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Showing papers in "Synthese in 2000"


Journal ArticleDOI
01 Sep 2000-Synthese
TL;DR: This paper explicates two notions of emergence which are based on two ways of distinguishing levels of properties for dynamical systems: diachronic and synchronic emergence and lower level to lower level emergent properties.
Abstract: This paper explicates two notions of emergencewhich are based on two ways of distinguishinglevels of properties for dynamical systems.Once the levels are defined, the strategies ofcharacterizing the relation of higher level to lower levelproperties as diachronic and synchronic emergenceare the same. In each case, the higher level properties aresaid to be emergent if they are ‘novel’ or ‘irreducible’ with respect to the lower level properties. Novelty andirreducibility are given precise meanings in terms of the effectsthat the change of a bifurcation or perturbation parameterin the system has. (The same strategy can be applied to otherways of separating levels of properties, like themicro/macro distinction.) The notions of emergence developed here are notions of emergencein a weak sense: the higher level emergent properties wecapture are always structural properties (or are realized insuch properties), that is, they are defined in terms of the lowerlevel properties and their relations. Diachronic and synchronicemergent properties are distinctions within thecategory of structural properties.

107 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
01 Feb 2000-Synthese
TL;DR: It is suggested that what is distinctive about human development is its degree of reliance on external scaffolding, including those which can be explained in evolutionary terms.
Abstract: The ‘developmental systems’ perspective in biology is intended to replace the idea of a genetic program This new perspective is strongly convergent with recent work in psychology on situated/embodied cognition and on the role of external ‘scaffolding’ in cognitive development Cognitive processes, including those which can be explained in evolutionary terms, are not ‘inherited’ or produced in accordance with an inherited program Instead, they are constructed in each generation through the interaction of a range of developmental resources The attractors which emerge during development and explain robust and/or widespread outcomes are themselves constructed during the process At no stage is there an explanatory stopping point where some resources control or program the rest of the developmental cascade ‘Human nature’ is a description of how things generally turn out, not an explanation of why they turn out that way Finally, we suggest that what is distinctive about human development is its degree of reliance on external scaffolding

102 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
01 Feb 2000-Synthese
TL;DR: Evidence from comparative, developmental, and cognitive psychological investigations is presented that show how social dominance hierarchies shaped the evolution of the human mind, and hence, human social institutions.
Abstract: Dominance hierarchies are ubiquitous in the societies of human and non-human animals. Evidence from comparative, developmental, and cognitive psychological investigations is presented that show how social dominance hierarchies shaped the evolution of the human mind, and hence, human social institutions. It is argued that the pressures that arise from living in hierarchical social groups laid a foundation of fundamental concepts and cognitive strategies that are crucial to surviving in social dominance hierarchies. These include recognizing and reasoning transitively about dominance relations, fast-track learning of social norms (permissions, prohibitions, and obligations), detecting violations of social norms (cheating), monitoring reciprocal obligations, and reading the intentions of others.

75 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
01 Feb 2000-Synthese
TL;DR: It is argued that rational analysis provides a model for the relationship between formal principles of rationality and everyday rationality, in the sense of successful thought and action in daily life.
Abstract: Rational analysis (Anderson 1990, 1991a) is an empiricalprogram of attempting to explain why the cognitive system isadaptive, with respect to its goals and the structure of itsenvironment We argue that rational analysis has two importantimplications for philosophical debate concerning rationality First,rational analysis provides a model for the relationship betweenformal principles of rationality (such as probability or decisiontheory) and everyday rationality, in the sense of successfulthought and action in daily life Second, applying the program ofrational analysis to research on human reasoning leads to a radicalreinterpretation of empirical results which are typically viewed asdemonstrating human irrationality

74 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
01 Jun 2000-Synthese
TL;DR: This paper surveys both the historical and philosophical background of dialoguetheory and the latest research initiatives on dialogue theory in computer science, and proposes a classification of the main types of dialogue that should provide the central focus for studying many important dialogue contexts in specific cases.
Abstract: Dialogue theory, although it has ancient roots, was put forward in the 1970s in logic as astructure that can be useful for helping to evaluate argumentation and informal fallacies.Recently, however, it has been taken up as a broader subject of investigation in computerscience. This paper surveys both the historical and philosophical background of dialoguetheory and the latest research initiatives on dialogue theory in computer science. The main components of dialogue theory are briefly explained. Included is a classification of the main types of dialogue that, it is argued, should provide the central focus for studying many important dialogue contexts in specific cases. Following these three surveys, a concluding prediction is made about the direction dialogue theory is likely to take in the next century, especially in relation to the growing field of communication studies.

69 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
01 Jan 2000-Synthese
TL;DR: This work uses Wigner's own application of group theory to nuclear physics to indicate that this effectiveness can be seen to be not so unreasonable if attention is paid to the various idealising moves undertaken.
Abstract: Wigner famously referred to the `unreasonable effectiveness' of mathematics in its application to science. Using Wigner's own application of group theory to nuclear physics, I hope to indicate that this effectiveness can be seen to be not so unreasonable if attention is paid to the various idealising moves undertaken. The overall framework for analysing this relationship between mathematics and physics is that of da Costa's partial structures programme.

63 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
01 Dec 2000-Synthese
TL;DR: This paper identifysystematically and in detail, several main variants ofstructuralism, including some not often recognized, are identified, and the relations between thesevariants, and between the respective problems they face, become manifest.
Abstract: In recent philosophy of mathematics avariety of writers have presented ``structuralist''views and arguments. There are, however, a number ofsubstantive differences in what their proponents take``structuralism'' to be. In this paper we make explicitthese differences, as well as some underlyingsimilarities and common roots. We thus identifysystematically and in detail, several main variants ofstructuralism, including some not often recognized assuch. As a result the relations between thesevariants, and between the respective problems theyface, become manifest. Throughout our focus is onsemantic and metaphysical issues, including what is orcould be meant by ``structure'' in this connection.

55 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
01 Apr 2000-Synthese
TL;DR: This paper considers the most important arguments infavor of lingualism, namely those inspired by Davidson: the argument from the intensional nature of thought, the idea that thoughts involve concepts, and the claim that belief requires the concept of belief.
Abstract: There are three main positions on animalthought: lingualism denies that non-linguistic animalshave any thoughts; mentalism maintains that theirthoughts differ from ours only in degree, due totheir different perceptual inputs; an intermediateposition, occupied by common sense and Wittgenstein,maintains that animals can have thoughts of a simplekind. This paper argues in favor of an intermediateposition. It considers the most important arguments infavor of lingualism, namely those inspired byDavidson: the argument from the intensional nature ofthought (Section 1); the idea that thoughts involveconcepts (Sections 2–3); the argument from the holisticnature of thought (Section 4); and the claim that beliefrequires the concept of belief (Sections 5–6). The lastargument (which Davidson favors) is uncompelling, butthe first three shed valuable light on the extent towhich thought requires language. However, none of themprecludes animals from having simple thoughts. Even ifone adopts the kind of third-person perspective onthought Davidson shares with Wittgenstein, the resultis a version of the intermediate position, albeit oneenriched by Davidson's insights concerningintensionality, concepts and holism (Section 7). We canonly ascribe simple thoughts to animals, and even thatascription is incongruous in that the rich idiom weemploy has conceptual connections that go beyond thephenomena to which it is applied.

53 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
01 Jul 2000-Synthese
TL;DR: A close look shows that the Moral Twin Earth argument poses no threat to moral naturalism, and the goal in this paper is the modest one of makingmoral Twin Earth safe for naturalists.
Abstract: Moral naturalism is the view that moral properties, such as lightness and goodness, are in some important sense "natural" properties. Some nat uralists have sought to make good on this idea by deploying a kind of semantics proposed by Hilary Putnam and others. Putnam himself sugges ted this strategy,1 and Richard Boyd has pursued it.2 The kind of semantics proposed by Putnam allows for true synthetic property identity statements, such as that water is H20. If this approach can be applied to moral pre dicates, it therefore opens the door to a kind of "synthetic semantic moral naturalism" according to which, for any moral property, there is a syn thetic truth to the effect that the property is identical to a certain natural property. This strategy has come under attack, however, in an argument by Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons known as the "Moral Twin Earth argument".3 On the one hand, Horgan and Timmons argue, G. E. Moore's "open question argument" defeated the idea that there are any analytically true sentences to the effect that a given moral property is identical to a natural property. On the other hand, they argue, the Moral Twin Earth argument undermines the idea that there are any synthetic truths to the effect that a given moral property is identical to a natural property. If they are correct, naturalism is in trouble.4 Are they correct? I will argue that they are not. A close look shows that the Moral Twin Earth argument poses no threat to moral naturalism. To say this is not to say that synthetic moral naturalism is without difficulties. I believe that in fact it has difficulty accounting for the normativity of moral claims. My goal in this paper, however, is the modest one of making Moral Twin Earth safe for naturalists.

44 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
01 Jul 2000-Synthese
TL;DR: In Milk, Honey, and the Good Life on moral Twin Earth, David Copp explores some ways in which a defender of synthetic moral naturalism might attempt to get around the authors' Moral Twin Earth argument, and brings out the force of the argument through his attempt to defeat it.
Abstract: In Milk, Honey, and the Good Life on Moral Twin Earth, David Copp explores some ways in which a defender of synthetic moral naturalism might attempt to get around our Moral Twin Earth argument. 1 Copp nicely brings out the force of our argument, not only through his exposition of it, but through his attempt to defeat it, since his efforts, we think, only help to make manifest the deep difficulties the Moral Twin Earth argument poses for the synthetic moral naturalist. Our response to Copp will be in two stages. First we will make some general observations about our argument that help one appreciate its force, and then we will turn to the details of Copp's proposals.

43 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
01 Jan 2000-Synthese
TL;DR: A new, dialogical, way is shown touild paraconsistent systems for propositional and first-order logic with classical and intuitionistic features (i.e. paraconsistency both with and withouttertium non-datur) and present their corresponding tableaux.
Abstract: Being a pragmatic and not a referential approach tosemantics, the dialogical formulation ofparaconsistency allows the following semantic idea tobe expressed within a semi-formal system: In anargumentation it sometimes makes sense to distinguishbetween the contradiction of one of the argumentationpartners with himself (internal contradiction) and thecontradiction between the partners (externalcontradiction). The idea is that externalcontradiction may involve different semantic contextsin which, say A and ¬A have been asserted.The dialogical approach suggests a way of studying thedynamic process of contradictions through which thetwo contexts evolve for the sake of argumentation intoone system containing both contexts.More technically, we show a new, dialogical, way tobuild paraconsistent systems for propositional andfirst-order logic with classical and intuitionisticfeatures (i.e. paraconsistency both with and withouttertium non-datur) and present theircorresponding tableaux.

Journal ArticleDOI
01 Dec 2000-Synthese
TL;DR: This work examines several famous geometrical, topological and set-theoretical examples of "monsters" to see to what extent intuition is undermined in its everyday roles.
Abstract: Geometrical and physical intuition, both untutored andcultivated, is ubiquitous in the research, teaching,and development of mathematics. A number ofmathematical ``monsters'', or pathological objects, havebeen produced which – according to somemathematicians – seriously challenge the reliability ofintuition. We examine several famous geometrical,topological and set-theoretical examples of suchmonsters in order to see to what extent, if at all,intuition is undermined in its everyday roles.

Journal ArticleDOI
01 Jul 2000-Synthese
TL;DR: This paper discusses three topics in succession: rationally defensible cyclical choices, the revealed preference theory ofoptimization, and the infinite regress of optimization, and concludes that (1) and (2) provide evidence only for the weak thesis that rationality implies optimization.
Abstract: The relations between rationality and optimizationhave been widely discussed in the wake of HerbertSimon's work, with the common conclusion that therationality concept does not imply the optimizationprinciple. The paper is partly concerned with addingevidence for this view, but its main, more challengingobjective is to question the converse implication fromoptimization to rationality, which is accepted even bybounded rationality theorists. We discuss three topicsin succession: (1) rationally defensible cyclicalchoices, (2) the revealed preference theory ofoptimization, and (3) the infinite regress ofoptimization. We conclude that (1) and (2) provideevidence only for the weak thesis that rationalitydoes not imply optimization. But (3) is seen todeliver a significant argument for the strong thesisthat optimization does not imply rationality.

Journal ArticleDOI
01 Dec 2000-Synthese
TL;DR: This paper will approach the subject of intuition from a different angle from what has been usual in the philosophy of mathematics, by beginning with some descriptive remarks about Reason and observing that something that has been called intuition arises naturally in that context.
Abstract: In this paper I will approach the subject of intuition from a different angle from what has been usual in the philosophy of mathematics, by beginning with some descriptive remarks about Reason and observing that something that has been called intuition arises naturally in that context. These considerations are quite general, not specific to mathematics. The conception of intuition might be called that of rational intuition; indeed the conception is a much more modest version of conceptions of intuition held by rationalist philosophers. Moreover, it answers to a quite widespread use of the word intuition in philosophy and elsewhere. But it does not obviously satisfy conditions associated with other conceptions of intuition that have been applied to mathematics. Intuition in a sense like this has, in writing about mathematics, repeatedly been run together with intuition in other senses. In the last part of the paper a little will be said about the connections that give rise to this phenomenon.

Journal ArticleDOI
01 Feb 2000-Synthese
TL;DR: It is argued that there is no way to repair the definitions of belief revision so as to retain the spirit of those theory, and belief revision is better studied from within an independently motivated epistemological theory.
Abstract: Postulational approaches attempt to understand the dynamics of belief revision by appealing to no more than the set of beliefs held by an agent and the logical relations between them. It is argued there that such an approach cannot work. A proper account of belief revision must also appeal to the arguments supporting beliefs, and recognize that those arguments can be defeasible. If we begin with a mature epistemological theory that accommodates this, it can be seen that the belief revision operators on which the postulational theories are based are ill-defined. It is further argued that there is no way to repair the definitions so as to retain the spirit of those theory. Belief revision is better studied from within an independently motivated epistemological theory.

Journal ArticleDOI
01 Feb 2000-Synthese
TL;DR: Evidence is reviewed showing that for a wide range of real-world problems, the most reliable, tractable reasoning strategies audaciously flout the internalist's epistemic virtues, and it is argued that these results force us to give up either (V), the authors' current conception of what it is to be epistemically responsible, or (C) the responsibility-reliability connection.
Abstract: Epistemic responsibility involves at least two central ideas. (V) To be epistemically responsible is to display the virtue(s) epistemic internalists take to be central to justification (e.g., coherence, having good reasons, fitting the evidence). (C) In normal (non-skeptical)circumstances and in thelong run, epistemic responsibility is strongly positively correlated with reliability. Sections 1 and 2 review evidence showing that for a wide range of real-world problems, the most reliable, tractable reasoning strategies audaciously flout the internalist's epistemic virtues. In Section 3, I argue that these results force us to give up either (V), our current conception of what it is to be epistemically responsible, or (C) the responsibility-reliability connection. I will argue that we should relinquish (V). This is likely to reshape our epistemic practices. It will force us to alter our epistemic judgments about certain instances of reasoning, to endorse some counterintuitive epistemic prescriptions, and to rethink what it is for cognitive agents to be epistemically responsible.

Journal ArticleDOI
01 Jun 2000-Synthese
TL;DR: Evaluation de la regle de conditionnalisation des degres de croyance etablie par Jeffrey malgre son caractere non-commutatif permet au contraire de distinguer de two types d'observation.
Abstract: Evaluation de la regle de conditionnalisation des degres de croyance etablie par Jeffrey malgre son caractere non-commutatif. Examinant l'applicabilite de la regle de Jeffrey aux experiences sensibles identiques, l'A. montre que la non-commutativite de la conditionnalisation permet au contraire de distinguer deux types d'observation.

Journal ArticleDOI
01 Dec 2000-Synthese
TL;DR: Husserl's solution of the problem of imaginary elements in mathematics as presented in the drafts for two lectures he gave in Göttingen in 1901 and other related texts of the same period is discussed, establishing also parallels between Husserl and Hilbert's notions of completeness.
Abstract: In this paper I discuss Husserl's solution of the problem of imaginary elements in mathematics as presented in the drafts for two lectures hegave in Gottingen in 1901 and other related texts of the same period,a problem that had occupied Husserl since the beginning of 1890, whenhe was planning a never published sequel to Philosophie der Arithmetik(1891). In order to solve the problem of imaginary entities Husserl introduced,independently of Hilbert, two notions of completeness (definiteness in Husserl'sterminology) for a formal axiomatic system. I present and discuss these notionshere, establishing also parallels between Husserl's and Hilbert's notions ofcompleteness.

Journal ArticleDOI
Diderik Batens1
01 Jan 2000-Synthese
TL;DR: An important property of the adaptive logics ACLuN1, ACLUN2, ACLuNs1, andACLuNs2 logics is proved: whenever a model is not selected, this is justified in terms of a selected model (Strong Reassurance).
Abstract: In an adaptive logic APL, based on a (monotonic) non-standardlogic PL the consequences of Γ can be defined in terms ofa selection of the PL-models of Γ. An important property ofthe adaptive logics ACLuN1, ACLuN2, ACLuNs1, andACLuNs2 logics is proved: whenever a model is not selected, this isjustified in terms of a selected model (Strong Reassurance). Theproperty fails for Priest's LP m because its way of measuring thedegree of abnormality of a model is incoherent – correcting thisdelivers the property.

Journal ArticleDOI
01 Jan 2000-Synthese
TL;DR: This paper discussespertasks recently discussed in the literature that purport to display a failure of energy conservation and determinism in Newtonian mechanics and debates whether these supertasks are admissible as Newtonian systems.
Abstract: Supertasks recently discussed in the literature purport to display a failure of energy conservation and determinism in Newtonian mechanics. We debate whether these supertasks are admissible as Newtonian systems, with Earman and Norton defending the affirmative and Alper and Bridger the negative.

Journal ArticleDOI
01 Mar 2000-Synthese
TL;DR: This paper clarifies the epistemic status of spontaneously broken symmetries and presents the details of an argument by analogy that suggests the spontaneously broken gauge symmetry of electroweak interactions, and the subsequent hypothetico-deductive testing of the hypothesis.
Abstract: Spontaneously broken symmetries are often called hidden or secret symmetries. They are symmetries in the laws of nature that do not show up in observable phenomena. This raises the basic epistemological question: Is there reason to believe that these hidden symmetries are real features of nature rather than artifacts of theorizing. This paper clarifies the epistemic status of spontaneously broken symmetries. It presents the details of an argument by analogy that suggests the spontaneously broken gauge symmetry of electroweak interactions, and the subsequent hypothetico-deductive testing of the hypothesis. It is a story of how dubious means can lead to a credible end.

Journal ArticleDOI
01 Jun 2000-Synthese
TL;DR: It is proposed here that requiring the expression of belief to be committed to the model (and to certain of its submodels) makes likelihood inference very nearly aspecial case of the Dempster–Shafer theory.
Abstract: The Dempster–Shafer approach to expressing beliefabout a parameter in a statistical model is notconsistent with the likelihood principle. Thisinconsistency has been recognized for some time, andmanifests itself as a non-commutativity, in which theorder of operations (combining belief, combininglikelihood) makes a difference. It is proposed herethat requiring the expression of belief to be committed to the model (and to certain of itssubmodels) makes likelihood inference very nearly aspecial case of the Dempster–Shafer theory.

Journal ArticleDOI
01 Sep 2000-Synthese
TL;DR: Arguments for vonNeumann–Morgenstern's argument for their minimax solution, the argument from self-enforcing agreements, theargument from the absence of probabilities, the transparency-of-reasons argument, and the argumentFrom regret are discussed, which fail entirely or have a very limited scope.
Abstract: Nash Equilibrium is a central concept ingame theory. It has been argued that playing NashEquilibrium strategies is rational advice for agentsinvolved in one-time strategic interactions capturedby non-cooperative game theory. This essaydiscusses arguments for that position: vonNeumann–Morgenstern's argument for their minimaxsolution, the argument from self-enforcingagreements, the argument from the absence ofprobabilities, the transparency-of-reasons argument,the argument from regret, and the argument fromcorrelated equilibrium. All of these argumentseither fail entirely or have a very limited scope.Whatever the use of Nash Equilibrium is, therefore,it is not useful as a rational recommendation inone-time strategic interactions. This is good newsfor Bayesians: although this discussion does notargue directly for the Bayesian idea of rationalityas expected utility maximization, it argues againsta position that has been regarded as a contender insituations of strategic interaction.

Journal ArticleDOI
01 Apr 2000-Synthese
TL;DR: It is argued that Putnam's qualified allegiance to Kant exposes him to some of the same metaphysical problems that affected Kant, namely, the familiar problem of postulating an absolute reality (Ding an sich), while atthe same time disavowing the meaningfulness of so doing.
Abstract: Since 1976 Hilary Putnam has drawn parallels between his `internal',`pragmatic', `natural' or `common-sense' realism and Kant's transcendentalidealism. Putnam reads Kant as rejecting the then current metaphysicalpicture with its in-built assumptions of a unique, mind-independent world,and truth understood as correspondence between the mind and that ready-madeworld. Putnam reads Kant as overcoming the false dichotomies inherent inthat picture and even finds some glimmerings of conceptual relativity inKant's proposed solution. Furthermore, Putnam reads Kant as overcoming thepernicious scientific realist distinction between primary and secondaryqualities, between things that really exist and their projections, adistinction that haunts modern philosophy. Putnam's revitalisation of Kantis not just of historical interest, but challenges contemporary versions ofscientific realism. Furthermore, Putnam has highlighted themes which havenot received the attention they deserve in Kantian exegesis, namely, theproblematic role of primary and secondary qualities in Kant's empiricalrealism, and the extent of Kant's commitment to conceptual pluralism.However, I argue that Putnam's qualified allegiance to Kant exposes him tosome of the same metaphysical problems that affected Kant, namely, thefamiliar problem of postulating an absolute reality (Ding an sich), while atthe same time disavowing the meaningfulness of so doing. In conclusion Isuggest that Putnam might consider Hegel's attempts to solve this problem inKant as a way of furthering his own natural realism.

Journal ArticleDOI
01 Jan 2000-Synthese
TL;DR: A brief survey of work in paraconsistent databases and knowledge bases affected by Newton da Costa's important and lasting contributions to the field is provided.
Abstract: The study of paraconsistent logic as a branch of mathematics and logic has been pioneered by Newton da Costa. With the growing advent of distributed and often inconsistent databases over the last ten years, there has been growing interest in paraconsistency amongst researchers in databases and knowledge bases. In this paper, we provide a brief survey of work in paraconsistent databases and knowledge bases affected by Newton da Costa's important and lasting contributions to the field.

Journal ArticleDOI
01 Jan 2000-Synthese
TL;DR: The interaction between the properties of topological spaces, particularly separation properties, and logical theories on thosespaces is studied, and Necessary and sufficient conditions which relate the T1-property to theproperties of logical theories, are obtained.
Abstract: This paper is dedicated to Newton da Costa, who,among his many achievements, was the first toaim at dualising intuitionism in order to produce paraconsistent logics,the C-systems. This paper similarly dualises intuitionism to aparaconsistent logic, but the dual is a different logic, namely closed setlogic. We study the interaction between the properties of topologicalspaces, particularly separation properties, and logical theories on thosespaces. The paper begins with a brief survey of what is known about therelation between topology and modal logic, intuitionist logic and paraconsistentlogic in respect of the incompleteness and inconsistency of theories.Necessary and sufficient conditions which relate the T1-property to theproperties of logical theories, are obtained. The result is then extendedto Hausdorff and Normal spaces. In the final section these methods areused to vary the modelling conditions for identity.

Journal ArticleDOI
01 Mar 2000-Synthese
TL;DR: The notion of verisimilitude was introduced by as mentioned in this paper as an attempt to show that science can be seen as a rational enterprise in the pursuit of truth, and defenders of this notion need to demonstrate that scientific norms can be interpreted (at least in principle) as rules that try to increase the degree of truthlikeness of scientific theories.
Abstract: I. A. Kieseppa's criticism of the methodological use of the theory of verisimilitude, and D. B. Resnik's arguments against the explanation of scientific method by appeal to scientific aims are critically considered. Since the notion of verisimilitude was introduced as an attempt to show that science can be seen as a rational enterprise in the pursuit of truth, defenders of the verisimilitude programme need to show that scientific norms can be interpreted (at least in principle) as rules that try to increase the degree of truthlikeness of scientific theories. This possibility is explored for several approaches to the problem of verisimilitude.

Journal ArticleDOI
01 Jan 2000-Synthese
TL;DR: Some conservative translations involving classical logic, Lukasiewicz three-valued system L3, the intuitionistic system I1 and several paraconsistent logics are presented.
Abstract: In 1999, da Silva, D'Ottaviano and Sette proposed a general definition for the term translation between logics and presented an initial segment of its theory. Logics are characterized, in the most general sense, as sets with consequence relations and translations between logics as consequence-relation preserving maps. In a previous paper the authors introduced the concept of conservative translation between logics and studied some general properties of the co-complete category constituted by logics and conservative translations between them. In this paper we present some conservative translations involving classical logic, Lukasiewicz three-valued system L 3, the intuitionistic system I 1 and several paraconsistent logics, as for instance Sette's system P 1, the D'Ottaviano and da Costa system J 3 and da Costa's systems C n, 1≤ n≤ω.

Journal ArticleDOI
01 Aug 2000-Synthese
TL;DR: L'A.
Abstract: Etude de la notion d'indetermination psychologique dans le domaine de la philosophie de l'esprit de Wittgenstein. Soulignant l'importance de la notion d'evidence indirecte au regard de la signification et de l'epistemologie du jugement psychologique, l'A. critique les interpretations operationnaliste et behavioriste de Wittgenstein, au profit d'une conception physicaliste et referentialiste de la pensee et de la memoire.

Journal ArticleDOI
01 Jul 2000-Synthese
TL;DR: It is argued that though the model-theoretic truths of some standard languages are demonstrably ''necessary'' (in a precise sense), the widespread view of model- theoretic truth as providing a general guarantee of necessity is mistaken.
Abstract: This paper examines the connection between model-theoretic truth and necessary truth. It is argued that though the model-theoretic truths of some standard languages are demonstrably ''necessary'' (in a precise sense), the widespread view of model-theoretic truth as providing a general guarantee of necessity is mistaken. Several arguments to the contrary are criticized.