Showing papers in "The Philosophical Review in 1957"

The principal Upanisads

Abstract: The Upanishads are the earliest documents which speak of the splendours of the world of the spirit. They illustrate the maxim that truth is one, though it shines in many forms. Eighteen of the principal Upanishads are given here, introduced and translated by a great Indian scholar and philosopher.

On "what is a poem?"

Abstract: W HEN children ask, "What is a poem ?" the question rarely troubles us; but when philosophers ask it, and in a way that associates it with "What is art?" or "What is beauty?", the question is likely to impress us as being difficult, and perhaps even profound. Now it can scarcely be doubted that the philosophical version of the question has led people to discuss important issues. And its outward simplicity may at first seem all to the good; or at least, if it is a fault to ask complicated questions in simple words, it is one that is more easily tolerated than its opposite. But in the present case I think the question is stated much too simply. What is taken to be one question is likely to become several quite distinct questions, each confused with the others. The result is then in accord with an all-too-familiar pattern: the muddle that comes from our efforts to answer several questions all at one time makes us suppose that the issue is unusually deep; and meanwhile our legitimate problems-those that attend our several questions taken separately and which, if a little less "deep," may nevertheless be of genuine interest-are left without a proper answer. So in the present essay I shall divide "What is a poem?" into a relatively manageable set of part questions. When the latter are simple I shall attempt to answer them. When they are complicated, however, I shall merely state and clarify them; for my aim is not so much to answer the part questions as to show the need of distinguishing them.

The case of the obliging stranger

Abstract: IMAGINE I approach a stranger on the street and say to him, "If you please, sir, I desire to perform an experiment with your aid." The stranger is obliging, and I lead him away. In a dark place conveniently by, I strike his head with the broad of an axe and cart him home. I place him, buttered and trussed, in an ample electric oven. The thermostat reads 4500 F. Thereupon I go off to play poker with friends and forget all about the obliging stranger in the stove. When I return, I realize I have overbaked my specimen, and the experiment, alas, is ruined. Something has been done wrong. Or something wrong has been done. Any ethic that does not roundly condemn my action is vicious. It is interesting that none is vicious for this reason. It is also interesting that no more convincing refutation of any ethic could be given than by showing that it approved of my baking the obliging stranger. This is really all I have to say, but I shall not stop on that account. Indeed, I shall begin again.

The Philosophical Retention of Absolute Space in Einstein's General Theory of Relativity

Abstract: PROFESSOR Jammer's commendable aim in this work' is to provide, for the first time, a history of theories of space in physics viewed within the wider matrix of Western philosophical and theological thought. His exceptional scholarly equipment in both modem mathematical physics and the relevant languages of Europe and the Middle East is equal to the task. But in the five chapters of this book only certain major episodes in the development of ideas of physical space are covered, being discussed under the following headings: (I) Space in Antiquity, (II) Judeo-Christian Ideas about Space, (III) The Emancipation of the Space Concept from Aristotelianism, (IV) The Concept of Absolute Space, and (V) Space in Modern Science. Jammer explains the content and organization of his book in the following words (pp. 2-3):

Synonymity as Revealed by Intuition

Abstract: TN HIS "Analytic Sentences," Benson Mates contends "that one is justified in saying that there are 'intuitive' notions of analyticity and synonymy."' This empirical hypothesis about the existence of certain phenomena or kinds of phenomena is tenable, so far as I can see. Mates has an intuitive notion of synonymity; I have had several in my life, and there is reason to believe that all of them have much in common. On the other hand, there is no reason to believe that the various intuited entities are identical or near identical. If a notion is distinguished from a concept, a sentence of the kind "The person P has an intuitive notion of synonymity" may conveniently be made to imply nothing about P's definiteness of intention, whereas the use of the term "concept" instead of "notion" in that skeleton sentence may be made to imply a certain minimal definiteness of intention. Calling something "an intuitive notion of x," where "x" is a word or series of words borrowed from the natural languages, suggests that a certain designation is appropriate as a sign vehicle responsible for designating x in particular communicational events. That is, one suggests, if not implicitly asserts, something about the nature of the intuited entity and something about the use of the designation. Suppose, for example, x is the designation "synonymity." The intuited entity would then not be considered the same as, for example, the intuited notion of heteronymity. This much may be inferred on the basis of plausible premises. But since the choice of one designation does not imply a rejection of all others, the entity which one author in one situation tries to refer to by the word "synonymity," he or others may in some other situations refer to by means of "sameness of meaning" or even "simultaneity"-for all we know. In the following, however, we shall leave out of consideration any use that seems awkward to us.

Recognizing and seeing as

Abstract: TO RECOGNIZE something is not just to have an experience, whatever the experience; nor is it just to have a feeling, whatever the feeling. No experience and no feeling could be a sufficient condition of recognizing, much as neither could be a sufficient condition of knowing. For to say that one recognized a building as St. Paul's implies not only that the building was in fact St. Paul's but also that one knew at the time that it was; and these are implications the truth of which no experience and no feeling could guarantee. But it would be wrong, I think, to conclude that we do not need to consider the character or quality of one's experience at the time of recognizing something in order to understand what is involved in recognition. Recognizing is not just knowing, or even knowing at the time: I might know that the building I am looking at is St. Paul's, not because I recognize it, but because I have been told. We speak of the experience of recognition, and sometimes, when we say that we recognize something, we mean to refer to a change in the character or quality of our experience: what we recognize looks different after we recognize it from the way it looked before. In this paper I want to try to account for the difference between recognizing and merely knowing at the time, and for the connection between recognizing and the character of our experience; to account for these, at least, in cases of recognizing by sight. My argument will be that a necessary but not a sufficient condition of recognizing x as y by sight is seeing x asy; and I will take as a paradigm case of seeing as, Wittgenstein's example of the duck-rabbit, a trick figure that can be seen either as a picture of a duck or as a picture of a rabbit.' I will assume that one who sees this figure as a duck has a different experience-different in character or quality-from one who sees it as a rabbit; but I hope that this assumption will gain some force and plausibility in the course of the argument.