Virginia Law Review 

About: Virginia Law Review is an academic journal. The journal publishes majorly in the area(s): Supreme court & Statute. It has an ISSN identifier of 0042-6601. Over the lifetime, 1827 publications have been published receiving 25020 citations.

Structure and process, politics and policy: administrative arrangements and the political control of agencies

Abstract: I N 1977, Congress substantially revised the Clean Air Act,1 the nation's flagship legislation on environmental policy. Many changes were considered, and among those that Congress adopted was an intricate redefinition of the procedures to be used by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in making rules.2 The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 (1970 Amendments), which had moved responsibility for air pollution regulation from the Public Health Service in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) to the newly minted EPA, set up the EPA's rulemaking procedures as \"informal\" with few procedural requirements and considerable decisional flexibility.' After extensive debate in both the 94th and 95th Congresses,4 Congress changed this to a new hybrid process (more formal than \"informal rulemaking\" but less formal than \"formal rulemaking\") that requires a more elaborate written record and a clearer statement of agency intentions and of the bases for its decisions.' As a reading of the committee reports and floor debates about these and similar proposals makes clear, legislators regard the choice of administrative structure and process as vitally important.6 The legislative history of admin-

Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review

Abstract: 1. The Allure of Interpretivism 2. The Impossibility of a Clause-Bound Interpretivism 3. Discovering Fundamental Values 4. Policing the Process of Representation: The Court as Referee 5. Clearing the Channels of Political Change 6. Facilitating the Representation of Minorities Conclusion Notes Index

A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law

Abstract: In this chapter, the authors take issue with both the prevailing principal-agent model of the public corporation and the shareholder wealth maximization goal that underlies it. Because corporations are fictional entities that can only act through human agents, problems of agent fealty are frequently encountered by those who study and practice corporate law. Thus, while the principal-agent problem may be important in understanding the business firm, authors question whether it necessarily provides special insight into the theory of the public corporation. The authors explore an alternative approach that they believe may go much further in explaining both the distinctive legal doctrines that apply to public corporations and the unique role these business entities have come to play in American economic life: the team production approach. In the economic literature, team production problems are said to arise in situations where a productive activity requires the combined investment and coordinated effort of two or more individuals or groups.