Showing papers in "Thought: A Journal of Philosophy in 2015"
TL;DR: In this paper, King's objection is based on an example that purports to show that three of Soames's propositions are really just one proposition, whereas they are all β-equivalent to the proposition King claims soames's three propositions are identical to.
Abstract: Soames's cognitive propositions are strings of acts to be performed by an agent, such as predicating a property of an individual. King takes these structured propositions to task for proliferating too easily. King's objection is based on an example that purports to show that three of Soames's propositions are really just one proposition. I translate the informally stated propositions King attributes to Soames into the intensional λ-calculus. It turns out that they are all β-equivalent to the proposition King claims Soames's three propositions are identical to. I argue on philosophical grounds against identifying β-equivalent propositions. The reason is that β-conversion obliterates too many of the procedural distinctions that are central to an act-based theory such as Soames's and which are worth preserving. In fact, β-expansion allows the addition of a fifth proposition that highlights additional procedural distinctions and propositional structure. The welcome conclusion is that we have five procedurally distinct, if equivalent, propositions.
51 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the causal approach to individual evidence and a recently influential modal account that explicates individual evidence in terms of Nozick's notion of sensitivity are investigated, and it is argued that either view is implausibly committed to the impossibility of no-fault wrongful convictions.
Abstract: Recent attempts to resolve the Paradox of the Gatecrasher rest on a now familiar distinction between individual and bare statistical evidence. This paper investigates two such approaches, the causal approach to individual evidence and a recently influential (and award-winning) modal account that explicates individual evidence in terms of Nozick's notion of sensitivity. This paper offers counterexamples to both approaches, explicates a problem concerning necessary truths for the sensitivity account, and argues that either view is implausibly committed to the impossibility of no-fault wrongful convictions. The paper finally concludes that the distinction between individual and bare statistical evidence cannot be maintained in terms of causation or sensitivity. We have to look elsewhere for a solution of the Paradox of the Gatecrasher.
41 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the structural features of ground and its associated notion of relevance have been investigated, and a logic of ground based on a worldly conception of facts has been proposed, which allows the derivation of implausible grounding claims.
Abstract: In his 2010 paper ‘Grounding and Truth-Functions’, Fabrice Correia has developed the first and so far only proposal for a logic of ground based on a worldly conception of facts. In this paper, we show that the logic allows the derivation of implausible grounding claims. We then generalize these results and draw some conclusions concerning the structural features of ground and its associated notion of relevance, which has so far not received the attention it deserves.
23 citations
TL;DR: It is argued that the concept of direction of fit (DOF) is best seen as picking out a certain inferential property of a psychological attitude, which is one that believing shares with assuming and fantasizing and fails to share with desire.
Abstract: I argue that the concept of direction of fit (DOF) is best seen as picking out a certain inferential property of a psychological attitude. The property in question is one that believing shares with assuming and fantasizing and fails to share with desire. Unfortunately, the standard analysis of DOF obscures this fact because it conflates two very different properties of an attitude: that in virtue of which it displays a certain DOF, and that in virtue of which it displays certain revision conditions. I claim that the latter corresponds with the aim of an attitude, not its DOF. In order to remedy this failure of the standard analysis, I offer an alternative account of DOF, which I refer to as the two-content analysis.
17 citations
TL;DR: The authors argue that presentism, understood as a view about time and existence, can perspicuously be defined in opposition to all other familiar contenders without appeal to any notion of presentness or cognate notions such as concreteness.
Abstract: We argue that presentism, understood as a view about time and existence, can perspicuously be defined in opposition to all other familiar contenders without appeal to any notion of presentness or cognate notions such as concreteness. Given recent worries about the suitability of such notions to cut much metaphysical ice, this should be welcomed by presentism's defenders. We also show that, irrespective of its sparse ideology, the proposed formulation forestalls any deviant interpretation at odds with the view it aims to capture.
14 citations
TL;DR: The strongest possible Lewisian triviality result for the indicative conditional is proven in this paper, which is the strongest possible result for any non-convex condition in the context of indicative conditional.
Abstract: The strongest possible Lewisian triviality result for the indicative conditional is proven.
13 citations
TL;DR: The bootstrapping argument has only one rehearsal in print and it is quite subtle as discussed by the authors, but it has been used to argue that the fruits of classical set theory can be obtained by naive means through a puzzling piece of reasoning often known as the bootstrap-argument.
Abstract: Graham Priest has argued that the fruits of classical set theory can be obtained by naive means through a puzzling piece of reasoning often known as the bootstrapping argument (Priest 2006). I will demonstrate that the bootstrapping involved is best understood as viciously circular and thus, that these fruits remain forbidden. The argument has only one rehearsal in print and it is quite subtle. This paper provides reconstruction of the argument based on Priest (2006) and attempts some fixes and alternative construals to get around some elementary problems. Despite these efforts, the argument remains unconvincing.
12 citations
TL;DR: This paper argued that the neutral counterpart theory fails with respect to slurs that encode truth-conditional content which does more than merely classify someone as a member of the target group (such as "slanty-eyed" and "curry muncher", as well as slurs that denigrate by virtue of their iconicity).
Abstract: Slurs denigrate individuals qua members of certain groups, such as race or sexual orientation. Most theorists hold that each slur has a neutral counterpart, i.e., a term that references the slur's target group without denigrating them. According to a widely accepted view, which I call ‘Neutral Counterpart Theory’, the truth-conditional content of a slur is identical to the truth-conditional content of its neutral counterpart (so, e.g., ‘Jew’ and ‘kike’ are truth-conditionally the same, yet the latter is an objectionable or derogatory way of referring to a person's ethnic background). My aim is to challenge this view. I argue that the view fails with respect to slurs that encode truth-conditional content which does more than merely classify someone as a member of the target group (such as ‘slanty-eyed’, ‘curry muncher’, ‘camel jockey’, and ‘Jewish American Princess’), as well as slurs that denigrate by virtue of their iconicity (‘ching chong’).
11 citations
9 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the connection between consequence relations and closure operations is investigated, and it is shown that a large family of familiar non-contractive consequence relations cannot respect this familiar connection.
Abstract: In this paper, I consider the connection between consequence relations and closure operations. I argue that one familiar connection makes good sense of some usual applications of consequence relations, and that a largeish family of familiar noncontractive consequence relations cannot respect this familiar connection.
9 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, a positive characterization of the structure of the lexicon from the point of view of predicativism is provided, and two potential strategies for solving the problem are presented.
Abstract: Predicativism about names—the view that names are metalinguistic predicates—has yet to confront a foundational issue: how are names represented in the lexicon? I provide a positive characterization of the structure of the lexicon from the point of view Predicativism. I proceed to raise a problem for Predicativism on the basis of that characterization, focusing on cases in which individuals have names which are spelled the same way but pronounced differently. Finally, I introduce two potential strategies for solving the problem, and offer reasons not to be optimistic about either.
TL;DR: The authors argue that there are norms governing reasoning in epistemic rationality, that is, there are diachronic norms governing how to change one's attitude over time, and that these norms can be found in the literature.
Abstract: Some philosophers have recently argued that there are no diachronic norms of epistemic rationality, that is, that there are no norms regarding how you should change your attitudes over time. I argue that this is wrong on the grounds that there are norms governing reasoning.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that plausible claims in the logic of partial grounding, when combined with a plausible analysis of that concept, entail the falsity of plausible grounding claims, which is problematic.
Abstract: I argue that plausible claims in the logic of partial grounding, when combined with a plausible analysis of that concept, entail the falsity of plausible grounding claims. As our account of the concept of partial grounding and its logic should be consistent with plausible grounding claims, this is problematic. The argument hinges on the idea that some facts about what grounds what are grounded in others, which is an idea the paper aims to motivate.
TL;DR: In this paper, an analysis of Moore's paradox is given in doxastic logic, and the authors reveal that introspection is less relevant to the Moorean problem than first appears.
Abstract: An analysis of Moore's paradox is given in doxastic logic. Logics arising from formalizations of various introspective principles are compared; one logic, K5c, emerges as privileged in the sense that it is the weakest to avoid Moorean belief. Moreover it has other attractive properties, one of which is that it can be justified solely in terms of avoiding false belief. Introspection is therefore revealed as less relevant to the Moorean problem than first appears.
TL;DR: In this article, the Nuisance Principle (NP) is shown to be inconsistent with the favored abstraction principle HP, under a modest assumption about infinite concepts, and it is shown that NP is also inconsistent with HP.
Abstract: Neo-Fregeans have been troubled by the Nuisance Principle (NP), an abstraction principle that is consistent but not jointly (second-order) satisfiable with the favored abstraction principle HP. We show that logically this situation persists if one looks at joint (second-order) consistency rather than satisfiability: under a modest assumption about infinite concepts, NP is also inconsistent with HP.
TL;DR: The relation of being more fundamental than, as well as the Finean notion of partial grounding, are widely taken to be irreflexive, transitive, and asymmetric as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: The relation of being more fundamental than, as well as the Finean notion of partial grounding, are widely taken to be irreflexive, transitive, and asymmetric. However, certain time-travel cases that have been used to raise worries about the irreflexivity, transitivity, and asymmetry of proper part of can also be used to argue that more fundamental than and partially grounds do not have these formal properties. I present this worry and discuss several responses to it, with the aim of showing that the problem is harder to address when applied to fundamentality and partial grounding than it was when merely applied to proper parthood.
TL;DR: This paper argued that given the possibility of backward causation, one ought to reject Lewis's theories of causation and counterfactuals. But they also pointed out that such a combination of views is untenable.
Abstract: David Lewis famously defends a counterfactual theory of causation and a non-causal, similarity-based theory of counterfactuals. Lewis also famously defends the possibility of backward causation. I argue that this combination of views is untenable—given the possibility of backward causation, one ought to reject Lewis's theories of causation and counterfactuals.
TL;DR: The authors identify an epistemic bilking argument, which has not received sufficient attention in the literature, and indicate how best to respond to it, which involves a parity argument based on a forwards causation case.
Abstract: The standard bilking argument is well-known and attempts to prove the impossibility of backwards causation. In this discussion note, I identify an epistemic bilking argument, which has not received sufficient attention in the literature, and indicate how best to respond to it. This response involves a parity argument based on a forwards causation case.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that three well-known examples of a deviant causal chain have something in common: they each violate Yablos proportionality constraint on causation, and they argue that this constraint provides the key to saving causal theories from deviant chains.
Abstract: Causal theories of action, perception and knowledge are each beset by problems of so-called ‘deviant’ causal chains For each such theory, counterexamples are formed using odd or co-incidental causal chains to establish that the theory is committed to unpalatable claims about some intentional action, about a case of veridical perception or about the acquisition of genuine knowledge In this paper I will argue that three well-known examples of a deviant causal chain have something in common: they each violate Yablos proportionality constraint on causation I will argue that this constraint provides the key to saving causal theories from deviant chains
TL;DR: Physicalism is not compatible with the possibility of blockers as mentioned in this paper, that is, a world which is physically like ours, but in which additional nonphysical entities have prevented the existence of conscious experience.
Abstract: Physicalism is incompatible with what is known as the possibility of zombies, that is, the possibility of a world physically like ours, but in which there are no conscious experiences. But it is compatible with what is known as the possibility of ghosts, that is, the possibility of a world which is physically like ours, but in which there are additional nonphysical entities. In this paper we argue that a revision to the traditional definition of physicalism designed to accommodate the possibility of ghosts inadvertently accommodates what is known as the possibility of inverted spectra, that is, the possibility of a world which is physically like ours, but in which colour experience is inverted. This consequence is unwelcome, because it is widely agreed that the possibility of inverted spectra is incompatible with physicalism. We argue for a revised definition of physicalism which resolves this problem. We then use our definition to argue that physicalism is not compatible with what is known as the possibility of blockers, that is, the possibility of a world which is physically like ours, but in which additional nonphysical entities have prevented the existence of conscious experience. This undermines Stephan Leuenberger's (2008) attempt to defend physicalism from arguments which purport to establish the possibility of zombies.
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors discuss subjective permissibility and subjectivity in contract negotiation, war theory, and just war theory with uncertainty, including contract negotiations and war theory.
Abstract: Keywords:
authority;
contracts;
subjective permissibility;
just war theory;
killing;
uncertainty
TL;DR: According to as discussed by the authors, the fact that a future person would have a life not worth living counts against bringing that person into existence but not against having that person live a life worth living, but not a life that would be worth living.
Abstract: According to “the asymmetry”, the fact that a future person would have a life not worth living counts against bringing that person into existence but the fact that a future person would have a life ...
TL;DR: In this article, the authors show that the vast majority of putative solutions to the liar paradox do not face the infamous revenge problem, and they raise a revenge problem that faces Scharp's inconsistency approach.
Abstract: The vast majority of putative solutions to the liar paradox face the infamous revenge problem. In recent work, however, Kevin Scharp has extensively developed an exciting and highly novel “inconsistency approach” to the paradox that, he claims, does not face revenge. If Scharp is right, then this represents a significant step forward in our attempts to solve the liar paradox. However, in this paper, I raise a revenge problem that faces Scharp's inconsistency approach.
TL;DR: In this article, the unrestricted composition thesis, which is a maximizing principle about what aggregates exist, places sharp limits on what unaggregated items can exist, is shown to be in conflict with general existence-conditions for certain categories of mereologically non-composite objects.
Abstract: I discuss a general limitative consequence of the unrestricted mereological composition thesis. The unrestricted composition thesis, which is roughly the assertion that every plurality of objects possesses a fusion or sum, is shown to be in conflict with general existence-conditions for certain categories of mereologically non-composite objects. The conclusion is that the unrestricted composition thesis, which is a maximizing principle about what aggregates exist, places sharp limits on what unaggregated items can exist.
TL;DR: Feferman and Ernst as discussed by the authors show that the resulting axiomatic system is still inconsistent and that some foundation has to be developed before naive category theory can replace naive set theory as a foundational theory for mathematics.
Abstract: Recently Feferman (Rev Symb Logic 6: 6–15, 2013) has outlined a program for the development of a foundation for naive category theory While Ernst (ibid 8: 306–327, 2015) has shown that the resulting axiomatic system is still inconsistent, the purpose of this note is to show that nevertheless some foundation has to be developed before naive category theory can replace axiomatic set theory as a foundational theory for mathematics It is argued that in naive category theory currently a ‘cookbook recipe’ is used for constructing categories, and it is explicitly shown with a formalized argument that this “foundationless” naive category theory therefore contains a paradox similar to the Russell paradox of naive set theory
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors distinguish the just false problem from another problem, with which it is often conflated, which they call the "exclusion problem" and argue that shriek rules do not help glut theorists with either problem.
Abstract: In a recent paper (2013), Jc Beall has employed what he calls ‘shriek rules’ in a putative solution to the long-standing ‘just false’ problem for glut theory. The purpose of this paper is twofold: firstly, I distinguish the ‘just false’ problem from another problem, with which it is often conflated, which I will call the ‘exclusion problem’. Secondly, I argue that shriek rules do not help glut theorists with either problem.
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors describe a scenario in which a person in his afterlife will with probability 1 spend twice as many days in Heaven as in Hell, but, even though Heaven is as good as Hell is bad, his expected utility for any given day in that afterlife is negative.
Abstract: This paper describes a scenario in which a person in his afterlife will with probability 1 spend twice as many days in Heaven as in Hell, but, even though Heaven is as good as Hell is bad, his expected utility for any given day in that afterlife is negative.