic and moral viciousness that damages both the prejudicial person and their socio-epistemic neighbors. Their accounts highlight how agents are rightly held responsible for prejudice, as it is the agents' epistemic negligence and moral failure that allows prejudice to take hold. As such, their view offers a balance between a critical examination of individuals and an acknowledgement of the deep sociality that pervades the epistemic domain.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors analyzes the relationship between competition and justice in Adam Smith in order to determine to what extent competition can promote and undermine justice, and argues that competition can undermine justice when (i) it pits people against each other and (ii) leads to psychological corruption.
Abstract: This article analyzes the relationship between competition and justice in Adam Smith in order to determine to what extent competition can promote and undermine justice. I examine how competition features in two basic motivations for human action, “the propensity to truck barter and exchange,” and “the desire of bettering our condition.” Both can be traced back to the desire for recognition, but they operate in very different ways. The former manifests itself in social cooperation, chiefly commercial exchange and the division of labor, and while it can take a competitive form, competitive success produces benefits for everyone. In contrast, the latter may manifest itself in win-lose social competition. Commercial society harnesses both motivations, and both have negative as well as positive effects. However, while Smith explicitly addresses the negative effects of excessive specialization in the division of labor, it is less clear how he thinks the negative effects of social competition can be addressed. I argue that competition can undermine justice when (i) it pits people against each other and (ii) leads to psychological corruption. I conclude with some reflections on what a focus on competition adds to our understanding of Smith's work.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Conway and Stewart as discussed by the authors argue that the role of suffering in a person's life can be seen as a theodicy, and they posit a vision for bringing about a more just society in the near term that is absent in Conway.
Abstract: Anne Conway and Maria W. Stewart are quietly revolutionary philosophers who provide valuable insights into the nature of suffering and its relation to justice. Conway scholars have claimed that she offers a theodicy, trying to reconcile suffering with the existence of a just God. However, this does not make sense of her arguments or audience. Instead, we should see her as a theoretician of the role of suffering in a person's life. Moving beyond the personal, Stewart's emphasis on social sources of suffering leads her to posit a vision for bringing about a more just society in the near term that is absent in Conway. Both philosophers provide fascinating insight into how to theorize suffering and justice, including the role of unity in a just society.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper , the authors argue that refusing to do a favor is morally wrong precisely because a favor has been asked, and that it is a special kind of imperfect obligation in Kant's and Mill's terminologies.
Abstract: Suppose that somebody is asking me kindly to do her a favor. She has no right to it. It is my choice whether or not to respond positively. Hence, she asks me for the favor rather than demand it. On the other hand, it seems that my refusal to do her the favor would be rude, inconsiderate, unkind, and morally wrong. This is why we tend to respond positively to favor asking and feel that we have to apologize if we refuse. In this article, I address this puzzle. I claim that refusing to do a favor is morally wrong precisely because a favor has been asked. The requestee needs me, and her very need calls upon me to reveal my goodness. In a sense, this is the strength of her weakness. I claim that acceding to do a favor is a special kind of imperfect obligation in Kant's and Mill's terminologies. As opposed to their descriptions, this obligation is directed toward a definite person at a prescribed time. It turns out that small favors are of the greatest importance for human activity. We all have our needs. We are social animals, and we are depended on others to fulfill our needs. Agreeing to do a favor is one of the building blocks of our shared social endeavor.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper , a compatible reading of Spinozism and trope theories is presented, which provides new reasons to take seriously some controversial Spinoza's claims, such as its monism and its commitment to universal necessity.
Abstract: Trope theory and Spinoza's metaphysics apparently present two incompatible ontological landscapes. Spinoza assigns a strong metaphysical priority to a grounding substance and describes common objects as adjectival upon such substance. By contrast, several contemporary trope theories attempt to reduce all substances (both universal and particular) to bundles of individual properties. In this article, I motivate, defend, and develop a compatible reading of Spinozism and trope theories. This interpretation provides new reasons to take seriously some of the most controversial of Spinoza's claims, such as its monism and its commitment to universal necessity. Moreover, my interpretation undermines some classical objections against trope theories, such as their unwarranted multiplication of metaphysical objects, and their commitment to a description of objects based on necessary sets of their properties.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors argued that belief, construed as cognitive commitment, is governed by three fundamental-cum-irreducible norms, which they call the "entitlement norm", "fulfillment norm" and "escapability norm".
Abstract: Much of the discussion on the normativity of belief rests on the presupposition that there is a single fundamental truth norm governing belief that explains all of its normative features. Building on the committive conception of belief proposed by some normativists, this article takes issue with this presupposition. In particular, it is argued that belief, construed as cognitive commitment, is governed by three fundamental-cum-irreducible norms, which I call the “entitlement norm,” the “fulfillment norm” and the “escapability norm,” and it is shown that each of them concerns a particular normative feature of belief. Taken together, these norms can explain all the normative features of belief without leading to implausible consequences. The discussion also shows that the relationship between the truth norm and the evidence norm is more complicated than is usually conceded by normativists.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper , the authors discuss two interpretations of the conception of equity on which justice was held to rest: at a theoretical level, they aimed to articulate distributive principles, and at a practical level they asked what qualities we need to possess in order to make just judgments.
Abstract: Although seventeenth-century societies fell far short of contemporary standards of justice, early modern philosophers thought deeply about what social justice consists in. At a theoretical level, they aimed to articulate distributive principles. At a practical level, they asked what qualities we need to possess in order to make just judgments. In the first part of this article, I discuss two interpretations of the conception of equity on which justice was held to rest. On either interpretation, I suggest, treating people equitably was held to be compatible with treating them in ways that we would consider radically unjust. This raises the practical question: What qualities was an equitable or just judge thought to need? The middle section of the article sketches a reply, drawing on a genre of early modern works about how to reason. As this section reveals, early modern thinkers were alive to the many ways in which we can fall short of justice and possessed many techniques for self-improvement. Greater justice was not beyond the bounds of their imaginations; so, what prevented them from defending it? In the final section of the article, I propose a partial answer, as relevant to us as to our early modern forebears.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors argue that the freedom to feel, express, and act on Lordean rage proper should be more limited than Cherry allows, and raise a set of questions about the aesthetics of persuasive anger.
Abstract: Myisha Cherry's The Case for Rage is a significant addition to the growing body of analytic philosophy that succeeds in not just engaging but shaping and even creating new forms of public discourse. It does so while remaining an exemplar for what good analytic philosophy should look like: filled with systematic and clear distinctions that illuminate rather than obfuscate real and concrete lived phenomena. I offer two challenges to Cherry's typology of rage: first, I rehabilitate two of variations she takes to be morally and politically problematic, and, second, I argue that the freedom to feel, express, and act on Lordean rage proper should be more limited than Cherry allows. I then raise a set of questions about the aesthetics of persuasive anger. Finally, I highlight two striking insights in Cherry's rich argument.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This paper reviewed racist texts in Kant's corpus and the responses to them proposed by scholars like Charles Mills (to whom the paper is dedicated), Robert Bernasconi, and Pauline Kleingeld.
Abstract: The last thirty years has seen an explosion of literature on Kant and race. Once overlooked essays and notes in which Kant expresses contempt for nonwhite people and support for slavery have been brought to light, and many scholars have wrestled with the question of how a philosopher who stressed the equal dignity of all human beings could hold such views. This article tries to reframe the debate over these issues. It begins by reviewing the racist texts in Kant's corpus and the responses to them proposed by scholars like Charles Mills (to whom the paper is dedicated), Robert Bernasconi, and Pauline Kleingeld. It then introduces elements of Kant's philosophical development that gave Kant reason to renounce his racism—whether or not he actually did so—from about the time of the Groundwork onward. Finally, it turns to the question of what Kant's racism can tell us about his moral philosophy—and perhaps about moral philosophy in general.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article , the authors present a prima facie case in favor of the achievement explanation and defend it against recent criticisms, including the claim that it wrongly excludes "lucky, easy, and failed creations from being artistically great".
Abstract: There is broad agreement in aesthetics that some artworks are greater than others despite bearing equivalent (or lesser) aesthetic value. One explanation of this difference in artistic value is that creation of the greater artwork represents a greater achievement. The aim of this article is to refine this explanation and to defend it against recent criticisms. First, I present a prima facie case in favor of the achievement explanation. Second, I draw on the history of photography to motivate three objections to it: namely, that it wrongly excludes (1) lucky, (2) easy, and (3) failed creations from being artistically great. Third, I present my refined version of the achievement explanation and show how it avoids these objections. On my view, an artistic achievement consists in creating a work it would have been especially hard for comparable artists to create. Finally, I raise and address several additional objections. In responding these objections, I argue, among other things, that my explanation of artistic value enhances our understanding of good-bad art: specifically, it allows us to see how good-bad art is artistically great despite being aesthetically flawed.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Locke's definition of miracles in "A Discourse of Miracles" is widely cited by scholars as evidence of his subjectivism on the matter as discussed by the authors , and it is argued that this interpretation falls short in two crucial respects: it undermines the function of miracles as evidence for divine revelation, so central to his account, and is at odds with his consistent and explicitly objective use of the term, as an event that necessarily involves a violation of the laws of nature.
Abstract: Locke's definition of miracles in “A Discourse of Miracles” is widely cited by scholars as evidence of his subjectivism on the matter. According to this interpretation, Locke held it to be sufficient that an event seems to be a violation of the laws of nature for it to count as a miracle. Nothing supernatural need actually occur. The principal aim of this article is to argue that Locke can and ought to be read as an objectivist about miracles. A subjectivist reading falls short in two crucial respects: It undermines the function of miracles as evidence for divine revelation, so central to his account, and is at odds with his consistent and explicitly objective use of the term, as an event that necessarily involves a violation of the laws of nature. Indeed, it is from their objective nature that Locke thinks miracles derive their evidential force. A key part of my argument lies in distinguishing between ontological and epistemological issues concerning miracles and demonstrating how this distinction is present throughout his work on the matter. Ultimately, I conclude that what is often interpreted as Locke's subjectivism about miracles is his privileging of these epistemic issues.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors explored the conditions under which laughter resulting from comic amusement reflects the moral stance of an individual and identified the subsection of humor that can offer an affirmative answer to the posed questions, highlighting the power dynamics at play within this subsection of humour to justify its characterization as "fascism" and concluding by offering guidance on identifying fascist laughter.
Abstract: The traditional concern of the academic literature on the ethics of humor is to determine whether ethical considerations influence comic amusement or, in other words, judge the impact of ethics over aesthetics. For some, ethically questionable dimensions bear no implication for the effectiveness of jokes; for others, they do, but this group disagrees on whether ethical problems make jokes less or more funny. This article attempts an alternative approach and explores the occurrences in which the aesthetic reaction to humor reveals a more profound ethical commitment. It asks: What are the conditions under which laughter resulting from comic amusement reflects the moral stance of an individual? Or, more simply: Can one judge a person's character based on what this person is laughing at? The article starts by showing how humor can legitimately be taken as representative of the individual spirit, continues by identifying the subsection of humor that can offer an affirmative answer to the posed questions, highlights the power dynamics at play within this subsection of humor to justify its characterization as “fascist,” and concludes by offering guidance on identifying fascist laughter.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors consider Douglass's changing views on this issue and reasons behind them to think about how he might offer insights into this current debate concerning Kant and race, and then offer suggestions on how to move forward.
Abstract: Samuel Fleischacker is interested in two questions that are—what he refers to as—a rephrasing of three implications Charles Mills takes away from his encounter with Kant: (1) Is Kant's moral philosophy racist at its core? and (2) Whether it is or not, how should we respond to the fact that Kant displays open racism in some of his writings when we study, teach, or try to make use of his purportedly egalitarian teachings? Frederick Douglass was an abolitionist who wrestled with similar questions regarding the liberatory and inclusive nature of emancipatory documents like the Constitution. In this essay, I want to consider Douglass's changing views on this issue and reasons behind them to think about how he might offer insights into this current debate concerning Kant and race. In doing so, I will consider to what extent Fleischacker adheres to Douglass's guidelines on this matter as he makes his case. I then offer suggestions on how to move forward.

Journal ArticleDOI

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TL;DR: In this article , an analysis of Peirce's notion of rhema is presented, and the authors identify and solve two problems that are direct consequences of the definition of Rhema.
Abstract: The article offers an analysis of Peirce's notion of “rhema.” It examines and explains Peirce's definition of the rhema; it identifies and solves two problems that are direct consequences of the definition. The first problem is that proper names, while classified as rhemata, do not satisfy Peirce's definition of the rhema. The second problem is that Peirce also calls “rhemata” the results of propositional analysis that however do not satisfy his own definition of the rhema. Peirce himself solves the first problem by generalizing the notion of rhema into that of “seme.” I argue that we can solve the second problem if, following M. Dummett, we distinguish propositional analysis from propositional decomposition.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article , the authors argue that what makes slavery and poverty unjust for Kant is not that they entail a human being finding herself (completely) dependent on the choice of another human being, but rather that the human being being deprived of her juridical personality.
Abstract: The main purpose of this article is to bring into relief the difficulties faced by generous interpretations of the Kantian problem of poverty and to propose an alternative interpretation which (a) agrees with some generous interpretations that Kant's juridical treatment of poverty is to be understood by analogy with his juridical treatment of slavery, but which (b) departs from generous interpretations in general by arguing that this analogy is not to be understood in terms of “dependence” as such, but in terms of “depersonification.” More specifically, it argues that what makes slavery and poverty unjust for Kant is not that they entail a human being finding herself (completely) dependent on the choice of another human being, but that they entail a human being being deprived of her juridical personality. The Kantian problem of poverty is ultimately a problem of juridical depersonification, and this problem of juridical depersonification does not arise in all (complete) dependence relations.

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TL;DR: In this article , the authors introduce argumentation-theoretical arguments for and against travel and argue that a modified version is suitable to visualize and analyze arguments for traveling as presented in Thomas's seminal book The Meaning of Travel.
Abstract: Emily Thomas's seminal book The Meaning of Travel has brought the philosophy of travel back into the public eye in recent years. Thomas has shown that the topic of travel can be approached from numerous different perspectives, ranging from the historical to the conceptual-analytical, to the political or even social-philosophical perspectives. This article introduces another perspective, which Thomas only indirectly addresses, namely the argumentation-theoretical perspective. It is notable that contemporary philosophy of travel lacks the nineteenth-century approach of using diagrams and maps to examine arguments for and against travel. Since this approach starts with Schopenhauer, we first introduce his argument maps, discuss their advantages and disadvantages, and argue that a modified version is suitable to visualize and analyze arguments for and against traveling as presented in Thomas's work.

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TL;DR: In this paper , a critical presentation and development of Alain Badiou's theory of romantic love is proposed, at the center of which is an understanding of the phenomenon in terms of a truth-generating event.
Abstract: This article proposes a critical presentation and development of Alain Badiou's theory of romantic love, at the center of which is an understanding of the phenomenon in terms of a truth-generating event. I discuss this notion against the more familiar ontological modes of theorizing love: as the subject's intentional attitude and as an activity of internal value. Arguing that the evental conception of love poses a preferable alternative to the former mode, my analysis focuses on its complementary relations with the latter, of which I take Stanley Cavell's theory of marriage as a representative. My further argument is concerned with the place of sexuality in the evental conception of love, compensating for what I argue to be the shortcomings of Badiou's treatment of the topic by turning to Roger Scruton's account of the immanent significance of the sexual.

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TL;DR: The authors made explicit some issues of gender that have been implicitly raised in recent discussions concerning the recovery of European women's contributions to the history of seventeenth-and eighteenth-century philosophy.
Abstract: This paper makes explicit some issues of gender that have been implicitly raised in recent discussions concerning the recovery of European women's contributions to the history of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophy. A useful way to bring these issues to light is to distinguish between the project of recovering women's contributions and the project of justifying their inclusion. The former project is an important effort to provide a more accurate understanding of the history of philosophy. Within the latter project, there is a distinction between justifying the inclusion of a specific author and justifying women's inclusion in general. The suggestion that we need to justify women's inclusion in general is fundamentally illegitimate because it presumes that either women's philosophical ability is up for debate or that their contributions require special explanation, both of which are misogynist.