Showing papers in "Theory and Society in 1985"

Toward a new sociology of masculinity

Abstract: The upheaval in sexual politics has mainly been discussed as a change in the social position of women. The political meaning of writing about masculinity turns mainly on its treatment of power. There are, however, some accounts of masculinity that have faced the issue of social power, and it is that we find the bases of an adequate theory of masculinity. Through the 1950s and 1960s the focus of sex-role research remained on women in the family. And the field of sex-role research remained a distinctly minor one within the overall concerns of sociology. A sociology of masculinity, of a kind, had appeared before the “sex-role” paradigm. The very idea of a “role” implies a recognizable and accepted standard, and sex-role theorists posit just such a norm to explain sexual differentiation. The sex-role literature mainly analyzes the acquisition of masculinity by means of a simple social-learning, conformity-to-norms model.

The patient's view: doing medical history from below.

Abstract: It is time to draw the threads together. I have been arguing that we should lower the historical gaze onto the sufferers. “Banish money,” wrote John Keats, “- banish sofas - Banish wine - Banish Music - But right Jack Health- Honest Jack Health, true Jack Health - banish Health and banish all the world.” R. Gittings, ed., (Oxford, 1979), 3. Health is the backbone of social history, and affliction the fons et origo of all history of medicine. For whereas one could plausibly argue, a history of crime should start not with the criminals but with law and police-because these define criminality - the sick cannot possibly be regarded as a class apart, conjured up by the faculty. Moreover, it is especially important to get under the skin of the sufferers, because most maladies have not in fact been treated by the profession but by self- or community help, or in the paramedical marketplace where the sufferers' own initiatives, confidence, and pockets are critical. In addition, lay medical power has also been crucial in a sphere I haven't touched upon here, since I have been concentrating on the sufferer as an individual - in other words, lay-instigated social, civic, and institutional strategies for sickness, above all, in earlier times, for coping with epidemic pestilences such as plague. For what emerges, for example, from recent studies of civic health arrangements in the Italian Renaissance is that physicians regularly had to play second fiddle, in the teeth of various lay interests, to city fathers, philanthropic patrons, and, of course, the Church itself. R. Palmer, “The Church, Leprosy and Plague in Medieval and Early Modern Europe,” in Sheils, , 79-100; A. W. Russell, ed., (Wolfenbuttel, 1981). Medicine has never enjoyed full monopoly or police powers, and most healing, like charity, begins at home. The upshot is that doctors traditionally had to remember that he who paid the piper called the tune. George Bernard Shaw was well aware of this: The doctor learns that if he gets ahead of the superstitions of his patients he is a ruined man; and the result is that he instinctively takes care not to get ahead of them. That is why all the changes come from the laity. G. B. Shaw, (Harmondsworth, 1979), 67–68. I do not intend to conclude by offering a set of theoretical models for understanding sick person-doctor interaction in times past. That would certainly be premature, and probably also counterproductive, by creating the illusion of patterns of typicality and uniformity. But I should like to tabulate certain strategies and broad interpretive guidelines for future investigations.

Goffman's legacy to political sociology

Abstract: I don't claim that Goffman addressed the questions that animate political sociologists. He was not interested in analyzing interaction to learn how it contributed to mobilization for collective action aimed at social change. He was not interested in changing political consciousness or in how the mass media and other social institutions make such change so difficult. But for those who are interested in such questions, he is worth heeding. His is an unanticipated bequest — from the cranky uncle who we always thought had no great love or admiration for our line of work.

Temporality and the modern state

Abstract: Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that as things now stand no state has reached, nor is it soon likely to reach, the point where it can comfortably abandon temporality altogether as a source of legitimacy. Even the most technocratic states today still rely on continuity and the “meaning systems” of the past in order to extract a measure of allegiance from their constituencies. Though a concern with history and time may not seem as important to state administrators as it once did, the value of temporal rationales nevertheless remains indispensable. This is particularly true in periods of crisis when state managers and ideologues feel compelled to resuscitate powerful memories of the genealogy of the state, or of the state's place in time, in order to strengthen their authority. In cases such as these, a politics of time is invaluable for at least formally authorizing the existence or role of the state in modern society.

Postmodernity and desire

Abstract: Western social theory over the past fifteen to twenty years has been marked by a paucity of communication between Germanic-critical and Gallicstructural inputs; moreover, relations between those Anglo-Americans who drew inspiration from the former and those influenced by the latter have been characterized frostily by silence. It is to the credit of Jurgen Habermas to have recently broken seals on hermetic casks and opened debate. In this context, Habermas's intervention brings into sharp relief the problematic nature and political implications of modernist and postmodernist culture.'

Wallerstein and his critics

Abstract: The reception of novel ideas in social and political theory has usually been marked by two phases: at first there is an initial burst of enthusiasm in which the idea in question is seen as providing answers to long-standing anomalies and opening up the way for new interesting paths of research; this acclaim, however, is then normally followed by a period of disillusionment in which the idea in question comes to be seen as a theoretical dead-end with the research being undertaken within its framework viewed as counterproductive. Immanuel Wallerstein's ambitious undertaking, The Modern World System, seems clearly to be in the second phase. Aristide Zolberg, for example, has argued that Wallerstein's work, "variously exhibits a functionalist tendency, viewing particular political processes as ephiphenomenal to economic causation."2

The frontier as social control

Abstract: The frontier experience, according to Turner, cast the mold for all that is distinctively American. The bounty of open land and the experience of forging local democratic institutions shaped the character of a new nation, built on the pillars of rugged individualism and democratic governance. The closing of the American frontier was a national tragedy, eulogized by Turner and recited by his followers.' From them, Americans have inherited a moral and intellectual dilemma. They can neither deny its significance nor accept its implications, so they continue to search for new frontiers.

Rationalizing intellectuals: Sweden in the 1930s and 1940s

Abstract: It is the intellectual who transforms the concept of the world into the problem of meaning. As intellectualism surpresses belief in magic, the world's processes become disenchanted, lose their magical significance, and henceforth simply "are" and "happen" but no longer signify anything. As a consequence, there is a growing demand that the world and the total pattern of life be subject to an order that is significant and meaningful.

Jeffrey Alexander and the search for multi-dimensional theory

Abstract: The publication of Jeffrey Alexander's four-volume Theoretical Logic in Sociology was unquestionably a historic event in at least one respect: it marks the entry of sociological publishing into the era of mega-hype. Never before has a sociological work been trumpeted by such lavish advertising, by such elaborate physical production, and by such a range of support from the big names of the discipline. Even Alvin Gouldner joined in, with his statement that "the publication of this work will be a major event in the lives of American sociologists." Rarely have the advance comments been so adulatory; rarely have the post-publication reviewers been so vituperative. The huge promotional build-up created a backlash; it has been hard to find a review that was favorable, or even temperate in its criticism.

Popular politics and the Dutch Patriot revolution

Abstract: John Adams was obviously excited by what he saw going on in the Dutch Republic in 1786. Having been closely associated with the Dutch since 1780, Adams had seen the Dutch Patriots' first halting steps toward demanding fundamental reform of their government. What he witnessed at Utrecht in August of 1786 was the culmination of a long political process that began in 1782 and was, in fact, a momentous victory for the Patriot movement: after years of struggle, the Patriots in Utrecht had purged the Municipal Council of their enemies and had inaugurated new Magistrates who had been democratically elected according to the provisions of a new municipal constitution.2 To be sure, John Adams has a well-deserved reputation for volatility and exaggeration, but there can be no doubt that he saw the work of the Utrecht Patriots as profoundly revolutionary, even by comparison with what had just transpired in North America. Just fourteen months later, however, the Dutch situation would look dramatically different. As the Patriot Revolution heated up through the spring and summer of 1787, the Stadhouder, Prince William V of Orange, who had borne the brunt of the Patriots' attack throughout the decade, called on outside help. In May the English put up the money 90,000 pounds while in September the Prussians put up the troops 26,000 men commanded by the Duke of Brunswick and on October 10, 1787, the Patriots' last stronghold, the city of Amsterdam, capitulated to the invasion force. By the end of 1787, the Orangist "restoration" was complete.

Class conflict and class collaboration in regional rebellions, 1500 to 1700

Abstract: I argue that distinctive regional modes of production entailed divergent configurations of interests and differing degrees of mutual dependence between peasants and landlords. Class-collaborative rebellions correlate highly with a mode of production that makes for cooperative interests and interclass dependence, while class-conflict rebellions correlate highly with a mode of production that makes for antagonistic interests and interclass independence. But class-collaboration was unlikely without a target, which the state provided. Yet the state became the target in subsistence regions where the lack of markets made the raising of tax revenues particularly difficult and where subsistence classes were not dependent on the state for markets and, therefore, had little incentive to cooperate with the state. On the other hand, in regions with a commercial mode of production, raising tax revenues was less burdensome and classes tended to be dependent on the state for markets and, therefore, less likely to engage in antistate collective action.

Historical science as linguistic figuration

Abstract: The separation of science and art is recent. In the preindustrial era, historical writing was considered a genre of literature, and literature was considered a craft. Literature, like the other arts, was very close to artisanry, and history, as a literary genre, therefore seemed very close to life. It involved, for example, the writing of diaries, sermons, eulogies, orations, and essays. With the rise of the factory system, however, art and literature were distinguished from the degraded world of industry and the market, and came to be viewed as unique forms of creation and experience. Literature was no longer seen as an everyday activity in which all educated people could partake. Instead, it came to mean a set of treasured texts produced by godlike madmen. This new romantic conception fetishized art, "concealing or mystifying the processes of its production. Literature thus ceased to be thought of as an art by which ideas could be conveyed effectively and elegantly.... More and more it came to be regarded as a magical or religious mission, which only those endowed with the gift of prophesy or second sight could fulfil."1

Economic development and political transformation

Abstract: Social structure and economic development largely influence the nature of social conflicts and political transformation. A combination of low political and economic integration and a high level of consolidation results in reformist conflicts. Low state intervention in the allocation and accumulation of capital reduces the probability that class conflict will be directed against the state. When state intervention is low, depoliticized, abstract market forces determine capital allocation and accumulation. In addition, low political and economic integration may give the state the appearance of serving societal interests rather than the interests of the upper class. This appearance of autonomy is reinforced by the institutions of formal democracy. As a consequence, class conflict is contained within civil society and deflected from the state. When consolidation is high, reformist conflicts against holders of capital may emerge. The United States experienced such movements in the 1930s. During the Great Depression, the state was drawn into some conflicts, but was not attacked by the working class. Today, the United States, like other advanced industrial societies, is less receptive to consolidation because of moderate levels of economic polarization, greater economic resilience, and high social differentiation. When state intervention and consolidation are low, organized groups with resources may gain economic benefits through segmented class conflict, whereas collectivities with weak solidarity and few resources remain inactive. Such is the case in the United States today. The combination of a high level of state intervention in capital allocation and accumulation with a high level of consolidation increases the likelihood of revolutionary conflict. High state intervention in capital allocation and accumulation has crucial social consequences. First, it politicizes other-wise abstract market relations. Second, it clearly reveals the state to be allied with a small circle of upper-class entrepreneurs, thereby discrediting the state's claim to serve societal interest. As a consequence, class conflict can readily assume a political character, expanding its target to include the state. A high level of consolidation enhances the capacity of challenging groups to act collectively to resist repression and seize power. Consolidation is more likely in societies with a high level of economic polarization, highly dependent economies, and low social differentiation. Russia in 1917 and Iran and Nicaragua in 1979 are revealing examples. The Russian and Nicaraguan revolutions were carried out primarily by workers and peasants, which helps explain the socialist orientation of the new leadership. In contrast, in Iran, the revolution was largely based on the conflicts and struggles of the traditional middle class, which eventually led to the formation of the theocratic state. A combination of high state intervention and low consolidation generates segmented conflict directed against the state. Many Third World societies are experiencing such a conflict today. To conclude, Marx's analysis focused primarily on social classes underemphasizing the significance of the state and its relation to society and economy. Skocpol's analysis, on the other hand, primarily focused on the state and the upper class, and failed to specify the proper, determining variables. If the analysis presented here is useful in specifying the conditions and forms of social conflicts, we must pay greater attention to social structural analysis, the nature of the relationship between the state, economy, social classes, and solidarity structures.