Showing papers in "Synthese in 1993"
144 citations
TL;DR: In this article, a reanalysis of the semantic value for demonstratives is presented, and distinct T-sentences for (39) can now be assigned in the two situations described above.
Abstract: ing from details, what is crucial to note in (42) is the presence of the event variable e, which ranges over acts of demonstration or reference by the speaker. Under Burge's account, the semantic value of a demonstrative NP like that dog involves not only an object x but also an event e; that is, such expressions are relational, taking pairs (x, e) as their semantic values. 16 Given this reanalysis of the semantic value for demonstratives, distinct T-sentences for (39) can now be assigned in the two situations described above. These will involve subILFs for the demonstratives that do not differ in their linguistic form (that planet), or in the object demonstrated (Venus); but do differ in the second member of the pair ix, e). Each demonstrative will involve a different event, corresponding to a different act of demonstration: ~? (43)a. (NP, iv, e)) b. (NP, (v, e')) L l (that planet, iv, e)) (that planet, iv, e')) If this proposal is on the right track, then examples like (39) represent another case of attitudes distinguished by content. 3.3. Logically Equivalent Attitude Reports Although (14)-(16) impose rather strict conditions on the logical equivalence of attitude reports, equivalence nonetheless is still possible in certain cases within the ILF theory. In particular, two distinct attitude reports a and /3 will be logically equivalent when the following two conditions are met: (i) the values assigned to the subparts of the complement clauses of a and/3 are identical (that is, a and/3 differ at most in the forms of (some of) their subconstituent parts); and (ii) a and/3 are evaluated under structures in which their formally distinct (but coreferring) subparts are given scope out of the complement clauses, beyond the highest attitude verb. We illustrate once again with (2a,b). In the discussion above we considered LF representations of sentences in which their proper name subjects were confined to the subordinate clause. Suppose, however, that these sentences are assigned LFs in which the subordinate subject is optionally given broad scope: (44)a. [NP Judy Garland]l [Max believes [tl sang \"Somewhere Over the Rainbow\"]]. I N T E R P R E T E D L O G I C A L F O R M S 323 b. [NV Frances Gumm]1 [Max believes [h sang \"Somewhere Over the Rainbow\"]]. The clausal complements are now formally identical, both having the form: tl sang \"Somewhere Over the Rainbow\". Furthermore, the semantic value assigned to the trace h will be the same in both cases: h will denote the individual Judy Garland/Frances Gumm. Accordingly, the T-sentences for (2a) and (2b) will be identical, requiring Max to stand in the believe-relation to one and the same object (45): ~s
134 citations
TL;DR: The theory that observation necessarily fails to determine theory is false in the sense that observation can provide overwhelming evidence for a particular theory or even a hypothesis within the theory as discussed by the authors, and the saga of quantum discontinuity illustrates how that power can be underestimated by inadequate caricatures of the evidential case.
Abstract: The thesis that observation necessarily fails to determine theory is false in the sense that observation can provide overwhelming evidence for a particular theory or even a hypothesis within the theory. The saga of quantum discontinuity illustrates the power of evidence to determine theory and shows how that power can be underestimated by inadequate caricatures of the evidential case. That quantum discontinuity can save the phenomena of black body radiation is the widely known result, but it leaves open the possibilities of other accounts. That these phenomena, with the aid of minimal assumptions, entail quantum discontinuity is the crucial but now largely forgotten result. It was first demonstrated by Ehrenfest and Poincare in 1911 and 1912.
57 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors focus on the confusions between complex idea and proposition, between proposition and judgment, and especially between name and predicate, and view these confusions as the inevitable results of the dynamical tensions among these different views.
Abstract: It is tempting to say from the contemporary point of view that thePort-Royal Logic is full of confusions as well as insights. I have focused on several of these confusions and their relations, in particular the confusions between complex idea and proposition, between proposition and judgment, and especially between name and predicate. In particular I have tried to emphasize the instability of the Port-Royal semantics — the ways in which their theory of terms vacillates between earlier views and something closer to a modern analysis. It may, however, be more profitable to regard this work as incorporating several logics, and to view the confusions as the inevitable results of the dynamical tensions among these different views.
54 citations
TL;DR: A new theory of causal relevance is advanced, according to which causal claims convey information about conditional probability functions, which is motivated by the problem of disjunctive factors, which haunts existing probabilistic theories of causation.
Abstract: I advance a new theory of causal relevance, according to which causal claims convey information about conditional probability functions. This theory is motivated by the problem of disjunctive factors, which haunts existing probabilistic theories of causation. After some introductory remarks, I present in Section 3 a sketch of Eells's (1991) probabilistic theory of causation, which provides the framework for much of the discussion. Section 4 explains how the problem of disjunctive factors arises within this framework. After rejecting three proposed solutions, I offer in Section 6 a new approach to causation that avoids the problem. Decision-theoretic considerations also support the new approach. Section 8 develops the consequences of the new theory for causal explanation. The resulting theory of causal explanation incorporates the new insights while respecting important work on scientific explanation by Salmon (1971), Railton (1981), and Humphreys (1989). My conclusions are enumerated in Section 9.
54 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that social explanations depend on the discovery of causal mechanisms underlying various social processes and that there are no social kinds: types of social entities that share a common casual constitution giving rise to strong regularities of behavior.
Abstract: This article disputes the common view that social science explanations depend on discovery of lawlike generalizations from which descriptions of social outcomes can be derived. It distinguishes between governing and phenomenal regularities, and argues that social regularities are phenomenal rather than governing. In place of nomological deductive arguments, the article maintains that social explanations depend on the discovery of causal mechanisms underlying various social processes. The metaphysical correlate of this argument is that there are no social kinds: types of social entities that share a common casual constitution giving rise to strong regularities of behavior. The article turns next to a consideration of the character of social causation and argues for a microfoundational interpretation of social causation: social causal powers are embodied in the constraints and opportunities that institutions present to individual agents. Finally, it is noted that these arguments have consequences for the credibility of social predictions: it is argued that predictions in social science are generally unreliable.
47 citations
TL;DR: The notion of spontaneous social order, an order in human affairs which operates without the intervention of any directly ordering mind, has been a natural fascination for social and political theorists as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: The notion of a spontaneous social order, an order in human affairs which operates without the intervention of any directly ordering mind, has a natural fascination for social and political theorists. This paper provides a taxonomy under which there are two broadly contrasting sorts of spontaneous social order. One is the familiar invisible hand; the other is an arrangement that we describe as the intangible hand. The paper is designed to serve two main purposes. First, to provide a pure account of the invisible hand, with some indication of the varieties of invisible hand (and, indeed, backhand) available. Second, to develop and motivate the unfamiliar conception of the intangible backhand. We believe that a recognition of the availability of this latter sort of spontaneous organising mechanism — and the mechanism is implicitly recognised in many traditions — is of great importance in political theory; it is of particular importance nowadays when the usual focus is entirely on the invisible hand.
45 citations
TL;DR: This article argued that dialectical arguments are from endoxa, emphasizing this feature as its defining characteristic omits others that are equally important and so distorts our conception of dialectic and its powers.
Abstract: There is now wide acceptance of the following pair of views: (1) Aristot elian dialectic was a technique of arguing from 'common beliefs', 'ac cepted opinions', or 'reputable views'; and (2) Aristotle thought that dialectic provided the way to the first principles of the sciences, or at any rate of some of them.11 want to argue that each of these is at best a half-truth. To begin with, although Aristotle does say that dialectical arguments are from endoxa, emphasizing this feature as its defining characteristic omits others that are equally important and so distorts our conception of dialectic and its powers. Next, one of these distortions is that if we do not take account of the full picture of dialectic and of Aristotle's specific purposes in the Topics, we will not understand what the endoxa are and why they are important to him. Finally, Topics 1.2, the text in which Irwin and others see Aristotle's declaration that dialectic 'has a road to the first principles of all disciplines', actually makes no such claim. If my arguments are sound, then a good deal of recent work on Aristotle at least needs reconsideration.
40 citations
TL;DR: The basic alternatives seem to be either a Humean reductionist view that any particular assertion needs backing with inductive evidence for its reliability before it can retionally be believed, or a Reidian criterial view that testimony is intrinscially, though defeasibly, credible, in the absence of evidence against its reliability.
Abstract: The basic alternatives seem to be either a Humean reductionist view that any particular assertion needs backing with inductive evidence for its reliability before it can retionally be believed, or a Reidian criterial view that testimony is intrinscially, though defeasibly, credible, in the absence of evidence against its reliability.
39 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors compare the particular problems of Gestalt (≡shape) perception with the attempts to attribute a shape to a quantum mechanical system like a molecule, arguing that at least part of a molecule's shape can be begenerated by the environment.
Abstract: Quantum systems have a holistic structure, which implies that they cannot be divided into parts. In order tocreate (sub)objects like individual substances, molecules, nuclei, etc., in a universal whole, the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen correlations between all the subentities, e.g. all the molecules in a substance, must be suppressed by perceptual and mental processes. Here the particular problems ofGestalt (≡shape)perception are compared with the attempts toattribute a shape to a quantum mechanical system like a molecule. Gestalt perception and quantum mechanics turn out (on an informal level) to show similar features and problems: holistic aspects, creation of objects, dressing procedures, influence of the ‘observer’, classical quantities and structures. The attribute ‘classical’ of a property or structure means thatholistic correlations to any other quantity do not exist or that these correlations are considered as irrelevant and therefore eliminated (either deliberately and by declaration or in a mental process that is not under rational control). An example of animposed classical structure is the nuclear frame of a molecule. Candidates for classical properties that arenot imposed by the observer could be the charge of a particle or the handedness of a molecule. It is argued here that at least part of a molecule's shape can begenerated ‘automatically’ by the environment. A molecular shape of this sort arises in addition to Lamb shift-type energy corrections.
38 citations
TL;DR: The arts and the sciences perform many of the same cognitive functions, both serving to serve to advance understanding as mentioned in this paper, however, science and art differ in their attitude toward facts, and science is said to adhere to facts; art, to be indifferent to them.
Abstract: The arts and the sciences perform many of the same cognitive functions, both serving to advance understanding This paper explores some of the ways exemplification operates in the two fields Both scientific experiments and works of art highlight, underscore, display, or convey some of their own features They thereby focus attention on them, and make them available for examination and projection Thus, the Michelson-Morley experiment exemplifies the constancy of the speed of light Jackson Pollock'sNumber One exemplifies the viscosity of paint Despite their similarities, science and art might seem to differ in their attitude toward facts Science is said to adhere to facts; art, to be indifferent to them Such, I urge, is not the case Science, like art, often scorns fact to advance understanding through fiction Thought experiments, I contend, are scientific fictions; literary and pictorial fictions, aesthetic thought experiments
TL;DR: The authors argue that the scientistic naturalism trivializes the question of the epistemic standing of the natural sciences, whereas modest naturalism takes it seriously, and can offer a plausible answer.
Abstract: Quine's ‘naturalized epistemology’ is ambivalent between a modest naturalism according to which epistemology is an a posteriori discipline, an integral part of the web of empirical belief, and a scientistic naturalism according to which epistemology is to be conducted wholly within the natural sciences. This ambivalence is encouraged by Quine's ambiguous use of “science”, to mean sometimes, broadly, ‘our presumed empirical knowledge’ and sometimes, narrowly, ‘the natural sciences’. Quine's modest naturalism is reformist, tackling the traditional epistemological problems in a novel way; his scientistic naturalism is revolutionary, requiring restriction and reconceptualization of epistemological problems. In particular, his scientistic naturalism trivializes the question of the epistemic standing of the natural sciences, whereas modest naturalism takes it seriously, and can offer a plausible answer.
TL;DR: The authors confronte la conception cartesienne de l'inference a la logique scolastique du Moyen Age, and mesure leurs enjeux respectifs du point de vue de la connaissance en engageant le statut de la physique, des mathematiques and de la theologie.
Abstract: L'A. confronte la conception cartesienne de l'inference a la logique scolastique du Moyen Age, et mesure leurs enjeux respectifs du point de vue de la connaissance en engageant le statut de la physique, des mathematiques et de la theologie
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors reconstruct Goodman's and Elgin's answer to the specific question: "What distinguishes the pictorial from the verbal or linguistic?" and reveal some major motivations behind their system-oriented approach and indicate some reasons why a strategy of this kind is to a certain extent mandatory to grasp the nature of pictorial representations.
Abstract: Philosophical discussions of depiction sometimes suffer from a lack of differentiation between several questions concerning the ‘nature’ of pictorial representation. To provide a suitable framework I distinguish six such questions and several levels on which one might want to proceed in order to answer some of them. With this background, I reconstruct Goodman's and Elgin's answer to the specific question: ‘What distinguishes the pictorial from the verbal or linguistic?’ I try to reveal some major motivations behind their system-oriented approach and to indicate some reasons why a strategy of this kind is to a certain extent mandatory to grasp the ‘nature of the pictorial’. The system-relative and functional character of depiction has to be captured by every adequate theory.
Journal Article•
TL;DR: The reprise d'un interet certain pour la philosophie de la science sociale est due en partie a l'attention nouvelle qui se porte sur les methodes empiristes pouvant proposer une explication rationnelle du comportement humain this article.
Abstract: La reprise d'un interet certain pour la philosophie de la science sociale est due en partie a l'attention nouvelle qui se porte sur les methodes empiristes pouvant proposer une explication rationnelle du comportement humain
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that internalistic foundationalist theories of the justification of memory belief are inadequate, and they argue against any theory that requires a memory belief to be based on a phenomenal state in order to be justified.
Abstract: In this paper I argue that internalistic foundationalist theories of the justification of memory belief are inadequate. Taking a discussion of John Pollock as a starting point, I argue against any theory that requires a memory belief to be based on a phenomenal state in order to be justified. I then consider another version of internalistic foundationalism and claim that it, too, is open to important objections. Finally, I note that both varieties of foundationalism fail to account for the epistemic status of our justified nonoccurrent beliefs, and hence are drastically incomplete.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that entia rationis, in what they call the via antiqua sense, are objects of thought and signification, required by a certain kind of semantics, but undesirable as objects simpliciter in ontology.
Abstract: In this paper I want to argue for two theses concerning entia rationis. My first thesis is that entia rationis, in what I would call the via antiqua1 sense, are objects of thought and signification, required by a certain kind of semantics, but undesirable as objects simpliciter in ontology. My second thesis is that this systematic role of entia rationis in the via antiqua tradition of mediaeval thought was simply eliminated by the advent of Ockhamist semantics, which opened the way towards a radical reinterpretation of the concept of entia rationis and towards a new research programme for ontology. In the next section of this paper, therefore, I start my discussion with a case study of the systematic role played by entia rationis in the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, a typical representative of the via antiqua tradition, occasionally drawing parallels with and taking illustrations from the works of other mediaeval thinkers, too.2 In the third section I give a systematic account of all kinds of entia rationis against the background of a comprehensive semantic theory constructed in the spirit of the via antiqua tradition. In the fourth section I describe the ways William Ockham's approach changed this semantic back ground, and examine how these changes influenced the concept of entia rationis. In the concluding section of the paper I present a simple formal reconstruction of what I take to be Ockham's basic innovations in semantics, and discuss briefly the new ontological programme it in itiated.
TL;DR: In contemporary thought, Clifford Geertz's name has become closely associated with an interpretive approach not only to anthropology but also to social science generally (including history).
Abstract: In contemporary thought, Clifford Geertz's name has become closely associated with an interpretive approach not only to anthropology but also to social science generally (including history).1 Although Peter Winch, Charles Talyor, Alfred Schutz, Paul Ricoeur, Hans-Georg Gad amer, and J?rgen Habermas are also advocates of interpretivism, Geertz is perhaps the only well known one who has actually used this approach in practicing social science. Thus, while the other advocates' writings have provided a philosophical rationale, Geertz's theoretical papers together with his anthropological fieldwork have provided both a rationale and a concrete model of what the results of an interpretive approach would look like. There is no doubt that Geertz's work has had a great impact on the anthropological profession itself. It has revived the holistic and the humanistic approaches to culture of Kroeber and of Boas in American anthropology.2 In addition, he has challenged his colleagues to reject the natural science approach that tends to dominate the profession. As Paul Shankman has noted:
TL;DR: In this article, a robust version of non-reductive materialism, called supervenient token-physicalism, is proposed to defend against the charge that nonreduction materialism leads to epiphenomenalism in failing to account for the causal or explanatory relevance of mental properties.
Abstract: Jaegwon Kim and others have claimed that (strong) psychophysical supervenience entails the reducibility of mental properties to physical properties. I argue that this claim is unwarranted with respect to epistemic (explanatory) reducibility (either of a ‘global’ or of a ‘local’ sort), as well as with respect to ontological reducibility. I then attempt to show that a robust version of nonreductive materialism (which I call ‘supervenient token-physicalism’) can be defended against the charge that nonreductive materialism leads to epiphenomenalism in failing to account for the causal or explanatory relevance of mental properties.
TL;DR: The authors demontrer de quelle maniere la theory de obligations de la logica moderna peut etre replacee dans le contexte de la theorie aristotelicienne de controverse, telle qu'elle a ete interpretee au Moyen Age.
Abstract: L'objectif de l'A. est de demontrer de quelle maniere la theorie des obligations de la logica moderna peut etre replacee dans le contexte de la theorie aristotelicienne de controverse, telle qu'elle a ete interpretee au Moyen Age
TL;DR: Laws in social science, if the authors had them, would contain many more variables than those in physics, and yet they berate the social scientist for not being able to do what even the natural scientist cannot do.
Abstract: Laws in social science, if we had them, would contain many more variables than those in physics. Yet we berate the social scientist for not being able to do what even the natural scientist cannot do. The multiplicity and complexity of factors in social phenomena impose limitations upon what we can reasonably expect to achieve. These limitations are only a practical, though perhaps practically insuperable, difficulty and we simply do the best we can. May Brodbeck (1962, p. 47)
TL;DR: In this paper, the measurement problem of quantum theory is discussed, and the difficulty of trying to solve it within the confines of a local, Lorentz-invariant physics is emphasised.
Abstract: The measurement problem of quantum theory is discussed, and the difficulty of trying to solve it within the confines of a local, Lorentz-invariant physics is emphasised. This leads to the obvious suggestion to seek a solution beyond physics, in particular, by introducing the concept of consciousness. The resulting dualistic model, in the natural form suggested by quantum theory, is shown to differ in several respects from the classical model of Descartes, and to suggest solutions to some of the long-standing problems concerning the relation of consciousness to the physical world.
TL;DR: In the early seventeenth century, the thought that if humans are not placed at the centre of the universe they can lay no claim to special status in the 'great chain of being' may have done something to delay the end of geocentrism as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: The Aristotelian universe was finite; ours is infinite. The Earth was at the centre of that older model; it has no special position now. Man, says Alexandre Koyr? (1958, p. 1), has "lost his place in the world". The scientific revolution has brought forth "the destruction of the Cos mos, the disappearance ... of the conception of the world as a finite, closed, and hierarchically ordered whole". It was perhaps inevitable, certainly understandable, that early cos mology would tackle questions like these, about the relationship of humanity to God, and the place of humans in the ontological order of the universe. In the seventeenth century, the thought that if humans are not placed at the centre of the universe they can lay no claim to special status in the 'great chain of being' may have done something to delay the end of geocentrism. The proponents of heliocentrism were not innocent of this sort of concern either. As Koyr? says:
TL;DR: This article showed that a system whose expected state changes with time cannot have both a forward-directed translationally invariant probabilistic law and a backward-directed temporal invariant law.
Abstract: A system whose expected state changes with time cannot have both a forward-directed translationally invariant probabilistic law and a backward-directed translationally invariant law. When faced with this choice, science seems to favor the former. An asymmetry between cause and effect may help to explain why temporally oriented laws are usually forward-directed.
TL;DR: The notion of common sense was then questioned as the certainties of one's own culture were seen to clash with those of other cultures, and some simply insisted on the incorrigible veracity of the common sense or custom; through ostracism and sometimes force some elements of the status quo fought to close Athenian society to currents of change.
Abstract: A concern about objectivity and rationality has been a major impetus to the development of philosophy in the West. Students of Greek philosophy are well aware of the effect that new currents of thinking about custom, knowledge, and belief had in motivating the inquiries that Socrates first undertook, inquiries about objectivity and truth that were codified and transmitted into our philosophical culture by his student Plato. As the society of the Athenians opened up both to dissident voices from within and to new perspectives from the nonAthenian world, common sense modes of justifying thought and action were questioned. A slight but significant awareness of the role of history in human affairs led to an inkling among some Athenians that modes of life that had previously been taken as divinely revealed and established might actually be simply the result of time and chance. The very notion of common sense was then questioned as the certainties of one's own culture were seen to clash with those of other cultures. In response to these destabilizing currents, some simply insisted on the incorrigible veracity of common sense or custom; through ostracism and sometimes force some elements of the status quo fought to close Athenian society to currents of change. Others, including many of those called Sophists, took the new knowledge about history and other cultures to imply a sort of relativism or subjectivism; combined with a proto-Nietzschean view of power and belief these Sophists taught the pursuit of influence rather than the acceptance of custom. Philosophy takes root in the West when Socrates enters the fray to oppose both the common-sensists and the relativists in the name of objectivity, and in so doing to engage in a radically new kind of thinking. Socrates' legacy to future philosophers is contained in his insistence that objective inquiry into the nature and worth of our most basic beliefs and practices is possible, and that rationality is a central part of any human life worth living. He rejects, then, both the 'head in the
TL;DR: In this article, the problem of establishing the temporal limits of the contradictory conditions involved in some changes such as the change from white to not-white is addressed, which can be summed up as follows: in the case of a body changing from a body to a body, the temporal interval taken by its change can be divided into two parts, namely, a first part during which the body is white, and a second during which it is not white.
Abstract: In Physics VIII 8, Aristotle deals with a difficulty in the temporal description of changes between contradictory conditions, which derives from his doctrine of the continuity of time. The problem arises in establishing the temporal limits of the contradictory conditions involved in some changes such as the change from white to not-white and can be summed up as follows: in the case of a body changing from white to not-white, the temporal interval taken by its change can be divided into two parts, namely, a first part during which the body is white, and a second during which it is not-white. The continuity of time and the properties of contradictory conditions, however, exclude a simple solution to the problem of temporal limits, i.e., that both a last instant in which the body is white and a first instant in which it is not white exist and that these two instants are different, being respectively the last instant of the temporal part during which the body is white and the first instant of the temporal part during which it is not-white. Yet, if these two instants are different, then, because of the continuity of time, there is a temporal interval between them; but since this time is after the last instant of the temporal part during which white exists and before the first instant of the temporal part during which not-white exists, it follows that during such an interval the body is neither white nor not-white, and this violates the law of the excluded middle. Further more, if one maintains that there is only one instant at which the two successive temporal parts join and that such an instant is both the last instant in which white exists and the first instant in which not-white exists, then the law of non-contradiction is violated, since in the same instant the body would be both white and not-white. Thus, if the law of the excluded middle and the law of non-contradiction are to be
TL;DR: In a recent article comparing my views with those of Sir Karl Popper, NANCY C A R T W R I G H T Altport argues (p. 56) that it is Popper's "lofty vision" as opposed to my "more practical and bottom up" perspective that will "communicate the excitement of pure research and the beauty of the theoretical vision that motivates it" as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: theory or which we can only come to understand or learn more about via this abstract theory, I agree. For these particles, our degree of belief can be no greater than our degree of belief in the abstract theory. I did not want to claim that particles are always more welt known or knowable than theories. Rather my claim was that there is a kind of explanation causal explanation that particles can provide that is closed to laws, and that for this kind of explanation, inference to the best explanation is valid. I suspect, however, that Atlport may be making a quite different point I do not yet understand. In the end Allport turns to aesthetics. He does not want in any way to rest the case for unifying covering taws on questions of beauty, since he takes this not to provide a defence of a sufficiently realist perspective. Nevertheless he does take questions of aesthetics seriously as well. In a recent article comparing my views with those of Sir Karl Popper, 1° 300 NANCY C A R T W R I G H T Altport argues (p. 56) that it is Popper's \"lofty vision\" as opposed to my \"more practical\" and \"bottom up\" perspective that will \"communicate the excitement of pure research and the beauty of the theoretical vision that motivates it\". That I think depends entirely on where one finds beauty. Popper and Allport, it seems, find beauty in \"the mastery of the whole world of experience, by subsuming it ultimately under one unified theoretical structure\" (Allport here is quoting Gerald Holton). I follow Gerard Manley Hopkins and look elsewhere: \"Glory be to God for dappled things . . . . All things counter, original, spare, strange; Whatever is fickle, freckled (who knows how?)\" 12
TL;DR: The authors show that these new forms of the argument are fallacious and give an exposition of and rebuttal to the original Chinese room argument, and then a brief introduction to the essentials of connectionism.
Abstract: Searle has recently used two adaptations of his Chinese room argument in an attack on connectionism. I show that these new forms of the argument are fallacious. First I give an exposition of and rebuttal to the original Chinese room argument, and then a brief introduction to the essentials of connectionism.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that Catastrophe theory is not only to be judged on its practical "results" which are in fact limited, but also on its epistemological and philosophical implications.
Abstract: Catastrophe theory has been sharply criticized because it does not seem to have practical applications nor does it seem to allow us to increase our power over Nature. I want to ‘rehabilitate’ the theory by foregoing the controversy raised by scientists about its practical efficiency. After a short exposition of the theory's mathematical formalism and a detailed analysis of the main objections that have been raised against it, I argue that theory is not only to be judged on its practical ‘results’, which are in fact limited, but also on its epistemological and philosophical implications. Catastrophe theory indeed represents a real revolution in science: it announces the coming of a more theoretical, less practical, science, having more to do with understanding reality than with acting on it, and, from that point of view, it may be considered as the modern philosophy of Nature.
TL;DR: In this paper, it was shown that mere appeal to modal operators in the sense of sentence-to-sentence devices is insufficient to escape the Paradox of the Knower.
Abstract: Predicates are term-to-sentence devices, and operators are sentence-to-sentence devices. What Kaplan and Montague's Paradox of the Knower demonstrates is that necessity and other modalities cannot be treated as predicates, consistent with arithmetic; they must be treated as operators instead. Such is the current wisdom. A number of previous pieces have challenged such a view by showing that a predicative treatment of modalities neednot raise the Paradox of the Knower. This paper attempts to challenge the current wisdom in another way as well: to show that mere appeal to modal operators in the sense of sentence-to-sentence devices is insufficient toescape the Paradox of the Knower. A family of systems is outlined in which closed formulae can encode other formulae and in which the diagonal lemma and Paradox of the Knower are thereby demonstrable for operators in this sense.