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Showing papers in "The Journal of African History in 1969"


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The anthropological and historical literature dealing with Africa abounds with references to a people called the "Hamites" as mentioned in this paper, which is a convenient explanation for all the signs of civilization found in Black Africa.
Abstract: The anthropological and historical literature dealing with Africa abounds with references to a people called the ‘Hamites’. ‘Hamite’, as used in these writings, designates an African population supposedly distinguished by its race— Caucasian—and its language family, from the Negro inhabitants of the rest of Africa below the Sahara.There exists a widely held belief in the Western world that everything of value ever found in Africa was brought there by these Hamites, a people inherently superior to the native populations. This belief, often referred to as the Hamitic hypothesis, is a convenient explanation for all the signs of civilization found in Black Africa. It was these Caucasoids, we read, who taught the Negro how to manufacture iron and who were so politically sophisticated that they organized the conquered territories into highly complex states with themselves as the ruling elites. This hypothesis was preceded by another elaborate Hamitic theory. The earlier theory, which gained currency in the sixteenth century, was that the Hamites were black savages, ‘natural slaves’—and Negroes. This identification of the Hamite with the Negro, a view which persisted throughout the eighteenth century, served as a rationale for slavery, using Biblical interpretations in support of its tenets. The image of the Negro deteriorated in direct proportion to the growth of the importance of slavery, and it became imperative for the white man to exclude the Negro from the brotherhood of races. Napoleon's expedition to Egypt in 1798 became the historical catalyst that provided the Western World with the impetus to turn the Hamite into a Caucasian.

214 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors examines three views which have been widely held about slavery and the slave trade in West Africa, and which have tended to mould interpretations of its history, especially for the period from the fifteenth to the nineteenth century.
Abstract: This paper examines three views which have been widely held about slavery and the slave trade in West Africa, and which have tended to mould interpretations of its history, especially for the period from the fifteenth to the nineteenth century. These are:(1) That the institution of slavery was endemic in, and a natural feature of, indigenous West African society, so that when foreigners arrived in West Africa with a demand for slaves, West Africans were able immediately to organize an export trade in slaves on an ever-increasing scale.(2) A contrary view, that it was the external demands for labour which led to a great growth of the institution of slavery in West Africa, and so corrupted its indigenous society.(3) A view which may or may not be combined with (2), namely that the external demand for slaves became so considerable that there was a disastrous effect on its population.Relevant evidence is touched upon from about the eleventh century onwards, and a fourth interpretation is developed which seems better to fit the economic and social realities which can be ascertained.In essence this is that economic and commercial slavery and slave-trading were not natural features of West African society, but that they developed, along with the growth of states, as a form of labour mobilization to meet the needs of a growing system of foreign trade in which, initially, the demand for slaves as trade goods was relatively insignificant. What might be termed a ‘slave economy’ was generally established in the Western and Central Sudan by about the fourteenth century at least, and had certainly spread to the coasts around the Senegal and in Lower Guinea by the fifteenth century.The European demand for slaves for the Americas, which reached its peak from about 1650 to about 1850, accentuated and expanded the internal growth of both slavery and the slave trade. But this was essentially only one aspect of a very wide process of economic and political development and social change, in West Africa. The data recently assembled and analysed by Curtin for the volume and distribution of the export slave trade do not suggest that the loss of population and other effects of the export of labour to the Americas need have had universally damaging effects on the development of West Africa. Rather, it is suggested, West African rulers and merchants reacted to the demand with economic reasoning, and used it to strengthen streams of economic and political development that were already current before the Atlantic slave trade began.

173 citations



Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, it was shown that the rich Ingombe Ilede burials date from the fourteenth/fifteenth centuries a.d., not from the ninth/tenth centuries as was previously supposed, thus little evidence for intensive trade between the Middle Zambezi and the Mocambique coast before ca. 1400.
Abstract: Recent excavations and radiocarbon dates provide evidence that the rich Ingombe Ilede burials date from the fourteenth/fifteenth centuries a.d., not from the ninth/tenth centuries as was previously supposed. There is thus little evidence for intensive trade between the Middle Zambezi and the Mocambique coast before ca. a.d. 1400.

59 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors outline the growth of Yao trade before the nineteenth century and consider the nature of Yao political organization and the way in which the slave trade facilitated the rise of large territorial chiefdoms.
Abstract: Through their deep involvement in the long-distance trade of eastern central Africa, the Yao were increasingly exposed to the impact of Swahili traders and their culture. During the nineteenth century the increased volume of trade, and the ever growing importance of slaves in that trade, combined to produce a marked growth in the scale of Yao political units. This paper begins by outlining the growth of Yao trade before the nineteenth century. It then considers the nature of Yao political organization and the way in which the slave trade, in particular, facilitated the rise of large territorial chiefdoms. The last section deals with related social and cultural changes, including the growth of towns and the introduction of Islam.

57 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The origins of the scramble for West Africa are discussed in this paper, where the authors argue that the crucial change in French African policy occurred not in 1882-3, as commonly assumed, but in 1879-80.
Abstract: This paper is a contribution to the current debate about the origins of the scramble for West Africa. It analyses the internal dynamics of French expansion and argues that the crucial change in French African policy occurred not in 1882–3, as commonly assumed, but in 1879–80. The policies adopted at this time, although their roots can be traced back to the governorship of Louis Faidherbe in Senegal, were distinguished by a new willingness on the part of the government in Paris to establish political as well as economic claims to West African territory, and by its readiness to bear the financial and military burdens of territorial expansion. Changes in French domestic politics or foreign relations cannot adequately account for this transition from informal to formal expansion, nor can it be explained solely in terms of commercial agitation in France or West Africa. The influence of public opinion and of colonial agents on the formulation of policy was more significant, but the crucial decisions were taken by the policy-makers themselves, and in particular by Charles de Freycinet (Minister of Public Works and later Prime Minister) and Admiral Jean Jaureguiberry (Minister of Marine and Colonies). They, above all, were responsible for inaugurating the era of French imperialism in West Africa. The new imperialism was most apparent in the drive to create a vast territorial empire in the Sudanese interior. But it was also evident in the intensification of commercial rivalries along the West African coast, and the paper argues that French actions there in 1882–3 were the continuation of policies adopted three years before rather than immediate responses to the British occupation of Egypt or to the growth of popular support for African expansion. Accordingly, the beginnings of French imperialism in West Africa are advanced as the principal cause of the scramble.

55 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The Uwaysiya was responsible for massive conversions to Islam in the coastal region, in inner Tanganyika, and on the Eastern fringes of the Congo at the end of the 19th and the beginning decades of the 20th centuries.
Abstract: Shaykh Uways b. Muḥammad al-Barāwī (1847–1909) was an important leader of the Qādirīya brotherhood in southern Somalia, on Zanzibar, and along the East African coast from Kenya to Mozambique, and founded his own branch of Qādirīya, the Uwaysīya. Before his death in 1909 when he was assassinated by representatives of the rival Sālihīya brotherhood (under the leadership of Muḥammȧd 'Ȧbdallah Hasan, the ‘Mad Mullah’), Uways missionary activities were very considerable.Uways' branch of the Qādiriya was probably behind certain episodes of Muslim resistance to European penetration into Buganda in the late 1880's, at the behest of Sayyid Barghash of Zanzibar. Indeed the relations between Shaykh Uways and successive rulers of Zanzibar, Barghash, Khalīfa, and Ḥamid b. Thuwaynī were very close. In 90's, certain Muslim elements in Tanganyika, in conjunction with the ṭarīqa, made trouble for the Germans in SE Tanganyika during the ‘Mecca Letters affair’ at Lindi in 1908. This episode revealed a division in the Tanganyika Muslim community.The Uwaysīya was responsible for massive conversions to Islam in the coastal region, in inner Tanganyika, and on the Eastern fringes of the Congo at the end of the 19th and the beginning decades of the 20th centuries.

50 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the Bakungu client-chiefs made further institutional changes during the second decade of the twentieth century to perpetuate their power in the Buganda kingdom by making further changes in ideology and in the structure of government.
Abstract: In 1959 C. C. Wrigley published ‘The Christian revolution in Buganda’. an important essay summarizing a decade of intensive research into Buganda politics during the nineteenth century. There he demonstrated how ‘Ganda society had undergone, immediately before the advent of British imperial power, a genuine revolution, which had brought about drastic changes in ideology and in the structure as well as the personnel of government and that as a result of these [and other] changes it was uniquely fitted to cope with the new situation which confronted it in the last years of the nineteenth century’. This essay seeks to reconstruct an intriguing attempt made by the Bakungu client-chiefs who triumphed in that ‘Christian revolution’ to perpetuate their power in the Buganda kingdom by making further institutional changes during the second decade of the twentieth century. But first it is necessary to discuss the general factors shaping political relationships between these client-chiefs and their European rulers during the first and third decades of this century. In this it is possible to take account not only of several secondary sources published since the appearance of Wrigley's article nearly ten years ago, but also of certain primary materials which have recently come to light.

49 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The ambiguity of the term may thus have progressively increased with the expansion of Islam in West Africa, while the name itself became sufficiently entrenched in popular usage for it to survive the fame of great West African empires like Mali and Songhay.
Abstract: The generic term Takarīr (also Takarna) is a popular Middle Eastern concept applied to all West African Muslims. The progenitor of the name, to which the attribution Takarīr is made, is the ancient state of Takrūr, which existed briefly on the Senegal basin from ca. a.d. 1OOO and which was the first West African chieftaincy to accept Islam. This paper suggests that probably the earliest West African Muslims to be seen in the Middle East in recognizable numbers may have come from that state. Because the milieu of the Hijaz and the diversity of races frequenting the annual pilgrimage ceremonies encouraged generalizations, the name Takarīr was conveniently applied to West Africans. The ambiguity of the term may thus be seen to have progressively increased with the expansion of Islam in West Africa, while the name itself became sufficiently entrenched in popular usage for it to survive the fame of great West African empires like Mali and Songhay. The term ‘Bilad al-Takrūr’ is essentially the extension of the Middle Eastern concept of Takrūr and has therefore received various territorial definitions.

48 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the Chadian Muslim states of Kanem, and later Bornu, have been linked throughout their history to North Africa by an important trade-route across the Sahara, from the Libyan coast to Lake Chad.
Abstract: The Chadian Muslim states of Kanem, and later Bornu, have been linked throughout their history to North Africa by an important trade-route across the Sahara, from the Libyan coast to Lake Chad. The popularity and permanence of this route throughout the centuries have been detennined by the economic needs and specialities of the N. African littoral, as well as of the Western Sudan. This route, first controlled by Ibāḍī Muslim Berbers from Zawīla from the eighth to the twelfth centuries, then briefly by the Ayyubids of Cairo, came under the control of Kanem, which was expanding northwards in the thirteenth century. The Fazzān (and Zawīla) then came under the control of Kanem, which seems to have maintained friendly relations with the Hafsid dynasty of Tunis. After the thirteenth century, independent states arose in the Fazzān. Then, after the establishment of an Ottoman Turkish province in Libya, the Turks and the Mais of Bornu were soon in contact, probably from about 1555, and certainly in the time of Mai Idrīs of Bomu (on the throne in 1557–8), as some newly found correspondence from the Ottoman Archives in Istanbul makes clear. There was certainly a friendly association between Bornu and the Turks at this period, if not an actual alliance, as Mai Idrīs hoped to obtain arms and perhaps Turkish troops as well to use against his enemies of the W. Sudan, principally the Hausa state of Kebbi. However, Idris's hopes were deceived, and the Ottoman Sultan Murād III did not provide what was wanted, causing Idrīs to turn to the Sa'dī Sharifian ruler of Fās, Aḥmad al-Manṣūr al-Dhahābī, with a similar request.

47 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, Dittmer links the Lower Congo with Katanga, and derives the latter cluster itself from the interlacustrine and Ethiopian clusters, and concludes that these were independent.
Abstract: Much speculation has been devoted to the possible connexions between the different clusters of kingdoms in Africa. Scholars have been puzzled for over half a century by the similarities in organization and ideology between different African states. They have tried to explain them either as the product of the diffusion of a common pattern, the ‘Sudanic State’ or the ‘Sacral Kingship’, or by maintaining that similar functional needs led to parallel independent inventions in many different areas. In Central Africa the specific positions taken have been that the Katanga states diffused their model of government to the Lower Congo cluster, or, as I myself have claimed, that these were independent. Dittmer links the Lower Congo with Katanga, and derives the latter cluster itself from the interlacustrine and Ethiopian clusters

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, a distinction is drawn between regional trade in items for which there is local demand, and longer distance commerce in raw materials, which may have been conducted with the aid of some standardized units of monetary significance.
Abstract: Three raw materials were essential to Iron Age peoples in South Central Africa: iron, copper and salt. This paper discusses some of the archaeological evidence for the development of regional and long-distance trade in these commodities during the earlier Iron Age. A distinction is drawn between regional trade in items for which there is local demand, and longer distance commerce in raw materials, which may have been conducted with the aid of some standardized units of monetary significance.The big question for future research is that of assessing the degree to which the more sophisticated centres of metallurgy and trade affected those societies, living outside the immediate area, whose technologies and economies were less highly developed.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This article presented a case for a revision of the early history of Pate, based on a critical examination of the Pate Chronicle in the light of archaeological and external historical evidence bearing on the subject.
Abstract: This article, based on a critical examination of the Pate Chronicle in the light of archaeological and external historical evidence bearing on the subject, presents a case for a revision of the early history of the town. It maintains that Pate was the latest of the settlements to rise to importance in the region, being of little importance before the sixteenth century, and preceded by other city-states, the earliest of which was Manda. The origins of Pate do not go back before the fourteenth century; the first dynasty there, the Batawi, was ruling up to around the seventeenth century, after which the Nabahani took over the sultanate.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors describe the wandering capitals of sixteenth and seventeenth-century Ethiopia, and offer an explanation for the pattern of movement of the capital in these cities.
Abstract: The purpose of this essay has been twofold: first, to describe the wandering capitals of sixteenth and seventeenth-century Ethiopia, and secondly, to offer an explanation for the pattern of movement.Ethiopian wandering capitals possessed many of the characteristics that are often used to distinguish cities from other forms of settlement. Roving capitals were large and densely populated enough to qualify for city status, they performed an essentially urban role of administration, the capitals were heterogeneous socially, and representatives of the Ethiopian literati were present. The population of these capitals were for the most part only seasonally urban and seasonally rural. And yet, these capitals were not permanent.The explanation offered may be succinctly summarized as follows. Initially, military motives prompted the Ethiopian eite to change their capitals from fixed to mobile settlements. These guerilla cities were adapted to in several ways. First, capitals moved to food supplies rather than supplies being moved to the capital. Secondly, capitals impoverished their current hinterlands. And thirdly, political integration of Ethiopia came eventually to depend on a mobile centre of polity. These three factors not only represent adaptations to nomadic capitals, but they in turn made a stabilization of capitals difficult. In other words, the very adaptations to the wandering capitals themselves had a feedback effect on the pattern of movement, and therefore contributed to a continuation of capital movement.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: From the sixteenth century until the coming of the Salazar regime, Portuguese control in the Zambezi basin rested on the prazos da coroa, grants of crown land.
Abstract: From the sixteenth century until the coming of the Salazar regime, Portuguese control in the Zambezi basin rested on the prazos da coroa—grants of crown land. Portuguese acquisition of land and jurisdiction began with the establishment of the trading fairs in Mashonaland in the second half of the sixteenth century. Private titles first became common in the seventeenth century, when individual conquistadores, who had obtained concessions from chiefs in return for their help in local wars, sought official titles for their land from the Portuguese crown. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the Crown tried to modify the terms of these grants and alter the character of the institution of the prazos. The prazo-holders successfully resisted these encroachments because their power rested on their followings of African slaves and clients, and on their control of local administration and their family alliances. In the nineteenth century their dependence on their African followings, coupled with increasing inter-marriage, greatly accentuated the African characteristics of the prazos. The most important of the prazo holders became the chiefs of newly emerging African peoples, and adopted the customs and beliefs associated with chieftainship. At the same time the disordered state of the Zambezi following the Ngoni invasions and the growth of the slave-trade eliminated the weaker families and concentrated power effectively in the hands of four major family groupings. The wars waged by the Portuguese government against these families lasted from the 1840s till teh end of the century. In spite of many victories, the internal feuds among the prazo families and the establishment of British administration in Central Africa brought about the end of their dominance. The prazos themselves survived into the twentieth century as units of fiscal and administrative policy.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors discusses the place of the Ethiopian Emperor Tewodros (1855-1868) in Ethiopian history and suggests that due to his policy of modernization, and to his ambition to transform Ethiopian society along modern lines, he is to be seen as the opener of the modern era.
Abstract: This paper discusses the place of the Emperor Tewodros (1855–1868) in Ethiopian history and suggests that due to his policy of modernization, and to his ambition to transform Ethiopian society along modern lines, he is to be seen as the opener of the modern era. It is suggested, as well, that this concept of modernization and transformation may be applicable to other pre-colonial African rulers. Special reference is made to missionary sources. Catholic material from the Lazarist Mission is used to clarify and elaborate the reforming intentions of the early years of the reign; while, for the later years, they reveal modern dimensions to Tēwodros's foreign policy. Protestant material from the Chrischona Mission throws new light on the Emperor's personality, and elaborates his attempts at introducing foreign influence with a modernizing intention. It is also shown how the Protestant missionaries established a close relationship with the Emperor, which partially rested upon certain shared religious values. This led the missionaries to interpret his reforming ambitions primarily in terms of the Reformation princes of Europe. Finally, it is suggested that the Protestant missionary material has an important contribution to make in determining a major turning point in Tēwodros's career; a point from which his career began to decline, and the reforming intentions were increasingly neglected.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The expansion of the Sokoto Caliphate into the lands of the diverse non-Muslim peoples of the Middle Belt area is a familiar theme in the nineteenth-century history of the Central Sudan.
Abstract: The expansion of the Sokoto Caliphate into the lands of the diverse non-Muslim peoples of the Middle Belt area is a familiar theme in the nineteenth-century history of the Central Sudan. As the Middle Belt is known to have an overall lower population density than adjoining areas to the north and south, the explanation has been proposed that this was due to slave raiding by Muslim states. A study of the history of this area does not support this overall view, even though it might be accepted with reference to limited areas. areas. It can be shown, moreover that in certain localities populations were actually enhanced as a result of the consolidation of Muslim power, while others, currently of extremely low density, were completely unaffected. If the factors affecting population in this area are to be understood, reference to over-simplified causes such as slave raiding must be shunned. Geographical and biological factors influencing population growth may be more fertile areas of enquiry.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, Mzilikazi built a personal military kingdom on the Zulu model at three successive locations in South Africa starting with a small band of refugees, and proved that the aggressive policy for which he is known was not maintained during those periods in which he felt secure, but rather when he was forced to migrate farther from his major enemy.
Abstract: Starting with a small band of refugees, Mzilikazi built a personal military kingdom on the Zulu model at three successive locations in South Africa. His early successes might be attributed to the disturbances resulting from the Difaqane. Later, his strength was maintained by his ability to incorporate diverse peoples into his polity. The aggressive policy for which he is known was not maintained during those periods in which he felt secure, but rather when he was forced to migrate farther from his major enemy, the Zulu. Evidence supports the contention that his main aim was a search for security. His policies were successful against the threats from African enemies. Only with the coming of white men did they fail. The essential features of Mzilikazi's political system are described to show what he preserved of traditional Nguni practices, what he borrowed from Dingeswayo and Shaka, and what he modified to fit his particular circumstances.The viability of Mzilikazi's developing polity is confirmed by his success in reconstructing his kingdom north of the Limpopo River. Without minimizing the traditional characterization of Mzilikazi as a warrior, a desolator and a tyrant, it is as a creative political administrator that his full stature can be appreciated.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In fact, it is still assumed today that Sheikh Mohammad Abdille Hassan's rebellion between 1899 and 1920 in British Somaliland only made an impact in northern and central Somalia as mentioned in this paper, however, the rebellion also influenced both the southernmost Somali and the administration of the Jubaland Province of the East Africa Protectorate.
Abstract: It is still assumed today that Sheikh Mohammad Abdille Hassan's rebellion between 1899 and 1920 in British Somaliland only made an impact in northern and central Somalia. In fact, however, the rebellion also influenced both the southernmost Somali and the administration of the Jubaland Province of the East Africa Protectorate. Anticipation that the rebellion would spread southwards, though unwarranted, led nevertheless to exaggerated fears and ultimately deterred further British involvement in that part of the Protectorate. These fears were not wholly unjustified, for the Jubaland Somali were inspired by Sheikh Mohammad's defiance of alien authority and probably wished to emulate him where possible. Furthermore, there was increasing contact between Mohammad Abdille Hassan's agents and the Juba region. However, it was the actual migration towards the Juba of Marehan who had fought with Sheikh Mohammad that had the most important impact on that area. Sheikh Mohammad's jihads also encouraged other Somali sections to migrate southwards. These migrations were largely responsible for the growing instability south of the Juba. They led to a large increase in the number of guns available and also encouraged inter-tribal fighting. Essentially Sheikh Mohammad's influence was political rather than religious. This distinction becomes clearer on examination of the spread of the Salihiyya tariqa as compared to those areas which were involved in political unrest.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The nature of German rule in Togo differed from that of the other German colonies as discussed by the authors, because it was administered by Imperial officials and it was very small, not particularly suitable for European settlement and much of its agricultural land was already under peasant cultivation, to which it was best suited.
Abstract: Superficially, the nature of German rule in Togo differed from that of the other German colonies. For example, right from the start, it was administered by Imperial officials. It thereby escaped some of the worst abuses of Chartered Company rule. Again because of the peculiar nature fo the country—it was very small, not particularly suitable for European settlement and much of its agricultural land was already under peasant cultivation, to which it was best suited—Togo escaped the large-scale expropriation of the subject peoples' land that was characteristic of German rule elsewhere.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors explored the Atlantic slave trade in the period 1795-1811 and found that some 170,000 African slaves were shipped from Africa, suffering a mortality rate of 95 per thousand.
Abstract: Despite its basic importance for an understanding of African History, the Atlantic slave-trade still remains one of the most unexplored aspects of modern African development. Except for a few pioneer works, there have been no systematic studies of numbers, origins, mortality, routes and volume of traffic. The present study is based on archival material in Brazil and is an exploration in depth of one major route, the West African to Rio de Janeiro shipping route in the period 1795–1811. During this time some 170,000 African slaves were shipped from Africa, suffering a mortality rate of 95 per thousand.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, it is argued that the early period of Igala history, where most of the divergence occurs, demonstrates the interaction of different principles of political growth and change, the time span being defined conventionally by associating each major development with one reign or generation.
Abstract: A wide range of contact with other peoples has tended to produce variety and divergence in Igala traditions concerning the origin of the kingship. To select one or other of these traditions for special emphasis, as was done in the past, is to misrepresent the nature of the corpus as a whole. Analysis of this complex body of tradition can be simplified by concentrating on three problems, the problem of divergence, the question of chronology, and the need to distinguish between the historical and the political functions of oral tradition. Divergence in Igala tradition reflects divisions within the clan system on which Igala political structure is based. But these differences of emphasis can be resolved if the time span covered by the legends is properly understood. These traditions open with a mythical or quasi-mythical period in which events are placed without reference to their sequence in time. Mythical thought is concerned with structure in the abstract, with form rather than with process. Thus it is argued that the early period of Igala history, where most of the divergence occurs, demonstrates the interaction of different principles of political growth and change, the time span being defined conventionally by associating each major development with one reign or generation. Dating from archaeological and ethnographic material suggests that a much longer time span is involved in Igala history than might be indicated by a superficial analysis of the oral traditions, based on genealogical counting.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The arrival of European concession-seekers in Barotseland coincided with a period of internal instability in that kingdom and King Lewanika, fearing both enemies within the ruling class as well as Ndebele raids, decided to follow the example of his friend Khama of the Ngwato in seeking British protection as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: The arrival of European concession-seekers in Barotseland coincided with a period of internal instability in that kingdom. King Lewanika, fearing both enemies within the ruling class as well as Ndebele raids, decided to follow the example of his friend Khama of the Ngwato in seeking British protection. With considerable difficulty he prevailed upon a local missionary, François Coillard, to write a letter on his behalf requesting such protection. It had already become clear that an important faction of the Lozi ruling class opposed the king's decision. Some of its members feared that his ‘protectors’ would make his overthrow that much more difficult; others were concerned that he more powerful white men would undermine the authority of the nation's traditional rulers. These suspicions received apparent confirmation when the representative who appeared to negotiate the concession proved to be an agent, not of Her Majesty's Government, but of the British South African Company. Thanks, however, to the ignorance of the missionaries who were interpreting for the court, as well as to the duplicity of Rhodes's agent himself, this distinction was successfully blurred. Opposition remained, however, until, at a critical moment in the negotiations, Khama's envoy threatened the council with harsh retribution if it refused to sanction the proposed treaty. In the face of this united stand of those who represented the power of the British government and its white associates and black collaborators, the National Council of Barotseland finally agreed to the concession, and, for better or worse, the Lozi found themselves under white ‘protection’.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, Wolseley ordered a halt to all offensives until the end of the fever season in April-May 1879, when patrols were then once again active, and a massive assault was made on the Bapedi stronghold on 28 November 1879.
Abstract: When the remnants of the Bapedi returned to their country after they had been driven from it by the Matabele, Sekwati strengthened the tribe so that attacks by the Boers, Zulus and Swazis were repulsed.When Sekhukhune succeeded to the chieftainship in 1861, his attempts at expanding Bapedi influence caused the South African Republic to declare war in 1876.After the annexation of the Transvaal by Great Britain, Sekhukhune resumed his empire building, and in March 1878 the Bapedi went on the warpath. Groups of hastily raised volunteers managed to contain the Bapedi in their strongholds, but after the failure of a British expedition in October 1878, offensive operations were abandoned until the end of the fever season in April–May 1879. Patrols were then once again active, when Sir Garnet Wolseley ordered a halt to all offensives; Sir Garnet himself arrived in the Transvaal in September 1879, and personally directed operations against Sekhukhune. A massive assault was made on the Bapedi stronghold on 28 November 1879; the Bapedi suffered a crushing defeat and the chief himself was captured.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, an outline of the Pan-African aspect of British colonial education policies during the inter-war years is presented, in particular the role of the missionary statesman, J. H. Oldham, in securing the adoption of a certain style of Negro education in the Southern States of America (one based on the work of the Hampton and Tuskegee Institutes) both by the International Missionary Council and by the Colonial Office Advisory Committee on Education, of which he was a member.
Abstract: This paper attempts an outline of the Pan-African aspect of British colonial education policies during the inter-war years. In particular, it analyses the role of the missionary statesman, J. H. Oldham, in securing the adoption of a certain style of Negro education in the Southern States of America (one based on the work of the Hampton and Tuskegee Institutes) both by the International Missionary Council and by the Colonial Office Advisory Committee on Education, of which he was a member. Oldham's interest in transferring the primarily agricultural and technical insights of the Hampton-Tuskegee model to Africa was developed in close collaboration with the Phelps-Stokes Fund of New York, and together they were responsible for directly exposing large numbers of missionaries and colonial officials to these emphases in the Southern States. The attempt to suggest the relevance to Africa of institutions which had long traditions of compromise with white supremacy in the American South inevitably cut across the Pan-African programmes of such New World Negroes as W. E. B. DuBois and Marcus Garvey, and had the effect of transplanting to the African continent some of the bitter disputes about the educational and political status of Negroes that had been common in America from the late nineteenth century conflict between DuBois and Booker T. Washington. While the article is primarily concerned with the formation of a missionary and Colonial Office consensus on the preferred Negro education for Africans, some attention is also paid to the extent to which the Hampton-Tuskegee model actually took root in Africa.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Sekonyela's downfall is commonly attributed to his personal defects, to the love of war by which he alienated his neighbours, and to the rough treatment by which his alienated his own people as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: Sekonyela's downfall is commonly attributed to his personal defects—to the love of war by which he alienated his neighbours, and to the rough treatment by which he alienated his own people, Conversely, Moshweshwe's rise to power is commonly attributed to his love of peace and to his benevolence.This article does not seek to refute the traditional assessments of the characters of the two chiefs, but to suggest that as explanations for their diifering fortunes they are inadequate. Basically Sekonyela failed because, after 1829, he was poorer than Moshweshwe. The Tlokwa had to kill and consume many of their cattle during the first two years of the difaqane, and it seems that they never fully recovered their former prosperity. Moreoverj they suffered further heavy losses in the war with the Korana and their allies in the early 1840s. Sekonyela, therefore, was not in a position to attract and bind thousands of followers to himself by sustaining them. Hence, to a large extent, his raids on his neighbours' herds, and his unpopularity among his own people.Moshweshwe, however, retained most of his cattle during the difaqane, and in 1829 conducted two richly rewarding raids against the Thembu. Thereafter his wealth far surpassed Sekonyela's, and it was mainly because of this that he was able to attract and hold so many followers.The territorial expansion of the Sotho naturally brought them into conflict with the Tlokwa, and in 1853, after the British had indicated that they were not prepared to interfere in this dispute, Sekonyela was overwhelmed by Moshweshwe's superior forces.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Asaba is an Ibo town, which, because of its position on the Niger, came into relatively early contact with Europeans as mentioned in this paper, which means that we have materials for its history in European records for more than a hundred years.
Abstract: Asaba is an Ibo town, which, because of its position on the Niger, came into relatively early contact with Europeans. This means that we have materials for its history in European records for more than a hundred years. This article is based on these records, and on present-day oral traditions. It begins with an account of Asaba's traditional social and political structure, and its former role in the economic life of the lower Niger.Asaba traditions relate in detail how the town was founded by a man from Nteje, east of the Niger, called Nnebisi. There is less information about its subsequent history, though it seems that it went through a significant changefrom the rule of a single Eze to a system of personal titles, like that found in eastern Iboland. Some attempts have been made to make a king list for Asaba, but it does not seem possible to establish either this or any other useful chronological framework other than that provided by family genealogies. These suggest that Nnebisi lived in the seventeenth century. The main theme in Asaba's external history is her changing relationship with her powerful neighbour, Benin.The choice of Onitsha, rather than Asaba, as a missionary and trading centre, meant that Asaba went through a period of relative eclipse. The first C.M.S. missionaries came to the town in 1875, but they had little impact on Asaba life. In the middle eighties, Asaba became the administrative capital of the newlyestablished Royal Niger Company. The impact of the Company on Asaba, though great, was short-lived. But one result of its choice of Asaba as a capital was the renewal of missionary endeavour, both Catholic and Protestant, in the town. This in its turn was to have a very great impact on Asaba's way of life.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In the period 1830-1838, the Zulu seem to have been more important for Lourenco Marques than any other Nguni group, as they were dominating many of the territories near it as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: The reasons for Dingane's attack on Lourenco Marques in 1833 may have been (a) the policy of expansion pursued by governor Ribeiro, which Machakane of Matola and perhaps Dingane himself may have tried to check, (b) lack of caution in treating Dingane, (c) perhaps also inability to meet Dingane's demands (this may have been due to economic difficulties after the partial breakdown of the slave trade in 1830), (d) the fact that Ribeiro probably maintained relations with Soshangana (which has been stressed by Lobato). Dingane seems to have regarded the governor as one of his subjects, although the Portuguese did not regard themselves as his subjects but as depending on MoCambique.In the period 1830–1838, the Zulu seem to have been more important for Lourenco Marques than any other Nguni group, as they were dominating many of the territories near it. In that period the Zulu empire included people of a language different from that of the majority, who do not seem to have been integrated into the Zulu nation through the national regimental system in the same way as Nguni groups subjected by the Zulu. In 1831–4 Zulu armies fighting near Lourenco Marques consisted of a few hundred Zulu warriors assisted by groups of auxiliaries (probably totalling 2,000–3,000 men) furnished by the local chiefs.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, Sanderson described the students of Africa who did not encore eu entre les mains ce maitre-livre: par l'ampleur de la documentation, le soin de l'analyse, leampleur of vues aussi, il s'est d'ores et deja impose comme un classique.
Abstract: Toute etude de la question du Haut-Nil doit aujourd'hui prendre pour point de depart l'ouvrage de M. G. N. Sanderson, England, Europe and the Upper Nile, 1882–1899. Rares sont sans doute les students of Africa qui n'ont pas encore eu entre les mains ce maitre-livre: par l'ampleur de la documentation, le soin de l'analyse, l'ampleur de vues aussi, il s'est d'ores et deja impose comme un classique. A partir de l'epoque de la revolte mahdiste jusqu'aux lendemains de Fachoda, on y suit, devide avec une clarte remarquable, l'echeveau des differentes politiques en presence sur le Haut-Nil: anglaise, francaise, italienne, allemande — sans oublier, bien entendu, celle de Leopold II.