Showing papers in "The Accounting Review in 2013"
TL;DR: This article examined the relation between managerial ability and earnings quality and found that more able managers are associated with fewer subsequent restatements, higher earnings and accruals persistence, lower errors in the bad debt provision, and higher quality accrual estimations.
Abstract: : We examine the relation between managerial ability and earnings quality. We find that earnings quality is positively associated with managerial ability. Specifically, more able managers are associated with fewer subsequent restatements, higher earnings and accruals persistence, lower errors in the bad debt provision, and higher quality accrual estimations. The results are consistent with the premise that managers can and do impact the quality of the judgments and estimates used to form earnings. Data Availability: Data are publicly available from the sources identified in the text.
508 citations
TL;DR: This paper examined the empirical association between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and tax avoidance and found that firms with excessive irresponsible CSR activities have a higher likelihood of engaging in tax-sheltering activities and greater discretionary/permanent book-tax differences.
Abstract: We examine the empirical association between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and tax avoidance. Our findings suggest that firms with excessive irresponsible CSR activities have a higher likelihood of engaging in tax-sheltering activities and greater discretionary/permanent book-tax differences. Moreover, at the onset of FASB Interpretation No. 48, these firms have more uncertain tax positions; also, these firms' initial tax positions are likely supported by weaker facts and circumstances as indicated by their larger post-FIN 48 settlements with tax authorities and their higher likelihood of a net decrease in the overall level of uncertain tax positions after FIN 48. Collectively, these results suggest that firms with excessive irresponsible CSR activities are more aggressive in avoiding taxes, lending credence to the idea that corporate culture affects tax avoidance. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources identified in the study.
442 citations
TL;DR: Wang et al. as discussed by the authors examined whether and how individual auditors affect audit outcomes using a large set of archival Chinese data, and found that the effects of individual auditor characteristics on audit quality are both economically and statistically significant, and are pronounced in both large and small audit firms.
Abstract: We examine whether and how individual auditors affect audit outcomes using a large set of archival Chinese data. We analyze approximately 800 individual auditors and find that they exhibit significant variation in audit quality. The effects that individual auditors have on audit quality are both economically and statistically significant, and are pronounced in both large and small audit firms. We also find that the individual auditor effects on audit quality can be partially explained by auditor characteristics, such as educational background, Big N audit firm experience, rank in the audit firm, and political affiliation. Our findings highlight the importance of scrutinizing and understanding audit quality at the individual auditor level. Data Availability: Data used in this study are publicly available from the sources described herein.
336 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors test whether earnings management spreads between firms via shared directors and find that a firm is more likely to manage earnings when it shares a common director with a firm that is currently managing earnings and is less likely to share a common board member with a non-manipulator.
Abstract: We test whether earnings management spreads between firms via shared directors. We find that a firm is more likely to manage earnings when it shares a common director with a firm that is currently managing earnings and is less likely to manage earnings when it shares a common director with a non-manipulator. Earnings management contagion is stronger when the shared director has a leadership or accounting-relevant position (e.g., audit committee chair or member) on its board or the contagious firm's board. Irregularity contagion is stronger than error contagion. The board contagion effect is robust to controlling for endogenous matching of firms with directors, fixed firm/director effects, incidence of MA M41; M49; G34; G39; D83. Data Availability: Data are available from...
243 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors suggest that the explanation for the bias is a correlated omitted variables problem that can be addressed in a straightforward fashion, including fixed-effects regression, and that the correlation varies with returns, biasing asymmetric timeliness estimates.
Abstract: The concept of conditional conservatism (asymmetric earnings timeliness) has provided new insight into financial reporting and stimulated considerable research since Basu (1997). Patatoukas and Thomas (2011) report bias in firm-level cross-sectional asymmetry estimates that they attribute to scale effects. We do not agree with their advice that researchers should avoid conditional conservatism estimates and inferences from research based on such estimates. Our theoretical and empirical analyses suggest the explanation is a correlated omitted variables problem that can be addressed in a straightforward fashion, including fixed-effects regression. Correlation between the expected components of earnings and returns biases estimates of how earnings incorporate the information contained in returns. Further, the correlation varies with returns, biasing asymmetric timeliness estimates. When firm-specific effects are taken into account, estimates do not exhibit the bias, are statistically and economical...
239 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors identify two design issues that explain the inconsistency between the theoretically predicted negative relation between audit effort and misstatements (measured using restatements) and empirical findings.
Abstract: : We identify two research design issues that explain the inconsistency between the theoretically predicted negative relation between audit effort and misstatements (measured using restatements) and empirical findings. First, auditor risk adjustment behavior induces an upward bias in the association between audit effort and restatements. Second, the theoretical prediction applies only to audited financial reports (i.e., annual reports) and not to unaudited reports (i.e., interim quarterly reports). Comingling restatements of audited with unaudited reports introduces an additional upward bias in the association between audit effort and restatements. After correcting for these two sources of bias, we find a robust negative association between audit effort and annual report restatements. JEL Classification: M49. Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from public sources.
223 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors provide an investigation of financial reporting quality (FRQ) of U.S. private versus public firms and find that in general public firms have higher accrual quality and are more conservative.
Abstract: Using a new database that contains accounting data for a large sample of U.S. private firms, we provide an investigation of financial reporting quality (FRQ) of U.S. private versus public firms. We find that in general public firms have higher accrual quality and are more conservative. The results are consistent with public firms' reporting reflecting greater demand for financial information. However, these reporting qualities of public firms are mitigated or eliminated in settings where public firms are more likely to manage earnings or face reduced demand for their financial information. Our study contributes not only to the current debate on private versus public financial accounting, but also to the broader literature attempting to understand the determinants of FRQ.
209 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigated the relationship between auditors' ex ante litigation risk and going concern reporting, and found a significant negative association between going-corp reporting and auditor litigation.
Abstract: Audit researchers have a long-standing interest in understanding whether issuing a going concern report to financially stressed clients protects auditors from litigation. An endogeneity issue arises, in that litigation risk affects the going concern decision and the going concern decision impacts auditor litigation risk. Using a simultaneous equations approach, we find a significant positive association between auditors' ex ante litigation risk and going concern reporting. By applying simultaneous equations, we also find a significant negative association between going concern reporting and auditor litigation, suggesting that auditors deter lawsuits by issuing going concern reports to their financially stressed clients. Our research further provides a more rigorous analysis of the relation between going concern reporting and lawsuit outcomes in the form of auditor litigation dismissals, small settlement amounts, and large settlement amounts. Our results indicate that when auditors are named in ...
173 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the existence of low-quality audits in an auditor office indicates the presence of a "contagion effect" on the quality of other (concurrent) audits conducted by the auditor office.
Abstract: : We investigate if the existence of low-quality audits in an auditor office indicates the presence of a “contagion effect” on the quality of other (concurrent) audits conducted by the off...
170 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the conditions under which providing relative performance information to employees has a positive effect on performance when compensation is not tied to peer performance were investigated, via an experiment, and the effect of relative performance (present or absent) on performance under two compensation contracts (flat-wage or individual performance-based).
Abstract: This study investigates the conditions under which providing relative performance information to employees has a positive effect on performance when compensation is not tied to peer performance. Specifically, I investigate, via an experiment, the effect of relative performance information (present or absent) on performance under two compensation contracts (flat-wage or individual performance-based). Given the presence of relative performance information, I examine the effect of the type of relative performance information (private or public) on performance. Using theory from psychology, I predict and find that relative performance information positively affects performance under the two compensation contracts and that this positive effect is greater under an individual performance-based contract than under a flat-wage contract. I also predict and find that, although both public and private relative performance information have a positive effect on performance, the effect is greater when relative...
169 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigate factors that affect the probability of receiving a 10-K comment letter, the extent of comments received, and the cost of remediation, and find that low profitability, high complexity, engaging a small audit firm, and weaknesses in governance are positively associated with the receipt of a comment letter.
Abstract: Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) comment letters provide independent and timely feedback on the clarity of disclosures and on the extent to which filings comply with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles and SEC reporting regulations. We investigate factors that affect the probability of receiving a 10-K comment letter, the extent of comments received, and the cost of remediation. We find that in addition to factors explicitly stated to increase SEC scrutiny in Section 408 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, low profitability, high complexity, engaging a small audit firm, and weaknesses in governance are positively associated with the receipt of a comment letter, the extent of comments, and the cost of remediation. The probability that the comment letter results in a restatement is higher for smaller companies and for companies engaging a small audit firm. We also provide evidence that comments relating to accounting issues result in higher remediation costs, largely due to the additional time...
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined the externalities of mandatory IFRS adoption on firms' investment efficiency in 17 European countries and found that the spillover effect of a firm's ROA difference versus its foreign peers, but not domestic peers, on the firm's investment efficiency increases after the adoption of IFRS.
Abstract: This study examines the externalities of mandatory IFRS adoption on firms' investment efficiency in 17 European countries. We use the ROA difference between the firm and its peers to proxy for the information on the peers' investment performance. We find that the spillover effect of a firm's ROA difference versus its foreign peers, but not domestic peers, on the firm's investment efficiency increases after IFRS adoption. We also find that increased disclosure by both foreign and domestic peers after IFRS adoption has a spillover effect on a firm's investment efficiency. Further, a firm's investment changes induced by its ROA difference versus foreign peers are more value-relevant after IFRS adoption, and those induced by increased disclosure by foreign peers under IFRS are value-relevant. Additional analyses reveal that our results are affected by legal enforcement strength, peer composition, and industry competition. Overall, we document positive externalities of mandatory IFRS adoption. Data A...
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined the fees incurred by firms for the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) by examining the fees paid by companies for the use of these standards.
Abstract: : This study provides evidence of a directly observable and significant cost of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adoption, by examining the fees incurred by firms for the...
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors provide evidence that disclosed items are not processed differently from recognized items when the disclosures are salient, not based on management estimates, and amenable to simple techniques for imputing as-if recognized amounts.
Abstract: : We provide evidence that disclosed items are not processed differently from recognized items when the disclosures are salient, not based on management estimates, and amenable to simple techniques for imputing as-if recognized amounts. For a sample of firms with both capital and operating leases, we find that as-if recognized amounts for leases are generally reliable and that both recognized lease obligations and disclosed lease obligations are associated with proxies for costs of debt and equity. The magnitudes of these associations are not statistically different across accounting treatments, suggesting that market participants impound as-if recognized operating lease obligations and recognized capital lease obligations similarly into costs of capital. Conditioning on the reliability of as-if recognized operating lease obligations, we find a difference in the association between recognized versus as-if recognized lease obligations and proxies for the costs of debt and equity when the operatin...
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined if analyst-and country-specific characteristics explain the variation in target price (TP) accuracy, and found that significant variation in average TP accuracy across countries is due to differences in accounting disclosure quality, the origin of the legal system, cultural traits, and IFRS regulation.
Abstract: Using an international sample of 16 countries, this paper examines if analyst- and country-specific characteristics explain the variation in target price (TP) accuracy. We find that significant variation in average TP accuracy across countries is due to differences in accounting disclosure quality, the origin of the legal system, cultural traits, and IFRS regulation. We also find that analysts exhibit differential and persistent ability to forecast target prices accurately, which confirms that some analysts have superior TP forecasting ability. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources indicated in the text.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigate how relative performance information (RPI) affects employee performance and allocation of effort across tasks in a multi-task environment and find that RPI induces both motivation and effort distortion effects and that both effects are magnified when the RPI is public rather than private.
Abstract: : This study investigates how relative performance information (RPI) affects employee performance and allocation of effort across tasks in a multi-task environment. Based on behavioral theories, we predict that the social comparison process inherent in RPI induces both a motivation effect that results in increased effort as well as an effort distortion effect that results in the distortion of effort allocations across tasks away from the firm-preferred allocations. We also predict that both effects are magnified when the RPI is public compared to private. We argue that although the motivation effect will generally benefit performance, the effort distortion effect may be detrimental to performance. We design an experiment that isolates these two effects. Consistent with our predictions, we find that RPI induces both motivation and effort distortion effects and that both effects are magnified when the RPI is public rather than private. Although the motivation effect increases performance, we demons...
TL;DR: This article examined the effect of financial data availability on the average donor's ability to unravel inflated program ratios by using the historical shift in data availability that occurred in 1997 and 1998 and found that donors began to discount ratios only after 1998.
Abstract: Prior research finds that donors reward nonprofits that report larger program ratios with more donations and that program ratios frequently are subject to intentional manipulation as well as unintentional errors. We examine how donors react to low-quality ratios. We find that the average donor discounts ratios that are inflated by only the simplest and most observable of methods. We then examine the effect of financial data availability on the average donor's ability to unravel inflated ratios by using the historical shift in data availability that occurred in 1997 and 1998. We find that donors began to discount ratios only after 1998. Finally, we examine whether the discount applied to program ratios varies across donor sophistication (measured as the percentage of fund balances with restrictions) and find that sophisticated donors apply incrementally larger discounts to inflated ratios and discount ratios that are inflated by more complex methods. JEL Classifications: G1; G18; G3; G38; L3; L30...
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine the impact of accounting for derivative instruments and hedging activities on the reporting behavior of commercial banks and the informativeness of their financial statements and find evidence consistent with this argument.
Abstract: We examine the impact of SFAS 133, Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities, on the reporting behavior of commercial banks and the informativeness of their financial statements. We argue that, because mandatory recognition of hedge ineffectiveness under SFAS 133 reduced banks' ability to smooth income through derivatives, banks that are more affected by SFAS 133 rely more on loan loss provisions to smooth income. We find evidence consistent with this argument. We also find that the increased reliance on loan loss provisions for smoothing income has impaired the informativeness of loan loss provisions for future loan defaults and bank stock returns. Data Availability: The data are available from public sources.
TL;DR: This article examined the role of accounting financial experts (AFEs) on the audit committees of S&P 1500 firms during the period 1999-2008 to explore whether concerns about the status of these experts discouraged firms from appointing them.
Abstract: Since 1999 regulators have attempted to improve the monitoring of financial reporting by exerting significant pressure on firms to appoint accounting financial experts (AFEs) to their audit committees. Yet, many firms have been reluctant to do so, which has made these firms more prone to financial reporting problems. We examine appointments of AFEs to the audit committees of S&P 1500 firms during the period 1999–2008 to explore whether concerns about the status of these experts discouraged firms from appointing them. We find that typical AFEs (CFOs and retired audit partners) have lower director status (board seats, trusteeships, social club memberships, and elite education) than other types of directors, and that this status gap is greater for higher status firms (larger, better connected, and more admired firms). Moreover, we find that higher status firms are less likely to appoint AFEs, suggesting that status-related concerns reduce the demand for accounting financial expertise on audit commi...
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined whether institutional ownership and analyst following affect the value relevance of disclosed versus recognized pension liabilities and found that firms with a higher level of institutional ownership or analyst following were more value relevant for off-balance-sheet pension liabilities.
Abstract: This study examines whether institutional ownership and analyst following affect the value relevance of disclosed versus recognized pension liabilities. Using a sample of firms with pension liabilities that were disclosed under SFAS No. 87 and subsequently recognized under SFAS No. 158 from 1999 to 2007, I find that off-balance-sheet pension liabilities are more value relevant for firms with a higher level of institutional ownership or analyst following in the pre-158 period. More importantly, I find that SFAS No. 158 increases the value relevance of previously disclosed off-balance-sheet pension liabilities for firms with a low level of institutional ownership or analyst following, and that the increase in the value relevance becomes less pronounced for firms with a higher level of institutional ownership or analyst following. Overall, the results are consistent with the view that institutional ownership and analyst following affect the value relevance of disclosed information as well as the va...
TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigate whether politically sensitive contractors pay higher taxes and whether their bargaining power reduces these tax costs, and they find that politically sensitive firms with greater bargaining power incur fewer tax-related political costs.
Abstract: We investigate whether politically sensitive contractors pay higher taxes and whether their bargaining power reduces these tax costs. Using federal contractor data, we develop a new composite measure of political sensitivity that captures both the political visibility arising from federal contracts and the importance of federal contracts to the firm. We proxy for bargaining power using the firm-level proportion of contract revenues not subject to competition, the firm-level proportion of contract revenues arising from defense contracts, and industry-level concentration ratios. We find that politically sensitive firms pay higher federal taxes, all else equal. However, firms with greater bargaining power incur fewer tax-related political costs. Our study provides new evidence on the political cost hypothesis in a tax setting and the first evidence of the interactive effects of a firm's political sensitivity and bargaining power on tax-related political costs. JEL Classifications: M41; H26
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigate the effect of clawback provision in executive compensation contracts on stock prices and find that the shareholders of adopting firms experience statistically significant positive stock-valuation consequences relative to propensity-score-matched control samples.
Abstract: We investigate the degree to which including a clawback provision in executive compensation contracts is an effective governance mechanism by documenting the impact of clawback adoption on stock prices. We expect this ex post settling-up mechanism to be beneficial because it diminishes financial reporting risks. In support of our hypotheses, we find that the shareholders of adopting firms experience statistically significant positive stock-valuation consequences relative to propensity-score-matched control samples. Further, firms with previous financial restatements had the largest economic gains, suggesting that a clawback policy can be effective at curtailing incentives for earnings manipulation. Analysis of the bid-ask spread provides evidence that these provisions contribute to reducing financial reporting risk for restating firms, while non-restating firms experience no change in the spread. We find no evidence that clawback provisions entail costs in the form of higher CEO compensation fol...
TL;DR: In this article, the authors provide both survey and experimental evidence to consider how social interactions between staff-level auditors and client management may affect staff auditors' perceptions and influence their decisions regarding the collection of audit evidence.
Abstract: This study provides both survey and experimental evidence to consider how social interactions between staff-level auditors and client management may affect staff auditors' perceptions and influence their decisions regarding the collection of audit evidence. During fieldwork, staff-level auditors have extensive interaction with client management. Survey evidence suggests that these staff-level auditors are often “mismatched” with client management, in terms of their experience, age, and accounting knowledge. Experimental results indicate that staff-level auditors may reduce the extent to which they collect evidence to avoid these interactions. Finally, the use of email communication with client management helped to mitigate the reduction in evidence collected caused by avoiding in-person interactions. Interestingly, when not collecting all the evidence, approximately half of the participants documented their findings in a vague or inappropriate manner, which would likely reduce the likelihood tha...
TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigate whether insider selling affects the likelihood of firms receiving auditor going-concern opinions, and find that the probability of receiving a negative opinion is negatively associated with the level of insider selling.
Abstract: We investigate whether insider selling affects the likelihood of firms receiving auditor going-concern opinions. Prior studies document significant negative market reactions to the issuance of going-concern opinions, indicating that such opinions convey bad news to investors. Insider sales followed by negative news are likely to attract regulators' scrutiny and investor class-action lawsuits. Therefore, we predict that, to reduce the risk of litigation, managers have incentives to avoid receiving going-concern opinions after their insider sales by pressuring auditors for clean audit opinions. We evaluate this prediction empirically and find that the probability of receiving a going-concern opinion is negatively associated with the level of insider selling. Further analysis indicates that this negative relation is more pronounced for firms that are economically significant to their auditors but less pronounced when (1) auditors have concerns about litigation exposure and reputation loss and (2) a...
TL;DR: This paper developed a simple two-period principal-agent model with moral hazard and adverse selection and test theoretical predictions using CEO compensation data from 1993-2006, finding that salary (bonus) is positively (negatively) associated with past performance for both continuing and newly hired CEOs.
Abstract: This study focuses on the relation between current compensation and past performance measures as signals of a chief executive officer's (CEO's) ability. We develop a simple two-period principal-agent model with moral hazard and adverse selection and test theoretical predictions using CEO compensation data from 1993–2006. Consistent with the predictions, we find that salary (bonus) is positively (negatively) associated with past performance for both continuing and newly hired CEOs. We also find that while current salary is positively associated with future performance, current bonus is not. As the model suggests, salary is adjusted to meet the reservation utility and information rent, and is positively correlated over time to reflect ability. Bonus serves to address moral hazard and adverse selection by separating high-ability agents into riskier contracts. Our results indicate that it is important to disaggregate cash compensation into salary and bonus components to understand the dynamic intera...
TL;DR: This article examined whether managers strategically choose forecast precision for self-serving purposes, and found that more positive (negative) news forecasts are more (less) precise than other management forecasts, while the opposite applies to management forecasts disclosed before insider purchases.
Abstract: Managers have great discretion in determining forecast characteristics, but little is known about how managerial incentives affect these characteristics. This paper examines whether managers strategically choose forecast precision for self-serving purposes. Building on the prior finding that the market reaction to vague forecasts is weaker than its reaction to precise forecasts, we find that for management forecasts disclosed before insider sales, more positive (negative) news forecasts are more (less) precise than other management forecasts. The opposite applies to management forecasts disclosed before insider purchases. These results are consistent with managers strategically choosing forecast precision to increase stock prices before insider sales and to decrease stock prices before insider purchases. Additional analyses indicate that the impact of managerial incentives on forecast precision is less pronounced when institutional ownership is high or when disclosure risk is high, and is more p...
TL;DR: This paper examined the role of accounting conservatism in the equity market and found that issuers with a greater degree of conservatism experience fewer negative market reactions to SEO announcements, and further showed that an important mechanism through which conservatism affects SEO announcement returns is by mitigating the negative impact of information asymmetry.
Abstract: : Using seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) from 1989 to 2008, we examine the role of accounting conservatism in the equity market. We find that issuers with a greater degree of conservatism experience fewer negative market reactions to SEO announcements. We further show that an important mechanism through which conservatism affects SEO announcement returns is by mitigating the negative impact of information asymmetry. Additional analyses suggest that our results are not driven by the effects of other forms of corporate governance. We also find evidence that conservative issuers continue to use conservative accounting after the equity offerings. Taken together, our findings are consistent with the argument that accounting conservatism reduces financing costs in SEOs. Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from public sources identified in the study.
TL;DR: In this article, the effect of minority shareholders increased control over corporate decisions on the quality of corporate decisions depends on the composition of the minority shareholders, and there is also weak evidence that minority shareholders are more likely to veto valuedecreasing equity offering proposals in firms with higher mutual fund ownership in the post-regulation period.
Abstract: : Using a 2004 Chinese securities regulation that requires equity offering proposals to obtain the separate approval of voting minority shareholders, we examine whether giving minority shareholders increased control over corporate decisions helps to reduce value-decreasing corporate decisions for firms domiciled in weak investor protection countries. We find that the regulation deters management from submitting value-decreasing equity offering proposals in firms with higher mutual fund ownership. There is also weak evidence that minority shareholders are more likely to veto value-decreasing equity offering proposals in firms with higher mutual fund ownership in the post-regulation period. Overall, our evidence suggests that in weak investor protection countries, the effect of granting minority shareholders increased control over corporate decisions on the quality of corporate decisions depends on the composition of minority shareholders. JEL Classifications: G32; G34; G38
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined the stock market reaction to 15 events relating to IFRS adoption in the United States and found that investors' reaction to adoption is more positive in cases where IFRS is expected to lead to convergence benefits.
Abstract: : This paper examines the stock market reaction to 15 events relating to IFRS adoption in the United States. The goal is to assess whether investors perceive the switch to IFRS as beneficial or costly. Our findings suggest that investors' reaction to IFRS adoption is more positive in cases where IFRS is expected to lead to convergence benefits. Our results also indicate a less positive market reaction for firms with higher litigation risk, which is consistent with investors' concerns about greater discretion and less implementation guidance under IFRS for these firms. Overall, the findings are relevant to the current debate on IFRS adoption in the U.S. and highlight the importance of convergence to investors. Data Availability: All data are publicly available from the sources indicated in the paper (see Appendices A and B).
TL;DR: In this article, the authors study the effectiveness of a code of ethics in an experimental setting and find that it not only improves manager return behavior and investor confidence but also enhances the potential for the code to activate social norms that control opportunistic behavior.
Abstract: Policy makers and corporations have recently emphasized a code of ethics as an effective aspect of corporate governance. The corporate governance literature in accounting, however, provides little empirical or theoretical support for this emphasis. We address this gap between public policy and the literature by studying the effectiveness of a code of ethics in an experimental setting. Using Bicchieri's (2006) model of social norm activation, we predict that a code of ethics will improve manager return behavior and investor confidence to the extent that it activates social norms that control opportunistic behavior. Further, we predict that adding a certification choice whereby the manager can publicly certify that he will adhere to the code will enhance the potential for the code of ethics to activate such norms. We find that a code of ethics only improves manager return behavior and investor confidence when the code incorporates a public certification choice by the manager. When the code is pres...