Showing papers in "World Politics in 1992"
TL;DR: The authors analyzes the incentives that have led to the development of local state corporatism and rapid rural industrialization, and describes the ways in which local governments coordinate economic activity and reallocate revenues from industrial production.
Abstract: In the 1980s fiscal reform in China provided localities with strong incentives and a heightened capacity to pursue industrial growth. As a result, local governments have responded vigorously to economic reform, managing rural collective-owned enterprises as diversified corporations, with local officials performing the role of a board of directors. This article analyzes the incentives that have led to the development of this form of local state corporatism and rapid rural industrialization, and it describes the ways in which local governments coordinate economic activity and reallocate revenues from industrial production. These developments are important for two reasons: they show that local government involvement in the economy does not necessarily decline with the expansion of market coordination; and they offer a successful model of reform that serves as a counterpoint to privatization proposals.
1,141 citations
TL;DR: The recent literature on international cooperation has made two general contributions as discussed by the authors, namely, it has developed a concept of cooperation, which can help distinguish what behavior counts as cooperation and which has been adopted widely in the field.
Abstract: Cooperation among nations has become the focus of a wide range of studies in the past decade. The recent international relations literature about cooperation has adopted a distinct approach. It has tended to focus on the systemic level of analysis. It has also used game theory as its central tool of analysis. This review evaluates this literature, arguing that these methodological choices have contributed to both the greatest strengths and the greatest weaknesses of the literature in explaining cooperation among nations.The recent literature on international cooperation has made two general contributions. First, it has developed a concept of cooperation, which can help distinguish what behavior counts as cooperation and which has been adopted widely in thefield.Second, the literature ha* tried to illuminate the conditions under which cooperation is likely to emerge. Using game theory to model relations at the systemic level parsimoniously, scholars have developed at least six hypotheses about the circumstances that promote cooperative behavior.The recent literature also suffers from at least two serious problems. The first problem flows from the assumptions used to generate the relatively parsimonious hypotheses. In particular, the way in which the assumption of anarchy is used causes problems. Second, and relatedly, the literature shows a remarkable neglect of domestic politics. As will be argued, this poses a serious limitation for understanding cooperation. Systemic theory simply cannot take us far enough. The international-level hypotheses depend on implicit theories about internal politics. Hypotheses about domestic influences on cooperation among states are not well developed. Although systemic theory has been touted for a variety of reasons, the biggest gains in understanding international cooperation in the future are likely to come from domestic-level theories.
361 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors developed a model based on the domestic structures of the leader and challenger that predicts which strategy will be employed by a declining dominant power and tested the propositions against historical survey data and several in-depth case studies.
Abstract: Realists have long viewed uneven rates of growth among states as a major cause of wars. According to strict logic of realpolitik, a declining dominant power should launch a preventive war against a rising challenger as a prudent long-term security strategy. But historically, power shifts have only sometimes resulted in war. Although preventive war has been the preferred response of declining authoritarian leaders, no democracy has ever initiated such a war. Instead, depending on the regime type of the rising challenger, democratic states have chosen accommodation, defensive alliances, or internal balancing to solve the problem of impending decline. In addition to establishing the correlation between preventive war and authoritarian regimes and explaining why democratic states forgo this option, this essay (1) develops a model based on the domestic structures of the leader and challenger that predicts which strategy will be employed by a declining dominant power and (2) tests the propositions against historical survey data and several in-depth case studies.
255 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors show that the neoliberals ignore so much contrary evidence as to suggest that the neoliberal paradigm has entered a degenerative stage, like classical economics in the years before Keynes's breakthrough and like much Marxist writing of the 1970s.
Abstract: Neoliberal economists say that growth is easy, provided the state does not obstruct the natural growth-inducing processes of a capitalist economy. They point to the success of South Korea and Taiwan as evidence that this proposition also holds for quite poor economies. Using chapters of Helen Hughes's edited volume by way of illustration, this article shows that the neoliberals ignore so much contrary evidence as to suggest that the neoliberal paradigm has entered a degenerative stage, like classical economics in the years before Keynes's breakthrough and like much Marxist writing of the 1970s.Two recent books about East Asia offer ways forward. The one by Alice Amsden argues that Korea has done better than other developing countries because it has created a more powerful synergy between a state that aggressively steers market competition and large, diversified business groups whose firms focus strategically on production processes at the shop floor. In conditions of “late development” this synergy is the key to success. Stephan Haggard's book accepts the core economic mechanism of the neoliberals but argues that the choice between sensible export-oriented policies, as in East Asia, or unsensible secondary import-substitution policies, as in Latin America, is determined by a complex conjunction of international pressures, domestic coalitions, political institutions, and ideas.Both books make important contributions to the debate. But they are weakened by not situating the experience of their case studies within an account of trends in the world system and by not addressing the question of what prevented massive “government failure” in market interventions in the East Asian cases. The last part of this paper takes a short step in this direction.
225 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, an analysis of efforts to promote local auto manufacturing in Southeast as well as East Asia is presented, arguing for an institutionalist approach to development that goes beyond statism.
Abstract: nomic development attempted to explain why growth did not occur, occurred slowly, or occurred in a distorted, dependent form. The impressive economic performances of the East Asian newly industrialized countries (NIcs) have changed this. Many noneconomists (as well as some economists) are now focusing on the political bases of development rather than underdevelopment. There are differences among these analysts. Some distance themselves from neoclassical economics by emphasizing the importance of "getting the prices wrong"; others acknowledge the utility of market-conforming policies.' But common to recent studies of NICS is the belief that growthpromoting economic policies require certain types of domestic political institutions. Analysts have emphasized the utility of strong states in this regard.2 Through an analysis of efforts to promote local auto manufacturing in Southeast as well as East Asia, this article argues for an institutionalist approach to development that goes beyond statism. The resolution of collective action problems is central to statist writings. Development requires that private returns to individual activities be brought in line with the broader needs of national development.3 Two factors are presumed to obstruct such harmonization in developing
134 citations
TL;DR: The authors explored a similar phenomenon in other societies, using cross-cultural ethnographic evidence, and found that polities organized according to more participatory (“democratic”) principles fight each other less often than do polities organised according to hierarchical principles.
Abstract: Evidence is accumulating that, in the modern international system, democracies rarely fight each other. But the reasons for the phenomenon are not well understood. This article explores a similar phenomenon in other societies, using cross-cultural ethnographic evidence. It finds that polities organized according to more participatory (“democratic”) principles fight each other less often than do polities organized according to hierarchical principles. Stable participatory institutions seem to promote peaceful relations, especially if people perceive that others also have some control over politics.
131 citations
TL;DR: The authors reformulates Jervis's spiral and deterrence models and argues that they overlook types of adversaries, including most importantly insecure greedy states, and that shifts in the adversary's balance of domestic power offer an alternative to individual learning as the basic way in which political consequences are generated.
Abstract: Analyses of military strategy often overlook its political consequences—its effect on the adversary's basic goals and understanding of the defender's resolve. As a result, they prescribe the wrong type of military policy and reduce states' security. This article explores how a variety of factors interact to produce political consequences. These factors include the type of adversary (specifically, its motives for expansion); the type of military strategy the defender adopts (offensive or defensive and unilateral or bilateral); the source of the adversary's misperceptions; and the process through which political consequences are generated. The article reformulates Jervis's spiral and deterrence models and argues that they overlook types of adversaries, including most importantly insecure greedy states; that shifts in the adversary's balance of domestic power offer an alternative to individual learning as the basic way in which political consequences are generated; that national-level failures of evaluation provide an alternative source of exaggerated insecurity; and that these differences can require the defender to follow different policies. Final sections explore military options for managing political consequences and implications for U.S. security policy.
125 citations
TL;DR: This paper examined the empirical record prior to the industrial revolution to see whether the power transition and hegemonic stability theory holds for that period, and they found strong support for power transition contention that a rough equality of power between rival sides increases the likelihood of war.
Abstract: This study extends recent research on the power transition and hegemonic stability theory to the preindustrial era. It improves on the original power transition theory by relaxing an assumption and by extending the empirical domain. Unlike the original power transition theory, the revised version is not restricted to the period after the industrial revolution and can therefore be applied to the preindustrial era. This study examines the empirical record prior to the industrial revolution to see whether the power transition and hegemonic stability theory holds for that period. The data for 1648 to 1815 indicate strong support for the power transition contention that a rough equality of power between rival sides increases the likelihood of war. That is, when the challenging great power, with its allies' support, catches up with the dominant power, great power war is most likely.
89 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined the case of the Brazilian debt rescheduling agreement of 1988 as a two-level game in which each of the two main negotiators (the Brazilian state and the international bank advisory committee) must satisfy its own constituents while trying to negotiate an international agreement.
Abstract: This study examines the case of the Brazilian debt rescheduling agreement of 1988 as a two-level game in which each of the two main negotiators—the Brazilian state and the international bank advisory committee—must satisfy its own constituents while trying to negotiate an international agreement. It is argued that the interaction between the domestic and international levels must be understood in order to explain the outcomes of international debt negotiations. This article draws on Robert Putnam's concept of the two-level game in international politics and on a wider literature concerning the influence of domestic political considerations in international negotiations to demonstrate that such an analysis can explain the process and outcome of the 1988 agreement, where a unitary negotiating level fails to predict the final result. The two-level model explains how domestic constraints and opportunities affect international outcomes, and it highlights the importance of the ratification process.
52 citations
TL;DR: The authors argue that explaining institutional differentiation requires the incorporation of public preferences and understandings into accounts of state development, and that culture determined the specific features of both the British National Health Service Act of 1946 and the American Medicare Act of 1965, as well as the differences between them.
Abstract: This article argues that explaining institutional differentiation requires the incorporation of public preferences and understandings into accounts of state development. Using primary evidence concerning policy discussions and public opinion, it suggests that culture determined the specific features of both the British National Health Service Act of 1946 and the American Medicare Act of 1965, as well as the differences between them. Examining the interaction of institutions and culture inserts democratic standards into the top-heavy Weberian discussions of state autonomy and accounts for the seemingly inexplicable failure of policymakers to ensure cost control over the new health programs.
44 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that the pattern of factionalization in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) is primarily determined by the electoral incentives of two sets of rational actors, LDP politicians and LDP supporters.
Abstract: Over the last two decades there have been numerous changes in the organization of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in Japan. The pattern of factionalization has changed significantly in terms of the number of competing major factions, the average size of their membership, and their internal structure. Moreover, a new set of institutionalized norms, such as the seniority and interfactional balancing principles, has emerged to govern organizational processes within the LDP. The conventional approach in the literature on Japanese politics, which focuses on factors unique or distinctive to Japanese history, culture, and social behavior, cannot adequately explain these recent changes in the LDP. This paper proposes an alternative, rational-choice explanation based on the standard microanalytic assumptions. More specifically, it argues that the pattern of the LDP's factionalization is primarily determined by the electoral incentives of two sets of rational actors, LDP politicians and LDP supporters, operating under institutional constraints, such as electoral laws and political funding regulations. It also argues that the organizational norms originate in the promotion incentives of the LDP politicians whose strategies are influenced by the uncertainty in the dynamics of the interfactional political process.
TL;DR: In this paper, a theoretical model for explaining great power cooperation in conflict management is presented, and the model refines recent cooperation theory by distinguishing between types and degrees of international cooperation.
Abstract: This essay presents a theoretical model for explaining great power cooperation in conflict management. The model refines recent cooperation theory by distinguishing between types and degrees of international cooperation. It also challenges the dominance of decisionmaking analysis in the crisis literature and supplements it with structural factors. In brief, the model suggests that whereas crisis cooperation (crisis management) is conditioned by structural elements, cooperation in normal diplomacy (conflict resolution) depends on state attributes and cognitive factors. Such a model can account for the fact that unintended wars can break out between relatively moderate and similar actors whereas immoderate and dissimilar states can manage crises effectively. At the same time the model explains why some states are able to cooperate in normal diplomacy better than others, even when more actors are cooperating.
TL;DR: In this article, Dehio's interpretation of European international politics was tested for the period 1494-1945 and the outcome suggests that peaks of regional and global power concentration alternate.
Abstract: Leadership long-cycle analyses emphasize the global political economy, sea power, and the cyclical rise and fall of maritime powers. Ludwig Dehio's interpretation of European international politics stressed regional politics, land power, and the cyclical rise and fall of continental powers. Since neither framework totally ignores what the other accentuates, a merger of the two perspectives is quite feasible and results in improved explanatory power. As an illustration, several of Dehio's generalizations about the nature and timing of regional power concentration are tested for the period 1494–1945. The outcome suggests that peaks of regional and global power concentration alternate. Global reconcentration is stimulated, at least in part, by the threat posed by a rising regional challenger.
TL;DR: In the early 1970s, a kaleidoscopic pattern of events in Soviet politics makes analysis of them a hazardous endeavor, but it is imperative to try to interpret the radical change that has come with more than six years of perestroika, punctuated by an abortive coup in August 1991, the recognition of the independence of the former Baltic republics, and the transition from the Soviet Union to a commonwealth of independent states.
Abstract: T HE kaleidoscopic pattern of events in Soviet politics makes analysis of them a hazardous endeavor, but it is imperative to try to interpret the radical change that has come with more than six years of perestroika, punctuated by an abortive coup in August 1991, the recognition of the independence of the former Baltic republics, and the transition from the Soviet Union to a commonwealth of independent states. At the same time, the breakdown of the old political system offers unprecedented opportunities, first, to reassess some of our older analytic concepts and second, to think tentatively about some new approaches. The totalitarian model essentially dominated Western analysis until the early 1960s, when several new paradigms were proposed. T. H. Rigby's "organizational society,"' Alfred Meyer's "USSR, Incorporated" model,2 and Carl Linden's conflict model' were among the first such attempts to reconceptualize Soviet politics. Rigby suggested that political systems can be "traditional" (based on "custom") or "contract" (based on "markets") or "organizational" (based on "command"). And of course, in the developmental process elements of two or all three types may be found in a single polity. The Soviet Union, in his view, "is one of the most highly developed. . . 'organizational' societies." Meyer emphasized the organizational aspect as well, treating the USSR as one big corporation. Both scholars emphasized the continuity of the enormous state role in the economy and society together with the abrupt decline of Stalin's terror. And they were concerned with how power might diffuse within the massive bureaucratic structures. Linden focused exclusively on the changing politics at the top, finding conflict among cliques of leaders that
TL;DR: The authors of as mentioned in this paper suggest that the long-term maintenance of Panama's military authoritarian regime was due in large part to its ability to acquire substantial amounts of foreign capital during the 1970s, such capital was preferentially obtained from the international banking community.
Abstract: Before the U.S. invasion of December 1989, Panama experienced one of the longest periods of military rule in the modern-day history of Latin America. While numerous authoritarian military regimes emerged in the region during the 1960s and established for themselves a relatively high degree of autonomy from both domestic and international actors, only those in Panama, Paraguay, and Chile survived until the late 1980s. And of these three surviving military regimes, only Panama's was ended through the application of external military force. For the past several years, there has been considerable discussion of the factors that seem best to account for General Manuel Antonio Noriega's personal ability to resist U.S. pressure from 1987 until 1989 and to largely insulate himself from the political and economic constraints of Panamanian domestic politics. However, much less attention has been devoted to discussion of the factors that explain the long-term maintenance of the military authoritarian regime in existence for fifteen years prior to his assumption of power. This analysis suggests that the long-term maintenance of Panama's military authoritarian regime was due in large part to its ability to acquire substantial amounts of foreign capital. During the 1970s, such capital was preferentially obtained from the international banking community. During the 1980s, it was obtained through illicit activities of various kinds, including participation in the growing international drug trade.
TL;DR: This article examined the change in Soviet policy under Gorbachev and found that the shift to a strategy of detente had numerous causes, but a simple American peace-through-strength explanation that stresses external constraints and Soviet internal weakness is inadequate.
Abstract: Regional conflicts have played a major role in American interpretations of Soviet foreign policy. They have affected judgments about Soviet intentions and have served as a barometer of Moscow's competitiveness. This study looks at the change in Soviet policy under Gorbachev. It proposes a strategic framework for the analysis of Soviet behavior and then examines Moscow's actions in terms of military support, active involvement, and the terms for peace. Special attention is paid to Soviet behavior in Southwest Asia. The study finds that Soviet behavior changed but in ways that were more subtle than often realized. Moscow pulled back having achieved partial success through compromise more often than it retreated in defeat. The shift to a strategy of detente had numerous causes, but a simple American peace-through-strength explanation that stresses external constraints and Soviet internal weakness is inadequate. Such explanations underestimate the importance of changing perceptions of threat and mistakenly affirm a deterrence conception of reciprocity (i.e., that force begets restraint). The evidence in regional conflicts suggests that a spiral model of reciprocity (i.e., that escalation begets escalation) is more apt.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors test the objective and subjective models of Soviet civil-military relations to investigate the factors leading to military participation in, and withdrawal from, the coup of August 1991.
Abstract: This paper tests the objective (professionalization) and subjective (party penetration) models of Soviet civil-military relations. The objective model is found to provide the best fit and is used to investigate further the factors leading to military participation in, and withdrawal from, the coup of August 1991. The objective model points to the importance of threats to professional autonomy and national unity, the politicization of the military, and declining regime legitimacy as the primary causal factors in the participation of the military in the coup. It also stresses the importance of military professionalism as a barrier to intervention and as a cause of military paralysis during the coup. Furthermore, the model points to the importance of democratic legitimacy in future civilian control and to the need for increased military professionalism to forestall threats to the post-Soviet regime.
TL;DR: The authors examines three Western European cases from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and shows that political liberalization does not necessarily require a reformer's commitment to democracy, even conservative politicians may find liberalization to be a rational and acceptable means to secure their power and to defeat powerful opponents.
Abstract: This article examines three Western European cases from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and shows that political liberalization does not necessarily require a reformer's commitment to democracy. Under the right circumstances, even conservative politicians may find liberalization to be a rational and acceptable means to secure their power and to defeat powerful opponents, despite the risk of future upheavals. Such circumstances were present in the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, when Mikhail Gorbachev and his supporters used the strategy of political liberalization to remove the threat posed by their rivals in the party apparatus.
TL;DR: This paper analyzed the relation between structural constraints and political choice in the context of political economy and economic policy-making within advanced capitalism and provided fine accounts of the interplay of structure and agency in concrete historical settings.
Abstract: By focusing on some major contributions to political economy and economic policy-making within advanced capitalism, among the richest subfields of the discipline, the article seeks to analyze the relation between structural constraints and political choice. With the partial exception of Politics against Markets, all the works reviewed here seek to interpret rather than change the world. Attending to the fine grain of historical detail, they insightfully describe important political developments. They provide fine accounts of the interplay of structure and agency in concrete historical settings. By developing impressive theory to illuminate these developments, the works considerably advance our knowledge of the way that political forces affect economic policy outcomes. However, they generally share three important and interrelated shortcomings: they do not adequately conceptualize the structural dynamics of democratic capitalism; they adopt an economistic perspective concerning the organization of interests and social identities; and they confine attention to what is and fail to consider what might be.