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Showing papers in "The International Journal of Ethics in 1896"


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Punishment is defined as the infliction of pain on a person because he has done wrong as discussed by the authors, and it is essential that it should be inflicted because of the wrong-doing.
Abstract: We may define punishment as the infliction of pain on a person because he has done wrong. That it must be painful, and that it must be inflicted on a person who has done, or is thought to have done,wrong, will be generally admitted, But we must also remember that it is essential that it should be inflicted because of the wrong-doing. In the little books written by the authors who educated our parents, the boy who went out without his mother's leave was struck by lightning. This cannot,unless theology is introduced,be considered as a punishment. For the lightning would have struck with equal readiness any boy in the same spot, although provided with the most ample parental authority. And the little books written by the moralists who are anxious to educate our children, although less amusing than their predecessors,are often not more accurate. They delight in talking of the rewards and punishments which Nature herself distributes among us. But Nature,though she often destroys,never punishes. For the moral value of an action makes no difference to her. Punishment,then,is pain,and to inflict pain on any person obviously needs a justification....

27 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The Morality that Ought to be as mentioned in this paper is a system of morality sought for by those who do not regard possession of the field as a sufficient itle in an ethical code to one's obedience.
Abstract: THERE was published some time since (on the principle that half an article is better than a whole one) a paper with the title, \" The Morality that Ought to Be.\" * It was a little criticism on the Rationalist endeavor to find a sufficient basis for morals in right reason-a little effort o see \" as in itself it really is\" the system of morality sought for by those who do not regard possession of the field as a sufficient itle in an ethical code to one's obedience, but propose to inquire, not what is the ideal of conduct tacitly implied in the \"moral injunctions\" in force about one in Society, but what is the ideal of conduct-the beau ideal-of all the beautiful impossible ideals the best. And the argument went on to show that there are at least as many such ideals, and as many such systems, each in the eye of reason the equal of any of the rest, as there are persons capable of giving in allegiance to them, and that the obligation one is under in respect to such ideals and systems is precisely on a par with the obligation one is under in respect to Logic or Hygiene, or any other practical science-a conditional obligation namely-the obligation, if one choose the end, to choose the means, the obligation not to fumble, simply-the obligation, when one has chosen what one wants to do, to do it intelligently, to use one's common sense. But side by side with these \" systems of morality,\" so-called by the extreme Rationalists, with their beautiful impossible ideals of which one may or may not feel the seductive charm,

11 citations




Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Some Aspects of the Social Problem as mentioned in this paper is a contribution to the philosophy of social reform, and, from the authority of the writers, commands the greatest respect, but I cannot help thinking that, in spite of explicit declarations to the contrary, its tendency is one-sided, and to a certain extent misleading.
Abstract: THE following considerations upon modern Socialism are suggested by the book entitled \" Some Aspects of the Social Problem.\" * Justice has already been done to its remarkable merits in the pages of this JOURNAL: it is certainly a noteworthy and impressive contribution to the philosophy of Social Reform, and, from the authority of the writers, commands the greatest respect. But I cannot help thinking that, in spite of explicit declarations to the contrary, its tendency is one-sided, and to a certain extent misleading,-more particularly, it seems to me to misrepresent both the aims and methods of modern Socialism or Collectivism. It does recognize a theoretical distinction between a higher and lower conception of Socialism, but the idea of Socialism it habitually uses is generalized from the lower. It may be granted that a philosophical interpretation of Socialism was not within the scope of the essayists, and that they were within their rights in taking Socialism \"as it is spoke,\" and sometimes written: that the \"idolon\" rather than the \"idea\" of Socialism was sufficient for their purposes. Still, the power of discrimination has generally been held to be a note of philosophy; and it surely could not have been the bias of philosophy which has led Mr. Bosanquet and Miss Dendy to group together under a common denomination such heterogeneous tendencies as \"the organization of industry\" and the extension of out-

6 citations







Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors discuss the duty which the persons who form the progressive or deviating element in a religious community owe to the rest of that community; the extent to which they ought to give expression and effect o their opinions within the community; and the point at which the higher interests of truth force them to the disruption of old ties and cherished associations.
Abstract: I HAVE taken as the subject of my address, to-day, the \"Ethics of Religious Conformity.\" What I wish to discuss is the duty which the persons who form the progressive-or, to use a neutral term, the deviating-element in a religious community owe to the rest of that community; the extent to which they ought to give expression and effect o their opinions within the community; and the point at which the higher interests of truth force them to the disruption of old ties and cherished associations. There can, I think, be little doubt that this is an ethical question of much importance. But it may reasonably be doubted whether it is one with which we are here called upon to concern ourselves. I will begin by trying to remove this doubt. (i) The aim of our Society is to be a moralizing agency; to assist \" individual and social efforts after right living.\" Now, actually, in the world we live in, the great moralizing agencies are the Christian churches; and the most advanced thinker can hardly suppose that this will not continue to be the case for an indefinite time to come. If so, surely none can be more seriously concerned than members of an Ethical Society

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: MACKENZIE as mentioned in this paper argued that we possess in ourselves the criterion of reason, and that it is a sacred privilege which we must never abdicate, that everything must submit to be tested by that criterion.
Abstract: That is my first principle. But my second is, that I think we should be bold. We possess in ourselves the criterion of reason; or, with due effort, we may develop it within us; and it is a sacred privilege which we must never abdicate, that everything must submit to be tested by that criterion. In the end we cannot accept anything as a right or as a duty, however venerable may appear to be its authority, however august its sanction, if it cannot somehow be made clear to us that it is an essential element or a necessary stage in the development of a full and perfect humanity.* JOHN S. MACKENZIE. UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, CARDIFF.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Direct Legislation is a means by which any class or group in a community, whether village, city, state, or nation, can bring up its grievances and its proposed remedy for such grievances before the whole people for discussion as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: single public man dare openly oppose them, so strongly are they rooted in the hearts of the Swiss people. In his closing paragraph, Mr. Lowell says: \" If the Referendum and the Initiative were instruments by which the laboring class could legislate for its own special benefit, they would be mischievous. Class legislation, enacted by a class, is absolutely inconsistent with democracy, which is a government by the whole people for the benefit of the whole people.\" True; and that is just what Direct Legislation is; it is a means by which any class or group in a community, whether village, city, State, or nation, can bring up its grievances and its proposed remedy for such grievances before the whole people for discussion, and then the whole people decides on the proposed remedy. The laboring class can force a discussion on some measure for its own special benefit, but it cannot, unless the people agree with it, make this measure a law. Direct Legislation will prevent class legislation. As Mr. Lowell truly says, \" If history proves anything, it proves that a democracy in which any one class becomes too powerful is doomed.\" ELTWEED POMEROY. NEWARK, N. J.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors regret that they misrepresented Bosanquet's point of view in her article on the "Socialistic Propaganda." It was certainly directed to what I may call the previous side of the Propaganda, and that it has a " previous" side cannot be disputed.
Abstract: P.S.-I regret that I misrepresented Mrs. Bosanquet's point of view in her article on the "Socialistic Propaganda." It was certainly directed to what I may call the " previous" side of the Propaganda, and that it has a " previous" side cannot be disputed. But the errors to which Mrs. Bosanquet drew attention were at any rate made bonide, and it would be interesting to have a criticism from the same competent hand of Mr. Mallock's equally previous 4" Classes and Masses" or the Individualist Propaganda. S. B.



Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In the last number of this JOURNAL, Professor James, in his delightful, mettlesome style, undertook to deal with this question as mentioned in this paper, instead of treating it in a universal, impersonal way, and seeking to make an answer emerge from an exhaustive discussion of the import of life.
Abstract: In the last number of this JOURNAL, Professor James, in his delightful, mettlesome style, undertook to deal with this question. Instead, however, of treating it in a universal, impersonal way, and seeking to make an answer emerge from an exhaustive discussion of the import of life, as it reveals itself in man, and of worth, as an attribute of such life, he has preferred to suppose the question put by a person in a certain pathological condition,-\" a fellow mortal who is on such terms with life that the only comfort left him is to brood on the assurance, ' you may end it when you will.' What reasons,\" he continues, \" can we plead that may render such a brother (or sister) willing to take up the burden again ?\" (pp. 5, 6.) In other words, what cure can we find for that \"religious disease\" (p. 7) called pessimism, that \"definition of the world\" (p. 22) which leads a man to the brink of suicide ? To the question, so formulated, the answer naturally comes in pathological terms, and in such Professor James has answered it. The answer seems to amount to this: If your patient is not past power of reflection (if he is, he is hopeless), there are two possible cures for him. Either (i) through the rousing of certain pathological conditions, pride, hatred, etc., inducive of absorbing activity, \"the longing to read the facts religiously may cease, and leave the bare facts by themselves; or (2) supplementary facts may be discovered * or believed in which permit the religious reading to go on\" (p. 8). In other words, you may either cause your patient to desist from reflection on life, as a whole, altogether, or


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Meinong as mentioned in this paper developed the outlines of a general psychological theory of value, and a system of ethics based upon it, which he called Werth Theorie und Ethik.
Abstract: THE economic theory of value has been submitted in these last years, especially by Austrian philosophers, to remarkable researches. An Austrian philosopher, Alexius Meinong, Professor of the University of Graz, has elaborated and presented the problem of value in general on its ethical side,* and his theory, though quite independent and individual, shows so many relations with the theory of economists that they might be united without much difficulty into one all-inclusivd system. The work is not, as its title would lead one to expect, simply a series of scientific contributions to the subject which it treats. It develops the outlines of a general psychological theory of value, and a system of ethics based upon it. It thus pursues the same aim as my \" Werth Theorie und Ethik,\" t a work to which the author in his preface xpressly alludes, and to which in his text he frequently and, indeed, almost exclusively refers. In reviewing it, I may be permitted, therefore, to refer to my own investigations, and to give particular attention to such points as suggest comparisons. Should one attempt o describe the fundamental character of the two works in a few words, one might designate Meinong's investi-



Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This article examined more closely than Mr. Pearson appears to have done the grounds of this impression, and to inquire whether it is really supported by the facts, and found that the writer there only gave form to a widely-spread impression that we are in the middle of a movement which can only be the disintegration of the family group and the transference of the functions that have hitherto been performed by it to the state.
Abstract: THE title of this paper was suggested by the chapter on the \"Decline of the Family\" in Charles Pearson's interesting book on \" National Life and Character.\" The writer there only gives form to a widely-spread impression that we are in the middle of a movement the issue of which can only be the disintegration of the family group and the transference of the functions that have hitherto been performed by it to the state. The object of my paper is to examine more closely than Mr. Pearson appears to have done the grounds of this impression, and to inquire whether it is really supported by the facts.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: YOKOI as discussed by the authors describes a vision of the good angel of destiny standing with a smile upon her face and pointing to the road the New Japan is to take, and when she succeeds in this attempt, then will she have attained that ideal of national greatness and glory about which the present generation of her people are but dreaming, for the realization of which they will be all willing to die.
Abstract: perfect philosophy of life. And when she succeeds in this attempt, then will she have attained that ideal of national greatness and glory about which the present generation of her people are but dreaming, for the realization of which they will be all willing to die. The good angel of destiny seems to be standing with a smile upon her face and pointing to the road the New Japan is to take. TOKIWO YOKOI. TOKYO, JAPAN.