scispace - formally typeset
Search or ask a question

Showing papers in "Synthese in 1972"


Journal ArticleDOI
01 Jan 1972-Synthese
TL;DR: This paper discusses the role of Inductive Reasoning in the Interpretation of Metaphor, and some problems Concerning the Logic of Grammatical Modifiers.
Abstract: Subjects, Speakers, and Roles.- Deep Structure as Logical Form.- Troubles about Actions.- Act.- Some Problems Concerning the Logic of Grammatical Modifiers.- Pragmatics and Intensional Logic.- General Semantics.- On the Frame of Reference.- Naming and Necessity.- Proper Names and Identifying Descriptions.- Pragmatics.- The Semantics of Modal Notions and the Indeterminacy of Ontology.- Opacity, Coreference, and Pronouns.- Methodological Reflections on Current Linguistic Theory.- Grammar and Philosophy.- Analytic/Synthetic and Semantic Theory.- A Program for Syntax.- A Program for Logic.- Linguistics and Natural Logic.- Semantical Archaeology: A Parable.- On the Semantics of the Ought-To-Do.- Inference and Self-Reference.- What Is Said.- The Role of Inductive Reasoning in the Interpretation of Metaphor.- Probabilistic Grammars for Natural Languages.- Addenda to Saul A. Kripke's Paper 'Naming and Necessity'.

791 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
01 Mar 1972-Synthese
TL;DR: There are three theses connected with Quine's views about the indeterminacy of translation which should be clearly distinguished from one another as discussed by the authors : (1) a person's dispositions to accept sentences do not determine a unique interpretation of those sentences; (2) the notions of meaning, propositional attitudes, etc., do not possess the explanatory power often attributed to them by philosophers; and (3) translation is not just inherited as a special case of the underdetermination of our theory of nature.
Abstract: There are three theses connected with Quine's views about the indeter minacy of translation which should be clearly distinguished from one another. These are: (1) A person's dispositions to accept sentences do not determine a unique interpretation of those sentences.1 (2) The notions of meaning, propositional attitudes, etc., do not pos sess the explanatory power often attributed to them by philosophers. (In particular, one cannot explain the truth of a sentence by saying it is "true by virtue of meaning", nor can one "explain why a person accepts a sentence by saying he accepts a proposition which the sentence expres ses."2) (3) "Though linguistics is of course a part of the theory of nature, the indeterminacy of translation is not just inherited as a special case of the underdetermination of our theory of nature. It is parallel but additional."3 I doubt that (1) is still a subject of debate. Quine's opponents have by now been argued around to admitting that alternative systems of analyt ical hypotheses, producing non-equivalent translations, will predict dis positions to accept sentences equally well. (2) is a much more important, interesting, and controversial matter, and one which requires more ar gument than merely citing (1). The arguments for (2) consist mainly in exhibiting the poverty of the 'explanations' provided by an appeal to the notions in question.4 (3) is often run together with (2). Thus when replying to Chomsky's doubts about (3) Quine himself seems to merge the two theses by saying that grasping the difference between the general "under determination of our theory of nature" and the special indeterminacy of translation will lead to "a change in prevalent attitudes toward meaning, idea, proposition", and that the difference escapes recognition "because of the uncritical persistence of old notions of meaning, idea, proposi tion".5 The suggestion seems to be that accepting (2) should lead to accepting (3), or vice versa, or both. I find this suggestion puzzling because I should want to accept (1) and

39 citations


Book ChapterDOI
01 Mar 1972-Synthese
TL;DR: The first part of the paper deals with two classical problems in the geometry of space, that of giving operationalism an exact foundation in the case of the measurement of spatial relations and that of providing an adequate theory of approximation and error in a geometrical setting.
Abstract: This article is concerned to formulate some open problems in the philosophy of space and time that require methods characteristic of mathematical traditions in the foundations of geometry for their solution. In formulating the problems an effort has been made to fuse the separate traditions of the foundations of physics on the one hand and the foundations of geometry on the other. The first part of the paper deals with two classical problems in the geometry of space, that of giving operationalism an exact foundation in the case of the measurement of spatial relations, and that of providing an adequate theory of approximation and error in a geometrical setting. The second part is concerned with physical space and space-time and deals mainly with topics concerning the axiomatic theory of bodies, the operational foundations of special relativity and the conceptual foundations of elementary physics.

32 citations


Book ChapterDOI
01 Mar 1972-Synthese
TL;DR: In each case, we are informed in almost sepulchral tones of the existence of something perfect against which all relative, operational measures are to be compared, and yet we lack the standard by which such perfection is to be understood.
Abstract: What is absolute space and absolute time? We have often heard that the theory of relativity has banished them, and yet Newton’s (1946) famous characterization of these ideas leaves us in the dark as to exactly what relativity has discredited: Absolute, true and mathematical time of itself and from its own nature flows equibly without regard to anything external. Absolute space in its own nature without regard to anything external, remains always similar and immovable. Despite the fact that Newton assures us that the concepts of absolute space and time are not being defined, we have the same feeling of un­easiness that accompanies Euclid’s (1956) equally famous characterization of straight lines : A line is breadthless length. A straight line is a line which lies evenly with the points on itself. In each case, we are informed in almost sepulchral tones of the existence of something perfect against which all relative, operational measures are to be compared, and yet we lack the standard by which such perfection is to be understood.

25 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
01 Mar 1972-Synthese
TL;DR: A critical survey of this discussion can be found in this paper, with the main conclusions being: (i) Hempel's original thesis may very well be right but his argument for it is unsatisfactory, (ii) theoretical terms can be logically indispensable for a non-Hempelian kind of inductive systematization, relative to both Craigian and Ramseyan elimination, (iii) Lehrer's attempt to prove the indispensability of theoretical terms for inductive-probabilistic systematisation is, as a modification of Hempelian, unsatisf
Abstract: In 1958, to refute the argument known as ‘the theoretician's dilemma’, Hempel suggested that theoretical terms might be logically indispensable for inductive systematization of observational statements. This thesis, in some form or another, has later been supported by Scheffler, Lehrer, and Tuomela, and opposed by Bohnert, Hooker, Stegmuller, and Cornman. In this paper, a critical survey of this discussion is given. Several different putative definitions of the crucial notion ‘inductive systematization achieved by a theory’ are discussed by reference to the properties of inductive inference. The consequences of the following differences between deductive and inductive inference are emphasized: the lack of simple transitivity properties (even in a modified sense) of inductive inference, and the failure of the inductive analogue of the converse of The Deduction Theorem. The main conclusions are: (i) Hempel's original thesis may very well be right but his argument for it is unsatisfactory, (ii) theoretical terms can be logically indispensable for a non-Hempelian kind of inductive systematization, relative to both Craigian and Ramseyan elimination, (iii) Lehrer's attempt to prove the indispensability of theoretical terms for inductive-probabilistic systematization is, as a modification of Hempelian kind of inductive-deterministic systematization, unsatisfactory, and (iv) there does not seem to be much hope of escaping the conclusion (ii), if it is true, by extending the Craigian replacement programme along the lines suggested by Cornman.

24 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
01 Mar 1972-Synthese
TL;DR: This paper showed that the operational definitions required by the operational imperative were not definitions at all, being rather statements of putative empirical regularities holding between particulars which in effect are formulations of empirically true or false theories.
Abstract: We have seen that the operational imperative is a prescriptive thesis about formulations of theories which imposes restrictions on the sorts of theories science may employ. We assessed the operational imperative by investigating a number of relationships holding between theory formulations, theories, physical systems, and phenomena, and then applying our findings to the operational imperative. These applications showed that the operational definitions required by the operational imperative were not definitions at all, being rather statements of putative empirical regularities holding between particulars which in effect are formulations of empirically true or false theories. From this fact it followed that the supposed epistemic pay-offs of following the operational imperative fail to accrue: Operational definitions do not enable one to go deductively from knowledge of observables to knowledge of unobservables, and operational definitions do not provide a means for testing theories about unobservable phenomena. As such the operational imperative should be rejected in both its weak and strong versions. However, we did discover a grain of truth in the observational imperative — namely that theories with non-observable parameters are testable only if these parameters have observable manifestations. But that grain of truth does not lead to the operational imperative as typically advanced unless one embraces certain epistemological theories about observation which recent work on observation makes highly doubtful.

23 citations


Book ChapterDOI
01 Mar 1972-Synthese
TL;DR: Reichenbach's insights on the relativity of topology, and some of Felix Klein’s work on the connections between local geometry and global geometry, are applied to the subject of relativistic cosmology.
Abstract: It has been said that it was Reichenbach’s merit to have realized that the conventional aspects of geometry are precisely the metrical aspects of geometry I disagree The most suggestive parts of Reichenbach’s work on space and time (1958) are his remarks on the possibility of alternative topologies for physical space For, if Reichenbach is correct, the topology of space has an intimate connection with both the causal structure of the universe and with the identity of objects in time We have alternatives for the first just because we have alternatives for the latter two My intent is to apply Reichenbach’s insights on the relativity of topology, and some of Felix Klein’s work on the connections between local geometry and global geometry, to the subject of relativistic cosmology

19 citations


Book ChapterDOI
01 Mar 1972-Synthese
TL;DR: The causal theory of time as mentioned in this paper is a special type of a relational theory for time, which holds that it is not necessary to postulate the absolute existence of instants of time, rather, time is said to be nothing over and above (to be constituted by, to be reducible to) the structure of temporal relations between events.
Abstract: The causal theory of time is a special type of a relational theory of time. A relational theory holds that it is not necessary to postulate the absolute existence of instants of time, to think of instants as part of a being which is absolute in that it is a kind of event container whose existence is independent of the existence of the events it contains; rather, time is said to be nothing over and above (to be constituted by, to be reducible to) the structure of temporal relations between events. The causal species of this theory says that temporal relations can be defined in terms of ‘physical relations’, relations which, whatever else they are, are not ‘specifically temporal’.

14 citations


Book ChapterDOI
01 Mar 1972-Synthese
TL;DR: In this paper, it was shown that the coherence of time can be described if only which pairs of space-time points are light-connected, and that any concept definable by coordinates is also definable in terms of nondirected light signals if and only if it is invariant under Lorentz transformations.
Abstract: ‘Temporal betweenness’ in space-time is defined solely in terms of light signals, using a signalling relation that does not distinguish between the sender and the receiver of a light signal. Special relativity and general relativity are considered separately, because the latter can be treated only locally. We conclude that the (local) coherence of time can be described if we know only which pairs of space-time points are light-connected. Other consequences in the case of special relativity: (1) a categorical axiom system exists in terms of nondirected light connection alone, with neither ‘particle’ nor ‘time order’ as a primitive concept, though we do not actually present the axioms; (2) any concept definable by coordinates is also definable in terms of nondirected light signals if and only if it is invariant under Lorentz transformations, translations, dilations, space reflections, and time reflections; and (3) any transformation of space-time (not necessarily continuous) which preserves nondirected light connection is a product of transformations just listed above. The bulk of the paper is devoted to proving that the definitions we give correspond to their intended interpretations in the usual space-time continua.

14 citations



Book ChapterDOI
01 Sep 1972-Synthese
TL;DR: In the special issue of Synthese devoted to the methodological Situation in sociology as mentioned in this paper, Jaakko Hintikka had invited me to write a paper for this special issue.
Abstract: My thanks to Jaakko Hintikka for having invited me to write a paper for the special issue of Synthese which is ‘devoted to the methodological Situation in sociology.’ My thanks, because it was in thinking about my contribution that the linkage of the three phenomena to which the terms in the title point occurred to me. Nor is this expression of my gratitude an intrusion of privacy. It is intrinsic to my investigation.

Book ChapterDOI
01 Mar 1972-Synthese
TL;DR: In the case of geometry, the issue of the conventionality of geometry appears to depend on one particular problem: the status of our methods of measuring length or our "congruence definitions".
Abstract: Physical geometry is an especially good case study for one interested in the problem of conventionalism in science for at least two reasons. First, there exist a large number of alternative geometrical theories which have all been extensively investigated. This contrasts sharply with most other areas of science in which ‘alternatives’ are largely conjectural. Thus, in the case of geometry, claims that our theories are in some sense conventional or arbitrary, in that we could just as well have had others, at least have more substance. Second, the issue of the conventionality of geometry appears to depend on one particular problem: the status of our methods of measuring length or our ‘congruence definitions’. Whether physical geometry is in some sense arbitrary or conventional depends on whether there is a sense in which our methods of measurement or our ‘congruence definitions’ are arbitrary or conventional. This, of course, simply reflects the mathematical fact that all the properties of a geometry are determined once a metric is determined.

Book ChapterDOI
01 Mar 1972-Synthese
TL;DR: In this article, the authors compare the meaning of the words "flow" and "water" in the expressions "the flow of time", "water", "air", and "flow of air", and examine whether the resemblance of these expressions is purely superficial or not.
Abstract: Examining the way in which we usually speak about time, the impression is strongly created that time is regarded as something in motion. We regularly talk about time ‘flowing’, ‘passing’, ‘flying’, etc. Of course, we have an approximate knowledge as to the meaning of these terms, but what is their exact significance? When comparing the word ‘flow’ in the expressions ‘the flow of time’ and ‘the flow of water’, ‘the flow of air’, we wonder whether this word ‘flow’ has essentially the same meaning, or whether the resemblance of these expressions is purely superficial, that is, confined to the use of the same word ‘flow’. This article aims at examining whether ‘the flow of time’ could be compared with ‘the flow of a liquid or gas’ in any real sense.


Book ChapterDOI
01 Mar 1972-Synthese
TL;DR: The Riemann-Helmholtz-Lie problem of space has been studied in the story of mathematics as mentioned in this paper, to which Poincare gave an important and final contribution concerning two-dimensional space.
Abstract: There is in the story of mathematics a problem, the so-called Riemann-Helmholtz-Lie problem of space, to which Poincare gave an important and final contribution concerning two-dimensional space. Of this problem I shall only speak allusively, although mathematical methods are presupposed everywhere by Poincare’s philosophy of space. Even when concepts seem to be borrowed from experience, idealization has to transform them into geometrical tools.

Book ChapterDOI
01 Mar 1972-Synthese
TL;DR: There are many points of view from which one finds it appropriate to look at the notion of causality, but the main intention has been to explicate and then to answer in the best possible way the following two basic questions.
Abstract: There are many points of view from which one finds it appropriate to look at the notion of causality. These include what I call the logical (linguistic), probabilistic (stochastic), analytic (physical, system-theoretic), and geometric (relativity-theoretic) viewpoints. In all of them, throughout the rather long and confusing intellectual history of the subject, the main intention has been to explicate and then to answer in the best possible way the following two basic questions: Q1 What curious entities, usually called causes and effects, are supposed to be in a causal relationship? Q2 What kind of relation, operator, or perhaps something else, called causal relation or causal operator, is associated with or attributed to the causal entities?

Book ChapterDOI
01 Mar 1972-Synthese
TL;DR: Kant's interpretation of the mathematics of motion is to be found in his Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science in the form of one fundamental principle of kinematics and three laws of mechanics as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: Kant’s interpretation of the mathematics of motion is to be found in his Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science in the form of one fundamental principle of kinematics and three laws of mechanics. None of these propositions is especially original with Kant so far as the sheer mathematics goes, but the selection of just these four propositions and Kant’s proof for each of them are at the very least strongly influenced by the special features of his critical philosophy. Before turning to details I should like to consider what Kant takes to be the significance and usefulness of the subject of metaphysical foundations of natural science (which in its strictest, and for Kant, most proper sense, is the metaphysical doctrine of corporeal nature). Kant’s claims are, as usual, in one sense very modest and in another sense magnificently presumptuous: modest in that he thinks his achievement “no great work” [kein grosses Werk]; presumptuous in that he believes himself to have once and for all exhaustively investigated his subject. In any case, Kant does claim that all mathematical physicists, however much they may seek to ‘repudiate any claim of metaphysics on their science’, must, at least implicitly, make use of the principles which he is about to elucidate.

Book ChapterDOI
01 Mar 1972-Synthese
TL;DR: The causal theory of time and space-time has been criticised by Earman as discussed by the authors, who pointed out the problems raised by the general theory of relativity (henceforth GTR).
Abstract: There is an important point behind Earman’s (this volume) criticisms of the causal theory of time and space-time. This point has been made perspicuously in a recent paper by Glymour (1970). It concerns the novel problems raised for a theory of space-time by the general theory of relativity (henceforth GTR), and I shall explain it briefly in Section II below. Section I briefly states my own view of the status of the causal theory, and Sections III and IV deal with Earman’s specific criticisms.

Journal ArticleDOI
01 Mar 1972-Synthese
TL;DR: Feyerabend's attack on the standard view of observation sentences as discussed by the authors is based on the principle of acquaintance, which is a central constituent of an empiricist epistemology.
Abstract: In a series of articles1 Paul K. Feyerabend has attacked what he calls the standard view of observation sentences, the view that they, together with their descriptive constituents, are invariant in meaning from theory to theory. He also claims that this goes hand in hand with (or perhaps is equivalent to) the view that the ontology of the observational domain is fixed independently of scientific theories. This attack is thus of interest to those2 who, like myself, hold to a principle of acquaintance that serves both as a tool of ontological analysis and as a central constituent of an empiricist epistemology. In this paper I wish to examine both Feyerabend's attack and his own position from the point of view of a proponent of such a principle of acquaintance. Feyerabend's strategy in this series of articles appears to be the follow ing. He specifies criteria for being an observation sentence which are neu tral to the issues of meaning and reference. He then points out that there are sentences which qualify as observation sentences on these criteria but which cannot be understood by one who does not know a particular theory. He infers from this that such observation sentences gain meaning from the theories in whose context they are made. He then attempts to attack the fundamental presuppositions of the standard view which would seek to qualify other sentences that meet his criteria as being epistemolog ically more basic than those which are theory-laden. This is intended to show by elimination that all observation sentences are dependent for their meaning on the theories in whose context they are made. Feyerabend's attack upon the standard view turns upon the following thesis:


Book ChapterDOI
01 Sep 1972-Synthese
TL;DR: In the last decades more and more social scientists seem to agree with the opinion expressed by R. Marsh in his book, Comparative Sociology, that: cross-social comparative analysis is fundamental to any general sociological or anthropological theory as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: In the last decades more and more social scientists seem to agree with the opinion expressed by R. Marsh in his book, Comparative Sociology, that: Cross-social comparative analysis is fundamental to any general sociological or anthropological theory.1


Journal ArticleDOI
01 Mar 1972-Synthese
TL;DR: The general claim is that the kind of empiricist model theoretic semantics constructed by Przel?cki is philosophically un satisfactory even for a semantical empiricist and totally unacceptable for aSemantical realist.
Abstract: In his recent monograph The Logic of Empirical Theories (1969) Marian Przel?cki gives an account of the empirical interpretation (in a semantical sense) of a (scientific) theory formalized in first-order predicate logic. The main task in developing an empirical semantics for such a theory is to give an empirical interpretation to the basic predicates of the theory.1 The word 'interpretation' means for Przel?cki interpretation in the model theoretic sense. Roughly speaking the meaning of a predicate equals its denotation in each possible empirical state of affairs. The interpretations (i.e. the empirical truth conditions) of sentences are presumably obtained by means of the empirical interpretations of the primitive predicates and the grammar of the language. We shall below discuss only the meaning (interpretation) of the primitive observational and theoretical predicates of a given scientific theory. Przel?cki's book is admirably clearly and lucidly written from a technical point of view. It contains a number of interesting logical results concerning the definability of theoretical predicates (by means of observational ones), meaning postulates, analytic and synthetic state ments. Most of these will not, however, be discussed in this paper. Instead we shall concentrate on questions of what might be called semantics or interpretation and on the limitations of logical model theo ry in answering them. My general claim is that the kind of empiricist model theoretic semantics constructed by Przel?cki is philosophically un satisfactory even for a semantical empiricist and totally unacceptable for a semantical realist. I shall next try to indicate my reasons for this claim by discussing some details of Przel?cki's empiricist semantics.

Book ChapterDOI
George Berger1
01 Mar 1972-Synthese
TL;DR: In this article, the causal theory of Minkowski space-time has been investigated and the relation of causal relations to metrical structures has been established for the special-relativistic Minkowsky model.
Abstract: This paper is a contribution to the causal theory of special-relativistic (Minkowski) space-time.1 My aim is to give an axiomatic characterization of temporally symmetric causal relations in Minkowski space-time, to show precisely the relation of causal to metrical structure, and to explicate the thesis that space-time ‘has’ a causal and topological structure which ‘underlies’ its metrical structure.2 The paper is largely mathematical in content, but many comments concerning the system appear as notes. Acquaintance with basic topological notions and with the Minkowski formalism of special relativity is presupposed.3 I shall first state the main result to be established and will then provide the philosophical motivation for the construction.

Journal ArticleDOI
01 Mar 1972-Synthese
TL;DR: This paper present an adequate explication of empirical knowledge in the form of a logic of epistemic expressions, based on the notions of evident, reasonable, and unreasonable belief. But their approach is limited to the case of knowledge claims.
Abstract: When we say of a man that he knows something we are making a claim that is both descriptive and evaluative. Most philosophers seem to agree that the descriptive aspect of a knowledge claim can be explicated in terms of true belief. There is also considerable agreement that the eval uative aspect is to be explicated in terms of the structure of the justifica tion one has for his belief. During the last decade, epistemologists have devoted a considerable amount of attention to the problem of explicating the evaluative aspect of knowledge claims. They have been inspired, in part, by the highly recalcitrant problems raised in Edmund Gettier's brief but epoch-making paper 'Is Justified True Belief Knowledge 7'1 To date, no universally agreed upon theory concerning these questions has been presented. One of my goals in this paper is to present an adequate ex plication of empirical knowledge. In addition to these attempts at explicating the concept of knowledge, many philosophers have worked recently on the logic of epistemic ex pressions, principally on expressions containing 'knows' and 'believes'. A great many insights into the formal characteristics of these expressions have been gained as a result of this work.3 Very little has been done, however, toward combining the results of this enterprise with the results achieved by those who have worked on the explication of the concept of knowledge. A second goal of this paper is to effect such a combination by constructing an explication of the concept of knowledge in terms of some notions which I earlier developed in an essay on the logic of epis temic expressions.4 In that essay, my primary concern was with the con cepts of evident, reasonable, and unreasonable belief. The approach adopted there is intended, however, to provide a basis for a general logic of epistemic expressions. I shall begin by giving a brief account of the basic elements of that approach.

Journal ArticleDOI
01 Mar 1972-Synthese
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors presented a statistical approach for the indirect assessment of unobserved properties of certain individual objects or for the purpose of prediction of future events, which may create certain logical and practical problems discussed among others by Hempel in his paper on 'Inductive Inconsistencies'.
Abstract: It is rather generally believed that the application of statistical propositions for the indirect assessment of unobserved properties of certain individual objects or for the purpose of prediction of future events may create certain logical and practical problems discussed among others by Hempel in his paper on 'Inductive Inconsistencies': The nature of this problem can be illustrated by an example taken from the paper mentioned above. Suppose that we meet a certain Mr. Petersen, and we would like to know whether or not he is a Roman Catholic. For some peculiar reasons we decide not to use the method of direct (i.e. observational) assessment of Mr. Petersen's religion (e.g. by asking him about his religion, or looking into his documents) but we prefer to approach this problem indirectly, by inferring this fact from some other informations. These informations will be of two kinds: the propositions which describe some characteristics of Mr. Petersen, other than his religion, and some propositions describing in general terms the relations between these characteristics we observe as properties of Mr. Petersen and the property of being a Roman Catholic. We are not surprised to learn that in this case these relations are of statistical nature; therefore our assessment of Mr. Petersen's religion will not be certain, but it will be made in terms of certain probability. It happens that Mr. Petersen is a Swede. Knowing a very low proportion of Roman Catholics among Swedes (e.g. 2%) we say that the probability that Mr. Petersen belongs to this denomination is also very low, namely 2%. In other words, we can say that it is almost certain that he is not a Roman Catholic. On the other hand we know that Mr. Petersen has made a pilgrimage to Lourdes. But the proportion of Roman Catholics among those who made a pilgrimage to Lourdes is very high let us say 98%, what makes the probability that Mr. Petersen is a Roman Catholic, very high. On the basis of the second information we are inclined to believe

Journal ArticleDOI
01 Sep 1972-Synthese
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that the lack of knowledge in social science is a direct result of a lack of an appropriate view of social reality and propose a set of reality assumptions which could fill the conjectured void.
Abstract: The accumulation of knowledge may be thought of as one of the criteria which must be satisfied before a discipline may call itself scientific. Al though there is an 'information explosion' in social science, at least if measured by the increase in the running feet of bookshelves devoted to social science literature, there is yet to be observed a substantial accumu lation of scientific knowledge. Further, with few exceptions, an examina tion of the type of training given to the future generation of researchers in social science gives little hope for any improvement in the near future. These factors the present substantial lack of accumulated knowledge coupled with the grossly inadequate training programs for the next gener ation of social scientists suggest that consideration should be given to the question: "What are the obstacles to the accumulation of knowledge in social science?" Consequently, this question is taken as a starting point for this essay. The theme to be developed is that the lack of accumulation of scientific knowledge in social sciences is a direct result of the lack of an appropriate view of social reality. The main purpose of the essay is to sketch one set of reality assumptions which could fill the conjectured void. If these proposed assumptions are to be utilized as a basis for social science research, a number of problems have to be solved. A few of these problems will be indicated. Before some basic assumptions about the nature of social science are stated, a few references related to the claim that social science is in an unsatisfactory state should be presented. Optimism for the future of scientific social science has been voiced by a few writers (Deutsch et al., 1971), but the significance of the optimism seems lessened when argu ments are presented by others (Filstead, 1970) disclaiming the appropri ateness of quantification. The basis for optimism for the development of scientific sociology also seems to be in question when sociologists review the status of some theories in their field. A general review of the work of several theorists has been presented (Robson, 1968) as well as a detailed review (Berger et al., 1968) of the work of Talcott Parsons, regarded by

Journal ArticleDOI
01 Mar 1972-Synthese
TL;DR: In this article, the relations between the syntactical predicate fi_is true and modal predicates such as *_ is necessary, *_is possible, ''is contingent'' and ''entails'' are investigated.
Abstract: 1. Our interest here is in the relations between the syntactical predicate fi_is true' and the syntactical modal predicates such as '_is necessary', *_is possible', '_is contingent', and *_entails...' That there should be similarities between these predicates is not surprising since the modal predicates are so-called because they deal with what used to be known as 'modes' of truth. '_is necessary', for example, is synonymous with '_is necessarily true'. The alleged pre-analytic view of the correct use of the predicate *_ is true' is that we may accept all instances of the schema

Journal ArticleDOI
01 Mar 1972-Synthese

Book ChapterDOI
01 Mar 1972-Synthese
TL;DR: In this article, the assumption that the universe can be described using a coordinate system is discussed and axioms for flat space-time which allow the coordinate system to be derived are presented.
Abstract: The assumption that the universe can be described using a coordinate system is very strong. To reveal some of the structure in such an assumption, I present in this paper axioms for flat space-time which allow the coordinate system to be derived. In this way a structure more general than that of a coordinate system is suggested.