Showing papers in "World Politics in 1988"
TL;DR: This paper found that the rise of left-libertarian parties is the result of a new cleavage mobilized in democratic party systems rather than of transient protest, and that there is little evidence that these parties are a reaction to economic and social crises in advanced democracies.
Abstract: Since the 1960s, new left-socialist or ecology parties have appeared in approximately half of the advanced Western democracies. These parties have a common set of egalitarian and libertarian tenets and appeal to younger, educated voters. The author uses macropolitical and economic data to explain the electoral success of these left-libertarian parties. While high levels of economic development are favorable preconditions for their emergence, they are best explained in terms of domestic political opportunity structures. There is little evidence that these parties are a reaction to economic and social crises in advanced democracies. The findings suggest that the rise of left-libertarian parties is the result of a new cleavage mobilized in democratic party systems rather than of transient protest.
408 citations
TL;DR: The classic dialectic between Realist and Liberal theories of international politics, as expressed by Robert O. Keohane, ed., in Neorealism and Its Critics and Richard Rosecrance The Rise of the Trading State, can be transcended.
Abstract: The classic dialectic between Realist and Liberal theories of international politics, as expressed by Robert O. Keohane, ed., in Neorealism and Its Critics and Richard Rosecrance The Rise of the Trading State, can be transcended. Neither paradigm singularly explains international behavior: Realism is the dominant approach, but liberal theories of transnationalism and interdependence help to illuminate how national interests are learned and changed. Keohane and fellow critics argue that Neorealism—articulated definitively in Kenneth Waltz's Theory of International Politics (1979)—elegantly systematizes Realism, but concentrates on international system structure at the expense of system process. Focused tightly on the concept of bipolarity, Waltz's theory tends toward stasis; the unit (state) level unproductively becomes an analytical “dumping ground.” As a Neoliberal counterpoint, Rosecrance's argument does not go far enough. In the tradition of commercial liberalism, he argues that an open trading system offers states maneuverability through economic growth rather than through military conquest. He tempers his argument with Realist considerations of prudence, but fails to clarify Realist-Liberal links in his theory, or to explore fully the connections between power and non-power incentives influencing states' behavior. A synthesis of Neorealism and Neoliberalism is warranted: a systemic theory using the former to analyze at the level of structure, the latter more often at the level of process.
389 citations
TL;DR: The dark side of government knows no geographic, economic, ideological, or political boundary as discussed by the authors, and this dark side is a dismal characteristic of contemporary politics, even in the late 20th century.
Abstract: G OVERNMENTS organize police forces and armies to protect their citizens, build schools and hospitals to educate and care for them, and provide financial assistance for the old and unemployed. But governments also kill, torture, and imprison their citizens. This dark side of government knows no geographic, economic, ideological, or political boundary. In the Middle East, for example, Iraq has morbidly placed a "welcome" doormat at the entrance to its torture chamber-a place where prisoners are burned with cigarettes and electric hot plates, where electric shocks are administered to them, and where they are hanged from the ceiling. In Central America, the government of Guatemala tolerates the torture and killing of three church workers who were assisting refugees. In Africa, the Cameroons allows eight prisoners to die of malnutrition; South Africa, through its policy of apartheid, systematically violates the rights of its nonwhite citizens. In Asia, Burmese army units operating in Karen state use local civilians as minesweepers. In Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union confines dissenters to psychiatric hospitals. In Western Europe, the residents of Northern Ireland are subjected to trials that fail to conform to international standards, and civilians are shot by the security forces.' The list goes on. Unfortunately, this type of governmental behavior is-even in the late 20th century-a dismal characteristic of contemporary politics. Most of the world's countries hold some "prisoners of conscience" or detain po-
319 citations
TL;DR: The concept of reactive state is useful in understanding the foreign economic policy behavior of Japan and certain other middle-range powers deeply integrated in the global political economy, particularly during periods of economic turbulence when international regimes do not fully safeguard their economic interests as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: The concept of the “reactive state” is useful in understanding the foreign economic policy behavior of Japan and certain other middle-range powers deeply integrated in the global political economy, particularly during periods of economic turbulence when international regimes do not fully safeguard their economic interests. The essential characteristics of the reactive state are two-fold: (1) it fails to undertake major independent foreign-policy initiatives although it has the power and national incentives to do so; (2) it responds to outside pressure for change, albeit erratically, unsystematically, and often incompletely.In the Japanese case, reactive state behavior flows from domestic institutional characteristics as well as from the structure of the international system. Domestic features such as bureaucratic fragmentation, political factionalism, powerful mass media, and the lack of a strong central executive have played an especially important part in Japanese financial, energy, trade, and technology policy formation since 1971.
259 citations
TL;DR: The anarchy approach stresses individual actors' choices and slights questions of how issues are posed and constrained as discussed by the authors, and it takes preferences as given without exploring either the frequency of Prisoners' Dilemma situations or the ways in which preferences are formed and can change.
Abstract: Recent work has focused on the problem of how states cooperate in the environment of anarchy. Linked to the ideas of the Prisoners' Dilemma and public goods, that work has provided important insights and lines of research. But it also has problems and limitations, which are explored in the paper. The anarchy approach stresses individual actors' choices and slights questions of how issues are posed and constrained. It takes preferences as given without exploring either the frequency of PD situations or the ways in which preferences are formed and can change. Many of the concepts the framework uses—e.g., cooperation and defection, the distinction between offense and defense, and the nature of power—are problematical. Issues of beliefs, perceptions, norms, and values also lead to a different perspective on cooperation.
201 citations
TL;DR: Despite their limited accomplishments in promoting economic development, the authoritarian regimes brought to power through social-revolutionary transformations have excelled at conducting humanly costly wars with a special fusion of popular zeal, meritocratic professionalism, and central coordination as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: Despite their limited accomplishments in promoting economic development, the authoritarian regimes brought to power through social-revolutionary transformations—from the French Revolution of the 18th century to the Iranian Revolution of the present—have excelled at conducting humanly costly wars with a special fusion of popular zeal, meritocratic professionalism, and central coordination. Revolutionary elites, whether communist or not, have been able to build the strongest states in those countries whose geopolitical circumstances allowed the emerging new regimes to become engaged in protracted and labor-intensive international warfare.
98 citations
TL;DR: The notion that the attitudes of the American public vis-a-vis the Soviet Union are driven essentially by emotion, and that they are more extreme and volatile than those of the government itself, is widely believed but may not be valid as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: The notion that the attitudes of the American public vis-a-vis the Soviet Union are driven essentially by emotion, and that they are more extreme and volatile than those of the government itself, is widely believed but may not be valid. While the public typically desires a combination of tough and conciliatory policies, it also tends to express, at any given moment, particular concern about whichever of the two it feels is most slighted in U.S. policy. Thus, the public will tend to seek conciliatory behavior from hawkish administrations while preferring a tough stance from administrations it deems dovish. By so doing, the public is likely to have a moderating effect on official behavior toward Moscow. The proposition is tested with reference to shifts in public approval of presidential Soviet policy, and certain implications are suggested for the manner in which political leadership perceives of its mandate.
91 citations
TL;DR: A complex relationship between state and capital has emerged, based upon structural factors (the need to maintain investment, economic growth, and a revenue base) as well as instrumental factors such as involvement of officials in business as state managers of capital and private investors as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: In the past three decades, the Suharto regime has presided over the rapid industrialization of Indonesia and the development of its capital-owning classes A complex relationship between state and capital has emerged, based upon structural factors (the need to maintain investment, economic growth, and a revenue base) as well as instrumental factors (the involvement of officials in business as state managers of capital and private investors) Recently, however, significant tensions have emerged between the interests of the regime and its officials on the one hand, and the interests of various elements of the capital-owning classes on the other, in response to broader structural pressures for economic changeThese tensions and pressures are a challenge to the pact of domination between state officials and their corporate allies, the system monopolies and protection from which corporate capital emerged, and the nature of political domination exerted by officials over the state apparatus Although the growing social and economic power of the capital-owning classes is not being converted into formal instrumental control over the state apparatus, economic strategies and political and economic alliances are being restructured, resulting in important shifts in the nature of Indonesian authoritarianism
89 citations
TL;DR: In the 1970s and 1980s, many scholars expected U.S. trade policy to look like that of the 1920s and 1930s, i.e., to be marked by widespread and high levels of protectionism.
Abstract: Many scholars expected U.S. trade policy in the 1970s and beyond to look like that of the 1920s and 1930s—i.e., to be marked by widespread and high levels of protectionism. The American market, however, remained relatively open. One central reason was the growth of antiprotectionist sentiment among American firms. Firms now opposed protection because they had developed extensive ties to the international economy through exports, multinational production, and global intrafirm trade. The development of these international ties by the 1970s reduced protectionist pressure by American firms even when they were faced with serious import competition: protection had become too costly. The preferences of these firms also seemed to affect trade policy outcomes, turning them away from protection.
85 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors evaluate the impact of structural attributes on the risk of major-power war and find no evidence that decision makers were significantly constrained by variations in the structural attributes.
Abstract: Systemic theorists emphasize the interplay of the distribution of power, the number of poles, and their tightness in predicting the occurrence of major-power war. The authors link individual-level incentives to these systemic constraints as factors that might affect the likelihood of war. They believe that their model specification is more comprehensive than any prior effort to evaluate the impact of structural attributes on the risk of major-power war. Empirical results from the individual-level prespective are encouraging when one examines European crises from 1816 to 1965, but there is no evidence that decision makers were significantly constrained by variations in the structural attributes. Neither the distribution of power nor the number or tightness of poles appears to influence the risk of war.
73 citations
TL;DR: O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead as discussed by the authors focus more on the transitions than on democracy itself, and fail to place transitions in the context of democracy's social and cultural bases.
Abstract: Analysis of transitions to democracy is marked empirically by democracy's own resurgent vigor, and theoretically by shifts away from focus on global political economy to concern with such political variables as organization or leadership, and study of their expression within national arenas. Contributors to Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy (edited by Guillermo O'Donnell, Phillippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead) explore these issues with special emphasis on how regime transitions begin and on possibilities for social, cultural, and economic democratization. The collection focuses more on the transitions than on democracy itself, and fails to place transitions in the context of democracy's social and cultural bases. Insufficient attention is given to civil society and to its organized links with politics. This theoretical and empirical position obscures the appeal of liberal democracy to elites and masses, and hinders understanding of why popular groups accept pacts and back the leaders who make them.
TL;DR: In this article, a comparative evaluation of state capacities attempts to account for the variations and nuances of the performance of Southeast Asian states, showing that the structure of political support and available means of social control provide relatively greater capacity to state elites in Singapore and Malaysia, and less capacity in the Philippines and Indonesia; Thailand is an intermediate case.
Abstract: The signal performances of Southeast Asian countries in attaining economic growth and political stability are frequently explained by cultural and policy factors. Recent research suggests, however, that the role of the state is extensive and central to economic and political goals. The present approach to the comparative evaluation of state capacities attempts to account for the variations and nuances of the performance of Southeast Asian states. The structure of political support and available means of social control provide relatively greater capacity to state elites in Singapore and Malaysia, and less capacity to state elites in the Philippines and Indonesia; Thailand is an intermediate case.
TL;DR: The authors analyzes the implications of social choice theory for the study of world politics and concludes that the outcomes are determined neither by structure nor by preferences alone, but rather by their interaction.
Abstract: This paper analyzes the implications of social choice theory for the study of world politics. A view of the world system as a social choice mechanism leads to the observation that the outcomes of world politics are determined neither by structure nor by preferences alone, but rather by their interaction. Structural change occurs only when the actors cannot achieve their preferences through the current system. Three particular social choice mechanisms are analyzed to determine which conditions of Arrow's theorem they violate. The argument is illustrated by examining two salient theoretical works, Waltz's Theory of International Politics and Gilpin's War and Change in World Politics. The critique of Waltz illustrates that structure alone cannot determine outcome; the critique of Gilpin examines how structural change occurs in world politics and underlines the importance of preferences in such changes.
TL;DR: The authors examines some of the central themes in recent studies relating to appeasement: the "structural" approach, which offers a new overall interpretation; the economic, military, and intelligence "dimensions" of British foreign policy in the 1930s; and the breaking down of traditional stereotypes of the roles of Chamberlain and Churchill.
Abstract: Historical research since the opening of the British archives in the late 1960s has brought about a substantial revision of the image of appeasement that had generally been accepted after World War II. Yet the traditional image has scarcely been questioned in contemporary writing on international relations. This article examines some of the central themes in recent studies relating to appeasement: the “structural” approach, which offers a new overall interpretation; the economic, military, and intelligence “dimensions” of British foreign policy in the 1930s; and the breaking down of traditional stereotypes of the roles of Chamberlain and Churchill. This reappraisal has important implications for the discipline of international relations, its view of the origins of World War II, and theories of international structural change.
TL;DR: In this paper, the links between external strategy and economic performance can be classified as fiscal (macroeconomic effects), structural (microeconomic and structural effects), and protectionist (effects on foreign economic policy).
Abstract: Realist approaches to international politics raise the possibility that external policies based on expanding military power may undermine the economic bases of that power. The links between external strategy and economic performance can be classified as fiscal (macroeconomic effects), structural (microeconomic and structural effects), and protectionist (effects on foreign economic policy). The case of prewar Japan suggests that, for countries at an intermediate position in the international power hierarchy and in the international division of labor, the positive effects of external ambition on economic performance may dominate. Other cases—National Socialist Germany, contemporary developing countries, and the postwar superpowers—seem to confirm that international position is a principal determinant of these effects.
TL;DR: This article showed that regardless of which data set is used, many of the central tests of important hypotheses concerning Kondratieff waves, international trade, and hegemony and war yield much the same results.
Abstract: Much of the empirical research on war has been conducted using only one of a number of data sets that have been compiled by leading scholars of international politics. In view of the low correlation among the data sets, however, one must be cautious in choosing between them for whatever task is at hand. The preliminary findings indicate that, regardless of which data set is used, many of the central tests of important hypotheses concerning Kondratieff waves, international trade, and hegemony and war yield much the same results
TL;DR: This paper showed that the lessons drawn from the history of industrialization in England are highly misleading, and thus challenged the empirical foundations for much of classical and Marxian development theory, and pointed out that many of the basic beliefs about how economies develop are derived from readings of history.
Abstract: Theories of development are derived from readings of history. Modern historical research challenges many of the basic beliefs about how economies develop. More specifically, recent research suggests that the lessons drawn from the history of industrialization in England are highly misleading. The article thus challenges the empirical foundations for much of classical and Marxian development theory.
TL;DR: For example, the authors show how positivist theories and methods can be used to clarify holist (or traditionalist) arguments, to sharpen debates, to suggest more telling tests, and to invigorate the field's research agenda.
Abstract: Specialists in the study of Soviet foreign policy increasingly feel torn between the positivist culture of political science departments and the holistic traditions of the Soviet area-studies programs. In fact, these approaches are largely complementary. Examples taken from literature on Soviet security policy and on the domestic sources of Soviet expansionism show how positivist theories and methods can be used to clarify holist (or traditionalist) arguments, to sharpen debates, to suggest more telling tests, and to invigorate the field's research agenda.
TL;DR: A review of recent developments affecting two key members of the governing coalition, the political elite and organized labor, is presented in this article, highlighting the challenges posed by the economic crisis and conflicting development priorities.
Abstract: Despite the past resilience of Mexico's authoritarian regime, the severity of the country's post-1982 economic crisis raises major questions concerning the future direction of Mexican politics. This review examines recent developments affecting two key members of the governing revolutionary coalition, the political elite and organized labor. The political elite's unity is potentially threatened by shifts in education and recruitment patterns, and widespread uncertainty regarding Mexico's economic future has produced the most serious intra-elite division since the early 1950s. Prolonged economic crisis has also placed severe strains on state-labor relations, and the government's implementation of a new development strategy may lead to a substantial redefinition of organized labor's overall position in the Mexican regime. These changes pose significant challenges to the political elite's ability to preserve a broad-based governing coalition and political openness while managing the economic crisis and conflicting development priorities.
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TL;DR: Schatzberg and Schatzberg as mentioned in this paper described the politics and class in Zaire: Bureaucracy, Business, and Beer in Lisala, with a focus on women.
Abstract: Michael G. Schatzberg, Politics and Class in Zaire: Bureaucracy, Business, and Beer in Lisala. New York, Africana Publishing Company, i980, 228 pp. Thomas M. Callaghy, The State-Society Struggle: Zaire in Comparative Perspective. New York, Columbia University Press, i984, 515 pp. Crawford Young and Thomas Turner, The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State. Madison, The University of Wisconsin Press, i985, 500 pp.
TL;DR: For a variety of reasons, explanations of Cuban foreign policy lack in persuasiveness as discussed by the authors, in which any number of factors are adduced to explain Cuban behavior, but they do not pay adequate attention to how these various pieces fit together into a coherent whole.
Abstract: For a variety of reasons, explanations of Cuban foreign policy lack in persuasiveness. Some authors adopt a kitchen-sink approach in which any number of factors are adduced to explain Cuban behavior, but they do not pay adequate attention to how these various pieces fit together into a coherent whole. Other writers concentrate on a single factor to explain Cuba's globalism, but in the process load more explanatory power than it can bear onto a sole variable. Still others have a penchant for prescribing proper foreign policy for the United States, with the result that the study of Cuban policy in its own terms is often shortchanged. Only by studying the character, world view, and charismatic influence of Fidel Castro can a center of gravity be found for the study of Cuban foreign policy.
TL;DR: The lessons-of-history/normalcy paradox as mentioned in this paper explains the inconsistency between official policy pronouncements and the accepted political modus operandi in terms of four "paradoxes": (1) the nation/state identity paradox, (2) the reunification/integration paradox; (3) the stability/security paradox; and (4) the normalcy paradox.
Abstract: Major changes in the postwar global environment have transformed “the” German question into many German questions that continue to complicate the foreign and domestic policy-making processes in the Federal Republic. Inconsistencies between official policy pronouncements and the accepted political modus operandi are explainable in terms of four “paradoxes”: (1) the nation/state identity paradox; (2) the reunification/integration paradox; (3) the stability/security paradox; and (4) the lessons-of-history/normalcy paradox. West German commitment to the Atlantic Alliance remains unshaken, but the FRG should not be forced to choose between the U.S. and Europe, between integration with the West and further improvement in relations with the GDR. Normalization of those relations will be best served by a mutual adherence to the principles of balance, territorial integrity, confidence building and greater transparency in matters of inter-German decision making.
TL;DR: In this article, the implementation of the Final Solution is discussed in terms of divergent interpretations characteristic of the functionalists and theintentionalists, and the routines of two sets of implementors are described: the mass liquidations perpetrated by the Einsatzgruppen an the barbaric-civil orderliness of the bureaucrats carrying out the deportation of the German Jews.
Abstract: The implementation of the Final Solution is discussed in terms of the divergent interpretations characteristic of the “functionalists” and the “intentionalists.” The routines of two sets of implementors are described: the mass liquidations perpetrated by the Einsatzgruppen an the “barbaric-civil orderliness” of the bureaucrats carrying out the deportation of the German Jews. In the final section, Lifton's concept of the medicalization of the killings is introduced, with attention also to his thoughts on “doubling” and the extension of his concerns “beyond Auschwitz” to the sphere of nuclear catastrophe.