Showing papers in "The China Quarterly in 1984"
TL;DR: For instance, this paper reviewed Taiwan's domestic politics since The China Quarterly last reviewed them in December 1975 and concluded that Taiwan has completed one cycle of succession in the leadership of its governing institutions and is now beginning another.
Abstract: Much has occurred in Taiwan's domestic politics since The China Quarterly last reviewed them in December 1975. Taiwan has completed one cycle of succession in the leadership of its governing institutions and is now beginning another. Following his father's death in 1975 Chiang Ching-kuo achieved both firm control over the Nationalist political establishment and apparent popularity with the Taiwanese public. Now, in the mid 1980s, President Chiang continues to maintain an intricate balance between the generally conservative senior generation still in power and the somewhat progressive junior generation he is positioning to succeed them.
110 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, a social change is underway that is likely to reduce the size of the family per se, and increase the importance of supra-family kinship networks such shifts would have farreaching effects on the society and economy of the island.
Abstract: Just below the glass-sheathed surface of Taiwan's modern cities, urban life is structured by webs of social ties that may be among the closest knit and farthest flung in the world Family-centred, these personal networks bind urban residents to one another, to kin in the countryside, and to kin all over the globe, obliterating the neat social distinctions between urban and rural, domestic and foreign Family networks undergird both the society and the economy of Taiwan Over the past 35 years Taiwan's families have been if not the island's greatest, certainly its least appreciated resource Family mobility strategies have both speeded development and tempered disparities due to ethnicity, class and spatial location Yet these same families may be the greatest obstacle to further, capital-intensive development, for they are insular and atomistic, and their resources are limited and subject to periodic break-up However, social change is underway that is likely to reduce the size of the family per se, and increase the importance of supra-family kinship networks Such shifts would have far-reaching effects on the society and economy of the island
69 citations
TL;DR: In this article, an overview of the most important political and ideological developments during the past six years, and in this context, to assess current trends in China, is given, with a question mark after it, indicating that the issue can as yet be regarded as finally settled.
Abstract: In this article, I shall attempt to give an overview of the most important political and ideological developments during the past six years, and in this context, to assess current trends in China. The three-word title is, of course, deliberately modelled on the Great Leap slogan “Politics in command”, and is intended to evoke the problem of whether or not policy-making since 1978 has been largely shaged by economic realities, and/or by the economic goals of the, leadership I have placed a question mark after it because, though I shall certainly express some opinions on this topic before I have done, I doubt that the issue can as yet be regarded as finally settled.
57 citations
TL;DR: In the late 1970s, a searching examination of the extent to which development policy in the previous two or more decades had succeeded in raising living standards was carried out by Mao and his followers as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: Marxist economists and socialist planners share the view that the major objective of socialist economic development is to meet the needs of mass consumption. During the debates that followed the death of Mao Zedong in 1976 there was a searching examination of the extent to which development policy in the previous two or more decades had succeeded in raising living standards. A central premise of the policies of reform and Readjustment that emerged by the late 1970s from this debate was that consumption growth since the 1950s had been too slow. What was the evidence to support this contention? In what ways has policy since 1978 sought to redirect economic growth towards increased levels of consumption? Have these policies been successful and to what extent are they likely to continue to raise living standards?
42 citations
TL;DR: The main aim of China's agricultural policy during the Readjustment has been to raise the production of all branches of the sector in order to increase employment and incomes and to reduce the country's growing dependence on foreign agricultural imports, especially sugar, cotton and edible oil as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: The main aim of China's agricultural policy during the Readjustment has been to raise the production of all branches of the sector in order to increase employment and incomes and to reduce the country's growing dependence on foreign agricultural imports, especially sugar, cotton and edible oil. In adopting this policy the government has recognized and accepted the need to maintain and even to increase foreign grain imports during the foreseeable future.
39 citations
TL;DR: The Republic of China on Taiwan in 1949-50 faced insurmountable odds and difficulties and year-to-year crises thereafter, and yet also overcame them to achieve economic modernization and prosperity as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: Just as the Greek hero Odysseus faced many misfortunes and great challenges and yet overcame them before returning to his beloved Ithaca, so, too, the Republic of China on Taiwan in 1949–50 faced insurmountable odds and difficulties and year-to-year crises thereafter, and yet also overcame them to achieve economic modernization and prosperity.
39 citations
TL;DR: The period 1978-83 saw swift escalation of earlier policies to promote rapid fertility decline in China as discussed by the authors, where the government attempted to remove pronatalist economic incentives and replace them with economic benefits to one-child families and economic penalties for those bearing two or more children.
Abstract: The period 1978–83 saw swift escalation of earlier policies to promote rapid fertility decline in China. The government attempted to remove pronatalist economic incentives and replace them with economic benefits to one-child families and economic penalties for those bearing two or more children. China's family planning programme became increasingly compulsory in tone and coercive in methods. The single-minded pursuit of low fertility and low population growth rates has thus far been successful, though an effective political reaction against the policy is possible in the future. Meanwhile, the field of demography, the scientific study of population, has once again become respectable in China and the country's demographers are gaining rapidly in sophistication. After three decades of statistical secrecy, the government has begun to release relatively detailed demographic data, thus greatly increasing world understanding of China's population situation.
31 citations
TL;DR: According to current Chinese views, in 1949 China was liberated from three major evils: feudalism, imperialism and bureaucratic capitalism as discussed by the authors, and the focus will be on the British experience at a time when Great Britain's political position in the Far East was being overshadowed by Japan's thrust towards hegemony.
Abstract: According to current Chinese views, in 1949 China was liberated from three major evils: feudalism, imperialism and bureaucratic capitalism. The present article takes a closer look at the relationship between the two last mentioned. The period chosen is the early and mid 1930s, which was marked by growing tensions between the powers in East Asia, by acute economic depression and subsequent recovery, and by the gradual extension of the Nanjing Government's control over the country. On the foreigner's side, the focus will be on the British experience at a time when Great Britain's political position in the Far East was being overshadowed by Japan's thrust towards hegemony. It will be argued, the widening gap between Britain's political and economic presence in China was partly bridged by increasingly close co-operation between British business and the Chinese ruling elite.
30 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors analyse recent leadership and policy trends in strategically-located Xinjiang, particularly the significance of Wang's return, and assess subsequent socio-economic developments and discuss their relevance to security and defence-related issues.
Abstract: At first glance, it would seem that over the past two decades Chinese Communist Party (CCP) power and policy in the distant Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR) of the People's Republic of China have travelled full circle. By late 1981 the region's foremost pre-Cultural Revolution leader, Wang Enmao, and many of the more moderate and pragmatic policies he had come to advocate for consolidating CCP (and Han) control without unduly provoking the sensitivities of the majority non-Han (and primarily Islamic) indigenous population, had returned.2 Thus, the stage was set for Xinjiang's de novo overall integration with the rest of China. Against a brief historical backdrop this article will analyse recent leadership and policy trends in strategically-located Xinjiang, particularly the significance of Wang's return. It will then assess subsequent socio-economic developments and discuss their relevance to security and defence-related issues. Finally, some conclusions will be made concerning the always complex process of integration, in terms of both its nature and degree and its interaction with the processes of ‘modernization.’
25 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors apply standard regression techniques to examine the impact of adverse weather conditions on average grain yield per sown hectare in contemporary China and show that grain production in China has become more weather-proof after three decades of massive investment in water control and other modern inputs.
Abstract: This article applies standard regression techniques to examine the impact of adverse weather conditions on average grain yield per sown hectare in contemporary China. By isolating the weather impact I hope (a) to quantify the possible influence of frequent policy and organizational changes which have been so characteristic of Chinese agriculture since 1949; and (b) to show to what extent grain production in China has become more “weather-proof” after three decades of massive investment in water control and other modern inputs. I shall deal mainly with the long-term trends from 1952 to 1981, with special reference to the extraordinary 1959–61 period, during which total grain output and yield declined by an average of 21 and 12 per cent respectively (or 25 and 18 per cent for the two trough years of 1960 and 1961), measured against the benchmark year of 1957.
24 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors focus on three aspects of China's foreign economic relations which are important to understand the Readjustment of 1979-84: (a) the government's general orientation to trade, (b) quantitative trends in investment and trade flows, and (c) the nature of trade organization and international economic links.
Abstract: There are three aspects of China's foreign economic relations which are important to our efforts to understand the Readjustment of 1979–84. These are: (a) the government's general orientation towards foreign economic relations; (b) quantitative trends in investment and trade flows; and, (c) the nature of trade organization and international economic links. The general orientation to trade is critical in a planned economy where central preferences (essentially political) are easily reflected throughout the system. Stalin's policy of autarchy transformed the international role of the Soviet economy, while in China, Mao Zedong's willingness to trade with the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc profoundly changed the character of the Chinese economy between 1953 and 1959. Large-scale plant imports created new industries and enlarged heavy industries established – particularly in the north-east – before 1949. This phase of policy had exhausted itself in China towards the end of the 1950s, although import data for 1959 reflect prior commitments and give little sign of this. However, the reality was that China's capacity to absorb imported capital goods, and the agricultural capacity to sustain foreign exchange earnings at the necessary level, were both weakening even before the dislocations of the Great Leap radically changed the role of foreign trade by converting China from a net food exporter to a net importer.
TL;DR: The goal of the Chinese Government is to make China an efficient, modern economy by the end of the century as discussed by the authors, which was articulated by Premier Zhou Enlai in 1964 and 1975 and made public by Premier Hua Guofeng in February 1978, but a serious attempt at fundamental change was not begun until the strategic shift in economic policy following the Third Plenum of the 11th Party Central Committee in December 1978.
Abstract: The goal of the Chinese Government is to make China an efficient, modern economy by the end of the century. This goal was articulated by Premier Zhou Enlai in 1964 and 1975, and made public by Premier Hua Guofeng in February 1978, but a serious attempt at fundamental change was not begun until the strategic shift in economic policy following the Third Plenum of the 11th Party Central Committee in December 1978. Since then the Chinese have undertaken a bewildering variety of experiments and reforms in industrial enterprises. These experiments started on an extremely small scale, primarily in Sichuan, and then spread rapidly throughout the country. In 1982, however, after five years' effort, one enterprise in four was still operating at a loss.
TL;DR: The Third Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party's 11th Central Committee that convened in December 1978 marked the beginning of a new phase in China's economic development as discussed by the authors, where major development policies and broad economic trends since 1978, and assesses the prospects for future growth.
Abstract: The Third Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party's 11th Central Committee that convened in December 1978 marked the beginning of a new phase in China's economic development. This article examines the major development policies and broad economic trends since 1978, and assesses the prospects for future growth. Section I sketches the economic legacies of the 1970s that shaped the economic policies and performance of the current period. Section II outlines the new development strategy and compares it with the strategies of the past. The rate of economic growth and structural changes are discussed in Section III. Section IV summarizes the findings and concludes with brief comments on the major constraints on future economic growth. One important issue, economic reform of the system, has been deliberately omitted because (with the exception of those in the agricultural sector) they are still in an experimental stage. While the focus of this study is on macro-economic policies and trends, these issues are closely related to micro-economic developments because economic policies are based on the leadership's perspective on developments at the micro level and economic trends reflect the implementation of macro policies by the micro-economic units.
TL;DR: In this article, the Sixth Five-Year Plan has been published in draft form laying down the blueprint of China's development in the coming few years, some kind of assessment needs to be made of the; educational system, its performance and its prospects, since much of they immediate and future operation of rapid economic growth depends on U ithe human capital provided by schools.
Abstract: Like other Chinese state institutions, the educational system has undergone many changes since the death of Mao Zedong and the overthrow of the “gang of four” in 1976. Several accounts and studies have appeared treating different stages and aspects of this continuing transformation. Further adjustments to the system of education are likely to take place in the near future. Now that the Sixth Five-Year Plan has been published in draft form laying down the blueprint of China's development in the coming few years, some kind of assessment needs to be made of the; educational system, its performance and its prospects, since much of they immediate and future operation of rapid economic growth depends on U ithe human capital provided by schools.
TL;DR: The legacies of the Cultural Revolution have been nowhere more enduring than in the Chinese Communist Party organization as mentioned in this paper, and recent programmes of Party reform still seek to overcome the malign effects of the cultural revolution in order to achieve the complementary objectives of reviving abandoned Party "traditions" and refashioning the Party according to the new political direction demanded by its present leaders.
Abstract: The legacies of the Cultural Revolution have been nowhere more enduring than in the Chinese Communist Party organization. Since late 1967, when the process of rebuilding the shattered Party began, strengthening Party leadership has been a principal theme of Chinese politics; that theme has become even more pronounced in recent years. It is now claimed that earlier efforts achieved nothing, and that during the whole “decade of turmoil” until 1976, disarray in the Party persisted and political authority declined still further. Recent programmes of Party reform, therefore, still seek to overcome the malign effects of the Cultural Revolution in order to achieve the complementary objectives of reviving abandoned Party “traditions” and refashioning the Party according to the new political direction demanded by its present leaders.
TL;DR: The military threat of the 1980s is more complex than that posed by the barbarian nomads of old, and time and space factors which long shielded the interior of China provide little protection in the missile age.
Abstract: For millennia China's enemies have come chiefly out of northern and central Asia. In the 1980s, after a historically anomalous century during which most of her enemies came from the sea, China's defences once again are orientated north and west. The military threat of the 1980s is more complex than that posed by the barbarian nomads of old. The Soviet armed forces can launch land-air battles simultaneously all along the 10,000-kilometre Sino-Soviet border. Moreover, time and space factors which long shielded the interior of China provide little protection in the missile age.
TL;DR: The Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party ratified major policy changes designed to increase peasant income substantially as mentioned in this paper, and these and ensuing changes have raised the profitability of agriculture and altered production and marketing patterns.
Abstract: Per capita peasant income in China rose only 0-5 per cent per year over the two decades prior to 1978. Rural income growth was not only slow, it also lagged far behind the 1-7 per cent per year rate of the urban sector, which had started from a higher base.' In December 1978 participants at the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party ratified major policy changes designed to increase peasant income substantially.2 These and ensuing changes have raised the profitability of agriculture and altered production and marketing patterns. Before evaluating the magnitude and sources of income growth it will be useful to outline the major policy changes.
TL;DR: Wang et al. as mentioned in this paper described China's new population policies and some of the possible political economic demographic social and psychological consequences of these policies and discussed the potential to produce social unrest.
Abstract: Chinas new population policies are described and some of the possible political economic demographic social and psychological consequences of these policies are discussed. Prior to 1956 China supported pronatalist policies but from the late 1950s through the 1970s increasing attention was focused on problems associated with population growth. During the early 1980s drastic antinatalist policies were adopted in the belief that uncontrolled population growth would retard capital formation and prevent the country from reaching its goal of a per capita income of US$1000 by the year 2000. The new policies besides promoting a reduction in population growth include a eugenics component aimed at producing a nation of healthy individuals. Population growth policies focus on promoting a 1 child family and strong incentives and disincentives are used to encourage the population to accept the new family size ideal. These policies were launched without sufficient consideration being given to their possible consequences and without developing a strong theoretical position to support the policies. Demographic data to assess the possible impact of these policies was not available since the study of demography was forbidden for many years. These policies have the potential to produce social unrest. They conflict with many aspects of the countrys political ideology and they may provoke a general questioning of the ideology. A recently published survey indicated that son preference remains strong and that most parents prefer to have more than 1 child. The failure of efforts to legalize the new policies is a further indication of a general lack of acceptance of the new policies. The policies are being extended to national minorities and these groups are likely to resist the implementation of family planning programs in their communites. Cadres at the grass roots are caught in the middle. They are pressured from the top to enforce policies without laws to back them up and they must bear the brunt of implementing these policies among people who oppose the policies. There is also considerable discussion among top Chinese officials about the ethical and human rights issues involved in the eugenic and disincentive aspects of the programs. The policies may also produce negative demographic and economic consequences. There are some economic advantages associated with population growth such as increasing the pool of people to provide creative solution to technological problems. As population growth declines the population will age and the dependency ratio will increase as the proportion of the elderly increases. There may be a shortage of manpower for the military and job mobility will decrease. Parents will be unwilling to relinquish their only child to serve in the military or to take a job in distant regions. Preliminary research on the personality development of only children in China indicates that only children are more selfish and lack a sense of responsibility and commitment to collective interests. Women who produce daughters may be divorced or maltreated. Couples will find it difficult to provide economic security for both sets of parents. The quota system may provoke competition and conflict between workers and community members. Many of these consequences will not materialize until after the small family trend is established and it will take a long time to reverse the trend. Population policies require long range planning and are not amenable to short term manipulation. Chinese leaders will need to assess whether the costs of these policies is higher than the benefits.
TL;DR: For example, Taiwan is part of a divided nation dwarfed by its rival but, like the tail that tries to wag the dog, Taipei claims to represent, and to speak for, the whole of China as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: -In the past three decades Taiwan has gained in terms of its economy but has substantially waned in terms of its international status. Economically, Taiwan has performed so impressively that it has become one of the newly industrialized countries (NICs) that are the envy of many developing nations. Its sustained high growth rate over a fairly long period commands respect from economists all over the world. In 1983 the GNP of the country approached US$50 billion and its per capita income reached US$2,444. It is one of the world's top 15 trading nations and has enjoyed a favourable balance of payments for many years. The 1983 exports and imports were valued at US$25,117 million and 20,285 million, respectively. In foreign affairs, Taiwan is practically isolated; once supported by a majority of the United Nations members as the de jure government of China, today only 23 nations still maintain formal diplomatic ties with the Republic of China (ROC). Most of these are small or mini-states, except for, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea and the Vatican City. The most important of its allies, the United States, normalized relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) at the end of 1978 and introduced an abnormal way of dealing with Taiwan. Since 1971 Taiwan has been excluded from the UN and practically all other intergovernmental international organizations, the only significant exception being the Asian Development Bank. Taipei continues to contend that it maintains "substantive relations" with some 140 nations, but these economic, cultural and sports exchanges, though helpful, can hardly act as substitutes for normal diplomatic relations. Taiwan is part of a divided nation dwarfed by its rival but, like the tail that tries to wag the dog, Taipei claims to represent, and to speak for, the whole of China. Since the Taipei Government will not accept the more realistic position that it represents Taiwan and Pescadores only, other nations cannot even accord it that more limited recognition. Therefore, even though it strives hard to establish, maintain and gain international recognition, its formal ties with the outside world decrease further as the years go by. Because it is so dwarfed by the mainland of China, it is thought of as small and of lesser significance by other countries even though Taiwan is actually larger than some 110 UN members in terms of population size and of economic and military strength. Because it is seen geographically and culturally as part of China and yet drastically different from the mainland in terms of its political ideology and economic system, it invites separate and varied treatments from communist and noncommunist countries alike; and yet, in the end, it cannot avoid being abandoned by most, once Beijing succeeds in pressuring others to make the choice between itself and Taipei.
TL;DR: In this article, the transition date of the official change in the definition of statistical categories in the People's Republic of China has been investigated and the United States Department of Agriculture delegation to China seem to have ended the debate by simply asking their Chinese hosts, although it is always possible that the effective date differed somewhat among reporting units or even among provinces.
Abstract: Soon after the People's Republic of China resumed publishing economic data series in the late 1970s it became clear that current definitional conventions for statistical categories often differed from those of the 1950s. For example, tractor stock, in standard 15 horse-power units from the 1950s, was recorded in series linked with current physical unit data. Sporadic efforts have been made clearly to define categories in different periods, pin down transition dates, and occasionally develop consistent series. In some instances, Chinese statistical organizations have produced series making adjustments for specific inconsistencies in previously published data. Soybeans, for example, are now included in the entire official series for foodgrain production and sown area from 1949 to the present; they were previously excluded from 1949–57 data. Articles by Walker and by Field and Kilpatrick were among attempts to correct for this inconsistency, considerably pre-dating the official published adjustment. At around the same time several researchers noted that roots and tubers were valued at one-fourth natural weight in the 1950s, but one-fifth under current convention. For a few years the transition date was open to question and arguments were tendered in support of 1977, 1970 and 1964. Members of a United States Department of Agriculture delegation to China seem to have ended the debate by simply asking their Chinese hosts. They were told categorically that the official change was in 1964, although it is always possible that the effective date differed somewhat among reporting units or even among provinces. Some four years later the date was confirmed in the 1983 Statistical Yearbook.
TL;DR: The relationship between scientific and technological development and economic growth in industrially advanced countries over the past 30 years has been investigated and refined over a number of years, and attempts have been made to quantify the relationship as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: The intimate, though as yet imperfectly understood, causal relation-ship between scientific and technological development and the economic growth in industrially advanced countries over the past 30 years has been investigated and refined over a number of years, and attempts have been made to quantify the relationship. Although a strong scientific and technological (S & T) base does not by itself guarantee rapid economic growth, most observers consider it to be a necessary prerequisite, after a certain level of development has been reached. One of the main ways that S & T act on the economic system is by the generation of new knowledge through research activities and the application of this in production. Such application often results in new products and processes which are grouped under the term “technological innovations.” The innovation process is usually defined as “the technical, industrial and commercial steps which lead to the successful marketing of new manufactured products and/or to the commercial use of technically new processes or equipment.”
TL;DR: In this article, the two greatest difficulties now confronting the Chinese are energy supply and energy transport, and even if we put aside for a moment the long-range aspects of these problems, the immediate issues are complex.
Abstract: During the period of the Readjustment China has faced numerous and difficult problems in the sphere of energy. The two greatest difficulties now confronting the Chinese are energy supply and energy transport. Even if we put aside for a moment the long-range aspects of these problems, the immediate issues are complex. At present energy investment is directed towards securing the supply in the long run, but while this is occurring shortages remain acute, and conservation and increased efficiency of utilization are critical.
TL;DR: The currency stabilization scheme announced by the Hong Kong Government on 15 October 1983 and implemented from 17 October represents a return to the modified colonial currency board system which had operated in Hong Kong from 1935 until June 1972, which in turn was a modified version of the currency system that had operated from the earliest days of British administration up to 1935.
Abstract: The currency stabilization scheme announced by the Hong Kong Government on 15 October 1983 and implemented from 17 October represents a return to the modified colonial currency board system which had operated in Hong Kong from 1935 until June 1972, which in turn was a modified version of the currency system that had operated in Hong Kong from the earliest days of British administration up to 1935. Before describing the new system it is useful to review briefly the various systems that have operated in Hong Kong in the past: the silver standard, which existed almost from the outset and continued until 1935; the sterling standard, maintained from 1935 to mid 1972; the short-lived quasi-US dollar standard in operation from July 1972 to November 1974; and the floating exchange rate system or pure Hong Kong dollar standard, which survived from November 1974 until October 1983. Emphasis throughout will be placed on the determination of the quantity of money or money supply in circulation.
TL;DR: Owen Rutter's somewhat idyllized picture of an essentially agricultural Taiwan could have portrayed the 1950s or, equally, Taiwan at any time in the more than 300 years of Chinese settlement there as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: Owen Rutter's somewhat idyllized picture of an essentially agricultural Taiwan could have portrayed the 1950s, or, equally, Taiwan at any time in the more than 300 years of Chinese settlement there. Most of the Chinese who crossed the Taiwan Straits to settle in Taiwan were peasant farmers, and, as they had done on continental China, they made their living by agriculture. In 1945, when the island reverted to China after 50 years as a Japanese colony, agriculture was still very much the predominant sector, and the majority of the population continued to rely on farming. But, from the late 1950s onwards, in the space of less than three decades, the pattern of more than three centuries has been radically altered. Industry has burgeoned to replace agriculture as the key sector, and, concomitantly, Taiwan's population is no longer characteristically rural. A massive outflow of rural people into the cities has left only one person in four living in the countryside
TL;DR: To encourage economic construction and development, China is considering the reform of her system of taxation, principally the taxing of industrial and commercial enterprises The aim of such reform is twofold: to secure more stable revenues for the financing of key projects of national importance and, even more crucial, to try to make the tax system into a means of economic management as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: To encourage economic construction and development, China is considering the reform of her system of taxation, principally the taxing of industrial and commercial enterprises The aim of such reform is two-fold: to secure more stable revenues for the financing of key projects of national importance and, even more crucial, to try to make the tax system into a means of economic management The latter has been called the leverage function of taxation