Showing papers in "Theory and Society in 1994"
TL;DR: Gilligan translated this question into research by subjecting the abstraction of universal and discrete agency to comparative research into female behavior evaluated on its own terms and revealed women to be more concrete in their thinking and more attuned to "fairness" while men acted on abstract reasoning and "rules of justice" as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: justice. Women, by contrast, were believed to be at a lower stage because they were found to have a sense of agency still tied primarily to their social relationships and to make political and moral decisions based on context-specific principles based on these relationships rather than on the grounds of their own autonomous judgments. Students of gender studies know well just how busy social scientists have been kept by their efforts to come up with ever more sociological "alibis" for the question of why women did not act like men. Gilligan's response was to refuse the terms of the debate altogether. She thus did not develop yet another explanation for why women are "deviant." Instead, she turned the question on its head by asking what was wrong with the theory a theory whose central premises defines 50% of social beings as "abnormal." Gilligan translated this question into research by subjecting the abstraction of universal and discrete agency to comparative research into female behavior evaluated on its own terms The new research revealed women to be more "concrete" in their thinking and more attuned to "fairness" while men acted on "abstract reasoning" and "rules of justice." These research findings transformed female otherness into variation and difference but difference now freed from the normative de-
2,345 citations
TL;DR: For example, the authors argues that Russian state elites, whose national self-understanding was not in the Soviet period embedded in, and is now only very imperfectly contained by, the institutional and territorial frame of the Russian Federation, see the Russian minorities in the non-Russian successor states as belonging, in an ill-defined yet potent sense, to the emerging Russian state.
Abstract: The Soviet nationality regime, with its distinctive and pervasive manner of institutionalizing nationhood and nationality, has transmitted to the successor states a set of deeply structured, and powerfully conflicting,expectations of belonging. Successor state elites, with their deeply institutionalized sense of political ownership and entitlement, see the polities that bear the names of their nation — above all the territory and institutions, but also, with some ambivalence, the population as well — as “their own,” as belonging, in a fundamental sense, to them. National minorities, above all Russians, with their institutionally supported, basically ethnocultural understanding of nationhood, see themselves as belonging, in a deep if not exclusive sense, to an “external” nation; this cannot help but color and qualify, even if it does not exclude, their belonging to the would-be nation-state in which they live, and of which they (or most of them) hold citizenship. Russian state elites, finally, whose national self-understanding was not in the Soviet period embedded in, and is now only very imperfectly contained by, the institutional and territorial frame of the Russian Federation, see the Russian minorities in the non-Russian successor states as belonging, in an ill-defined yet potent sense, to the emerging Russian state. These deeply rooted and powerfully conflicting expectations of belonging — interacting, of course, with conflicts of interest engendered by state-building, regime change, and economic restructuring — will make the dynamic interplay between non-Russian successor states, Russian minorities, and the Russian state a locus of refractory, and potentially explosive, ethnonational conflict in coming years.
282 citations
TL;DR: In the absence of a Romanian state, Romanian chroniclers of the seventeenth century propounded three theories of their ethnic origins, Latinist, indigenist, and mixed.
Abstract: As an independent state, Romania has not been around much more than a century. Wallachia and Moldavia only acquired autonomy as coupled principalities under Ottoman sovereignty in 1861, and only became an independent kingdom in 1881. The Kingdom of Romania, furthermore, only annexed Bessarabia, Bukovina, and Transylvania more than half of its maximum territory after astute switching of sides during World War I. In the absence of a Romanian state, nevertheless, Romanian chroniclers of the seventeenth century propounded three theories of their ethnic origins, Latinist, indigenist, and mixed: first, that a homogeneous people descended from the Roman legions and colonists established in the new province of Dacia after the emperor Trajan conquered the region in 105-106 AD; second, that a likewise homogeneous people sprang from the highly civilized Dacians already on the spot whom the Romans integrated into their empire; third, that Romans and Dacians not only mixed, but selectively assimilated some later migrants into the region.
183 citations
TL;DR: For example, this paper pointed out that economic stagnation and consumer deprivation, deeply eroded commitment to official ideology and the growth of widespread cynicism, corruption and weakening of the apparatus of rule, and the gradual enlargement of autonomous, self-organized spheres of social and intellectual life were the main causes of rapid political change in the communist world after 1988.
Abstract: There is considerable irony in the current search for the causes of the rapid political changes sweeping the communist world after 1988. In retrospect, it is not hard to single out a number of macrosocietal trends that led eventually to regime change: economic stagnation and consumer deprivation, deeply eroded commitment to official ideology and the growth of widespread cynicism, the corruption and weakening of the apparatus of rule, and the gradual enlargement of autonomous, self-organized spheres of social and intellectual life. It is ironic, however, that each of these macrosocietal developments, now the cornerstones of emerging explanations of rapid political change, were only recently treated as evidence of the remarkable comparative stability of communist regimes throughout the world in the last half-century. Economic inefficiency, consumer deprivation, and housing shortages were well evident in these societies for decades. The official ideology of these regimes was long met with public indifference and private derision. The party apparatus for decades operated as a collection of local political machines founded upon venality and patronage. Beginning as early as the mid-1950s, observers noted a gradual enlargement of tolerated private spheres of independent intellectual and political discourse: today's independent political groups are the descendants of yesterday's dissidents; and yesterday's dissidents are the descendents of yesteryear's prison camp inmates. While today we can look back upon an inexorable cumulative crisis; a few years ago one could just as easily be struck by how little all of these deeply rooted problems seemed to shake these stable and stagnant regimes.
102 citations
TL;DR: In the modern world, national identity constitutes what may be called the "fundamental identity," the identity that is believed to define the very essence of the individual, which the other identities one may have modify but slightly, and as a result these other identities are considered secondary.
Abstract: The term "nationalism," in its neutral, general sense, refers to the set of ideas and sentiments that forms the conceptual framework of national identity. National identity is one among many, often coexisting and overlapping identities occupational, religious, tribal, linguistic, territorial, class, gender, and more. But in the modern world, national identity constitutes what may be called the "fundamental identity," the identity that is believed to define the very essence of the individual, which the other identities one may have modify but slightly, and as a result these other identities are considered secondary. The world community today is a community of "nations"; modem societies are "nations" by definition, those societies that do not view themselves as nations are believed to be not (yet) modern, and, in many cases, loyalty to the "nation" lies at the basis of social solidarity and represents the strongest motive behind political mobilization. All contemporary "nations" are derived from entities that previously possessed quite different identities. The first nation was England, which became one in the sixteenth century. The United States of America, France, and Russia defined themselves as such in the eighteenth century. Most others followed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.1
87 citations
TL;DR: For example, this article pointed out that the spread of market transactions was broadly speaking corrosive of the legitimacy of the communist party and contributed to the erosion of party legitimacy in Eastern Europe and China.
Abstract: In recent decades communist elites in virtually every socialist state embarked on strategies of reform that progressively weakened their authority. In Eastern Europe, the reform policy of the Hungarian state during the 1970s reflected official acceptance of the market-like informal economy. Rather than suppressing the shadow second economy, Kadar initiated reforms that sought to make official and legal the market activities of households. In China, economic reforms launched by post-Mao party leaders led to the emergence of markets both within and outside the boundaries of the state socialist redistributive economy. The state attempted to specify a new structure of property rights, institute legal and regulatory reforms, and create new economic institutions required for a hybrid mixed economy. As in Hungary, however, the spread of market transactions was broadly speaking corrosive of the legitimacy of the communist party. After more than a decade of reform, today the Chinese communist elite fitfully await the consequences of what they sense is a deepening crisis in the party's legitimacy. Both in Eastern Europe and in China, the combined effects of myriad market-like transactions highlighted the failures of central planning and contributed to the erosion of party legitimacy; in Eastern Europe they paved the way for regime change.2 Although perestroika accomplished little in reforming the Soviet economy, Soviet citizens too came to rely increasingly on the market-like informal second economy as their source of consumer goods and services.3 Although little progress was achieved under Gorbachev in instituting a market economy, high-level talks and public airing of plans for a rapid transition to a market economy contributed to the collapse of the Soviet planned economy. The failed coup of August 1991 reflected the extent of defection and the erosion of commitment to the party's cause within the Soviet elite. It was not so much the breadth of popular resistance as the failure of will on the part of conspirators that caused the coup's speedy collapse.
81 citations
TL;DR: Foucault's theory of power is closely linked to concrete empirical studies, which in turn contribute to the refinement of his theoretical tools as mentioned in this paper, but in spite of his repeated theoretical claim that resistance is the "irreducible opposite (HS, 96)" of power, this former concept received little attention in the historical studies.
Abstract: Each of Foucault's major theoretical expositions of the concept of power his critique of Rusche and Kirchheimer at the beginning of Discipline and Punish, his discussion of the "apparatus [dispositif]" of sexuality in The History of Sexuality, volume 1, and his response to questions posed by Dreyfus and Rabinow in the late essay "How is Power Exercised?" reiterates various methodological precautions.1 Power, Foucault argues, is not a property, a possession, a commodity one can exchange for something else, a resource, or an institution. Further, power is not a function of law, morality, repression, or the economic base. Commentators have energetically exposed the culprits of these methodological errors, writers and schools of thought whose names Foucault rarely mentions Durkheim, Weber, classical Marxism, phenomenology, depth hermeneutics, Lukhcs, Marcuse and the Frankfurt School, Althusser, and Habermas.2 Foucault's theory of power is closely linked to concrete empirical studies, which in turn contribute to the refinement of his theoretical tools. Such is not the case, however, with Foucault's concept of resistance, which he articulated solely in theoretical terms. Foucault has asserted in essays and interviews that every power relation is accompanied by points of resistance, such that as he puts it in Volume 1 of the History of Sexuality "resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power (HS, 95)." But in spite of his repeated theoretical claim that resistance is the "irreducible opposite (HS, 96)" of power, this former concept received little attention in Foucault's historical studies. Why did Foucault insist on the centrality of resistance to all power relations but devote his studies of modernity almost exclusively to an analysis of modern forms of power, without ever examining corresponding forms of resistance?
77 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that elite male family heads seized hold of local state offices, constituting themselves as a regent patriciate, and contributed to the rise of the Netherlands as long as a locally-centered patrimonial state was an effective form of rule.
Abstract: In early modern Europe, as every schoolchild learns, states and elite families were often closely interlocked. Yet family history and state theory are generally studied separately today. I try' here to unite them by underlining the central role of family lineages and gender identities in the formation of patrimonial political structures, focussing on the Netherlands, a precocious and influential developer along a number of social and cultural dimensions? My thinking about this problem has been guided by several general questions. When did elite families and lineages anchor political stability, or contribute to political change? How did gender arrangements complement or crosscut these familial patterns? What are the implications for theories of state formation? In the Netherlands, I argue, elite male family heads seized hold of local state offices, constituting themselves as a regent patriciate. 2 Over time, increasing familial exclusiveness and the changing class character of the regents interacted with the axial position of the Dutch in the emergent world economy. The regents' dynastic grip contributed to the rise of the Netherlands as long as a locally-centered patrimonial state was an effective form of rule. But when competitor states took the first steps beyond patrimonialism toward a rational-legal bureaucratic apparatus staffed by means of patronage, the persistence of the Dutch familial state undermined the politico-economic viability of the Netherlands in the world economy. Thus, I argue that elite family patterns and dynamics in the Netherlands were one cause of that country's spectacular rise and decline. In all patrimonial states, state officials had two concerns: securing the state that provided their office, and maintaining the status and wealth of their families and lineages. During some periods, these goals could be jointly achieved - at others, not. In the latter case, efforts by office
72 citations
TL;DR: In particular, the number of architectural firms and therefore of architects in their employ is closely related to the volume of construction; more construction projects also imply a greater possibility that some of them will be commissioned by competition.
Abstract: During the 1970s and 1980s, the number of persons who reported their occupation as architects grew at an impressive rate in the United States; the number of design competitions paralleled this rapid growth. At first glance, the volume of construction appears to be a common underlying link between the two developments. In particular areas, the number of architectural firms, and therefore of architects in their employ, is closely related to the volume of construction; more construction projects also imply a greater possibility that some of them will be commissioned by competition.1 However, design competitions will continue attracting architects even in recessionary times, if their professional ambition and their numbers push them into this chancy and onerous method of looking for work. The relationship therefore depends at least partially on something other than the economy.
69 citations
TL;DR: Goldstone, Goldstone, Ted Robert Gurr, and Farrokh Moshiri as discussed by the authors, editors, Revolutions of the Late Twentieth Century (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991); Farideh Farhi, States and Urban-Based Revolutions: Iran and Nicaragua (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1990); and Tim McDaniel, Autocracy, Modernization, and Revolution in Russia and Iran (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).
Abstract: Including a discussion of James B. Rule, Theories of Civil Violence (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1988); Rod Aya, Rethinking Revolutions and Collective Violence: Studies on Concept, Theory, and Method (Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis, 1990); Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley, Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America: A Comparative Study of Insurgents and Regimes Since 1956 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); Jack A. Goldstone, Ted Robert Gurr, and Farrokh Moshiri, editors, Revolutions of the Late Twentieth Century (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991); Farideh Farhi, States and Urban-Based Revolutions: Iran and Nicaragua (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1990); and Tim McDaniel, Autocracy, Modernization, and Revolution in Russia and Iran (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991).
58 citations
TL;DR: Schumpeter's Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy as discussed by the authors is a companion volume of Mannheim's Man and Society in the Age of Reconstruction and Karl Polanyi's The Great Transformation.
Abstract: In 1942 Schumpeter wrote Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. 1 The book was written in the shadows of the Great Depression and was inspired by the hopes of an allied victory. Of central importance to the book then was to construct the vision, and write of the needs, of the post-fascist post-war reconstruction era. In the work, in the light of the developments of the second half of the twentieth century, Schumpeter asked two poignant questions and gave two debatable answers: "Can capitalism survive? No ''2 and "Can socialism work? Of course it can" Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, in our mind, is a companion volume of Mannheim's Man and Society in the Age of Reconstruction 3 and Karl Polanyi's The Great TransformationJ Schumpeter, Mannheim, and Polanyi shared one common belief and one common interest: each one of them believed that with the Great Depression and the Second World War laissez-faire capitalism had came to its end, and all three were interested in working on blue-prints for post-war reconstruction of Western societies, s Reconstruction - all three agreed - has to be innovative and has to have a new base of departure: it can neither be capitalism as we used to know it nor can it be totalitarianism of rightwing or left-wing versions. Each in his own way foreshadowed something that eventually became the social-democratic welfare state of the 1950s-1970s and that proved to be by all objective measures the most successful epoch of capitalism.
TL;DR: For instance, the authors argues that conflict is usually focussed and thus is ultimately amenable to negotiation. But, as the dispute literature reminds us, parties to a dispute often confront one another with only the haziest idea of what they want, what they think others want, and what they are prepared to trade off, the negotiating process itself often serves to clarify those interests.
Abstract: Political conflict in modem society has often centered around two major themes: interests and identity. Within liberal democracies, the conflicting interests of both individuals and groups have usually been more amenable to negotiation and compromise. Although, as the dispute literature reminds us, parties to a dispute often confront one another with only the haziest idea of what they want, what they think others want, and what they are prepared to trade off, the negotiating process itself often serves to clarify those interests. Through the use of familiar strategies such as coalition-building and log-rolling, it is usually possible to define interests more precisely as the negotiations proceed. The outcomes of interest-disputes are, in most cases, relatively transparent: they are usually stated in "objective" terms in agreements that can be codified and formally enforced. Perhaps more important, each side wants these outcomes to be clear, at least to itself. There is usually no reason for self-deception. While it is true that interest-disputes may lead to intense conflict, that conflict is usually focussed and thus is ultimately amenable to negotiation.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors conceptualize the process of colonialism as having consisted of two phases with the concomitant social consequences being very different for each phase, in the first phase, existing social arrangements were harnessed to the exigencies of revenue generation and political control.
Abstract: Although pre-colonial Kerala was socially stratified, society was organized into a system of interdependent castes and religious groups, each with a particular social, economic, and ritual role and position in the larger order. My argument is that over the period of colonialism, the global and systemic character of the social structure and most of the earlier ties of dependency that bound the groups together were dissolved, and each of the units of the system began to develop autonomous ethnic identities. Ethnic formation was the consequence of the economic and political compulsions of colonial rule. I conceptualize the process of colonialism as having consisted of two phases with the concomitant social consequences being very different for each phase. In the first phase, existing social arrangements were harnessed to the exigencies of revenue generation and political control. In the process there was an increase in the exploitation of the lower strata and an empowerment of the elites. A combination of factors initiated the process of ethnicization among the laboring groups and among the displaced elites. In the second, capitalistic phase, the compulsions of a market economy and a moder state necessitated the overthrow of the traditional stratification system. The displacement of groups from their socioeconomic niches, together with the introduction of new resources into the society, carried forward the process of ethnic formation and mobilization.
TL;DR: One of the questions that social scientists have to deal with in reacting to the collapse of Communism in the Soviet Union is why they, and other non-academic experts such as the intelligence agencies of the great Western powers, as well as as discussed by the authors did not anticipate that this would happen, or even that it could occur.
Abstract: One of the questions that social scientists have to deal with in reacting to the collapse of Communism in the Soviet Union is why they, and other nonacademic experts such as the intelligence agencies of the great Western powers, as well, did not anticipate that this would happen, or even that it could occur. The evidence is fairly clear that the world was taken by surprise by the transformations that emerged under Gorbachev and even more by the outlawing of the Communist party after the coup against him. There was, of course, an equivalent failure to expect that the East European Communist regimes would give up power.
TL;DR: The answer now seems obvious as mentioned in this paper, with apologies to the venerable Carr, "History is the conceptual space, the time of human experience, in which social scientific knowledge and, most of all, prediction is proven wrong." or, if you prefer, "any succession of rupturing events which together bring to light our misunderstandings and misrecognitions of the present."
Abstract: The answer now seems obvious. "History," with apologies to the venerable Carr, "is the conceptual space, the time of human experience, in which social scientific knowledge and, most of all, prediction is proven wrong." Or, if you prefer, "any succession of rupturing events which together bring to light our misunderstandings and misrecognitions of the present."2 In the past few years, pace Francis Fukuyama's3 prognosis of the "end of history," there has been an awful lot of it about. Indeed, if History is Dead, its rigor mortis appears unusually vigorous.
TL;DR: In this paper, an interpretive-analytic for the study of how discourse functions in sociopolitical movements is presented, employing ideas derived from Kenneth Burke and Michel Foucault, and the results of research on how discourses function in movements, elaborating a power/strategy interpretation of what movement actors do with words.
Abstract: This article outlines an interpretive-analytic for the study of how discourse functions in sociopolitical movements. Employing ideas derived from Kenneth Burke and Michel Foucault, and the results of research on how discourses function in movements, it elaborates a power/strategy interpretation of what movement actors do with words. Politics, both Burke and Foucault insist, is war pursued by other means. In other words, movements are militant campaigns; activists are generals and soldiers; the context in which movements unfold is a theater of force relations; actions are battles and words are tactical weapons. Movement actors must mobilize a discursive arsenal to organize, educate, and activate to engage opponents in the public theater.
TL;DR: According to Saint Simon, Louis XIV on his deathbed expressed regret about the pain caused others by his overwhelming passion for building and war as discussed by the authors, but this is only a passingly sympathetic moment.
Abstract: According to Saint Simon, Louis XIV on his deathbed expressed regret about the pain caused others by his overwhelming passion for building and war. For Saint Simon, this is only a passingly sympathetic moment. He is more concerned about the suspect moral character of a king who would inflict so much suffering on his people to follow his own passion and who would wait until death to renounce his weakness. The deathbed confession is followed soon in Saint Simon's diary by the descriptions of the general glee in France and throughout Europe that followed the announcement of the king's death a mirror, we suspect, of the author's own elation.1
TL;DR: These quotations from two of the major ideologues of Basque and Catalan nationalism reflect two radically different conceptions of what the nation is and two significantly different political programs for the Basque Country and Catalonia: independence and adherence to tradition for the former, federalism/confederalism and a secular and capitalist organization of society for the latter as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: These quotations from two of the major ideologues of Basque and Catalan nationalism, respectively, reflect two radically different conceptions of what the nation is and two significantly different political programs for the Basque Country and Catalonia: independence and adherence to tradition for the former, federalism/confederalism and a secular and capitalist organization of society for the latter. The Basque and Catalan nationalist movements differed substantially in their character despite the fact that they developed simultaneously in two ethnically distinct Spanish communities, that stood out in terms of their high level of industrial development relative to the rest of Spain, and that had experienced intense immigration from the poorest regions of Spain. Therefore, this contrast between Basque and Catalan nationalism questions the suitability of explanations of peripheral nationalism that stress the role of relative levels of development, of cultural distinctiveness, and of the socially disruptive effects of the arrival of large numbers of immigrants. While these explanations may be useful to explain the emergence and dynamics of nationalism, they are ill-suited to explain what constitutes the exclusive focus of this article, that is, differences in the character of nationalist movements.
TL;DR: Goodwyn's interpretation is that the oppositional sub-cultures and organizations of workers (particularly at the Baltic Coast) developed independently from the parallel organizations of intellectuals (such as KOR), with only a minimal and insignificant dialogue between them as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: Solidarity, perhaps the most massive social movement in history, has attracted a number of social scientists who have engaged in the uneasy task of defining, describing, and explaining this unusually complex and fascinating social phenomenon 1 One of the most hotly debated issues in this constantly expanding field of studies is the "Leninist" dilemma of who was more important in bringing about the revolutionary change, the (oppositional) intellectuals or the workers In The Roots of Solidarity: A Political Sociology of Poland's Working-Class Democratization by Roman Laba and in Lawrence Goodwyn's Breaking the Barrier: The Rise of Solidarity in Poland, workers are portrayed as the primary causal force behind Solidarity; the role of intellectuals was, as they construe it, non-causal ("creative but not causal" in Laba's words) 2 In Goodwyn's interpretation, the oppositional sub-cultures and organizations of workers (particularly at the Baltic Coast) developed independently from the parallel organizations of intellectuals (such as KOR), with only a minimal and insignificant dialogue between them
TL;DR: This paper argued that universal pragmatics is a form of non-representational foundationalism and that Habermas's work is not foundationalist in the sense made popular by Rorty.
Abstract: Jurgen Habermas has developed an analysis of rationality that, when linked to his theory of societal development, provides a valuable perspective on the predicaments and possibilities within modernity. One of the important claims of his project is that universal pragmatics provides a non-foundational universalism1 for social and political theory. My claim is that universal pragmatics is a form of non-representational foundationalism. This is to say that Habermas's work is not foundationalist in the sense made popular by Rorty.2 The reason is that Habermas does not argue for a correspondence theory of truth.3 For Rorty, representation and foundationalism tend to be joined because the quest for foundations is understood in terms of representation as the search for a transparent, "God's-eye" view of the world.4 But it does not follow that a non-representationalist is always a non-foundationalist. My argument, then, is that Habermas's work, while it does not rest on a representationalist epistemology, is a form of foundationalism. An important part of the article therefore simply seeks to be clear about Habermas's arguments, because his claim is misleading.
TL;DR: The authors describe China's current experiments that combine privatization with political centralization as "Market Leninism", although some may dispute the appropriateness of this label, as they argue that market Leninism can be viewed as a form of market socialism, whereas state socialism can be found only in Cuba and North Korea.
Abstract: How things have changed. To many observers it seems as if socialism's time has come and gone. The cataclysmic and as Lipset and Bence detail in this issue, generally unforeseen developments of the past few years appear to have dealt state socialism a mortal blow. Less than a decade ago a large proportion of the world's population lived in socialist regimes, but today unequivocally socialist regimes can be found only in Cuba and North Korea. China's current experiments that combine privatization with political centralization are perhaps best characterized as "Market Leninism," although some may dispute the appropriateness of this label.
TL;DR: To treat social and political questions normatively is to treat them in terms of "rightness" or "justice" or other notions of normative correctness. But normative correctness can only be a matter of interpretation, of judgment; to judge is to interpret (unless we suppose the existence of objective and necessary criteria of correctness as discussed by the authors ).
Abstract: To treat social and political questions normatively is to treat them in terms of "rightness" or "justice" or other notions of normative correctness. The claim to correctness is a claim to moral authority. Yet normative correctness can only be a matter of interpretation, of judgment; to judge is to interpret (unless we suppose the existence of objective and necessary criteria of correctness a supposition I discuss below). The application of norms is itself a judgment, one ever problematic because ever contested by a variety of mutually incompatible answers to the question: what is the source and validity of the norms that an individual or group actually employs, of the norms that a community or society should employ?
TL;DR: According to a widespread view, one of the most significant political events of the second half of the twentieth century was the sudden breakdown of the socialist camp, which initiated radical changes on the global political scene as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: According to a widespread view, one of the most significant political events of the second half of the twentieth century was the sudden breakdown of the socialist camp, which initiated radical changes on the global political scene.1 There have been various attempts to explain the main cause of this breakdown. In searching for a cause we should recall Marx's well-known saying that socio-political relations that thwart development of the means of production are doomed to failure. Sooner or later they must perish.
TL;DR: Moore as mentioned in this paper reviewed classic ideas about the conditions for revolution disaffection among intellectuals, sharp division within the ruling classes, loss of unified control over the instruments of violence, emergence of mass popular rebellion, and so on then considered skeptically the likelihood that such conditions would converge in the United States.
Abstract: In a prophetic essay published three years after his Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Barrington Moore Jr. assayed the current prospects for revolution in America.1 He wrote in 1969, a time of many calls for liberation by means of revolution, and not a few for revolution by means of liberation. Moore reviewed classic ideas about the conditions for revolution disaffection among intellectuals, sharp division within the ruling classes, loss of unified control over the instruments of violence, emergence of mass popular rebellion, and so on then considered skeptically the likelihood that such conditions would converge in the United States. He insisted on change and variability in essential conditions for revolution, but also pleaded for the value of sober thought on the subject:
TL;DR: Greenfeld and Chirot's article on nationalism and aggression is an adaptation from Greenfeld's much longer work on the development of nationalism in England, France, Russia, Germany and the United States.
Abstract: Liah Greenfeld and Daniel Chirot's article on nationalism and aggression is an adaptation from Greenfeld's much longer work on the development of nationalism in England, France, Russia, Germany and the United States. Having examined the larger book, I find it an extremely well-researched and insightful discussion of the origins and development of different conceptions of nationalism in these countries from the sixteenth through the nineteenth centuries. I must admit to having a good deal more trouble, however, with their attempt to extrapolate from her model to explain the behavior of some of these and other nations in the twentieth century.
TL;DR: For instance, the authors examines the reception of Nietzsche by writers involved in self-consciously creative projects on the intellectual field, those agents who by inclination or by necessity operated within that sphere of cultural production identified with the free inquiry and expression of the artist.
Abstract: Scholars have typically found it necessary to examine the reception of Nietzsche by writers involved in self-consciously creative projects on the intellectual field, those agents who by inclination or by necessity operated within that sphere of cultural production identified with the free inquiry and expression of the artist. Hence the proliferation of excellent scholarship devoted to the appropriation of Nietzsche by Georges Bataille, Andr6 Gide, Andre Malraux, and other notable French writers. However, to restrict one's analysis to this literary sector of intellectual life ignores the important role played by academics in cultural production, for the "freedom" of the artist can only exist in relation to its opposite that is, against the background of rules, conventions, and institutions that define the sphere of the university. In France, this tension between the literary world and the university sphere became exacerbated during the 1890s as representatives of both experienced crises of identity and purpose, leading to significant transformations that would inevitably structure the manner in which each would perceive the other. Just as avant-garde writers shifted from the detached and "decadent" position of lart pour l'art during the 1880s to the more committed stance of l'art social by the early 1890s, the academic community came to redefine the meaning of the profession, as well as the requirements for its own reproduction, according to
TL;DR: Goodwin this article argues that the more recent and ultimately humbler approaches to the study of revolutions, which are historically grounded, conjunctural, and theoretically eclectic are better ways of deciphering the dynamics (or at least the mechanics) of revolutionary situations and outcomes.
Abstract: If I understand Jeff Goodwin's piece correctly, he is right on at least two general points. First that the more recent and ultimately humbler approaches to the study of revolutions, which are historically grounded, conjunctural, and theoretically eclectic are better ways of deciphering the dynamics (or at least the mechanics) of revolutionary situations and outcomes. Second that like other sociologies, these new approaches tend to blur the distinction between self-created concepts and reality. Overarching and generally useful concepts of culture and state are forwarded but immediately, albeit unconsciously, used as means to replace boundaries with borders.