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JournalISSN: 1079-8986

The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 

Association for Symbolic Logic
About: The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic is an academic journal published by Association for Symbolic Logic. The journal publishes majorly in the area(s): Axiom & Mathematical proof. It has an ISSN identifier of 1079-8986. Over the lifetime, 1093 publications have been published receiving 13084 citations.


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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: A logic BI in which a multiplicative (or linear) and an additive (or intuitionistic) implication live side-by-side is introduced and computational interpretations, based on sharing, at both the propositional and predicate levels are discussed.
Abstract: We introduce a logic BI in which a multiplicative (or linear) and an additive (or intuitionistic) implication live side-by-side. The propositional version of BI arises from an analysis of the proof-theoretic relationship between conjunction and implication; it can be viewed as a merging of intuitionistic logic and multiplicative intuitionistic linear logic. The naturality of BI can be seen categorically: models of propositional BI's proofs are given by bicartesian doubly closed categories, i.e., categories which freely combine the semantics of propositional intuitionistic logic and propositional multiplicative intuitionistic linear logic. The predicate version of BI includes, in addition to standard additive quantifiers, multiplicative (or intensional) quantifiers and which arise from observing restrictions on structural rules on the level of terms as well as propositions. We discuss computational interpretations, based on sharing, at both the propositional and predicate levels.

522 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This paper finds the logic LP of propositions and proofs and shows that Godel's provability calculus is nothing but the forgetful projection of LP, which achievesGodel's objective of defining intuitionistic propositional logic Int via classical proofs and provides a Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov style provability semantics for Int which resisted formalization since the early 1930s.
Abstract: In 1933 G¨ odel introduced a calculus of provability (also known as modal logic S4 )a nd left open the question of its exact intended semantics. In this paper we give as olution to this problem. We find the logic LP of propositions and proofs and show that G¨ odel's provability calculus is nothing but the forgetful projection of LP .T his also achieves G¨ odel's objective of defining intuitionistic propositional logic Int via classical proofs and provides a Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov styleprovability semantics forIntwhich resisted formalization since the early 1930s. LP may be regarded as a unified underlying structure for intuitionistic, modal logics, typed combinatory logic and ! -calculus.

448 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the complexity of the satisfiability problem for FO2 is shown to be NEXPTIME-complete, and it is shown that every satisfiable FO2-sentence has a model whose size is at most exponential in the size of the sentence.
Abstract: We identify the computational complexity of the satisfiability problem for FO2, the fragment of first-order logic consisting of all relational first-order sentences with at most two distinct variables. Although this fragment was shown to be decidable a long time ago, the computational complexity of its decision problem has not been pinpointed so far. In 1975 Mortimer proved that FO2 has the finite-model property, which means that if an FO2-sentence is satisiable, then it has a finite model. Moreover, Mortimer showed that every satisfiable FO2-sentence has a model whose size is at most doubly exponential in the size of the sentence. In this paper, we improve Mortimer's bound by one exponential and show that every satisfiable FO2-sentence has a model whose size is at most exponential in the size of the sentence. As a consequence, we establish that the satisfiability problem for FO2 is NEXPTIME-complete.

357 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This talk surveys a range of positions on the fundamental metaphysical and epistemological questions about elementary logic, for example, as astarting point: what is the subjectmatter oflogic—what makes itstruthstrue?
Abstract: This talk surveys a range of positions on the fundamental metaphysical and epistemological questions about elementary logic, for example, as a starting point: what is the subject matter of logic—what makes its truths true? how do we come to know the truths of logic? A taxonomy is approached by beginning from well-known schools of thought in the philosophy of mathematics—Logicism, Intuitionism, Formalism, Realism—and sketching roughly corresponding views in the philosophy of logic. Kant, Mill, Frege, Wittgenstein, Carnap, Ayer, Quine, and Putnam are among the philosophers considered along the way.

218 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: After a careful historical and conceptual analysis of computability and recursion, several recommendations are made about preserving the intensional differences between the concepts of “computability” and “recursion.”
Abstract: We consider the informal concept of “computability” or “effective calculability” and two of the formalisms commonly used to define it, “(Turing) computability” and “(general) recursiveness”. We consider their origin, exact technical definition, concepts, history, general English meanings, how they became fixed in their present roles, how they were first and are now used, their impact on nonspecialists, how their use will affect the future content of the subject of computability theory, and its connection to other related areas. After a careful historical and conceptual analysis of computability and recursion we make several recommendations in section §7 about preserving the intensional differences between the concepts of “computability” and “recursion.” Specifically we recommend that: the term “recursive” should no longer carry the additional meaning of “computable” or “decidable;” functions defined using Turing machines, register machines, or their variants should be called “computable” rather than “recursive;” we should distinguish the intensional difference between Church's Thesis and Turing's Thesis, and use the latter particularly in dealing with mechanistic questions; the name of the subject should be “Computability Theory” or simply Computability rather than “Recursive Function Theory.”

218 citations

Performance
Metrics
No. of papers from the Journal in previous years
YearPapers
202320
202250
202139
202075
201990
201889