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Showing papers in "Synthese in 1981"


Journal ArticleDOI
01 Aug 1981-Synthese
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that probabilistic explanation is the explanation of things that happen by chance, i.e., the outcomes of irreducibly Probabilistic processes.
Abstract: Elsewhere I have argued that probabilistic explanation, properly so called, is the explanation of things that happen by chance: the outcomes of irreducibly probabilistic processes) Probabilistic explanation proceeds, I claimed, by producing a law-based demonstration that the explanandum phenomenon had a particular probability of obtaining and noting that, by chance, it did obtain. This account will presented in more detail below, but the bulk of this paper will be given over to a discussion of two large problems confronting such a view: (1) many seemingly acceptable exp!anations of chance phenomena do not make explicit use of laws; and (2) many seemingly acceptable explanations that at least purport to be probabilistic concern phenomena known or assumed to be deterministic. Problem (1) is but an instance of a very general difficulty facing law-based accounts of explanation, and the approach to solving it suggested below may readily be extended to non-probabilistic explanation. Problem (2) raises a difficulty peculiar to probabilistic explanation, but I hope to show that an appropriate solution to problem (1) offers the key to a plausible solution to problem (2). Discussions of both problems run the risk of degenerating into merely verbal quibbles. However, I believe that the issues concerning the application of the expressions 'explanation' and 'probabilistic explanation' which will be discussed here are genuine, and that we may gain understanding of explanatory practice by seeing how one might resolve problems (1) and (2). To revive an old way of putting it, there is a worthwhile analogy between 'explanation' and 'proof'. 3 Various things have come to be called 'p roofs ' deductive arguments, experiments, testimony, and testimonials, to name a f e w but when well-informed we do not allow these various things to play the same roles in our lives. When we do logic, science, jury duty, or shopping, we attend to the relevant differences among so-called

203 citations


Book ChapterDOI
01 Aug 1981-Synthese
TL;DR: The primary criterion of adequacy of a probabilistic causal analysis is that the causal variable should render the simultaneous phenomenological data conditionally independent.
Abstract: The primary criterion of adequacy of a probabilistic causal analysis is that the causal variable should render the simultaneous phenomenological data conditionally independent. The intuition back of this idea is that the common cause of the phenomena should factor out the observed correlations. So we label the principle the common cause criterion. If we find that the barometric pressure and temperature are both dropping at the same time, we do not think of one as the cause of the other but look for a common dynamical cause within the physical theory of meteorology. If we find fever and headaches positively correlated, we look for a common disease as the source and do not consider one the cause of the other. But we do not want to suggest that satisfaction of this criterion is the end of the search for causes or probabilistic explanations. It does represent a significant and important milestone in any particular investigation.

172 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
01 Apr 1981-Synthese

151 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
01 Oct 1981-Synthese

145 citations



Journal ArticleDOI
01 Nov 1981-Synthese
TL;DR: The aim of this paper is to investigate the constitutive connections between demonstrative, or more generally indexical, thought and the explanation of action and to offer an account of the structure of demonstrative thoughts.
Abstract: My aim in this paper is to investigate the constitutive connections between demonstrative, or more generally indexical, thought and the explanation of action. The view that particular demonstratives have especially tight connections with the explanation of action is not new: but my view is that the full generality of such connections and their importance for understanding demonstrative thought and action goes well beyond the formulations I have encountered. One cannot approach these issues without some theory of the structure of demonstrative thoughts, a subject of great interest in its own right. In section I, I offer an account of the structure of demonstrative thoughts. (This section could be read as a brief selfcontained essay in philosophical logic.) The apparatus developed there is applied in the later sections, which become progressively more speculative. My discussion will be conducted under two self-imposed restrictions. It is by now a commonplace that there is an interdependence between the theory of action and the theory of perception which makes impossible any account of the one which does not make reference to the other. If there are constitutive links between demonstrative thought and action, there must equally be such links between demonstrative thought and perception. There is much that could be said about these latter links which is omitted here. I also omit any direct discussion of what David Kaplan calls 'cognitive dynamics', the study of what it is for attitudes with their contents to persist over time. Both these restrictions are artificial, and it is plausible that consideration of the topics thus omitted would affect one's view of the relations between demonstratives and action. I impose the restriction simply for manageability, and hope to remedy the omission in other work.

115 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
01 Oct 1981-Synthese

92 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
01 Jan 1981-Synthese
TL;DR: Our concrete mental operations are adaptations to the mode of life in which we had to compete for survival a long, long, time before science as discussed by the authors. But in science we can transcend them, as electronics t ranscends our sense organs.
Abstract: • . . our concrete mental operations are indeed adaptations to the mode of life in which we had to compete for survival a long, long, time before science. As such we are saddled with them, just as we are with our organs of locomotion and our eyes and ears. But in science we can transcend them, as electronics t ranscends our sense organs. Why, then, do the formal operations of the mind carry us so much further? Were those abilities not also matters of biological evolution? tf they, too, evolved to let us get along in the cave, how can it be that they permit us to obtain deep insights into cosmology, elementary particles, molecular genetics, number theory? To this question I have no answer.

84 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
01 Nov 1981-Synthese
TL;DR: An account of reference would consist in a set of rules the rules of reference which determine a function from expressions to the items which are their referents, and should likewise be construed as a representation of a speaker's ability to understand sentences by way of the meaning of their constituent parts.
Abstract: Reference is what relates words to the world of objects on whose condition the truth of sentences hinges. It is natural to wonder what sorts of relations underlie the reference relation-to wonder, that is, what constitutes the mechanism of reference. This question comes naturally because reference has the appearance of a supervenient phenomenon: semantic facts, one feels, hold in virtue of facts of some other kind. To ask for a specification of the underlying facts is not (necessarily) to commit oneself to a reductionist view of reference; it may be that our best account of the reference relation, though substantial and illuminating, fails to reach the standards of genuine reduction-it takes the form of a 'picture' rather than a 'theory'.1 An account of reference, of the shape I envisage, would consist in a set of rules the rules of reference which determine a function from expressions to the items which are their referents. The rules would speak of relations, not themselves directly characterised in terms of the notion of reference, recognition and deployment of which is comprised in mastery of a language: a speaker has mastered the rules of reference for a language if and only if he appreciates (perhaps inchoately) what relations go to determine the referent of an arbitrary singular term. Specifying the rules of reference is thus part of an account of the principles in which a speaker's ability to interpret words as possessed of specific referents consists, and hence of his ability to come to know the truth conditions of sentences. Articulating the rules of reference is thus analogous to devising a theory of the structure of sentences: such a theory should likewise be construed as a representation of a speaker's ability to understand sentences by way of the meaning of their constituent parts. Recent discussion of the mechanism of reference has tended to focus on the case of proper names, as if these were the basic referential devices. This focus reflects the assumption that the mode of operation of names provides the model for an account of how

51 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
01 May 1981-Synthese

51 citations



Journal ArticleDOI
01 Jan 1981-Synthese

Journal ArticleDOI
01 Sep 1981-Synthese
TL;DR: The approach to decision theory in this article is reviewed and challenged in various related ways and defended, first ad hoc (II−V) and then by a general argument of Ellery Ells's (VI).
Abstract: The approach to decision theory floated in my 1965 book is reviewed (I), challenged in various related ways (II–V) and defended, firstad hoc (II–IV) and then by a general argument of Ellery Ells's (VI). Finally, causal decision theory (in a version sketched in VII) is exhibited as a special case of my 1965 theory, according to the Eellsian argument.

Journal ArticleDOI
01 Aug 1981-Synthese

Journal ArticleDOI
01 Jan 1981-Synthese
TL;DR: A diagnosis is offered which does not blame the Sorites paradox on the incoherence of certain vague predicates, and which allows it to be literally true that an object is green.
Abstract: Does the Sorites paradox show a wide class of observational expressions to be incoherent? Michael Dummett has argued that it does ] To accept Dummett ' s argument is not to be forced to abandon observational predicates altogether. His argument does not apply to all observational predicates: one can retain 'is discriminably different f rom' and such comparat ives as 'is yel lower than' and 'is balder than'. But clearly we could not express everything we originally wanted to express. A description of an object using vocabulary to which Dummett ' s argument does not apply will not always settle the question of whether it is green, or whether it is bald if it is a person° My aim in this paper is to offer a diagnosis which does not blame the Sorites paradox on the incoherence of certain vague predicates, and which allows it to be literally true that an object is green. First I will consider some other reactions to Dummett ' s argument. They are reactions with which it is hard to rest content. In considering why this is so we will discover properties which must be possessed by any more satisfying reaction.

Journal ArticleDOI
01 May 1981-Synthese
TL;DR: For Kant, the concept of things in themselves or noumena is not a door through which we are able to exit from the phenomenal realm into the sphere of mind independent reality.
Abstract: For Kant, the concept of things in themselves or noumena isnot a door through which we are able to exit from the phenomenal realm into the sphere of mind-independent reality. Rather, it is an epistemic, mind-imposed contrivance through which alone we are able to operate our conceptual scheme — a scheme in which objectivity and externality play a crucial role.


Journal ArticleDOI
01 Mar 1981-Synthese
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine some of the turnings of philosophical conceptions of the problem of induction and of ways in which it might be properly solved or dissolved, and raise particularly important questions about the nature of knowledge and especially scientific knowledge.
Abstract: Since the days of Hume's skeptical doubt, philosophical conceptions of the problem of induction and of ways in which it might be properly solved or dissolved have undergone a series of striking metamor phoses. In my paper, I propose to examine some of those turnings, which seem to me to raise particularly important questions about the nature of empirical knowledge and especially scientific knowledge. Many, but by no means all, of the statements asserted by empirical science at a given time are accepted on the basis of previously established evidence sentences. Hume's skeptical doubt reflects the realization that most of those indirectly, or inferentially, accepted assertions rest on evidence that gives them no complete, no logically conclusive, support. This is, of course, the point of Hume's obser vation that even if we have examined many occurrences of A and have found them all to be accompanied by B, it is quite conceivable, or logically possible, that some future occurrence of A might not be accompanied by B. Nor, we might add, does our evidence guarantee that past or present occurrences of A that we have not observed were or are accompanied by B, let alone that all occurrences ever of A are, without exception, accompanied by B. Yet, in our everyday pursuits as well as in scientific research we constantly rely on what I will call the method of inductive ac ceptance, or MIA for short: we adopt beliefs, or expectations, about empirical matters on logically incomplete evidence, and we even base our actions on such beliefs to the point of staking our lives on some of them. The problem of induction is usually understood as the question of what can be said in justification of this procedure. Any attempt to answer that question requires, first of all, a clear characterization of the method of inductive acceptance, presumably

Journal ArticleDOI
01 Aug 1981-Synthese
TL;DR: The main thrust of as mentioned in this paper is that Suppes' account of causality is intrinsically defective and that there is no way to differentiate genuine from spurious causes or direct from indirect causes using only probability relations.
Abstract: An analysis of causality has been particularly troublesome, and thus mostly ignored, by those who believe the world is indeterministic. Patrick Suppes has attempted to give an account of causality that would hold in both deterministic and indeterministic worlds. To do this, Suppes uses probability relations to define causal relations. The main problems facing a probabilistic theory of causality are those of distinguishing between genuine and spurious causes as well as direct and indirect causes. Suppes presents several definitions of different types of causes in an attempt to capture the distinction between genuine and spurious causes and direct and indirect causes. It is my claim that Suppes' definitions fail to distinguish among genuine and spurious causes and direct and indirect causes. To support this claim I will give some counterexamples to Suppes' theory. I will then modify some of Suppes' definitions in a natural manner, and show that even with modification they are still prone to counterexamptes. The main thrust here is that Suppes' account of causation is intrinsically defective. I believe that there is no way to differentiate genuine from spurious causes or direct from indirect causes using only probability relations; thus no minor modifications of Suppes' definitions will be sufficient to resolve these difficulties. While presenting counterexamples to Suppes' definitions, I will also try to explain in principle why each particular example is a counterexample to Suppes' theory. After presenting these counterexamples, I will introduce the idea of an interactive fork and use it to argue that the basic intuition around which Suppes built his theory is faulty. In the last section of the paper I will discuss the more fundamental issue of whether all positive causes must raise the probabilities of their effects. Although this issue lies at the heart of most probabilistic accounts of causality, it has largely been ignored in the literature. I hope to show that we are not justified in believing that positive causes always raise the probability of their effects and that more discussion is needed on this important subject.

Journal ArticleDOI
01 Sep 1981-Synthese
TL;DR: In this article, the authors give an account of scientific explanation which aims at showing clearly and explicitly why laws are needed and how they can be used in explanation situations, and they also suggest that there is an interesting type of an explanatory argument which has been neglected in the modern theory of explanation, vizo explanation with statistical initial conditions.
Abstract: In this paper I shall give an account of scientific explanation which aims at showing clearly and explicitly why laws are needed and how they are used in explanation situations. In this account, laws are not extensional statements, and they do not function as premises from which the explanandum is der ivedthey are rather premises which can be used for calculating the degree of the expectability of the explanandum.on the basis of the initial conditions. This analysis also suggests that there is an interesting type of an explanatory argument which has been neglected in the modern theory of explanation, vizo explanation with statistical initial conditions.

Journal ArticleDOI
01 Mar 1981-Synthese
TL;DR: In this article, it was shown that to have withheld the result of the race to the end would have been inconsiderate under the circumstances, even though the order of the telling completely reverses the order in occurrence.
Abstract: Nothing strikes us as unusual here even though the order of telling completely reverses the order of occurrence. Indeed, to have withheld the result of the race to the end would have been inconsiderate under the circumstances. In other reports the telling may jump back and forth; for example: Excalibur, though he broke last from the gate, won by a nose after having dropped back to fourth, coming into the stretch, from the lead he had taken by the far turn.


Journal ArticleDOI
01 Jan 1981-Synthese
TL;DR: The structuralist view of theories has been criticised by Stegm?ller as discussed by the authors, who argued that any attempt to explicate important concepts within the general philosophy of science under the traditional construal of theories as classes of statements is bound to lead to an inadequate, oversimplified or unworkable picture of science.
Abstract: There are three fundamental components in the methodology of theory reconstruction associated with what has become known as the structuralist account of empirical theories. The first of these is an insistence upon axiomatization by means of a set-theoretic predicate; the second may be identified with the formal apparatus for describing the logical structure and empirical content of theories, as developed by J. D. Sneed and his collaborators. The third position, forcefully argued by Wolfgang Stegm?ller is roughly the view that any attempt to explicate important concepts within the general philosophy of science under the 'traditional' construal of theories as classes of statements is bound to lead to an inadequate, oversimplified or unworkable picture of science.1 In contrast to the numerous drawbacks he discerns within the standard or 'received' account of theories, Stegm?ller maintains for his "nonstatement view" that it is simpler to handle, is richer and more flexible, leads to greater differentiations and constitutes a logic ally and empirically better representation of the claims made by scientists in their theorizing. Both the 'structure' and 'dynamics' of theories (the latter comprising in particular a systematic recon strual of Kuhn's and Lakatos's accounts of scientific change) are thus held to be more perspicuously presented by means of the nonstatement view. Stegm?ller has developed and elaborated the structuralist account of science in his book The Structure and Dynamics of Theories as well as in numerous articles and research papers. More recently, and partly in response to Feyerabend's review of The Structure and Dynamics of Theories, he has set out to clarify and contrast the statement/nonstatement views and present the most systematic sur vey and defence of the structuralist approach to date; the results are published in The Structuralist View of Theories.

Journal ArticleDOI
01 May 1981-Synthese
TL;DR: In this article, a modern, non-reductive antirealism interpretation of Kant's idealism is presented, with the advantage of the fact that it is depicted as an ontologically neutral philosophical theory and not as a Berkeleyan idealism.
Abstract: The essay that follows takes some preliminary steps towards yet another contemporary reading of Kant's transcendental idealism and the allied notions. I will interpret Kant's idealism along the lines of a modern, non-reductive antirealism. Specifically, I will liken the dis pute between the transcendental idealist and realist to a debate about the correct theory of meaning and hence the correct semantics for the class of empirical judgments. I number among the advantages of this approach the fact that transcendental idealism is depicted as an ontologically neutral philosophical theory and not as a Berkeleyan idealism. Moreover, the rival realism, which is also independent of ontological doctrines (and indeed of doctrines about reference), turns out to be neither an empty nor an incoherent theory. Every philosophical epoch since Kant's own has reconstructed the main themes of the critical philosophy in terms characteristic of that epoch. It may well be that the readings are all equally valid, and that the mere fact of the perennial reinterpretation indicates the profun dity of Kant's thought. Nevertheless I believe there are standards for these interpretative enterprises. Every such rereading must account for the actual course of Kant's arguments as well as interpret his general themes. Each must offer a systematic reading of the text in addition to being philosophically viable in its own terms. Thus we might speak of a progression of "theories of Kant", each guided by its own philoso phical criteria and taking Kant's arguments as its raw data. There is an exegetical advantage to these standards. A new reading geared to the text may illuminate some of the twists and turns of one or another perplexing Kantian argument. But even more importantly, these standards force us to use Kant as a tool in fashioning a

Journal ArticleDOI
01 Jun 1981-Synthese
TL;DR: In the Treatise of Human Nature as mentioned in this paper, the authors discuss three mutually independent principles of the universal validity, the necessity, and the generalizability of the causal connect ion.
Abstract: In the Treatise of Human Nature ~ Hume discusses two principles which underlie our causal inferences. The first is the principle of the universal validity of the causal connection. According to it, everything that begins to exist necessarily has a cause. The second principle reads: every particular cause necessarily has a particular effect. This, however, is ambiguous. One can find in it two meanings which Hume himself did not clearly separate. First of all, if this A causes this B (e.g, if this lightning causes this thunder), then there stands between this case of A and this case of B a necessary relation, such that this A could not (ceteris paribus) have been followed by a case of non-B. But it would still be possible, ceteris paribus, that another case of lightning might not be followed by a case of thunder, despite the fact that this lightning was vera causa of this thunder. Though every causal relation which does obtain obtains necessarily, this principle does not exclude the possibility that every such connection is unique; there could be causality without causal law. Second, this principle can also mean that like causes necessarily have like effects. For example, if lightning ever causes thunder, then ceteris paribus lightning always causes thunder. This reading of the principle is that of the generalizability of each specific causal connection, and on it is based the possibility of discovering causal laws by induction. The truth-value of the last-formulated principle is independent of the truth or falsity of the two previous principles; 2 at least Hume claims to have established this principle purely inductively. These three mutually independent principlesof the universal validity, the necessity, and the generalizability of the causal connect ion-are the

Journal ArticleDOI
01 Mar 1981-Synthese

Journal ArticleDOI
01 Jan 1981-Synthese
TL;DR: It is claimed that scientific discovery is a form of problem solving and a philosophical account of scientific discovery could be developed from the theory of the design of problem-solving procedures for artificial intelligence.
Abstract: H. A. Simon has argued that the process of 'law discovery' can be described and theorized about and that we can give a normative account of relatively efficient ways of engaging in this process. He (i) claims that scientific discovery is a form of problem solving and (ii) suggests that a philosophical account of scientific discovery could be developed from the theory of the design of problem-solving procedures for artificial intelligence (Simon [22]). Simon defends his points by considering the process by which one might 'discover' the pattern behind the sequence of letters ABMCDMEFM . . . . He distinguishes between two tasks, (1) the discovery of the pattern by which the letters in any part of the sequence are written and (2) showing that the pattern holds as the sequence is indefinitely extended. But he tells us:

Journal ArticleDOI
01 Mar 1981-Synthese
TL;DR: Hempel has sketched a number of turns in the problem of induction, showing us in the process that the traditional problem of justifying inductive inference is inextricably bound up with problems concerning rational criteria of hypothesis and theory acceptance as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: Professor Hempel has sketched a number of turns in the problem of induction, showing us in the process that the traditional problem of justifying inductive inference is inextricably bound up with problems concerning rational criteria of hypothesis and theory acceptance In taking us through these various turns he surveys, and provides us valuable insights into, several of the guiding trends of a vast and often highly technical literature In the interests of highlighting this valuable feature of his paper and to provide some focus for our subsequent discussion, I shall briefly review some of these turns, placing emphasis on what Hempel notes as the central relevance of certain questions raised by Richard Rudner concerning the character of scientific criteria of hypothesis acceptance There are a number of, to my mind unsettled, issues concerning the task of the scientist qua scientist-particularly, the range of considerations that figure in the acceptance of hypotheses, and, indeed, how such "acceptance" is to be construed and I shall direct the latter part of my commentary to these issues In his opening remarks, Hempel correctly points out that adequate solutions to the problem of justifying the method of inductive ac ceptance, or MIA, depend on a clear characterization of the proposed method and the rules of inference that comprise it Unlike the relatively unproblematic cases of deductive validity, when we apply an inductive rule to a premise such as 'All examined instances of A have been B\ it is not clear what we mean when we say that 'All A are B' inductively follows from it We cannot, of course, say this con clusion follows invariably, nor can we make the initially more plaus ible-sounding claim that when this sort of premise is true it is rational to accept the conclusion, or to act as if it were true: for adherence to the rule, thus construed, can lead us to the reductio predicament of "rationally" accepting logically incompatible conclusions that are supported by the same body of evidence One way to avoid this problem, and thus bring us a step closer to

Journal ArticleDOI
01 Nov 1981-Synthese
TL;DR: The role of demonstrative reference in metaphysics and the philosophy of mind has been examined in this article, where it is argued that in order to think of oneself as a self who faces a world, one must be able to make demonstrative references to others.
Abstract: Demonstrative reference is the mechanism that connects us, as con scious beings, to the world we encounter. Aristotle, Kant and Hegel recognized the role of demonstrative reference as the grain of truth in empiricism; and demonstrative reference is at the heart of Descartes' Cogito. Recently, attention has been given to the significance of demonstrative reference for language and perceptual beliefs.1 I shall emphasize the role of demonstrative reference in our under standing of self-consciousness. In order to think of oneself as a self who faces a world, one must be able to make demonstrative reference. In order to think of others as selves, one must be able to attribute demonstrative reference to them. Here I study both the indexical mechanism for making demonstrative reference and the quasi-indexical mechanism for attributing demonstrative reference to others. Ultimately, I connect these largely linguistic investigations to broader topics in metaphysics and the philosophy of mind. Part I is an examination and critique of several views of indicators in indirect discourse; Part II is a discussion of quasi-indexical reference; Part III is a critical assessment of the Casta?eda-Hintikka debate on the irreducibility of quasi-indicators; Part IV is an argument linking the capacity to make first-person demonstrative reference to self-con sciousness.

Journal ArticleDOI
01 Feb 1981-Synthese