Supreme Court Economic Review 

About: Supreme Court Economic Review is an academic journal. The journal publishes majorly in the area(s): Supreme court & Government. It has an ISSN identifier of 0736-9921. Over the lifetime, 206 publications have been published receiving 2164 citations.

What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does)

Abstract: This article presents a positive economic theory of the behavior of appellate judges and Justices. The essay argues that the effort to insulate judges from significant economic incentives, through devices such as life tenure and stringent conflict of interest rules, has not rendered judicial behavior immune to economic analysis. Drawing on analogies to the managers of non-profit enterprises, to those who vote in political elections, and to theatrical spectators, the essay models the judicial utility function in terms that allows judges to be seen as ordinary people responding rationally to ordinary incentives. This model provides a theoretical alternative to the common view of judges as Prometheans or saints, and it suggests new ways of looking at such practical issues as the design of the judicial compensation system.

Building Trust: Public Policy, Interpersonal Trust, and Economic Development

Abstract: Zak & Knack (2001) demonstrate that interpersonal trust substantially impacts economic growth, and that sufficient interpersonal trust is necessary for economic development. To investigate the ability of policy-makers to affect trust levels, this paper builds a formal model characterizing public policies that can raise trust. The model is used to derive optimal funding for trust-raising policies when policy-makers seek to stimulate economic growth. Policies examined include those that increase freedom of association, build civic cultures, enhance contract enforcement, reduce income inequality, and raise educational levels. Testing the model's predictions, we find that only freedom, redistributive transfers, and education efficiently and robustly stimulate prosperity. They do this by strengthening the rule of law, reducing inequality, and by facilitating interpersonal understanding, all of which raise trust.

Rules versus Standards in Rich and Poor Countries: Precise Legal Norms as Substitutes for Human Capital in Low-Income Countries

Abstract: Legal norms can be precise rules, which are blueprints for action and allow for mechanical decisions by judges and civil servants. Alternatively, they can be vague, mission-oriented standards, which delegate decisions from the maker of the law to the judiciary and the administration. Rules economize on the costs of adjudication and administration. Standards economize on the costs of norm specification. In low-income countries with a relatively low level of training, it is efficient to concentrate human capital to specify precise legal norms, which can easily be adjudicated and administered but might be inflexible. In rich countries with a high endowment of human capital, it is better to have vague legal norms. The adjudication of vague legal norms requires a high level of expertise, but allows for the flexibility to reach custom-made decisions.

Patent Law, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court: A Quiet Revolution

Abstract: Over the last twenty years, a quiet revolution has taken place in patent law. Traditionally, patents were rarely valid, but if valid, broadly enforced. Since Congress created the Federal Circuit in 1982 and vested it with exclusive intermediate appellate jurisdiction over patent appeals, patents have become routinely valid, but narrowly enforced. This article evaluates the economic consequences of this revolution. Focusing on the reasons for, and the costs of, uniformity in patent protection, this article shows that the revolution will tend to limit the patent system's ability to ensure the expected profitability, and hence the existence, of desirable, but high cost innovation.

OCS Leasing and Auctions: Incentives and the Performance of Alternative Bidding Institutions

Abstract: In Watt v. Energy Action Educational Foundation, the Supreme Court rebutted a challenge to the federal government's mix of "nontraditional" outer continental shelf lease-auction mechanisms authorized under the 1978 OCS Amendments. The issues of this case addressed here include: the economic intent of the congressional language; incentive properties of various of the authorized auction processes; methodological shortcomings inherent in the implicit congressional directive for field experimentation; and, the usefulness of laboratory experimental economics in answering relevant auction-policy questions. The discussion of experimental economics includes evidence already gained from laboratory experiments relating to hypotheses about auction-market performance.