Showing papers in "Synthese in 1998"
TL;DR: It is shown that the relational theory needs nothing more than the physical, minimal criterion of identity as defined by Everett's theory, and that this can be transparently interpreted in terms of the ordinary notion of the chance occurrence of an event, as witnessed in the present.
Abstract: A variety of ideas arising in decoherence theory, and in the ongoing debate over Everett's relative-state theory, can be linked to issues in relativity theory and the philosophy of time, specifically the relational theory of tense and of identity over time. These have been systematically presented in companion papers (Saunders 1995; 1996a); in what follows we shall consider the same circle of ideas, but specifically in relation to the interpretation of probability, and its identification with relations in the Hilbert Space norm. The familiar objection that Everett's approach yields probabilities different from quantum mechanics is easily dealt with. The more fundamental question is how to interpret these probabilities consistent with the relational theory of change, and the relational theory of identity over time. I shall show that the relational theory needs nothing more than the physical, minimal criterion of identity as defined by Everett's theory, and that this can be transparently interpreted in terms of the ordinary notion of the chance occurrence of an event, as witnessed in the present. It is in this sense that the theory has empirical content.
117 citations
TL;DR: It is argued that within the rather narrow context in which this complete and consistent mode of uncertain reasoning is actually characterised by the observance of just a single common sense principle (or slogan).
Abstract: This paper concerns the question of how to draw inferences common sensically from uncertain knowledge. Since the early work of Shore and Johnson (1980), Paris and Vencovska (1990), and Csiszar (1989), it has been known that the Maximum Entropy Inference Process is the only inference process which obeys certain common sense principles of uncertain reasoning. In this paper we consider the present status of this result and argue that within the rather narrow context in which we work this complete and consistent mode of uncertain reasoning is actually characterised by the observance of just a single common sense principle (or slogan).
104 citations
TL;DR: It is argued that names are in fact rigidly designating indexicals, and that fully developed, the direct reference theory's best strategy for solving the puzzles amounts to the adoption of the indexical theory of names.
Abstract: Indexicals are unique among expressions in that they depend for their literal content upon extra-semantic features of the contexts in which they are uttered Taking this peculiarity of indexicals into account yields solutions to variants of Frege's Puzzle involving objects of attitude-bearing of an indexical nature If names are indexicals, then the classical versions of Frege's Puzzle can be solved in the same way Taking names to be indexicals also yields solutions to tougher, more recently-discovered puzzles such as Kripke's well-known case involving Paderewski We argue that names are in fact rigidly designating indexicals We also argue that fully developed, the direct reference theory's best strategy for solving the puzzles amounts to the adoption of the indexical theory of names – a move that we argue should be thought of as a natural development of the direct reference theory, and not as antagonistic to it
86 citations
TL;DR: The consequences of Nietzsche's perspectivism for notions of truth and objectivity are investigated, and it is shown how the metaphor of visual perspective motivates an epistemology that avoids self-referential difficulties.
Abstract: I investigate the consequences of Nietzsche's perspectivism for notions of truth and objectivity, and show how the metaphor of visual perspective motivates an epistemology that avoids self-referential difficulties. Perspectivism's claim that every view is only one view, applied to itself, is often supposed to preclude the perspectivist's ability to offer reasons for her epistemology. Nietzsche's arguments for perspectivism depend on “internal reasons”, which have force not only in their own perspective, but also within the standards of alternative perspectives. Internal reasons allow a perspectivist argument against dogmatism without presupposing aperspectival criteria for theory choice. Nietzsche also offers “internal” conceptions of truth and objectivity which reduce them to a matter of meeting our epistemic standards. This view has pluralistic implications, which conflict with common sense, but it is nevertheless consistent and plausible. Nietzsche's position is similar to Putnam's recent internalism, and this is due to their common Kantian heritage.
73 citations
TL;DR: A systems-theoretical interpretation as a new version of an organizational account of functionality, which is more comprehensive than traditional cybernetic views and provides explicit criteria for empirically testable function ascriptions.
Abstract: Function and teleology can be naturalized either by reference to systems with a particular type of organization (organizational views) or by reference to a particular kind of history (etiological views). As functions are generally ascribed to states or traits according to their current role and regardless of their origin, etiological accounts are inappropriate. Here, I offer a systems-theoretical interpretation as a new version of an organizational account of functionality, which is more comprehensive than traditional cybernetic views and provides explicit criteria for empirically testable function ascriptions. I propose, that functional states, traits or items are those components of a complex system, which are under certain circumstances necessary for their self-re-production. I show, how this notion can be applied in intra- and trans-generational function ascriptions in biology, how it can deal with the problems of multifunctionality and functional equivalents, and how it relates to concepts like fitness and adaptation. Finally, I argue that most intentional explanations can be treated as functional explanations
71 citations
TL;DR: It is argued that rules that can serve as reasons for linguistic utterances cannot be considered as normative or meaning determining and are not capable of guiding speakers in the ordinary performance of speech acts.
Abstract: Can there be rules of language which serve both to determine meaning and to guide speakers in ordinary linguistic usage, i.e., in the production of speech acts? We argue that the answer is no. We take the guiding function of rules to be the function of serving as reasons for actions, and the question of guidance is then considered within the framework of practical reasoning. It turns out that those rules that can serve as reasons for linguistic utterances cannot be considered as normative or meaning determining. Acceptance of such a rule is simply equivalent to a belief about meaning, and does not even presuppose that meaning is determined by rules. Rules that can determine meaning, on the other hand, i.e., rules that can be regarded as constitutive of meaning, are not capable of guiding speakers in the ordinary performance of speech acts.
65 citations
TL;DR: The paper offers a new analysis of the difficulties involved in the construction of a general and substantive correspondence theory of truth and delineates a solution to these difficulties in the form of a new methodology.
Abstract: The paper offers a new analysis of the difficulties involved in the construction of a general and substantive correspondence theory of truth and delineates a solution to these difficulties in the form of a new methodology. The central argument is inspired by Kant, and the proposed methodology is explained and justified both in general philosophical terms and by reference to a particular variant of Tarski's theory. The paper begins with general considerations on truth and correspondence and concludes with a brief outlook on the “family” of theories of truth generated by the new methodology.
57 citations
TL;DR: Two philosophical traditions with much in common, (classical) pragmatism and (Heidegger's) hermeneutic philosophy, are compared with respect to their approach to the philosophy of science as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: Two philosophical traditions with much in common, (classical) pragmatism and (Heidegger's) hermeneutic philosophy, are here compared with respect to their approach to the philosophy of science. Both emphasize action as a mode of interpreting experience. Both have developed important categories – inquiry, meaning, theory, praxis, coping, historicity, life-world – and each has offered an alternative to the more traditional philosophies of science stemming from Descartes, Hume, and Comte. Pragmatism's abduction works with the dual perspectives of theory (as explanation) and praxis (as culture). The hermeneutical circle depends in addition on the lifeworld as background source of ontological meaning and resource for strategies of inquiry. Thus a hermeneutical philosophy of research involves three components: lifeworld (as ontological and strategic), theory (as explanatory), and praxis (as constitutive of culture).
54 citations
TL;DR: This paper offers a precise analysis, a model of “collective sociality”, including the two features of performativeness and reflexivity, and adds a third feature of sociality, the collective availability or “forgroupness” of collective social items.
Abstract: In recent philosophical and sociological literature, two important features of sociality in collective contexts have been emphasized by authors such as Barnes (1983), Bloor (1996), Kusch (1997), and Searle (1995). First, many social things and their characteristics are performatively created by “us” (group members). 1 For example, we may collectively bring about that certain pieces of metal qualify as money. Second, some central collective and social concepts have been regarded as reflexive in roughly the sense indicated by saying that money is not money unless collectively accepted to be money. Although the features of performativity and reflexivity have been discussed earlier (especially outside philosophy), little attempt has been made at giving a precise analysis. 2 Our account adds a third feature of sociality, the collective availability or “forgroupness” of collective social items. In this paper, we offer a precise analysis, a model of “collective sociality”, including the two features of performativeness and reflexivity. We speak of collective sociality, or of the collective-social features of things, rather than merely of “collectivity” or “sociality” here. This is because there are many kinds of things called social (e.g., thinking of other people) which need not be collective, and there are collective activities which are not social. Recall Weber’s example of people in the street simultaneously opening their umbrellas when it starts to rain – this is a non-socialcollective action. Basically, the predicate ‘collective’ in a pure sense applies to collections of people and their features. The predicate ‘social’ in contrast applies to mental (and other) interrelations between individuals. 3 What is more, we will be interested in the man-made or socially constructed aspects of the social world. The intersection of collective, social and constructed aspects forms the set of social features or properties that we will be interested in below. This we find analysandumwhich is intuitively
36 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the role of conditionals in rational decision making is investigated and a proof of a representation theorem for preferences defined on sets of sentences (and, in particular, conditional sentences), where an agent's preference for one sentence over another is understood to be a preference for receiving the news conveyed by the former is given.
Abstract: This paper investigates the role of conditionals in hypothetical reasoning and rational decision making. Its main result is a proof of a representation theorem for preferences defined on sets of sentences (and, in particular, conditional sentences), where an agent’s preference for one sentence over another is understood to be a preference for receiving the news conveyed by the former. The theorem shows that a rational preference ordering of conditional sentences determines probability and desirability representations of the agent’s degrees of belief and desire that satisfy, in the case of non-conditional sentences, the axioms of Jeffrey’s decision theory and, in the case of conditional sentences, Adams’ expression for the probabilities of conditionals. Furthermore, the probability representation is shown to be unique and the desirability representation unique up to positive linear transformation.
28 citations
Journal Article•
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue for the importance of the notion of integrated whole in both ontology and natural language semantics, in particular for the mass-count distinction, semantic selection, and semantics of part-structure modifiers.
Abstract: In this paper, I have argued for the importance of the notion of integrated whole in both ontology and natural language semantics. Whereas ontology only cares about essential integrity, notions of accidental and conceived integrity play a role in semantics of natural language as well - in particular, for the mass-count distinction, semantic selection, and the semantics of part-structure modifiers. Because of the restricted transitivity and closure principles, integrity conditions also influence what counts as the parts of an entity. Integrity itself, as we have seen, can be retrived from the information content of a reference situation. Hence, together with the ontological part structure, it is the content of a reference situation that determines the part structure of an entity. But this means that the reason why one and the same entity may have different situated part structures in different situations is simply because refernece situation may differ in information content. Formal mereological accounts of part structures - not only extensional mereological ones - have generally assumed that an entity could have only one part structure. But this is because, if those accounts acknowledged integrity at all as a component of part structures, they acknowledged only essential integrity. However, by admitting accidental and conceived integrity and partiality regarding the properties an object may have in a situation, the notion of a variable part structure of an object establishes itself rather naturally
TL;DR: There are tensions in Kripke's views concerning (A), though, and ultimately in the views of anyone who holds that (A) is necessary, and this paper draws attention to some of them and advances an argument for thinking that (B) is contingent.
Abstract: An identity statement flanked on both sides with proper names is necessarily true, Saul Kripke thinks, if it's true at all. Thus, contrary to the received view – or at least what was, prior to Kripke, the received view – a statement like
TL;DR: It is argued that a type-type identity thesis between computational states and physical states is no less plausible than a multiple realization thesis.
Abstract: The paper criticizes standard functionalist arguments for multiple realization. It focuses on arguments in which psychological states are conceived as computational, which is precisely where the multiple realization doctrine has seemed the strongest. It is argued that a type-type identity thesis between computational states and physical states is no less plausible than a multiple realization thesis. The paper also presents, more tentatively, positive arguments for a picture of local reduction.
TL;DR: This paper will show that there are some theories of causation that a compatibilist should not endorse: namely, counterfactual theories, specifically the one developed by David Lewis and a newer, amended version of his account.
Abstract: The problem of analyzing causation and the problem of incompatibilism versus compatibilism are largely distinct. Yet, this paper will show that there are some theories of causation that a compatibilist should not endorse: namely, counterfactual theories, specifically the one developed by David Lewis and a newer, amended version of his account. Endorsing either of those accounts of causation undercuts the main compatibilist reply to a powerful argument for incompatibilism. Conversely, the argument of this paper has the following message for incompatibilists: you have reason to consider defending a counterfactual theory of causation.
TL;DR: An analysis of these supertasks suggests that they involve systems that do not satisfy the mathematical conditions required of Newtonian systems at the time the supertask is due to be completed, or else they rely on the application of the time-reversal transformation to states which are not well-defined.
Abstract: In two recent papers Perez Laraudogoitia has described a variety of supertasks involving elastic collisions in Newtonian systems containing a denumerably infinite set of particles. He maintains that these various supertasks give examples of systems in which energy is not conserved, particles at rest begin to move spontaneously, particles disappear from a system, and particles are created ex nihilo. An analysis of these supertasks suggests that they involve systems that do not satisfy the mathematical conditions required of Newtonian systems at the time the supertask is due to be completed, or else they rely on the application of the time-reversal transformation to states which are not well-defined. Consequently, it is unjustified to conclude that the paradoxical results are arising from within the framework of Newtonian mechanics. In the last part of this article, we discuss various aspects of the physics of these supertasks.
TL;DR: The burden of proof is still on the shoulders of Tarski's critics, who have not lifted the burden, and arguments by John Etchemendy and Vann McGee to the effect that some of those properties are not necessary properties of some Tarskian logical truths are found unconvincing.
Abstract: This paper examines the question of the extensional correctness of Tarskian definitions of logical truth and logical consequence. I identify a few different informal properties which are necessary for a sentence to be an informal logical truth and look at whether they are necessary properties of Tarskian logical truths. I examine arguments by John Etchemendy and Vann McGee to the effect that some of those properties are not necessary properties of some Tarskian logical truths, and find them unconvincing. I stress the point that since the hypothesis that Tarski's definitions are extensionally correct is deeply entrenched, the burden of proof is still on the shoulders of Tarski's critics, who have not lifted the burden.
TL;DR: The improved Coherence argument is applied to van Fraassen's (1984) Reflection principle and points out the failure of a Coherence Argument that is intended to support Conditionalization as a naive, universal, update rule.
Abstract: I re-examine Coherence Arguments (Dutch Book Arguments, No Arbitrage Arguments) for diachronic constraints on Bayesian reasoning. I suggest to replace the usual game–theoretic coherence condition with a new decision–theoretic condition ('Diachronic Sure Thing Principle'). The new condition meets a large part of the standard objections against the Coherence Argument and frees it, in particular, from a commitment to additive utilities. It also facilitates the proof of the Converse Dutch Book Theorem. I first apply the improved Coherence Argument to van Fraassen's (1984) Reflection principle. I then point out the failure of a Coherence Argument that is intended to support Conditionalization as a naive, universal, update rule. I also point out that Reflection is incompatible with the universal use of Conditionalization thus interpreted. The Coherence Argument therefore defeats the naive view on Bayesian learning that it was originally designed to justify.
TL;DR: This essay can be seen as an attempt to rehabilitate the Picture Theory of Meaning, from the Tractatus, to show that the historical evolution of geometry can be interpreted as the development of the form of its language.
Abstract: The aim of this paper is to introduce Wittgenstein’s concept of the form of a language into geometry and to show how it can be used to achieve a better understanding of the development of geometry, from Desargues, Lobachevsky and Beltrami to Cayley, Klein and Poincare. Thus this essay can be seen as an attempt to rehabilitate the Picture Theory of Meaning, from the Tractatus. Its basic idea is to use Picture Theory to understand the pictures of geometry. I will try to show, that the historical evolution of geometry can be interpreted as the development of the form of its language. This confrontation of the Picture Theory with history of geometry sheds new light also on the ideas of Wittgenstein.
TL;DR: It is argued that the dynamical systems-based approach to individuation increases the plausibility of a theory that assigns reference as a function of the subject's causal history.
Abstract: Naturalistically minded philosophers hope to identify a privileged nonsemantic relation that holds between a mental representation m and that which m represents, a relation whose privileged status underwrites the assignment of reference to m. The naturalist can accomplish this task only if she has in hand a nonsemantic criterion for individuating mental representations: it would be question-begging for the naturalist to characterize m, for the purpose of assigning content, as 'the representation with such and such content'. If we individuate mental representations using the tools of dynamical systems theory, we find that a given mental representation, characterized nonsemantically, emerges in the cognitive system as the result of causal interactions between the subject and her environment. At least for the most basic of our mental representations, I argue that the dynamical systems-based approach to individuation increases the plausibility of a theory that assigns reference as a function of the subject's causal history.
TL;DR: A conceptual model of the supervenience relation is presented that captures all the important extant concepts (and suggests a few new ones) without ignoring the complexities uncovered during work over the past two decades.
Abstract: Discussion of the supervenience relation in the philosophical literature of recent years has become Byzantine in its intricacy and diversity. Subtle modulations of the basic concept have been tooled and retooled with increasing frequency, until supervenience has lost nearly all its original lustre as a simple and powerful tool for cracking open refractory philosophical problems. I present a conceptual model of the supervenience relation that captures all the important extant concepts (and suggests a few new ones) without ignoring the complexities uncovered during work over the past two decades. I test my analysis by applying it to the problem of defining physicalism, concluding that the thesis of physicalism is best captured by the conjunction of two supervenience relations.
TL;DR: A new and simple result about creation ex nihilo of particles can be proved compatible with classical dynamics and it follows that there is no reason why even a world of rigid spheres should be eternal, as has been erroneously assumed.
Abstract: In this paper a simple model in particle dynamics of a well-known supertask is constructed (the supertask was introduced by Max Black some years ago). As a consequence, a new and simple result about creation ex nihilo of particles can be proved compatible with classical dynamics. This result cannot be avoided by imposing boundary conditions at spatial infinity, and therefore is really new in the literature. It follows that there is no reason why even a world of rigid spheres should be eternal, as has been erroneously assumed, especially since the time of Newton.
TL;DR: This paper presents a defense of Epistemic Arithmetic as used for a formalization of intuitionistic arithmetic and of certain informal mathematical principles.
Abstract: This paper presents a defense of Epistemic Arithmetic as used for a formalization of intuitionistic arithmetic and of certain informal mathematical principles. First, objections by Allen Hazen and Craig Smorynski against Epistemic Arithmetic are discussed and found wanting. Second, positive support is given for the research program by showing that Epistemic Arithmetic can give interesting formulations of Church's Thesis.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors defend un engagement realiste de l'interpretation des relations theorie-monde dans le sens d'une correspondance systematique entre certaines operations/relations mathematiques concernant the representation des attributs physiques elementaires, d'one part, and les relations/operations physiques sur les objets possedant ces attributs, D'autre part.
Abstract: L'A. defend la these selon laquelle les interpretations empiristes des relations theorie-monde rencontrent d'enormes difficultes des lors qu'elles doivent rendre compte de la relation de mesure fondamentale qui existe entre les theories scientifiques quantitatives et le monde. Developpant l'exemple de la representation numerique du concept physique de longueur, et soulignant le role epistemique et methodologique de la perception et de l'observation, l'A. defend un engagement realiste de l'interpretation des relations theorie-monde dans le sens d'une correspondance systematique entre certaines operations/relations mathematiques concernant la representation des attributs physiques elementaires, d'une part, et les relations/operations physiques sur les objets possedant ces attributs, d'autre part
TL;DR: According to Quentin Smith, the central doctrines of Naming and Necessity were developed by Ruth Marcus in her pioneering papers on quantified modal logic in the late 40's, and in her paper, ‘Modalities and Intensional Languages’ in 1961 as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: My task today is an unusual and not very pleasant one. I am not here to debate the adequacy of any philosophical thesis. Rather, my job is to assess claims involving credit and blame. According to Quentin Smith, the central doctrines of Naming and Necessity were developed by Ruth Marcus in her pioneering papers on quantified modal logic in the late 40’s, and in her paper, ‘Modalities and Intensional Languages’ in 1961.1 Smith maintains that Saul Kripke learned these doctrines from her, initially misunderstood them, and, when he later straightened things out, mistakenly took the doctrines to be his own. Finally, Kripke is supposed to have published them without properly citing her. The entire profession was allegedly fooled, despite the fact that Kripke and Marcus were among its most well known members, and their work was familiar to leading researchers in the field. For years nobody said anything. Now, more than 20 years later, Smith claims to be bringing the truth to light.
TL;DR: L'A.
Abstract: Analyse de la notion de causation dans le cadre d'une ontologie pluraliste. Defendant la these du pluralisme, de la survenance et de la surdetermination au sein d'une conception excessive du monde, et se referant aux evenements physiques et mentaux sans rester dans les limites de la psychologie, l'A. refute l'argument de l'exclusion developpe par J. Kim a partir du principe de l'exclusion explicative, d'une part, et montre que la position de la surdetermination combinee a la survenance n'implique pas de contrefactuels incompatibles avec le pluralisme ontologique, d'autre part
TL;DR: The argument by Steven Weinberg that seeks to establish local quantum field theory as the only type of quantum theory in accord with the relevent evidence and satisfying two basic physical principles is reconstructed as a demonstrative induction.
Abstract: In this essay I examine a recent argument by Steven Weinberg that seeks to establish local quantum field theory as the only type of quantum theory in accord with the relevent evidence and satisfying two basic physical principles. I reconstruct the argument as a demonstrative induction and indicate it's role as a foil to the underdetermination argument in the debate over scientific realism.
TL;DR: Soulevant la question du conventionnalisme dans la philosophie tardive de Wittgenstein, l'A.
Abstract: Soulevant la question du conventionnalisme dans la philosophie tardive de Wittgenstein, l'A. propose une autre interpretation du paradoxe du suivre la regle que celle defendue par Dummett, et montre que le probleme de la verite necessaire et de la regle grammaticale releve de la definition descriptive du concept de convention. Distinguant les notions d'explication et de description, de necessite et de convention, l'A. etudie les consequences de l'argument sur la conception wittgensteinienne de la signification, d'une part, et montre que la reponse de Wittgenstein au paradoxe de la regle opere un passage du realisme a une semantique anti-realiste, d'autre part
TL;DR: It is argued that the game of “matching pennies” provides a useful model for the interaction of a teacher who wants her exam to be surprising and students who want to avoid being surprised.
Abstract: This paper proposes a game-theoretic solution of the surprise examination problem. It is argued that the game of “matching pennies” provides a useful model for the interaction of a teacher who wants her exam to be surprising and students who want to avoid being surprised. A distinction is drawn between prudential and evidential versions of the problem. In both, the teacher should not assign a probability of zero to giving the exam on the last day. This representation of the problem provides a diagnosis of where the backwards induction argument, which “proves” that no surprise exam is possible, is mistaken.
TL;DR: This paper has three objectives: to show how David Lewis' influential account of how a population is related to its language requires that speakers be 'conceptually autonomous' in a way that is incompatible with content ascriptions following from the assumption that its speakers share a language.
Abstract: This paper has three objectives. The first is to show how David Lewis' influential account of how a population is related to its language requires that speakers be 'conceptually autonomous' in a way that is incompatible with content ascriptions following from the assumption that its speakers share a language. The second objective is to sketch an alternate account of the psychological and sociological facts that relate a population to its language. The third is to suggest a modification of Lewis' account of convention that will allow one to preserve the claim that there are conventions of language.
TL;DR: This article showed that the basic notions of all formal semantics, such as possible world, situation, reference, etc, are in a serious need of clarification, and pointed out that these notions are inadequate.
Abstract: In recent years and recent decades the logic and semantics of demonstrative expressions (sometimes called instead indexicals) has been the subject of intensive and extensive interest The treatment of indexicals was the main step Richard Montague took in going beyond the plain vanilla version of possible-worlds semantics He distinguished different occasions of language use from the possible worlds in which the use takes place David Kaplan developed a treatment of demonstratives by associating to linguistic expressions a second meaning entity, called character, over and above its sense (in the Fregean sense) Being able to deal with demonstrative reference was one of the main motivations of the entire much-touted situation semantics of Perry and Barwise It is the purpose of this paper to show that all these treatments are inadequate and to sketch a better one In doing so, we will find that the basic notions of all formal semantics, such as possible world, situation, reference,etc are in a serious need of clarification The clarification attempted here turns on the way an interpreted language is supposed to be applied to the world This application problem is what has prompted the reference to “small worlds” in my title