Showing papers in "The Review of Economic Studies in 2009"

Training, Wages, and Sample Selection: Estimating Sharp Bounds on Treatment Effects

Abstract: This paper empirically assesses the wage effects of the Job Corps program, one of the largest federally funded job training programs in the US Even with the aid of a randomized experiment, the impact of a training program on wages is difficult to study because of sample selection, a pervasive problem in applied microeconometric research Wage rates are only observed for those who are employed, and employment status itself may be affected by the training program This paper develops an intuitive trimming procedure for bounding average treatment effects in the presence of sample selection In contrast to existing methods, the procedure requires neither exclusion restrictions nor a bounded support for the outcome of interest Identification results, estimators, and their asymptotic distribution are presented The bounds suggest that the program raised wages, consistent with the notion that the Job Corps raises earnings by increasing human capital, rather than solely through encouraging work The estimator is generally applicable to typical treatment evaluation problems in which there is nonrandom sample selection/attrition Copyright , Wiley-Blackwell

Inequality in Landownership, the Emergence of Human-Capital Promoting Institutions, and the Great Divergence

Abstract: This paper suggests that inequality in the distribution of landownership adversely affected the emergence of human-capital promoting institutions (e.g. public schooling), and thus the pace and the nature of the transition from an agricultural to an industrial economy, contributing to the emergence of the great divergence in income per capita across countries. The prediction of the theory regarding the adverse effect of the concentration of landownership on education expenditure is established empirically based on evidence from the beginning of the 20th century in the U.S.

Large Stakes and Big Mistakes

Abstract: Workers in a wide variety of jobs are paid based on performance, which is commonly seen as enhancing effort and productivity relative to non-contingent pay schemes. However, psychological research suggests that excessive rewards can, in some cases, result in a decline in performance. To test whether very high monetary rewards can decrease performance, we conducted a set of experiments in the U.S. and in India in which subjects worked on different tasks and received performance-contingent payments that varied in amount from small to very large relative to their typical levels of pay. With some important exceptions, very high reward levels had a detrimental effect on performance.

The Burden of Knowledge and the 'Death of the Renaissance Man': Is Innovation Getting Harder?

Abstract: This paper investigates a possibly fundamental aspect of technological progress. If knowledge accumulates as technology advances, then successive generations of innovators may face an increasing educational burden. Innovators can compensate through lengthening educational phases and narrowing expertise, but these responses come at the cost of reducing individual innovative capacities, with implications for the organization of innovative activity - a greater reliance on teamwork - and negative implications for growth. Building on this "burden of knowledge" mechanism, this paper first presents six facts about innovator behavior. I show that age at first invention, specialization, and teamwork increase over time in a large micro-data set of inventors. Furthermore, in cross-section, specialization and teamwork appear greater in deeper areas of knowledge while, surprisingly, age at first invention shows little variation across fields. A model then demonstrates how these facts can emerge in tandem. The theory further develops explicit implications for economic growth, providing an explanation for why productivity growth rates did not accelerate through the 20th century despite an enormous expansion in collective research effort. Upward trends in academic collaboration and lengthening doctorates, which have been noted in other research, can also be explained in this framework. The knowledge burden mechanism suggests that the nature of innovation is changing, with negative implications for long-run economic growth.

Strategic Communication with Lying Costs

Abstract: I study a model of strategic communication between an uninformed Receiver and an informed but upwardly biased Sender. The Sender bears a cost of lying, or more broadly, of misrepresenting his private information. The main results show that inflated language naturally arises in this environment, where the Sender (almost) always claims to be of a higher type than he would with complete information. Regardless of the intensity of lying cost, there is incomplete separation, with some pooling on the highest messages. The degree of language inflation and how much information is revealed depend upon the intensity of lying cost. The analysis delivers a framework to span a class of cheap-talk and verifiable disclosure games, unifying the polar predictions they make under large conflicts of interest. I use the model to discuss how the degree of manipulability of information can affect the trade-off between delegation and communication. Copyright 2009, Wiley-Blackwell.

Peer Effects and Social Networks in Education

Abstract: This paper studies whether structural properties of friendship networks affect individual outcomes in education. We first develop a model that shows that, at the Nash equilibrium, the outcome of each individual embedded in a network is proportional to her Katz-Bonacich centrality measure. This measure takes into account both direct and indirect friends of each individual but puts less weight to her distant friends. We then bring the model to the data by using a very detailed dataset of adolescent friendship networks. We show that, after controlling for observable individual characteristics and unobservable network specific factors, the individual’s position in a network (as measured by her Katz-Bonacich centrality) is a key determinant of her level of activity. A standard deviation increase in the Katz-Bonacich centrality increases the pupil school performance by more than 7 percent of one standard deviation.

Multi-product firms and flexible manufacturing in the global economy

Abstract: We present a new model of multi-product …rms (MPFs) and ‡exible manufacturing and explore its implications in partial and general equilibrium. International trade integration aects the scale and scope of MPFs through a competition eect and a demand eect. We demonstrate how MPFs adjust in the presence of single-product …rms and in heterogeneous industries. Our results are in line with recent empirical evidence and suggest that MPFs in conjunction with ‡exible manufacturing play an important role in the impact of international trade on product diversity.

Do Population Control Policies Induce More Human Capital Investment? Twins, Birthweight, and China’s ‘One Child’ Policy

Abstract: In this paper, we address the issues of whether reductions in fertility increase human capital investments per child and whether twinning can identify the quantity—quality (Q-Q) trade-off. We show that estimates of the effects of twinning at higher parities on the outcomes of older children in prior studies do not identify family-size effects but are confounded by inter-child allocation effects because of the endowment deficit and close spacing of twins. However, examining the effects of twinning by birth order, net of the effects stemming from the endowment deficit of twins, can provide upper and lower bounds on the trade-off between the family size and average child quality. Our estimates, based on data from China, indicate that an extra child at parity one or at parity two, net of one component of birth-endowment effects associated with birth weight, significantly decreases the schooling progress, the expected college enrolment, grades in school and the assessed health of all children in the family. Despite the evident significant trade-off between number of children and child quality in China, the findings suggest that the contribution of the one-child policy in China to the development of its human capital was modest. Copyright , Wiley-Blackwell.

Occupational Mobility and Wage Inequality

Abstract: In this article we argue that wage inequality and occupational mobility are intimately related. We are motivated by our empirical findings that human capital is occupation specific and that the fraction of workers switching occupations in the U.S. was as high as 16% a year in the early 1970's and had increased to 21% by the mid-1990's. We develop a general equilibrium model with occupation-specific human capital and heterogeneous experience levels within occupations. We find that the model, calibrated to match the level of occupational mobility in the 1970's, accounts quite well for the level of (within-group) wage inequality in that period. Next, we find that the model, calibrated to match the increase in occupational mobility, accounts for over 90% of the increase in wage inequality between the 1970's and the 1990's. The theory is also quantitatively consistent with the level and increase in the short-term variability of earnings. Copyright , Wiley-Blackwell.

Knowing What Others Know: Coordination Motives in Information Acquisition

Abstract: We explore how optimal information choices change the predictions of strategic models. When a large number of agents play a game with strategic complementarity, information choices exhibit complementarity as well: If an agent wants to do what others do, they want to know what others know. This makes heterogeneous beliefs di‐cult to sustain and may generate multiple equilibria. In models with substitutability, agents prefer to difierentiate their information choices. We use these theoretical results to examine the role of information choice in recent price-setting models and to propose modeling techniques that ensure equilibrium uniqueness.

Accounting for incomplete pass-through

Abstract: Recent theoretical work has suggested a number of potentially important factors in causing incomplete pass-through of exchange rates to prices, including markup adjustment, local costs and barriers to price adjustment. We empirically analyze the determinants of incomplete passthrough in the coee industry. The observed pass-through in this industry replicates key features of pass-through documented in aggregate data: prices respond sluggishly and incompletely to changes in costs. We use microdata on sales and prices to uncover the role of markup adjustment, local costs, and barriers to price adjustment in determining incomplete pass-through using a structural oligopoly model that nests all three potential factors. The implied pricing model explains the main dynamic features of short and long-run pass-through. Local costs reduce long-run pass-through by a factor of 59% relative to a CES benchmark. Markup adjustment reduces pass-through by an additional factor of 33%, where the extent of markup adjustment depends on the estimated \super-elasticity" of demand. The estimated menu costs are small (0:23% of revenue) and have a negligible eect on long-run pass-through, but are quantitatively successful in explaining the delayed response of prices to costs. We nd that delayed passthrough in the coee industry occurs almost entirely at the wholesale rather than the retail level.

A truth serum for non-Bayesians : correcting proper scoring rules for risk attitudes

Abstract: Proper scoring rules provide convenient and highly efficient tools for incentive-compatible elicitations of subjective beliefs. As traditionally used, however, they are valid only under expected value maximization. This paper shows how they can be generalized to modern ("non-expected utility") theories of risk and ambiguity, yielding mutual benefits: users of scoring rules can benefit from the empirical realism of non-expected utility, and analysts of ambiguity attitudes can benefit from efficient measurements using proper scoring rules. An experiment demonstrates the feasibility of our generalization.

Entry and competition effects in first-price auctions: theory and evidence from procurement auctions

Abstract: Motivated by several interesting features of the highway mowing auction data from the Texas Department of Transportation (TDoT), we study three competing procurement auction models with endogenous entry. Our entry and bidding models provide several interesting implications. For the first time, we show that even within an independent private value paradigm, as the number of potential bidders increases, bidders' equilibrium bidding behaviour can become less aggressive, and the expected procurement cost may rise because the "entry effect" is always positive and may dominate the negative "competition effect". We then develop structural models of entry and bidding corresponding to the three models under consideration, controlling for unobserved auction heterogeneity, and use the recently developed semi-parametric Bayesian estimation method to analyse the data. We select the model that best fits the data, and use the corresponding structural estimates to quantify the "entry effect" and the "competition effect" with regard to the individual bids and the procurement cost. Copyright 2009, Wiley-Blackwell.

Structural Changes, Common Stochastic Trends, and Unit Roots in Panel Data

Abstract: This paper studies the problem of unit root testing in the presence of multiple structural changes and common dynamic factors. Structural breaks represent infrequent regime shifts, while dynamic factors capture common shocks underlying the comovement of economic time series. We examine the modified Sargan–Bhargava (MSB) test in the panel data setting and propose ways to handle multiple structural changes and dynamic factors. Properties of the MSB test under these non-standard conditions are derived. For example, the test statistics are shown to be invariant, in the limit, to mean breaks. This invariance does not carry over to breaks in linear trends, where the test statistics will converge to functionals of weighted Brownian bridges. A simplified test statistic is then proposed, which is invariant to both mean and trend breaks. We further study pooled test statistic based on standardization and combination of p-values. Response surfaces for p-values of all test statistics are computed to facilitate the empirical implementation of the proposed methodology. The pooled tests are shown to have good finite sample performance.

Time-Varying Risk, Interest Rates, and Exchange Rates in General Equilibrium

Abstract: Under mild assumptions, the data indicate that time-varying risk is the primary force driving nominal interest rate differentials on currency-denominated bonds. This finding is an immediate implication of the fact that exchange rates are roughly random walks. A general equilibrium monetary model with an endogenous source of risk variation–a variable degree of asset market segmentation– can produce key features of actual interest rates and exchange rates. In this model, the endogenous segmentation arises from a fixed cost for agents to exchange money for assets. As inflation varies, so does the benefit of asset market participation, and that changes the fraction of agents participating. These effects lead the risk premium to vary systematically with the level of inflation. This model produces variation in the risk premium even though the fundamental shocks have constant conditional variances.

A Theory of Liquidity and Regulation of Financial Intermediation

Abstract: This paper studies a Diamond-Dybvig model of providing insurance against unobservable liquidity shocks in the presence of unobservable trades. We show that competitive equilibria are inefficient. A social planner finds it beneficial to introduce a wedge between the interest rate implicit in optimal allocations and the economy's marginal rate of transformation. This improves risk sharing by reducing the attractiveness of joint deviations where agents simultaneously misrepresent their type and engage in trades on private markets. We propose a simple implementation of the optimum that imposes a constraint on the portfolio share that financial intermediaries invest in short-term assets. Copyright , Wiley-Blackwell.

Openness, Government Size and the Terms of Trade

Abstract: This paper investigates the relationship between trade openness and the size ofngovernments, both theoretically and empirically. We argue that openness can increase the size of governments through two channels: (1) a terms of trade externality, whereby trade lowers the domestic cost of taxation, and (2) the demand for insurance, whereby trade raises risk and public transfers. We provide a unified framework for studying and testing these two mechanisms. Our main theoretical prediction is that the relative strength of the two explanations depends on a key parameter, namely, the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods. Moreover, while the first mechanism is inefficient from the standpoint of world welfare, the second is instead optimal. In the empirical part of the paper, we provide new evidence on the positive association between openness and government size and we explore its determinants. Consistently with the terms of trade externality channel, we show that the correlation is contingent on a low elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods. Our findings raise warnings that globalization may have led to inefficiently large governments.

Measuring Strategic Uncertainty in Coordination Games

Abstract: This paper proposes a method to measure strategic uncertainty by eliciting certainty equivalents analogous to measuring risk attitudes in lotteries. We apply this method by conducting experiments on a class of one-shot coordination games with strategic complementarities and choices between simple lotteries and sure payoff alternatives, both framed in a similar way. Despite the multiplicity of equilibria in the coordination games, aggregate behaviour is fairly predictable. The pure or mixed Nash equilibria cannot describe subjects’ behaviour. We present two global games with private information about monetary payoffs and about risk aversion. While previous literature treats the parameters of a global game as given, we estimate them and show that both models describe observed behaviour well. The global-game selection for vanishing noise of private signals offers a good recommendation for actual players, given the observed distribution of actions. We also deduce subjective beliefs and compare them with objective probabilities.

Temptation-Driven Preferences

Abstract: "My own behaviour baffles me. For I find myself not doing what I really want to do but doing what I really loathe." Saint PaulWhat behaviour can be explained using the hypothesis that the agent faces temptation but is otherwise a "standard rational agent"? In earlier work, Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) use a set betweenness axiom to restrict the set of preferences considered by Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (2001) to those explainable via temptation. We argue that set betweenness rules out plausible and interesting forms of temptation including some which may be important in applications. We propose a pair of alternative axioms called DFC, desire for commitment, and AIC, approximate improvements are chosen. DFC characterizes temptation as situations in which given any set of alternatives, the agent prefers committing herself to some particular item from the set rather than leaving herself the flexibility of choosing later. AIC is based on the idea that if adding an option to a menu improves the menu, it is because that option is chosen under some circumstances. From this interpretation, the axiom concludes that if an improvement is worse (as a commitment) than some commitment from the menu, then the best commitment from the improved menu is strictly preferred to facing that menu. We show that these axioms characterize a natural generalization of the Gul-Pesendorfer representation. Copyright , Wiley-Blackwell.

Dynamic Kidney Exchange

Abstract: We study how barter exchanges should be conducted through a centralized mechanism in a dynamically evolving agent pool with time- and compatibility-based preferences. We derive the dynamically efficient two-way and multi-way exchange mechanisms that maximize total discounted exchange surplus. Recently several live-donor kidney exchange programs were established to swap incompatible donors of end-stage kidney disease patients. Since kidney exchange can be modeled as a special instance of our more general model, dynamically efficient kidney exchange mechanisms are derived as corollaries. We make policy recommendations using simulations.

Competitive Non-linear Pricing and Bundling

Abstract: We examine the impact of multiproduct nonlinear pricing on profit, consumer surplus and welfare in a duopoly. When consumers buy all their products from one firm (the one-stop shopping model), nonlinear pricing leads to higher profit and welfare, but often lower consumer surplus, than linear pricing. By contrast, in a unit-demand model where consumers may buy one product from one firm and another product from another firm, bundling generally acts to reduce profit and welfare and to boost consumer surplus. In a more general model where consumers may buy from more than one firm and where consumers have elastic demands for each product, nonlinear pricing has ambiguous effects. Compared with linear pricing, nonlinear pricing tends to raise profit but harm consumer surplus when: (i) demand is elastic, (ii) there is substantial product differentiation, (iii) there is substantial heterogeneity in consumer demand, (iv) consumers face substantial shopping costs when visiting more than one firm, and (v) a consumer's brand preference for one product is strongly correlated with her brand preference for another product. Nonlinear pricing is more likely to lead to welfare gains when (i), (ii), (iv) and (v) hold, but (iii) does not.

Labour Market Regulations and the Sectoral Reallocation of Workers: The Case of Trade Reforms

Abstract: In this paper I highlight the importance of incorporating the institutional features of local labour markets into the analysis of trade reforms. A trade reform is often deemed beneficial because the elimination of trade barriers allows labour to reallocate towards those sectors in the economy in which the country has a comparative advantage. The amount and speed of the reallocation, however, and the post-reform behaviour of output, productivity and welfare, will depend on how regulated the labour market is. First, I document that high firing costs slow down the intersectoral reallocation of labour after a trade reform. Second, in order to isolate the effect of firing costs on labour reallocation, output and welfare after a trade reform, I build a dynamic general equilibrium model. I find that if a country does not liberalize its labour market at the outset of its trade reform, the intersectoral reallocation of workers will be 30% slower, and as much as 30% of the gains in real output and labour productivity in the years following the trade reform will be lost. From a policy standpoint, the message is that while trade reforms are desirable, they need to be complemented by labour market reforms in order to be fully successful. Copyright 2009, Wiley-Blackwell.

The Swing Voter's Curse in the Laboratory

Abstract: This paper reports the first laboratory study of the swing voter’s curse and provides insights on the larger theoretical and empirical literature on "pivotal voter" models. Our experiment controls for different information levels of voters, as well as the size of the electorate, the distribution of preferences, and other theoretically relevant parameters. The design varies the share of partisan voters and the prior belief about a payoff relevant state of the world. Our results support the equilibrium predictions of the Feddersen-Pesendorfer model, and clearly reject the notion that voters in the laboratory use naive decision-theoretic strategies. The voters act as if they are aware of the swing voter’s curse and adjust their behavior to compensate. While the compensation is not complete and there is some heterogeneity in individual behavior, we find that aggregate outcomes, such as efficiency, turnout, and margin of victory, closely track the theoretical predictions.

Optimal Monetary Policy with Uncertain Fundamentals and Dispersed Information

Abstract: This paper studies optimal monetary policy in a model where aggregate fluctuations are driven by the private sector's uncertainty about the economy's fundamentals Information on aggregate productivity is dispersed across agents and there are two aggregate shocks: a standard productivity shock and a "noise shock" affecting public beliefs about aggregate productivity Neither the central bank nor individual agents can distinguish the two shocks when they are realized Despite the lack of superior information, monetary policy can affect the economy's relative response to the two shocks As time passes, better information on past fundamentals becomes available The central bank can then adopt a backward-looking policy rule, based on more precise information about past shocks By announcing its response to future information, the central bank can influence the expected real interest rate faced by forward-looking consumers with different beliefs and thus affect the equilibrium allocation If the announced future response is sufficiently aggressive, the central bank can completely eliminate the effect of noise shocks However, this policy is typically suboptimal, as it leads to an excessively compressed distribution of relative prices The optimal monetary policy balances the benefits of aggregate stabilization with the costs in terms of cross-sectional efficiency Copyright , Wiley-Blackwell

Superstars and Mediocrities: Market Failure in The Discovery of Talent

Abstract: A basic problem facing most labor markets is that workers can neither commit to long-term wage contracts nor can they self …nance the costs of production. I study the eects of these imperfections when talent is industry-speci…c, it can only be revealed on the job, and once learned becomes public information. I show that …rms bid exces- sively for the pool of incumbent workers at the expense of trying out new talent. The workforce is then plagued with an unfavorable selection of individuals: there are too many mediocre workers, whose talent is not high enough to justify them crowding out novice workers with lower expected talent but with more upside potential. The result is an ine¢ ciently low level of output coupled with higher wages for known high talents. This problem is most severe where information about talent is initially very imprecise and the complementary costs of production are high. I argue that high incomes in pro- fessions such as entertainment, management, and entrepreneurship, may be explained by the nature of the talent revelation process, rather than by an underlying scarcity of talent. (JEL D30, J31, J6, M5)

Strategic Communication Networks

Abstract: We consider situations in which individuals would like to choose an action which is close to that of others, as well as close to a state of nature, with the ideal proximity to the state varying across agents. Before this coordination game is played, a cheap-talk communication stage is offered to the individuals who decide to whom they reveal their private information about the state. The information transmission occurring in the communication stage is characterized by a strategic communication network. We provide an explicit link between players' preferences and the equilibrium strategic communication networks. A key feature of our equilibrium characterization is that whether communication takes place between two agents not only depends on the conflict of interest between these agents, but also on the number and preferences of the other agents with whom they communicate. Apart from some specific cases, the equilibrium communication networks are quite complex despite our simple one-dimensional description of preference heterogeneity. In general, strategic communication networks cannot be completely Pareto-ranked, but expected social welfare always increases as the communication network expands.

To Segregate or to Integrate: Education Politics and Democracy

Abstract: In most democracies, the majority of education expenditures is financed by the government In non-democracies, we observe a wide variation in the mix of public and private funding of education In addition, countries with high inequality tend to rely more heavily on private schooling We develop a theory which integrates private decisions on education and fertility with voting on public schooling expenditures The theory is able to account for the facts mentioned above Countries with high inequality exhibit more private education expenditures since rich people opt out of the public system In non-democracies, concentration of political power leads to multiple equilibria in the determination of public education spending

Efficient Intra-Household Allocations and Distribution Factors: Implications and Identification

Abstract: This paper provides an exhaustive characterization of testability and identifiability issues in the collective framework in the absence of price variation; it thus provides a theoretical underpinning for a number of empirical works that have been developed recently. We first provide a simple and general test of the Pareto-efficiency hypothesis, which is consistent with all possible assumptions on the private or public nature of goods, all possible consumption externalities between household members, and all types of interdependent individual preferences and domestic production technology. The test is proved to be necessary and sufficient. We then provide conditions for the identification of the sharing rule and the Engel curves of individual household members for a variety of different observational schemes.

The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals

Abstract: We study two-sided markets with a finite number of agents on each side, and with two-sided incomplete information. Agents are matched assortatively on the basis of costly signals. Asymmetries in signalling activity between the two sides of the market can be explained by asymmetries either in size or in heterogeneity. Our main results identify general conditions under which the potential increase in expected output due to assortative matching (relative to random matching) is offset by the costs of signalling. Finally, we examine the limit model with a continuum of agents and point out differences and similarities to the finite version. Technically, the paper is based on the elegant theory about stochastic order relations among differences of order statistics, pioneered by Barlow and Proschan in 1966 in the framework of reliability theory.

Detecting and Predicting Forecast Breakdowns

Abstract: We propose a theoretical framework for assessing whether a forecast model estimated over one period can provide good forecasts over a subsequent period. We formalize this idea by defining a forecast breakdown as a situation in which the out-of-sample performance of the model, judged by some loss function, is significantly worse than its in-sample performance. Our framework, which is valid under general conditions, can be used not only to detect past forecast breakdowns but also to predict future ones. We show that main causes of forecast breakdowns are instabilities in the data-generating process and relate the properties of our forecast breakdown test to those of structural break tests. The empirical application finds evidence of a forecast breakdown in the Phillips' curve forecasts of U.S. inflation, and links it to inflation volatility and to changes in the monetary policy reaction function of the Fed.