Showing papers in "Synthese in 1989"

Cognition, Construction of Knowledge, and Teaching

Abstract: The existence of objective knowledge and the possibility of communicating it by means of language have traditionally been taken for granted by educators. Recent developments in the philosophy of science and the historical study of scientific accomplishments have deprived these presuppositions of their former plausibility. Sooner or later, this must have an effect on the teaching of science. In this paper I am presenting a brief outline of an alternative theory of knowing that takes into account the thinking organism’s cognitive isolation from ‘reality’. This orientation was proposed by Vico at the beginning of the 18th century, disregarded for two hundred years, and then propounded independently by Piaget as a developmentaly grounded constructivist epistemology. The paper focuses specifically on the adaptive function of cognition, Piaget’s scheme theory, the process of communication, and the subjective perspective on social interaction. In the concluding section it then suggests some of the consequences the shift of epistemological presuppositions might have for the practice of teaching.

Conceptual change in science and in science education

Abstract: There is substantial evidence that traditional instructional methods have not been successful in helping students to ‘restructure’ their commonsense conceptions and learn the conceptual structures of scientific theories. This paper argues that the nature of the changes and the kinds of reasoning required in a major conceptual restructuring of a representation of a domain are fundamentally the same in the discovery and in the learning processes. Understanding conceptual change as it occurs in science and in learning science will require the development of a common cognitive model of conceptual change. The historical construction of an inertial representation of motion is examined and the potential instructional implications of the case are explored.

Data and phenomena

Abstract: My aim in this paper is to draw attention to a distinction and to a related set of procedures which are important to understanding science but which, until very recently, have been neglected or misdescribed by philosophers of science. The distinction in question is the distinction between data and phenomena and the procedures have to do with inferring claims about phenomena from claims about data. I shall begin with a general characterization of what I mean by data and phenomena. I shall then explore some of the implications of this characterization for a number of traditional issues concerning explanation, testing and theory-structure. Much of my discussion will draw on empirical case studies conducted by sociologists and historians of recent science. I shall try to suggest that many of the observations found in this literature about the openness, complexity, and imperfectly understood character of experimental systems, about the craft nature of experimental work, and about the different skills and preoccupations of experimentalists and theoreticians reflect real structural facts about testing, explanation, and theory-structure that deserve more attention from philosophers of science than they have hitherto received. In doing this, I shall also try to illustrate how these observations can be separated from some of the more grandiose conclusions about relativism and social construction with which they are often associated in the sociological literature. Phenomena, as I shall use the term, are relatively stable and general features of the world which are potential objects of explanation and prediction by general theory. Examples of real or putative phenomena, some of which will be discussed in more detail below, include weak neutral currents, gravitational radiation, Brownian motion, proton decay, capacity limitations and recency effects in short term memory, and the proportionately higher rate of technical innovation among middle-sized firms in moderately concentrated industries. Data, by contrast, play the role of evidence for claims about

The rationality of science, critical thinking, and science education

Abstract: This paper considers two philosophical problems and their relation to science education. The first involves the rationality of science; it is argued here that the traditional view, according to which science is rational because of its adherence to (a non-standard conception of) scientific method, successfully answers one central question concerning science's rationality. The second involves the aims of education; here it is argued that a fundamental educational aim is the fostering of rationality, or its educational cognate, critical thinking. The ramifications of these two philosophical theses for science education are then considered, and a science education which takes reasons in science as its fundamental feature is sketched.

Conditionals and theory change: Revisions, expansions, and additions

Abstract: This paper dwells upon formal models of changes of beliefs, or theories, which are expressed in languages containing a binary conditional connective. After defining the basic concept of a (non-trivial) belief revision model. I present a simple proof of Gardenfors's (1986) triviality theorem. I claim that on a proper understanding of this theorem we must give up the thesis that consistent revisions (‘additions’) are to be equated with logical expansions. If negated or ‘might’ conditionals are interpreted on the basis of ‘autoepistemic omniscience’, or if autoepistemic modalities (Moore) are admitted, even more severe triviality results ensue. It is argued that additions cannot be philosophically construed as ‘parasitic’ (Levi) on expansions. In conclusion I outline somed logical consequences of the fact that we must not expect ‘monotonic’ revisions in languages including conditionals.

Why the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles is not contingently true either

Abstract: Faced with strong arguments to the effect that Leibniz'sPrinciple of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII) is not a necessary truth, many supporters of the Principle have staged a strategic retreat to the claim that it is contingently true in this, the actual, world The purpose of this paper is to examine the status of the various forms of PII in both classical and quantum physics, and it is concluded that this latter view is at best doubtful, at worst, simply wrong

Reflective modalities and theory change

Abstract: In 'Belief Revision and the Ramsey Test' (G~irdenfors, 1986) Peter G~irdenfors has shown that a prima facie plausible acceptance condition for subjunctive, conditionals is incompatible with a certain apparently equally plausible requirement on how a rational agent should change his beliefs in the light of new information. The above mentioned acceptance condition for conditionals is the so-called Ramsey Test.

Piagetian epistemology: Equilibration and the teaching of science

Abstract: That Piagetian epistemology has the dynamics of knowledge growth as its core consideration predetermines a need to consider it as potentially applicable to teaching This paper addresses that need by first outlining the Piagetian theory of equilibration and then applying it to the construction of methods of teaching science

Reasoning and logic

Abstract: Gilbert Harman, in ‘Logic and Reasoning’ (Synthese 60 (1984), 107–127) describes an “unsuccessful attempt ... to develop a theory which would give logic a special role in reasoning”. Here reasoning is psychological, “a procedure for revising one's beliefs”. In the present paper, I construe reasoning sociologically, as a process of linguistic interaction; and show how both reasoning in the psychologistic sense and logic are related to that process.

Massey on fallacy and informal logic: A reply

Abstract: L'A. examine la critique de la logique informelle et de la faute d'argumentation (fallacy) proposee par Massey. Cette critique s'inscrit dans le cadre theorique plus large d'un debat entre partisans de la logique formelle et partisans de la logique informelle

Applying idealized scientific theories to engineering

Abstract: The problem for the scientist created by using idealizations is to determine whether failures to achieve experimental fit are attributable to experimental error, falsity of theory, or of idealization. Even in the rare case when experimental fit within experimental error is achieved, the scientist must determine whether this is so because of a true theory and fortuitously canceling idealizations, or due to a fortuitous combination of false theory and false idealizations. For the engineer, the problem seems rather different. Experiment for the engineer reveals the closeness of predictive fit that can be achieved by theory and idealization for a particular case. If the closeness of fit is good enough for some practical purpose, the job is done. If not, or there are reasons to consider variation, then the engineer needs to know how well the experimentally determined closeness of fit will extrapolate to new cases. This paper focuses on engineering measures of closeness of fit and the projectibility of those measures to new cases.

Truth and beauty in scientific reason

Abstract: A rationalist and realist model of scientific revolutions will be constructed by reference to two categories of criteria of theory-evaluation, denominated indicators of truth and of beauty Whereas indicators of truth are formulateda priori and thus unite science in the pursuit of verisimilitude, aesthetic criteria are inductive constructs which lag behind the progression of theories in truthlikeness Revolutions occur when the evaluative divergence between the two categories of criteria proves too wide to be recomposed or overlooked This model of revolutions depends upon a substantial new treatment of aesthetic criteria in science with which much of the paper will therefore be occupied

The misrepresentation of science by philosophers and teachers of science

Abstract: In education there is a concern that science teachers misrepresent the nature of science to students. An assumption that is implicit in this concern is that science teachers should be teaching the philosophy of science as it is understood by philosophers. This paper argues that both philosophers and science teachers misrepresent science when they engage in their respective disciplines, and it is evident the two misrepresentations are of different types. In philosophy, the misrepresentation is of a philosophical-epistemological nature where advocates of particular views maintain that advocates of other views misinterpret the nature of science. In education, the misrepresentation is of a cognitive, teaching nature where teachers' practical interpretations are not congruent with philosophers' interpretations of science. The discrepancy that exists between the two misrepresentations is due to the intentions of the two disciplines, and assuming that science teachers should teach a philosophically coherent interpretation of the nature of science is an over-simplification of the problem. The concepts of espoused theories and theories-in-use are used to link the two interpretations of science and provide suggestions for future research that may help clarify misrepresentations of science in science education.

The ‘Interests’ of science and the problems of education

Abstract: Reorientations in the understanding of science, such as that of the past quarter-century, can have educational impact far beyond the level of pedagogy. If educative activity is the means for each generation to pass to the next its view of the major features of life, then a new theory of the n a t u r e of science could lead to a new view of science in society, and therefore also in education. It is this broader aspect of the possible influence of recent philosophy of science that forms the subject of the present paper. Because I will attempt to link a number of apparently disparate problems, however, and to make unorthodox suggestions about interests of science that are at present suppressed, the treatment here must of necessity be general and programmatic. Our starting point will be the recent work of Mary Hesse, with some reference to Jiirgen Habermas. I will assume, therefore, the reader's familiarity with earlier ideas introduced by such figures as Thomas Kuhn, N. R. Hanson, Paul Feyerabend and Imre Lakatos ideas that have ushered in the age now often called 'post-empiricist'. Briefly put, I would like to draw out the possible consequences for educational philosophy of two key innovations treated by Hesse, and then, to reformulate these innovations in a way particularly suitable to contemporary educational problems. I refer, first, to her surprising acceptance of Jiirgen Habermas's proposal that science ought not be regarded as neutral inquiry because, in fact, the meaning of its findings are constituted by its own specific interests (1980, p. xxi); and second, her even more provocative suggestion (going beyond Habermas) that hermeneutics is involved in all the sciences, including the most analytic and nomological (Arbib and Hesse 1986, p. 181). To appreciate fully the import of this last point, it must be recalled that until recently for many philosophers, especially in Europe hermeneutics (interpretation of meanings) was in effect one more demarcation criterion: It was relevant to the human sciences, where

The particulate instantiation of homogeneous pink

Abstract: If one examines the sky at sunset on a clear night, one seems to see a continuum of colors from reds, oranges, and yellows to a deep blue black. Between any two colored points in the sky there seem to be other colored points. Furthermore, the changes in color across the sky appear to be continuous. Although the colors at the zenith and the horizon are obviously distinct, nowhere in the sky can one see any color borders, and every sufficiently small region of the sky is made up of regions that all seem to be of the same color. How can this apparent continuity be explained? One classic answer is simply to admit an infinite number of colors, and an infinite number of sense data, and allow that a glimpse of the sky comprises a completed infinity a continuous series of colors-at-phenomenal places. The question of whether the set of sense data (or sense impressions) is finite or infinite created some interesting divisions among classic theorists.1 More recently the issue has been invoked as an objection to any attempt to identify sensory experiences with brain states. Wilfrid Sellars is a proponent of a subtle variant of this objection. Sellars' celebrated 'grain' argument begins with the example of a solid pink ice cube:

Semantics and the computational paradigm in cognitive psychology

Abstract: There is a prevalent notion among cognitive scientists and philosophers of mind that computers are merely formal symbol manipulators, performing the actions they do solely on the basis of the syntactic properties of the symbols they manipulate. This view of computers has allowed some philosophers to divorce semantics from computational explanations. Semantic content, then, becomes something one adds to computational explanations to get psychological explanations. Other philosophers, such as Stephen Stich, have taken a stronger view, advocating doing away with semantics entirely. This paper argues that a correct account of computation requires us to attribute content to computational processes in order to explain which functions are being computed. This entails that computational psychology must countenance mental representations. Since anti-semantic positions are incompatible with computational psychology thus construed, they ought to be rejected. Lastly, I argue that in an important sense, computers are not formal symbol manipulators.

Idealized laws, antirealism, and applied science: A case in hydrogeology

Abstract: When is a law too idealized to be usefully applied to a specific situation? To answer this question, this essay considers a law in hydrogeology called Darcy's Law, both as it is used in what is called the symmetric-cone model, and as it is used in equations to determine a well's groundwater velocity and hydraulic conductivity. After discussing Darcy's law and its applications, the essay concludes that this idealized law, as well as associated models and equations in hydrogeology, are not realistic in the sense required by the D-N account. They exhibit what McMullin calls mathematical idealization, construct idealization, empirical-causal idealization, and subjunctive-causal idealization. Yet this lack of realism in hydrogeology is problematic for reasons unrelated to the status of the D-N account. These idealizations are also problematic in applied situations. Their problems require developing two supplemental criteria, necessary for their productive application.

History, philosophy, and science teaching: A brief review

Abstract: School science education is currently the subject of much debate. Historians and philosophers of science should play a role in this debate. Since the late nineteenth century there has been a persistent, if minor, tradition arguing for the incorporation of historical and philosophical dimensions in the teaching of school science. With the current crisis in science teaching, there are encouraging signs that more attention is being paid to this tradition. What is required is much greater collaboration between philosophers, historians, and science educators, particularly in the training of teachers.

Gibbs' paradox and non-uniform convergence

Abstract: It is only when mixing two or more pure substances along a reversible path that the entropy of the mixing can be made physically manifest. It is not, in this case, a mere mathematical artifact. This mixing requires a process of successive stages. In any finite number of stages, the external manifestation of the entropy change, as a definite and measurable quantity of heat, isa fully continuous function of the relevant variables. It is only at an infinite and unattainable limit thata non-uniform convergence occurs. And this occurs when considered in terms of the number of stages together with a ‘distinguishability parameter’ appropriate to the particular device which is used to achieve reversibility. These considerations, which are of technological interest to chemical engineers, resolve a paradox derived in chemical theory called Gibbs' Paradox.

The justification and selection of scientific theories

Abstract: This paper is a critique of a project, outlined by Laudan et al. (1986) recently in this journal, for empirically testing philosophical models of change in science by comparing them against the historical record of actual scientific practice. While the basic idea of testing such models of change in the arena of science is itself an appealing one, serious questions can be raised about the suitability of seeking confirmation or disconfirmation for large numbers of specific theses drawn from a massive list of claims abstracted from the writings of a few philosophers of science. The present paper discusses what one might reasonably expect from a model of change in science and then compares some clusters of theses from Laudan et al. with developments in recent theoretical physics. The results suggest that such straightforward testing of theses may be largely inconclusive.

A multi-relation approach of general systems and tests of applications

Abstract: In this paper, under the assumption that ZFC axiom system is consistent, the following are proved: (a) there is no system whose object set consists of all systems; (b) any system is not an object of itself; (c) any system is constructed with basic elements (elements which are not systems). Based on these results, the following problems in epistemology are discussed: the feasibility of the definition of the theory so-called “science of science”; the existence of basic particles in the world; and the existence of absolute truths.

Themes and schemes: A philosophical approach to interdisciplinary science teaching

Abstract: An interdisciplinary fusion between the philosophy of science and the teaching of science can help to eradicate the disciplinary rigidity entrenched in both. In this paper I approach the history of sciencethematically, identifying general themes which transcend the boundaries of individual disciplines. Such conceptual themes can be used as a basis for an interdisciplinary introduction to university science, encouraging certain important cognitive skills not exercised during the disciplinary training emphasised in traditional approaches. Courses which teach themes such as conservation, randomness, and holism/reductionism have already proved successful, and these innovations should encourage philosophers and historians to explore the exciting new possibilities which arise from stepping outside the confines of a single discipline.

Two sides of wonder: Philosophical keys to the motivation of science learning

Abstract: Science education is most efficacious and enduring when undertaken within a philosophical framework akin to that of science, itself. This entails recognition that, above all, science is a mode of rational inquiry pursued by those who are curious about the natural world and motivated to seek rational answers to personally meaningful questions. The key to successful science instruction lies in fostering a student's self-motivation and productively channeling his innate curiosity. To do this a science educator must (a) convey to students an accurate and sympathetic impression of the importance of science to their cultural development; (b) help students develop an ability to evaluate information critically and arrive at logical conclusions; (c) provide students opportunities to engage in creative, personally meaningful scientific research.

Realism and the underdetermination of theory

Abstract: The main theme is that theorizing serves empirical prediction. This is used as the core of a counter to contemporary anti-realist arguments. Different versions of the thesis that data underdetermines theory are identified and it is shown that none which are acceptable differentiates between theory selection and prediction. Criteria sufficient for the former are included amongst those necessary for the latter; and obviously go beyond mere compatibility with data.