Showing papers in "Theology in 1998"
28 citations
TL;DR: The authors make some normative suggestions about religions and secularity in constitutions, in education and in the media, and make a brief review of the conceptual and factual questions (including the historical background).
Abstract: When the children dress up as angels and shepherds for the school assembly at Christmas, it may seem churlish for atheist parents to protest at indoctrination into the Christian religion. There are issues of principle which can be raised, but many will shrug and say 'It's part of our culture, which the children may as well know about'. But what is 'our culture'? Who exactly are 'we'? English, Scottish, British, European, Christian, post-Christian, 'modem', 'democratic', 'scientific', or what? Jewish or Muslim parents will not identify themselves with 'our' culture if that concept is glossed in Christian terms, and they may resist any influence of Christianity in state education. There are other areas of public life in which the Christian roots of most European culture generate controversy. (There are Greek and Roman roots also, as well as other influences not least, the development of science and technology since the seventeenth century.) Some countries recognize a particular branch of Christianity as having a special constitutional role the Anglican Church 'of' England, the Presbyterian Church 'of' Scotland, the Roman Catholic Church in the Republic of Ireland. In post-communist Poland there has been debate about whether the state should enter into a Concordat with the Vatican, and grant the Catholic Church a recognized status in law. Religious propaganda and broadcasting is another area of potential controversy. What rights to free speech, publicity or air-time should churches and religious groups have? (In Russia there has been pressure from the Orthodox Church to restrict evangelization by 'foreign' sects.) On what principles should we approach these very controversial questions? A short essay can only make a small beginning. After a brief review of the conceptual and factual questions (including the historical background), I will make some normative suggestions about religions and secularity in constitutions, in education and in the media. Though my examples may be British, the issues are universal. Europe has long been historically defined as Christian by nationwide 'conversions' (whatever those distant events amounted to), by battles against 'infidels' at the edges, and by discrimination against non-Christians within. There were invasions of 'barbarian' hordes from Asia (still remembered in the interrupted trumpet-call played daily in Cracow in Poland). In the fifteenth century, Spain forcibly expelled the Jews and Muslims, leaving in control a fanatical version
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors propose a public forum for thinking about "what really matters" in a pluralistic practice where a group or group might be invited to submit ideas and present programmes, and the skills of the media could be drawn upon in making the content attractive to a wide audience.
Abstract: or group might be invited to submit ideas and present programmes. The skills of the media could be drawn upon in making the content attractive to a wide audience. (But perhaps a talking head can still be as effective as a rapid succession of visual images, depending on how the head talks, and whether it has anything significant to say.) Such public opportunities for reflection could provide something in the way of a national forum for thinking about 'what really matters'. A pluralistic practice as envisaged here would have the virtues of neutrality, variety and sincerity. Neutrality, in that no one religion or viewpoint would have any special rights or influence: the riches of various traditions and ways of thought could be presented to the uncommitted. There would thus be variety, the content would be interestingly unpredictable, perhaps even entertaining (there could be some of the novelty-value and controversiality beloved of the media). And there would be sincerity and spontaneity, for the presenters of individual programmes would be free to recommend the virtues of their particular approach as passionately as they liked, within the limits of respect for others. By such means, in schools and in the media, we might try to transcend the divisive and backward-looking tendency to define cultural identity by appeal to one particular past tradition in opposition to others. Rather than merely tolerate diversity in a relativistic way, we might look critically and creatively into the various religious and non-religious conceptions, and begin to forge a more inclusive and potentially universal culture.
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TL;DR: A true religion is an authentic channel or context of this salvific transformation as discussed by the authors, which consists in a fundamental shift from a bad and humanly destructive situation of alienation from God to a new, healing and growing relationship of reconciliation and acceptance, increasingly expressed in a life lived in response to God.
Abstract: What do we mean by a true religion? To start with, one whose teachings are true. But there is more to it than that. For the central religious concern is undoubtedly salvation, which consists in a fundamental shift from a bad and humanly destructive situation of alienation from God to a new, healing and growing relationship of reconciliation and acceptance, increasingly expressed in a life lived in response to God. And so a true religion is an authentic channel or context of this salvific transformation. More about both of these elements presently.
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TL;DR: 'You're good at this, aren't you!' I was taken aback as mentioned in this paper by this remark, even though I had not in fact said anything linguistically unusual; rather I was beginning to understand just how crucial the topic was to a large group of people.
Abstract: 'You're good at this, aren't you!' I was taken aback. Editors will tell you quite rightly that most people aren't much interested in linguistics. So when you're discussing a topic in this area with a group of people from a local community, and a woman shouts out in the meeting 'You're good at this, aren't you!', you realize the subject is of more than just theoretical concern. (Actually something similar had happened on more than one occasion before, including once in a men's group.) I hadn't in fact said anything linguistically unusual; rather I was beginning to understand just how crucial the topic was to a large group of people. The subject? Discourse analysis and inclusivity. The people? Single Christians.
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TL;DR: Moltmann as mentioned in this paper argued that Pannenberg's understanding of the retroactive effect of Jesus' resurrection is insufficient for an understanding of 'person' of Jesus, and stressed that the risen Christ is the crucified Christ.
Abstract: Moltmann criticizes Pannenberg's view, claiming that his understanding of the retroactive effect of Jesus' resurrection is insufficient for an understanding of the 'person' of Jesus. Moltmann wishes to stress that the risen Christ is the crucified Christ. In this way he identifies the future of God with the sufferings of the present as the promise of that future. J. Moltmann, The Crucified God: The Cross of Christ as the Foundation and Criticism of Christian Theology (SCM 1979), p. 181.
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TL;DR: In this paper, the basic accounts of the Gospels are considered in the light of the long tradition of their interpretation in the Church, so that people can see the implications of giving allegiance to the faith to which they witness.
Abstract: the basic accounts of the Gospels, but also they need to be meditated upon in the light of the long tradition of their interpretation in the Church, so that people can see the implications of giving allegiance to the faith to which they witness. I hope that readers of Theology, whether students of theology, teachers, clergy and lay ministers, or members of congregations, will be stimulated and encouraged by these articles to promote a wider and deeper understanding of Christian theology and its relationship to their contexts and to other faiths, whether among their friends, their students or their congregations.
TL;DR: LeLeP as mentioned in this paper does not undercut the priesthood nor does it undervalue it, it retains the inextricable link between ordination and presidency, and it rescues ordination from being used as a means to a eucharistic end.
Abstract: eucharistic team in the name of their own ordained priest and they would act on his or her behalf. In this way none can say they own the priesthood, only share it, none can say it is 'mine', only 'ours', none can claim individual status, and this makes clear that this ministry belongs to the Church and not to the candidate. So there is a derived and subordinate authority given to such a eucharistic team to preside, delegated to them, for specific occasions, times and places. So we are not being presented with a lay priest but with a local eucharistic team. Each member of the eucharistic team can preside but only from within the group and the group or team is licensed, not the individuaL LELEP does not undercut the priesthood nor does it undervalue it. It retains the inextricable link between ordination and presidency and reaffirms that that is the norm. It avoids the danger of ordaining someone for limited purposes for there is so much more to ordination than that. Presiding at the Eucharist is an expression of priesthood, not its defining characteristic. It further avoids dislocating the sacramental elements from the celebrating people; it prevents any individual lay person claiming too much for self, and it rescues ordination from being used as a means to a eucharistic end. And it removes that nonsense which says there comes a point where the practical distinction between minister and layman is the ability to say one prayer at the communion service. If LELEP achieves all this and disturbs nothing else can it really be possible, might it possibly be meant?
TL;DR: The authors show that negative understandings of Judas do not necessarily result in "scapegoating" and that negative portrayals do not always lead to further scapegoating of others, and that the existence of a'scapegoat' figure in the foundational Christian narrative makes possible, or even encourages, further scapegoat of others.
Abstract: William Klassen's intriguing book Judas Betrayer or Friend of Jesus? was published in Britain in June 1996. A few months later the press was full of coverage of 'runaway' Bishop Roderick Wright. Following reports of his relationship with a divorced woman, Bishop Wright was described as a 'lying Judas' guilty of betrayal, treachery, and of taking the press 'silver' (Report, The Times, 23 September 1996).Such coverage might seem to bear out the truth of some thoughtful remarks by Klassen on the consequences of reading Judas entirely as a 'betrayer' and 'traitor', an interpretation that still dominates in Christianity. Whether or not the revisionary aspects of his portrait of Judas are accepted (and to those who would argue, as I would, that it does not do justice to the denseness of the relevant New Testament texts, it has to be said that much vilificatory material about Judas does not do so either), it is hard to disagree with Klassen that Christians have often tended to scapegoat others, particularly discredited 'insiders' such as Bishop Wright, and to neglect Jesus' commandment to love enemies. Klassen's book implies a relationship between such scapegoating and negative portrayals of Judas. The argument seems to be that the existence of a 'scapegoat' figure in the foundational Christian narrative makes possible, or even encourages, further scapegoating of others. However, in this article I want to throw into question any simple understanding of the way such a 'process' might work. By exploring an impassioned medieval dispute relating to another errant bishop, I will show that negative understandings of Judas do not necessarily result in 'scapegoating'.
TL;DR: The 1998 Lambeth Conference, the Turnbull Report on the organization of the Church of England and the recent proposals of the group chaired by Lord Bridge for'reform' of synodical government make it timely to take a fresh look at the principles of Anglican conciliarity.
Abstract: Conciliarity is a way of enacting the total life of the Church, understood in a realist sense as the Body of Christ. It stands for the whole body of the Church taking responsibility for its doctrine, worship and discipleship. Conciliarity evokes the authority that is dispersed throughout the whole body, when the Church comes together, through constitutional, representative channels in councils and synods at various levels, to take counsel for its well-being and the more effective performance of its mission. Conciliarity provides the theological context in which the collegiality of bishops, with their special responsibility for pastoral oversight and teaching, and the primacy of archbishops functions. The 1998Lambeth Conference, the Turnbull Report on the organization of the Church of England and the recent proposals of the group chaired by Lord Bridge for 'reform' of synodical government make it timely to take a fresh look at the principles of Anglican conciliarity.' To do this we need to glance at those developments in the pre-Reformation Western Church that stimulated the emergence of a conciliar theology.
TL;DR: For example, there is a lack of concern on the part of the churches for the framework of the social, economic and political structures that govern people's lives, apart from where their own interests are concerned, for example over education and church schools as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: development. These are important, and individual theologians and various bodies working on behalf of the churches have made significant and influential contributions to debates about these issues. The writings and contributions to government reports of, for example, Sherwin Bailey and R. C. Mortimer, played an important part in the 1960s in divorce law reform and the liberalization of the law about homosexual acts; Faith in the City made a significant impact on thought about urban regeneration in the 1980s. The churches and individual church people have continued to play an active part in social thinking. Where the change seems most apparent is a seeming lack of concern on the part of the churches for the framework of the social, economic and political structures that govern people's lives, apart from where their own interests are concerned, for example over education and church schools. The church people of the 1940s,whose work John Nurser describes, offer a model for churches and theologians to contribute to the ordering of society, without being Christianly imperialistic; they were so subtle that most people have forgotten their part in it.
Abstract: The book is dedicated to Bernard Haring and Richard McCormick; and, as one might expect, combines secure loyalty and thoughtful independence of mind. His title is a handicap, touching off prejudices 'of course morality can't change' 'of course it can' rather than inviting the reader into the discussion. Maybe 'Can the Church change its mind?' would have been too restrictive, but it would have given more idea of what to expect. What he offers is not a philosophical argument about moral absolutes versus relativism, but a frequently historical discussion of how Christian ethics have indeed developed, and not for the worse. For Father Fagan, change is the stuff of life: it is good and Godgiven and needs to be understood not deplored. His pastoral concern is to help Christians not to be upset by change, even by the accelerated rate of change of our own times. He believes lay people can and should do their own thinking and develop their own capacity for discernment, which is the meaning of conscience. He is always fair and balanced, but there is a certain dryness about his exposition in the earlier chapters which makes one wonder whether he will reach the people he could most encourage and help. He is at his best and wisest when he reaches practicalities. 'Responsible parenthood' is a major theme. This Anglican reviewer finds herself in agreement with most of what he says, but feels some sadness that it should so much need to be said. It is a possible criticism that, for all his mature wisdom, he can be more idealistic than realistic. The laity indeed are no longer illiterate. What he is up against is unwillingness to read theology, which puts his intelligent lay people at the mercy of prejudiced over-simplifications. It is noteworthy that 'the media' do not appear in the index.
TL;DR: The Nicene Creed, as a reviewer recently admonished us yet again, is hardly the faith of the 'undivided Church', but must instead be understood as the symbol of the victors in a political battle fought 'with considerable strong-arm tactics' as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: The Nicene Creed, as a reviewer recently admonished us yet again, is hardly the faith of the 'undivided Church', but must instead be understood as the symbol of the victors in a political battle fought 'with considerable strong-arm tactics'.' New Testament scholars, too, have been brought up to insist that the socio-political controversies and the literary dependencies behind the historical genesis of each biblical document are vital for an accurate understanding. These are home truths so familiar, so basic that they slip down effortlessly like James Bond's unstirred Martini; we teach our students to recite them with their prayers before they go to bed at night. Surely no one in their right mind could possibly question them? Nagging doubts did, alas, intrude upon my reading of that review. Is it really of the slightest consequence to the congregation of Little Snoring that 1,800 years ago the formulations of Nicaea happen to have flattered the convictions of the party that triumphed in a longforgotten feud? Might it not rather be the case that for all its historically contingent, socially fraught and politically dubious origins, the Creed came to be universally adopted in the Church precisely because successive generations found it to be a widely serviceable expression of 'essential' Christian doctrines that is to say, truths accepted as being of transcendent and abiding significance rather than specific to a particular culture, clique or contexti\" And if this is even vaguely true for the Creed, must not an equivalent judgement apply a fortiori to the case of Holy Scripture? And what might be the implications of such ecclesial realism for the exercise known as New Testament theology?
TL;DR: The authors argue that friendship can be seen as a normative pattern for a Christian understanding of relationship both inter-human and human-divine, and point out the importance of friendship in the Scriptures and in the Christian tradition.
Abstract: In answering the question 'What does friendship add to our moral life?', Marilyn Friedman has proposed that 'in a time of widespread decline in the role of kinship networks and pitched battles over the role of sexual relationships in our lives, friendship may emerge, in our culture, as the least contested, most enduring, and most satisfying of all close personal affiliations'. She goes on to tell us that, 'virtue theorists and feminist philosophers are among those who have recently given a good deal of philosophical attention to the moral dimensions of friendship. These investigations have yet to scale the full heights of value and richness that friendship can afford to our lives.\" The recognition of the potential of friendship by Friedman is one which I would want to applaud and in what follows, by drawing attention to the importance of friendship in the Scriptures and in the Christian tradition, I shall argue that friendship might be thought of as a normative pattern for a Christian understanding of relationship both inter-human and human-divine. If we are looking for scriptural justification for the possibility that friendship might be a normative Christian relationship it might be thought, at first sight, that we are not on strong ground. We might cite the case of David and Jonathan, and we could point out that friendship was important to Jesus: he was known as a 'friend of taxcollectors and of sinners' and his relationships seem to have been the cause of some scandaL His close friendship with Mary Magdalene and the references to 'the disciple whom Jesus loved' in John's Gospel would suggest that he was not averse to close reciprocal
TL;DR: It is unfortunate that the film ends with Poncelet being executed in a cruciform pose, which serves to undermine its rejection of the equation of a condemned criminal with Christ.
Abstract: 9 Moberly, Atonement and Personality, p. 19. 10 Moberly, Atonement and Personality, pp. 20-1. 11 Robbins, Dead Man Walking, p. 70. 12 Robbins, Dead Man Walking, p. 131. 13 Robbins, Dead Man Walking, p. 90. 14 Robbins, Dead Man Walking, p. 28. 15 Robbins, Dead Man Walking, pp. 79-80, 81. 16 Robbins, Dead Man Walking, p. 81. 17 Robbins, Dead Man Walking, p. 87. It is unfortunate that the film ends with Poncelet being executed in a cruciform pose. This serves to undermine its rejection of the equation of a condemned criminal with Christ. 18 Moberly, Atonement and Personality, p. 283. 19 Moberly, Atonement and Personality, p. 259. 20 Arthur Michael Ramsey, From Gore toTemple: The Development ofAnglican Theology between Lux Mundi and the Second World War (Longmans 1960), p. 46. 21 Helen Prejean, Dead Man Walking: An Eyewitness Account of the Death Penalty in the United States (Fount 1994), p. 313. 22 I should like to thank Huw Yardley, Jacky Humphreys and Sue Gillingham for their encouragement and for their helpful comments on this paper.
TL;DR: Optimism is a way of thinking and living which affirms on the one hand the capacity to improve oneself and the whole human condition, and on the other hand, claims that ultimate reality, being under the control of good rather than evil, supports, if not guarantees this improvement.
Abstract: Optimism is a way of thinking and living which affirms on the one hand the capacity to improve oneself and the whole human condition, and on the other hand, claims that ultimate reality, being under the control of good rather than evil, supports, if not guarantees this improvement.