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Showing papers in "Stanford Law Review in 1986"


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors discuss the traditionalists and modernists of cattle ranching, and the benefits and costs of boundary fences and boundary fences in the North-West Territories.
Abstract: Introduction .. 624 I. SHASTA COUNTY AND ITS CATrLE INDUSTRY 629 A. Physical Environment 629 B. Social Environment 632 C. Work Environment: Modes of Cattle Ranching ....... 636 1. The traditionalists 637 2. The modernists 638 D. The Benefits and Costs of Boundary Fences 640 II. THE POLITICS OF CATTLE TRESPASS IN THE NORTHEASTERN FOOTHILLS 643 A. Caton's Folly: The Closing of the Range at Round M ountain 644 B. Caton's Repentance: The Defeat of the Oak Run Closure Petition .. 647 1. Frank Ellis 647

196 citations


Journal ArticleDOI

128 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Rabin this paper discusses the role of the court in the development of the progressive ERA and its role in World War I and the 1920s: the ASSOCIATIONAL IDEA, the New Deal, the DePRESSION and the New Dealt and the Court.
Abstract: Copyright 1986 by Robert L. Rabin INTRODUCTION 1189 REGULATORY POLITICS IN THE POPULIST ERA 1197 II. THE COURT IN THE POPULIST ERA 1208 III. REGULATORY POLITICS IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 1216 IV. THE COURT IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 1229 V. WORLD WAR I AND THE 1920s: THE ASSOCIATIONAL IDEA 1236 VI. THE DEPRESSION AND THE NEW DEAL 1243 VII. THE NEW DEAL AND THE COURT 1253 VIII. THE POST-NEW DEAL ERA 1262 IX. REGULATORY POLITICS AND THE GREAT SOCIETY 1272 X. THE PUBLIC INTEREST ERA 1278 XI. THE PUBLIC INTEREST ERA IN THE COURTS 1295 XII. A POSTSCRIPT ON DEREGULATION—UNRESOLVED TENSIONS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 1315

94 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The economic analysis of publicly held corporations has exploded in recent years as mentioned in this paper. Yet there has been little attention to the more common corporate form of organization, the closely held corporation, which is not because one analysis will cover both.
Abstract: The economic analysis of publicly held corporations has exploded in recent years. Yet there has been little attention to the more common corporate form of organization, the closely held corporation.2 This is not because one analysis will cover both. There is a fundamental difference between closely and publicly held corporations. Risk bearing and management are separated in publicly held but not in closely held corporations. The presence or absence of this separation of functions determines the governance mechanisms that have evolved in the two types of firms.3

44 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Frost as discussed by the authors wrote: "Good fences make good neighbors. But there is something there that doesn't love a wall, that sends the frozen ground-swell under it, And spills the upper boulders in the sun, And makes gaps even two can pass abreast.
Abstract: Something there is that doesn't love a wall, That sends the frozen-ground-swell under it, And spills the upper boulders in the sun, And makes gaps even two can pass abreast. The work of hunters is another thing: I have come after them and made repair Where they have left not one stone on a stone, But they would have the rabbit out of hiding, To please the yelping dogs. The gaps I mean, No one has seen them made or heard them made, But at spring mending-time we find them there. I let my neighbor know beyond the hill; And on a day we meet to walk the line And set the wall between us once again. We keep the wall between us as we go. To each the boulders that have fallen to each. And some are loaves and some so nearly balls We have to use a spell to make them balance: 'Stay where you are until our backs are turned!' We wear our fingers rough with handling them. Oh, just another kind of out-door game, One on a side. It comes to little more: There where it is we do not need the wall: He is all pine and I am apple orchard. My apple trees will never get across And eat the cones under his pines, I tell him. He only says, 'Good fences make good neighbors'. Spring is the mischief in me, and I wonder If I could put a notion in his head: 'Why do they make good neighbors? Isn't it Where there are cows? But here there are no cows. Before I built a wall I'd ask to know What I was walling in or walling out, And to whom I was like to give offence. Something there is that doesn't love a wall, That wants it down.' I could say 'Elves' to him, But it's not elves exactly, and I'd rather He said it for himself. I see him there Bringing a stone grasped firmly by the top In each hand, like an old-stone savage armed. He moves in darkness as it seems to me~ Not of woods only and the shade of trees. He will not go behind his father's saying, And he likes having thought of it so well He says again, \"Good fences make good neighbors.\" Page 1 of 2 Frost, Mending Wall

37 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Preference law is strictly a creature of bankruptcy law, rather than a part of non-bankruptcy commercial law that simply receives special enforcement in the bankruptcy process as mentioned in this paper, and preference law, unlike fraudulent conveyance, reflects a kind of insecurity about the formal process of bankruptcy.
Abstract: American bankruptcy law has never decided what to do about the crucial but elusive concept of the voidable preference. Defined in the most roughly general terms, a preference has a few basic elements: It is a transfer of money or of some interest in property by a debtor to a creditor to settle an antecedent debt; it occurs when the debtor faces imminent bankruptcy; and it benefits that creditor to the prejudice of other creditors by granting the favored creditor a greater share of the diminished assets of the debtor than that creditor would enjoy under the formal system of bankruptcy distribution.' Preference doctrine would seem to be a central part of bankruptcy law. If the general purpose of bankruptcy law is to ensure a ratable distribution of the debtor's assets among the creditors,2 preference law would seem, by definition, to be a primary instrument for achieving that goal. Indeed, the preference, unlike its somewhat mismatched partner, the fraudulent conveyance, is strictly a creature of bankruptcy law, rather than a part of nonbankruptcy commercial law that simply receives special enforcement in the bankruptcy process.3 Preference law, however, reflects a kind of insecurity about the formal process of bankruptcy. Bankruptcy law enforces its principle of ratable distribution at the technical point when the petition is filed. But preference law then sets a still earlier moment at which the debtor's estate faces a risk of dismemberment. At that earlier moment, preference law imposes a duty or sanction on the debtor or individual creditors to preserve the estate so that, when the petition is filed, the trustee

24 citations





Journal ArticleDOI

15 citations



Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: A Chronological review of the literature on the economic model of labor can be found in this paper, with a focus on the role of labor in the model of economic models of labor.
Abstract: I. PREVIOUS ANALYSES OF LABOR 995 A. A Brief Description of the Kinds of Analyses Utilizing Econom ics 995 B. A Chronological Review of the Literature 998 II. THE ECONOMIC MODEL 1004 A. Supply and Demand 1004 B. The Monopolist of an Input 1005 C. Influencing the Employer's Ability to Do Without Labor: Manipulating the Elasticity of Derived Demand 1007 D. Increasing the Value of an Employee's Labor to the Employer: Manipulating the Position of the Derived Demand Curve 1009 E. Assisting the Creation of a Product Cartel by the Final Output Producer 1010 F. Summary of the Economic Model of Labor 1010 III. THE MODEL APPLIED TO CASES: WHAT CONDUCT IS ALLOWED A LABOR UNION? 1010 IV. CREATING A MONOPOLY OF LABOR SUPPLY 1012 A. Labor Supply in a Firm 1012 B. Labor Supply in an Industry 1018 V. MANIPULATING THE ELASTICITY OF THE DERIVED DEMAND FOR LABOR 1022 A. Elasticity of Substitution Between Labor and Other Inputs at the Firm 1022 B. Elasticity of Supply of Other Inputs at the Firm 1026 C. Elasticity of Demandfor the Firm's Output .. 1032 D. Elasticity of Substitution in the Industry 1036 E. Elasticity of Supply of Nonlabor Inputs at the Industry Level . 10 38 F. Elasticity of Demandfor the Industry's Output 1039

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Many of the characteristics of American labor-management relationships are identical to those of the 1920s and early 1930s-the eve of the New Deal and the Wagner Act as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: Many of the characteristics of American labor-management relationships are identical to those of the 1920s and early 1930s-the eve of the New Deal and the Wagner Act. There are numerous similarities between the two periods. One difference is that the post-World War II period has fostered multi-employer and industrywide pattern bargaining relationships that are now being eroded or dissolved. Another is that the advent of multinational corporations which cut across national boundaries seems to have placed national unions at something of a disadvantage. Today, as then-slightly more than fifty years ago-the unions are in retreat on virtually all fronts. Then, as now, there are multiple causes-economic circumstances: tolerance of unemployment at increasingly high levels, faith in a kind of swashbuckling individualism, the rise of overt management anti-union practices, trade union lethargy and bewilderment, and the law. Today, these changes are not limited to our shores but are present in most industrialized countries throughout the world. Fifteen years after the enactment of the National Labor Relations Act, Professor Irving Bernstein, in his important work, The New Deal Collective Bargaining Policy, noted that on the eve of the Great Depression and the New Deal, union membership had retrogressed to the level obtained in 1917: When the percentage of the total work force is consid