Showing papers in "Synthese in 1997"

The case for the philosophy of chemistry

Abstract: The philosophy of chemistry has been sadly neglected by most contempory literature in the philosophy of science. This paper argues that this neglect has been unfortunate and that there is much to be learned from paying greater philosophical attention to the set of issues defined by the philosophy of chemistry. The potential contribution of this field to such current topics as reduction, laws, explanation, and supervenience is explored, as are possible applications of insights gained by such study to the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of social science.

Mathematics. a science of patterns

Abstract: The present article aims at showing that it is possible to construct a realist philosophy of mathematics which commits one neither to dream the dreams of Platonism nor to reduce the word 'realism' to mere noise. It is argued that mathematics is a science of patterns, where patterns are not objects (or properties of objects), but aspects, or aspects of aspects, etc. of objects. (The notion of aspect originates from ideas sketched by Wittgenstein in the Philosophical Investigations.) The philosophical importance of this contribution is mainly in the successfulness of the attempt made to justify a view of mathematics which, holding on to a Tarskian/Aristotelian conception of mathematical truth, does not involve the postulation of entities which are beyond the bounds of experience.

On the need for properties : The road to pythagoreanism and back

Abstract: The development of a compositional model shows the incoherence of such notions as levels of being and both bottom-up and top-down causality. The mathematization of nature through the partial considerations of physics qua quantities is seen to lead to Pythagoreanism, if what is not included in the partial consideration is denied. An ontology of only probabilities, if not Pythagoreanism, is equivalent to a world of primitive dispositionalities. Problems are found with each. There is a need for properties as well as quantities and these properties must be qualitative as well as dispositional. So there is a need for physical qualia (qualities) for the depiction of the intrinsic character of the finest interstices of nature.

The phenomenology of mathematical beauty

Abstract: Whereas painters and musicians are likely to be embarrassed by references to the beauty of their work, mathematicians enjoy discussions of the beauty of mathematics. Professional artists stress the technical rather than the aesthetic aspects of their work. Mathematicians, instead, are fond of passing judgment on the beauty of their favored pieces of mathematics. A cursory observation shows that the characteristics of mathematical beauty are at variance with those of artistic beauty. Courses in “art appreciation” are fairly common; it is unthinkable to find any “mathematical beauty appreciation” courses. We will try to uncover the sense of the term “beauty” as it is used by mathematicians.

The logical problem of language acquisition

Abstract: Arguments from the ‘Logical Problem of Language Acquisition’ suggest that since linguistic experience provides few negative data that would falsify overgeneral grammatical hypotheses, innate knowledge of the principles of Universal Grammar must constrain learners’ hypothesis formulation. Although this argument indicates a need for domain-specific constraints, it does not support their innateness. Learning from mostly positive data proceeds unproblematically in virtually all domains. Since not every domain can plausibly be accorded its own special faculty, the probative value of the argument in the linguistic case is dubious. In ignoring the holistic and probablistic nature of theory construction, the argument underestimates the extent to which positive data can supply negative evidence and hence overestimates the intractability of language learning in the absence of a dedicated faculty. While nativism about language remains compelling, the alleged ‘Logical Problem’ contributes nothing to its plausibility and the emphasis on the Problem in the recent acquisition literature has been a mistake.

The phenomenology of mathematical proof

Abstract: Everybody knows what a mathematical proof is. A proof of a mathematical theorem is a sequence of steps which leads to the desired conclusion. The rules to be followed in this sequence of steps were made explicit when logic was formalized early in this century and they have not changed since. These rules can be used to disprove a putative proof by spotting logical errors; they cannot, however, be used to find the missing proof of a mathematical conjecture.

Internalism, externalism and the no-defeater condition

Abstract: Despite various attempts to rectify matters, the internalism-externalism (I-E) debate in epistemology remains mired in serious confusion. I present a new account of this debate, one which fits well with entrenched views on the I-E distinction and illuminates the fundamental disagreements at the heart of the debate. Roughly speaking, the I-E debate is over whether or not certain of the necessary conditions of positive epistemic status are internal. But what is the sense of ‘internal’ here? And of which conditions of which positive epistemic status are we speaking? I argue that an adequate answer to these questions requires reference to what I call the no-defeater condition which is satisfied by a subject’s belief B just in case she does not believe that B is defeated. I close by stating succinctly the main positions taken in the I-E debate, identifying the basic points of disagreement and suggesting fruitful courses for future discussion.

Chemistry as the science of the transformation of substances

Abstract: Definissant la chimie comme la science macroscopique des substances et de leurs tranformations, l'A. souleve la question de la reductibilite des notions macroscopiques telles que la substance chimique, l'equilibre et la temperature, au domaine de la microphysique. Examinant la relation entre l'image manifeste et l'image scientifique (Sellars) a travers l'exemple de l'eau (Hare), l'A. montre qu'il ne peut y avoir de reduction de la thermodynamique physico-chimique a la physique statique, d'une part, ni de la chimie moleculaire a la mecanique quantique par l'intermediaire de la chimie quantique, d'autre part

Can the Decoherence Approach Help to Solve the Measurement Problem

Abstract: This work examines whether the environmentally-induced decoherence approach in quantum mechanics brings us any closer to solving the measurement problem, and whether it contributes to the elimination of subjectivism in quantum theory. A distinction is made between ,collapse, and ,decoherence,, so that an explanation for decoherence does not imply an explanation for collapse. After an overview of the measurement problem and of the open-systems paradigm, we argue that taking a partial trace is equivalent to applying the projection postulate. A criticism of Zurek's decoherence approach to measurements is also made, based on the restriction that he must impose on the interaction between apparatus and environment. We then analyze the element of subjectivity involved in establishing the boundary between system and environment, and criticize the incorporation of Everett's branching of memory records into the decoherence research program. Sticking to this program, we end by sketching a proposal for ‘environmentally-induced collapse’.

Husserl and hilbert on completeness

Abstract: Soulevant la question de la deduction de la verite d'une theorie a partir de sa consistance chez Husserl et Hilbert, l'A. montre que la refutation de la conception fregeenne de la verite et de la non-contradiction des axiomes de la geometrie, entreprise par Hilbert a partir de la definition de l'axiome de la completude, a influence l'approche genetique du probleme de l'imaginaire developpee par Husserl dans la «Philosophie de l'arithmetique»

Curie's principle

Abstract: A reading is given of Curie's Principle that the symmetry of a cause is always preserved its effects. The truth of the principle is demonstrated and its importance, under the proposed reading, is defended.

Causation in branching time (I): Transitions, events and causes

Abstract: We propose a theory of events and causes against the background of branching time. Notions discussed include possibility based on reality, transitions, events, determinacy, contingency, causes and effects. The main idea in defining causal relations is to introduce a certain preconditioning circumstance under which one event follows another. We also briefly compare this theory with some other theories.

Molecular shape, reduction, explanation and approximate concepts

Abstract: Soulevant la question de l'irreductibilite explicative de la notion de forme moleculaire, l'A. montre que les concepts approximatifs propres a la philosophie de la chimie, tels que la force, le gene, l'espece et l'esprit, ne peuvent etre reduits, ni de facon explicative, ni de facon eliminative, aux concepts ontologiques de la physique, a moins de reinterpreter les notions memes de reduction, concept et propriete essentielle

Husserl's phenomenology and weyl's predictivism

Abstract: In this paper I discuss the version of predicative analysis put forward by Hermann Weyl in Das Kontinuum. I try to establish how much of the underlying motivation for Weyl's position may be due to his acceptance of a phenomenological philosophical perspective. More specifically, I analyze Weyl's philosophical ideas in connexion with the work of Husserl, in particular Logische Untersuchungen} and Ideen .

Laws and development

Abstract: J J C Smart (1963) once argued that biology is unlike the physical sciences because there are no laws in biology While physics and chemistry can construct general theories centered on genuine laws, biology is limited to case studies that make use of the laws of physics and chemistry: biology is more like engineering than it is like the physical sciences The debate about biological laws has continued since Smart’s condemnation of laws in biology, drawing both philosophers and biologists into its wake For instance, Mayr (1988) argues that one of the chief differences between biology and the physical sciences is that biology has no genuine laws Hull (1978) claims that since species and taxa are individuals and not natural kinds, no statements that refer to species or taxa can be construed as laws Waters (1986) asserts that the principle of natural selection is not a law, and Beatty (1981) argues that the laws of population genetics are not laws On the other side, Brandon (1981), Sober (1984), Rosenberg (1985), and Resnik (1988) argue that the principle of natural selection is a law, and Rosenberg (1985) asserts that molecular biology also contains laws Finally, van der Steen and Kamminga (1991) discuss the tension between laws and natural history in biology In this paper I will examine the argument against developmental laws in more depth I will agree with the neo-Darwinian orthodoxy that the socalled developmental laws proposed by the process structuralists are not genuine biological laws, although I will not accept the standard arguments for this position The standard arguments against biological laws claim that biological generalizations are not laws because they describe mere accidental, historical features of the living world I will argue that, on the contrary, a statement could be a law even though it may describe accidental (or historical) features of the world Whether a statement is a law depends on the role it plays in inquiry: laws typically play a more central role in inquiry than accidental generalizations Thus, the reason why the laws proposed by the developmental biologists are not laws of nature is that

The Tractatus System of Arithmetic

Abstract: The philosophy of arithmetic of Wittgenstein's Tractatus is outlined and the central role played in it by the general notion of operation is pointed out. Following which, the language, the axioms and the rules of a formal theory of operations, extracted from the Tractatus, are presented and a theorem of interpretability of the equational fragment of Peano's Arithmetic into such a formal theory is proven.

Bibliography on philosophy of chemistry

Abstract: Bibliographie consacree a la philosophie de la chimie en son sens large, incluant les ouvrages en histoire de la chimie et en education de la chimie. Remplacant la bibliographie etablie par van Brakel et Vermeeren en 1981, l'A. se propose de publier regulierement une remise a jour de la presente liste (1912-1996) qui privilegie les publications de langue anglaise et se limite a quelques references en allemand

Haack on Justification and Experience

Abstract: Evidence and Inquiry1 is a wonderfully rich and insightful book. It contains compelling analyses and critiques of a wide variety of epistemological and anti-epistemological views pertaining to empirical knowledge, including recent versions of foundationalism and coherentism, Popper's "epistemol ogy without a knowing subject", Quine's naturalized epistemology, Gold man's reliabilism, the scientistic views of Stich and the Churchlands, and the "vulgar pragmatism", as Haack quite appropriately refers to it, of Rorty and the more recent Stich. All of this material is valuable, and much of it seems to me entirely decisive. In particular, the critical discussion of reliabilism is by far the best and most complete in the literature; and the analysis and refutation of the various recent efforts to evade or dismiss the traditional epistemological projects and issues is nothing short of devas tating. Indeed, it is its resolute refusal to be diverted from the pursuit of the traditional epistemological issues that seems to me the most valuable feature of the book. In this spirit, while applauding Haack's demolition of the various anti epistemological views ? it was dirty work, but someone had to do it I will focus here on her discussions of the views that attempt to solve rather than dissolve the traditional epistemological issues concerning empirical knowledge. I will begin by considering Haack's critique of recent versions of coherentism and foundationalism. I will then turn to a more extended exposition and evaluation of her own proposed third alternative, which she dabsfoundherentism.

Cognition Is Not Computation: The Argument from Irreversibility

Abstract: The dominant scientific and philosophical view of the mind – according to which, put starkly, cognition is computation – is refuted herein, via specification and defense of the following new argument: Computation is reversible; cognition isn't; ergo, cognition isn't computation. After presenting a sustained dialectic arising from this defense, we conclude with a brief preview of the view we would put in place of the cognition-is-computation doctrine.

Truth conditions of tensed sentence types

Abstract: Quentin Smith has argued that the new tenseless theory of time is faced with insurmountable problems and should be abandoned in favour of the tensed theory of time. Smith's main argument attacks the fundamental premise of the tenseless theory: that tenseless truth conditions for tokens of tensed sentences adequately capture the meaning of tensed sentences. His position is that tenseless truth conditions cannot explain the logical relations between tensed sentences, thus the tensed theory must be accepted. Against Smith, this paper adopts an alternative approach to the explanation of the entailment relations between sentences which contain indexicals. The approach drops the reliance upon tokens and instead relies on the evaluation of sentence types with respect to a context rather than upon actual or possible utterances of tokens of the types. This (new) version of the tenseless theory of time can adequately explain the relevant entailment relations between tensed sentences.

Mathematics, models and zeno's paradoxes

Abstract: A version of nonstandard analysis, Internal Set Theory, has been used to provide a resolution of Zeno's paradoxes of motion. This resolution is inadequate because the application of Internal Set Theory to the paradoxes requires a model of the world that is not in accordance with either experience or intuition. A model of standard mathematics in which the ordinary real numbers are defined in terms of rational intervals does provide a formalism for understanding the paradoxes. This model suggests that in discussing motion, only intervals, rather than instants, of time are meaningful. The approach presented here reconciles resolutions of the paradoxes based on considering a finite number of acts with those based on analysis of the full infinite set Zeno seems to require. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of the classical and quantum mechanics of performing an infinite number of acts in a finite time.

Despite Pyhsicists, Proof is Essential in Mathematics.

Abstract: Soulevant la question du statut de la preuve mathematique, l'A. montre que la decouverte et la justification d'importants resultats mathematiques ont ete realisees avant d'en etablir la preuve reelle. Mesurant l'interraction des mathematiques avec la physique theorique et la theorie du champ quantique, l'A. etablit un lien entre le caractere prometheen des mathematiques dans le domaine des sciences et le caractere essentiel de la preuve pour les mathematiques

Proof and the evolution of mathematics

Abstract: Definissant les mathematiques comme une science proche de la physique dans leur volonte de comprendre la nature, l'A. montre que la verification scientifique et la preuve mathematique different dans leur degre de certitude. Soulevant la question d'un changement des standards generaux et des buts de la physique theorique, l'A. montre que l'idee de preuve mathematique a evolue ces dernieres annees, sous la double impulsion d'une interraction entre les mathematiques et la physique, d'une part, et de l'apparition de nouveaux modes de communication avec internet, d'autre part

From completeness to archimedean completenes

Abstract: A partir d'une analogie entre le systeme numerique de H. Hahn et l'approche des nombres reels par Hilbert, l'A. mesure le role des proprietes de completude et de fixation dans l'etude comparative des champs archimediens ordonnes, d'une part, et dans l'analyse des modeles de la geometrie euclidienne (geometrie cartesienne, systeme elementaire de Tarski), d'autre part, a la lumiere des axiomes de la continuite definis par Hilbert et Bernays

On the Actual Impact of Deterministic Chaos

Abstract: The notion of (deterministic) chaos is frequently used in an increasing number of scientific (as well as non-scientific) contexts, ranging from mathematics and the physics of dynamical systems to all sorts of complicated time evolutions, e.g., in chemistry, biology, physiology, economy, sociology, and even psychology. Despite (or just because of) these widespread applications, however, there seem to fluctuate around several misunderstandings about the actual impact of deterministic chaos on several problems of philosophical interest, e.g., on matters of prediction and computability, and determinism and the free will. In order to clarify these points a survey of the meaning variance of the concept(s) of deterministic chaos, or the various contexts in which it is applied, is given, and its actual epistemological implications are extracted. In summary, it turns out that the various concepts of deterministic chaos do not constitute a “new science”, or a “revolutionary” change of the “scientific world picture”. Instead, chaos research provides a sort of toolbox of methods which are certainly useful for a more detailed analysis and understanding of such dynamical systems which are, roughly speaking, endowed with the property of exponential sensitivity on initial conditions. Such a property, then, implies merely one, but quantitatively strong type of limitation of long-time computability and predictability, respectively.

What Was Aristotle Doing in His Early Logic, Anyway? a Reply to Woods and Hansen

Abstract: En reponse a l'article precedent de J. Woods et H. Hansen critiquant sa lecture de la conception aristotelicienne du paralogisme («Hintikka on Aristotle's fallacies», in «Synthese», 113, 2, 1997, pp. 217-39), l'A. montre que la distinction etablie entre les erreurs relevant de l'inference logique et celles relevant du questionnement constitue une classification anachronique des paralogismes etudies par Aristote dans les «Topiques» et dans le traite «De sophisticis elenchis» consacre a la methode socratique d'enquete rationnelle

A Defense of Backwards in Time Causation Models in Quantum Mechanics

Abstract: This paper offers a defense of backwards in time causation models in quantum mechanics. Particular attention is given to Cramer's transactional account, which is shown to have the threefold virtue of solving the Bell problem, explaining the complex conjugate aspect of the quantum mechanical formalism, and explaining various quantum mysteries such as Schrodinger's cat. The question is therefore asked, why has this model not received more attention from physicists and philosophers? One objection given by physicists in assessing Cramer's theory was that it is not testable. This paper seeks to answer this concern by utilizing an argument that backwards causation models entail a fork theory of causal direction. From the backwards causation model together with the fork theory one can deduce empirical predictions. Finally, the objection that this strategy is questionable because of its appeal to philosophy is deflected.

Kant's Syntheticity Revisited by Peirce

Abstract: This paper reconstructs the Peircean interpretation of Kant's doctrine on the syntheticity of mathematics. Peirce correctly locates Kant's distinction in two different sources: Kant's lack of access to polyadic logic and, more interestingly, Kant's insight into the role of ingenious experiments required in theorem-proving. In this second respect, Kant's analytic/synthetic distinction is identical with the distinction Peirce discovered among types of mathematical reasoning. I contrast this Peircean theory with two other prominent views on Kant's syntheticity, i.e. the Russellian and the Beckian views, and show how Peirce's interpretation of Kant solves the dilemma that each of these two views faces. I also show that Hintikka's criterion for Kant's synthetic judgments, i.e. a new individual introduced by the ∃-instantiation rule, does not capture the most important characteristic of Peirce's theorematic reasoning, i.e. the process of choosing a correct individual.

Hilbert and set theory

Abstract: Mesurant l'influence episodique d'Hilbert sur le developpement de la theorie des ensembles, l'A. examine l'utilisation des preuves non-constructives de l'existence, l'axiomatisation de la geometrie euclidienne, l'axiome de la completude et l'arithmetique des nombres reels chez Hilbert. Le programme hilbertien de la consistance des mathematiques est ensuite evalue a la lumiere de l'oeuvre de Godel (hypothese de la continuite) et a la lumiere des developpements recents dans le domaine des mathematiques inversees

Hintikka on Aristotle's fallacies

Abstract: Critique de l'interpretation des paralogismes aristoteliciens developpee par J. Hintikka dans son article intitule «The fallacy of fallacies» (in «Argumentation», 1, 1987, pp. 211-38). Rejetant le modele interrogatif defendu par Hintikka, l'A. montre que la definition du paralogisme etablie par Aristote dans les «Topiques» et dans le traite «De sophisticis elenchis» n'est pas celle d'une erreur essentielle dans le questionnement, et d'une erreur accidentelle dans le raisonnement deductif; au contraire, le paralogisme est une erreur logique essentielle et une erreur accidentelle dans le questionnement