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JournalISSN: 0081-9557

Supreme Court Review 

University of Chicago Press
About: Supreme Court Review is an academic journal published by University of Chicago Press. The journal publishes majorly in the area(s): Supreme court & Statute. It has an ISSN identifier of 0081-9557. Over the lifetime, 474 publications have been published receiving 4195 citations. The journal is also known as: The Supreme Court review.


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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In the most recent case, United States v. Loew's Inc., the Court again struck down the block-booking practice, stating flatly: ''The antitrust laws do not permit a compounding of the statutorily conferred monopoly''.
Abstract: The phenomenon of block-booking of movies-the offer of only a combined assortment of movies to an exhibitor-has been the subject of several antitrust cases. In the most recent case, United States v. Loew's Inc.,' Mr. Justice Goldberg, speaking for the Court, again struck down the practice, stating flatly: \"The antitrust laws do not permit a compounding of the statutorily conferred monopoly.\" The explanation of the practice of block-booking is not explicit in the decision, but a fair interpretation is this: The owner of two films uses the popularity of one to compel the exhibitor to purchase the other as well. This is not a full explanation, however, for it does not explain why the seller should wish to sell the inferior film. Consider the following simple example. One film, Justice Goldberg cited Gone with the Wind, is worth $10,000 to the buyer, while a second film, the Justice cited Getting Gertie's Garter, is worthless to him. The seller could sell the one for $10,000, and throw away the second, for no matter what its cost, bygones are forever bygones. Instead the seller compels the buyer to take both. But surely he can obtain no more than $10,000, since by hypothesis this

324 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: For both educational affirmative action and the use of race in districting, the authors argued that the approach mapped out by the Powell opinion in Bakke, the Michigan District Court in Gratz, and the Supreme Court dissenters in the Shaw v. Reno line of voting rights cases makes more sense as a part of our constitutional law rather than the sort of categorical opposition to race in anything other than a strictly remedial context that is rapidly becoming its chief competition.
Abstract: For both educational affirmative action and the use of race in districting, this essay pursues parallels with the Supreme Court's religion clause jurisprudence in aid of the argument that the approach mapped out by the Powell opinion in Bakke, the Michigan District Court in Gratz, and the Supreme Court dissenters in the Shaw v. Reno line of voting rights cases makes more sense as a part of our constitutional law than the sort of categorical opposition to the use of race in anything other than a strictly remedial context that is rapidly becoming its chief competition. My contention is that the Supreme Court's attitude toward race, at least in the two contexts of educational affirmative action and voting rights, should follow the same trajectory as its attitude toward religion already has. The trajectory I have in mind is the following: For a period of time, on Establishment Clause grounds, the exclusion of religion and the religious from otherwise generally available opportunities was endorsed, indeed was seen as constitutionally required. Then the Court came to realize that it worked a discrimination against those whose central organizing characteristic or salient trait was their religion to allow other such characteristics, but not religion, to form the basis for inclusion. Similarly, to allow every other basis for commonality or salience to count and not race may be seen to disadvantage those for whom race is a defining characteristic in a way that itself implicates the Equal Protection Clause. To put the argument in extremely compressed and referential form, if colorblindness is analogous to aggressive enforcement of the Establishment Clause, then, while the University of California's use of race in the plan struck down in Bakke may resemble the New York legislature's use of religion in the districting legislation struck down in Kiryas Joel, the inclusion of race in the Harvard admissions plan praised by Justice Powell more closely resembles the inclusion of religion mandated by the Supreme Court for the University of Virginia's funding scheme in Rosenberger. And, if the affirmative action claims of racial minorities are like the accommodation claims of religious minorities, then, while some voluntary pursuit of racial diversity by public educational institutions is like permissible accommodation, some majority minority districting under the Voting Rights Act is like required accommodation.

167 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In contrast, information is not subject to the same rules of property law that govern apples and steel mills as discussed by the authors, since it is not owned by the owner and can be used by third parties who may use it for their own benefit.
Abstract: Most things are owned by someone. The owner makes decisions on the assumption that, if he can improve the use or productivity of the property, he may claim a substantial part of the benefits. Information, in contrast, usually is unowned; at least, it is not subject to the same rules of property law that govern apples and steel mills. It is difficult too, for someone who possesses information to appropriate the benefits of knowledge. Much of the value of information depends on its employment in transactions with third parties (whether strangers or employees) who may elect to use the knowledge for their own benefit later on.1 It is hard to detect a

97 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: A common theme in foreign affairs law is the importance of the US speaking with "one voice" to the international community as mentioned in this paper, so that the US is not embarrassed by multiple, inconsistent pronouncements from the several states or the different branches of the national government when it takes a position on a foreign affairs issue.
Abstract: A common theme in foreign affairs law is the importance of the US speaking with “one voice” to the international community. Speaking with one voice, so the story goes, ensures that the US is not embarrassed by multiple, inconsistent pronouncements from the several states or the different branches of the national government when it takes a position on a foreign affairs issue. Such acoustic dissonance from the US could potentially result in a loss of credibility, a reduced capacity to achieve foreign policy goals, and a greater chance of conflict with other countries. So, when the Constitution is unclear about the allocation of decision-making authority on an issue, but the President or the national government speaks first, the presumption in favor of speaking in one voice reduces the possibility of multiple governmental decision makers and permits the US to act clearly and decisively in foreign affairs. While it reduces acoustic dissonance, the presumption in favor of one voice has two other effects as well: the centralization of foreign affairs decision making in the federal government vis-a-vis the states and centralization of foreign affairs decision making in the President vis-a-vis Congress.

72 citations

Performance
Metrics
No. of papers from the Journal in previous years
YearPapers
202311
202213
20205
20197
20184
20178