Showing papers in "World Politics in 1999"
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TL;DR: This paper reviewed a wide range of recent attempts in both economics and political science to explain the "resource curse" and found that much has been learned about the economic problems of resource exporters but less is known about their political problems.
Abstract: How does a state's natural resource wealth influence its economic development? For the past fifty years, versions of this question have been explored by both economists and political scientists. New research suggests that resource wealth tends to harm economic growth, yet there is little agreement on why this occurs. This article reviews a wide range of recent attempts in both economics and political science to explain the “resource curse.” It suggests that much has been learned about the economic problems of resource exporters but less is known about their political problems. The disparity between strong findings on economic matters and weak findings on political ones partly reflects the failure of political scientists to carefully test their own theories.
1,690 citations
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TL;DR: The authors found that political realignment toward the United States, the largest power in the IMF, increases a country's probability of receiving an IMF loan, suggesting that these processes are best modeled dynamically.
Abstract: Analysts have long suspected that politics affects the lending patterns of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), but none have adequately specified or systematically tested competing explanations. This paper develops a political explanation of IMF lending and tests it statistically on the developing countries between 1985 and 1994. It finds that political realignment toward the United States, the largest power in the IMF, increases a country's probability of receiving an IMF loan. A country's static political alignment position has no significant impact during this period, suggesting that these processes are best modeled dynamically. An analysis of two subsamples rejects the hypothesis that the IMF has become less politicized since the end of the cold war and suggests that the influence of politics has actually increased since 1990. The behavior of multilateral organizations is still driven by the political interests of their more powerful member states.
635 citations
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TL;DR: The results of a survey of women in legislatures and executives around the world as they were constituted in 1998 (N = 180) were reported in this paper, where the chief hypotheses regarding the factors hindering or facilitating women's access to political representation were tested by multivariate regression models.
Abstract: This article reports the results of a survey of women in legislatures and executives around the world as they were constituted in 1998 (N = 180). The chief hypotheses regarding the factors hindering or facilitating women's access to political representation were tested by multivariate regression models. The regression models juxtaposed a cocktail of institutional, political, cultural, and socioeconomic variables with the following dependent variables: (1) the percentage of MPs who are women and (2) the percentage of cabinet ministers who are women. A number, although not all, of the cited hypotheses were statistically confirmed and more finely quantified. The socioeconomic development of women in society has an effect on the number of women in parliament but not in the cabinet. A country's length of experience with multipartyism and women's enfranchisement correlates with both the legislative and the executive percentage. Certain electoral systems are more women friendly than others. The ideological nature of the party system affects the number of women elected and chosen for cabinet posts. And last, the state's dominant religion, taken as a proxy for culture, also statistically relates to the number of women who will make it to high political office. However, other long-held hypotheses were not proved. The degree of
democracy is not a good indicator of the percentage of women who will make it into the legislature or the cabinet, nor is the dichotomy between
a presidential or parliamentary system.
524 citations
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors test Kantian and realist theories of interstate conflict using data extending over more than a century, treating those theories as complementary rather than competing, and find that high levels of democracy and economic interdependence in the international system reduce the probability of conflict for all dyads, not just for those that are democratic or dependent on trade.
Abstract: The authors test Kantian and realist theories of interstate conflict using data extending over more than a century, treating those theories as complementary rather than competing. As the classical liberals believed, democracy, economic interdependence, and international organizations have strong and statistically significant effects on reducing the probability that states will be involved in militarized disputes. Moreover, the benefits are not limited to the cold war era. Some realist influences, notably distance and power predominance, also reduce the likelihood of interstate conflict. The character of the international system, too, affects the probability of dyadic disputes. The consequences of having a strong hegemonic power vary, but high levels of democracy and interdependence in the international system reduce the probability of conflict for all dyads, not just for those that are democratic or dependent on trade.
471 citations
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors take issue with the conceptual and analytical underpinnings of this literature by highlighting how new political institutions, rather than securing democratic politics, have in fact had a more checkered effect.
Abstract: Scholars of democratic consolidation have come to focus on the links between political institutions and enduring regime outcomes. This article takes issue with the conceptual and analytical underpinnings of this literature by highlighting how new political institutions, rather than securing democratic politics, have in fact had a more checkered effect. It delineates why the theoretical expectations of the democratic consolidation literature have not been realized and draws, by example, on the contemporary ethnic movements that are now challenging third-wave democracies. In particular, it highlights how contemporary indigenous movements, emerging in response to unevenly institutionalized reforms, pose a postliberal challenge to Latin America's I newly founded democracies. These movements have sparked political debates and constitutional reforms over community rights, territorial autonomy, and a multiethnic citizenry. As a whole, I they have laid bare the weakness of state institutions, the contested terms of democracy, and the I indeterminacy of ethnic accommodation in the region. As such, these movements highlight the need to qualify somewhat premature and narrow discussions of democratic consolidation in favor I of a broader research agenda on democratic politics.
394 citations
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TL;DR: The authors examines the impact of international human rights standards on policies toward Korean and more recent migrant workers in Japan and concludes that international norms do not diffuse automatically or consistently across states, and there has been too little detailed process tracing of norm diffusion and therefore to move beyond correlation.
Abstract: In recent years immigrant rights have increasingly been examined
in an international context. An important theme in these
discussions has been the question of whether, and if so how,
states are constrained in developing immigrant and immigration
policies. Some scholars argue that states are constrained by
international human rights standards, while others, skeptical of this
position, focus on a wide range of arguments at the domestic level
of analysis. The skeptics are right that those asserting the impact
of international human rights standards on immigrant policy have
not demonstrated their importance domestically. International
norms and standards do not diffuse automatically or consistently
across states, and there has been too little detailed process tracing
to illustrate the mechanisms of norm diffusion and therefore to move
beyond correlation. To do so requires attention to the domestic
actors who mobilize international norms and to the specific
domestic circumstances in which they operate. This article
examines a hard case by studying the impact of international
human rights standards on policies toward Koreans and more
recent migrant workers in Japan. In this case international norms
matter. But they do not matter in a mysterious or automatic way.
Domestic actors use international norms in context-specific
environments to back up and make arguments for which they have
few domestic resources. This is not a story of international versus
domestic politics, nor is it a story about a paralyzed state. State
actors are actively involved in the process of integrating
international standards domestically, and the author examines how
those standards work their way into the political process.
269 citations
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors suggest modifications to the dominant theories of collective action and the literature on the politics of economic adjustment to highlight the centrality of interest groups favoring marketization.
Abstract: For much of the discipline of economics, a closed economy is seen
as the result of efforts of distributional coalitions and rent seekers
to maintain sector-specific protections. Accordingly, economic
liberalization is explained by the policy consistency of
uncompromising reform elites. Students of the politics of economic
adjustment in the developing world, in turn, have argued that reform
programs concentrate costs in the present and disperse benefits in
the future. Hence, losers are prepared to engage in collective
action, whereas prospective winners, facing uncertainty about
payoffs, remain disorganized. They thus posit the cohesiveness
and insularity of policymakers as the main variable for explaining
successful reform. Both economists and political scientists,
therefore, adopt a collective action approach that overlooks how
groups organize in support of liberalization. In the recent Latin American experience, however, these reforms
have preserved market reserves for firms that provided vital political
support to, and often colluded with, policymaking elites. This
setting has thus reproduced incentives for rent-seeking behavior,
even in the presence of comprehensive liberalization. This evidence
supports two interrelated theoretical claims. First, distributional
coalitions may proliferate when the state withdraws from the
economy, not only when it intervenes. Second, interest-based
variables retain explanatory power in political economy--which state
autonomy arguments disregard--irrespective of whether the
economy is closed or open--which neoclassical perspectives
overlook. To highlight the centrality of interest groups favoring
marketization, therefore, the article suggests modifications to the
dominant theories of collective action and the literature on the
politics of economic adjustment.
229 citations
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TL;DR: In this paper, the effects of proportional representation and single-member district elections on the number of parties in five post-communist states were examined, and it was shown that under conditions of extreme party underdevelopment, the electoral system that promotes the use of party labels (proportional representation) may be more effective than the plurality system (single-member plurality elections).
Abstract: Scholars studying electoral systems have consistently found that single-member plurality elections tend to constrain the number of parties operating in a polity to a much greater extent than multimember proportional representation systems. This article tests this hypothesis in the post-communist context by examining the effects of proportional representation and single-member district elections on the number of parties in five postcommunist states. It is shown that some postcommunist states, most notably Poland and Hungary, have followed the standard pattern of party consolidation over time in reaction to incentives of electoral systems, while others, most notably Russia and Ukraine, have not. The author argues that the different effects of electoral systems can be attributed to different levels of party institutionalization found in postcommunist states.These findings have policy implications. Under conditions of extreme party underdevelopment, the electoral system that promotes the use of party labels—proportional representation—may be more effective than the plurality system in constraining the number of parties, provided a legal threshold is used. This runs counter to the conventional wisdom that plurality elections offer the greatest constraint on the number of parties.
213 citations
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TL;DR: Using the implementation process of the Organic Law of the Village Committees, the authors describes how reformers adapted to the Chinese institutional setting to promote political reform over opposition at the elite and local levels.
Abstract: Earlier institutionalist studies in Chinese politics have shown how conservatives and local bureaucrats took advantage of institutional designs in the Leninist system of the People's Republic of China to delay and undermine the implementation of reforms. There has been less discussion of how reformers adapted their strategies to existing institutional constraints to overcome the opposition of conservatives. Using the implementation process of the Organic Law of the Village Committees, this article describes how the reformers adapted to the Chinese institutional setting to promote political reform over opposition at the elite and local levels.As the case of the village elections shows, the reformers in China designed a strategy to promote reform incrementally. Each step along the way was arranged to appear to be a natural response to the interaction between the initial reform policy and unforeseen consequences brought about by the previous policy. In this process, reformers deliberately manipulated a crucial variable—time—to bring about gradual change in the important actor, that is, the peasants, from spectators into participants, and thereby to change the balance of power between proponents and opponents of the reform. Other political players were also carefully enfranchised at different stages of the implementation process to help reformers in their struggle against conservatives.
161 citations
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TL;DR: The authors describes and criticizes three different approaches to international distributive justice represented in the recent literature: (1) social liberalism, which takes the nation-state as basic and argues for international transfers to the extent necessary to sustain just domestic institutions; (2) laisser-faire liberal, which, in its redistributivist variant, aims to rectify the injustices arising from the unequal appropriation of natural resources; and (3) cosmopolitan liberalism which takes each individual's interests as equally deserving of concern in the design of global (and sectional) institutions.
Abstract: In recent years there has been a renewal of interest in the liberal
tradition in international thought, with particular attention being
paid to liberal conceptions of international distributive justice.
This article describes and criticizes three different approaches to
international distributive justice represented in the recent
literature: (1) social liberalism, which takes the nation-state as
basic and argues for international transfers to the extent
necessary to sustain just domestic institutions; (2) laisser-faire
liberalism, which, in its redistributivist variant, aims to rectify
injustices arising from the unequal appropriation of natural
resources; and (3) cosmopolitan liberalism, which takes each
individual's interests as equally deserving of concern in the design
of global (and sectional) institutions.
127 citations
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TL;DR: This paper showed that African public bureaucracies are not as large as often portrayed, that they have been getting smaller, and that reducing their size alone has not been a prescription for economic revival.
Abstract: How close is the link between outsized states and economic stagnation in Africa? This article shows that African public bureaucracies are not as large as often portrayed, that they have been getting smaller, and that reducing their size alone has not been a prescription for economic revival. To the contrary, the countries with higher levels of public employment, such as Botswana and Mauritius, are apt to have the better economic records. These findings suggest that a superabundance of public personnel is not in itself?, major impediment to growth in Africa. Too much attention has been paid to quantitative or “first-generation” bureaucratic problems, and too little attention has been given the “second-generation” issues of bureaucratic quality.
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TL;DR: In this paper, a comparative analysis of the democratic transitions in the multinational federations of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union is presented, where the authors focus on the strategic choices by actors in multiple political arenas and the shifting balance of power between center and republics.
Abstract: One of the challenges presented to democratization theory by the
collapse of communist regimes is the need to take into account the
impact of ethnonational diversity on the processes of transition.
This article explores that question in a comparative analysis of the
dissolutions of the multinational federations of Yugoslavia,
Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union. It revisits what has been a
core--although usually unarticulated--premise of the
democratization literature: that the decisions and negotiations that
critically shape regime transition occur in a single, central political
arena, a political space common to all actors. In contrast to that
perspective, the strategic political context for transition in
multinational states differs both from that in homogeneous states
and from that in unitary multinational states, in offering multiple
arenas of political contestation. The implication for democratization
in multinational states is that, depending on the institutional
structure of the state, regime change may occur at different rates in
different substate political arenas--the republics--in such a way as
to trigger the erosion of central control over the transition. Where
democratization theory has emphasized strategic choice
conditioned by the balance of power between regime and opposition
actors, an accounting of the politics of transition in ethnofederal
states must emphasize (1) strategic choices by actors in multiple
political arenas and (2) the shifting balance of power between
center and republics.
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TL;DR: The authors analyzed how neoliberal economic reforms in Mexico led to the construction of distinct market governance institutions for market governance across four states (Chiapas, Guerrero, Oaxaca, and Puebla).
Abstract: Neoliberal economic reforms, rather than unleashing market forces,
can result in new institutions for market governance. By vacating
institutionalized policy domains, neoliberal reforms can trigger
two-step reregulation processes, as first, political entrepreneurs
launch projects to build support coalitions by reregulating markets,
and second, societal groups respond to these projects by
mobilizing to influence the terms of reregulation. Depending on the
strengths and strategies of politicians and societal groups,
reregulation processes result in varied institutions for market
governance. The article develops this argument by analyzing how
neoliberal reforms in Mexico led to the construction of distinct
institutions for market governance across four states (Chiapas,
Guerrero, Oaxaca, and Puebla). The findings from Mexico highlight
the importance of moving beyond the questions of why developing
countries choose neoliberal policies and how they implement them.
Students of the political economy of development should shift their
attention instead to understanding the kinds of new institutions that
replace those destroyed or displaced by neoliberal reforms.
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TL;DR: In this paper, a formal model of a contagion process based on the assumption that an agreement between two states increases the desirability of similar treaties to third parties is presented.
Abstract: Why was there an abrupt increase in economic openness in Europe in the 1860s? This increase may have been the result of a contagion process, in which the Cobden-Chevalier treaty between Britain and France threatened to displace third-party exports to Fra
nce with British exports. As a result, most European states signed
similar treaties with France, which had further ripple effects. This article outlines a formal model of this process, based on the assumption that an agreement between two states incre
ases the desirability of similar treaties to third parties. Propositions regarding the rate and pattern of spread of treaties are derived from this model. This article then discusses the insights these propositions may offer into the rise and fall of the most-favored-nation network of treaties between 1860 and 1929. At a theoretical level the model aims to link the microlevel processes underlying state preferences to system-level phenomena. At a substantive level this analysis offers insight into the
current explosion of regionalism.
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TL;DR: The authors examines the fate of these alliances by applying a revised version of Albert Hirschman's schema of exit, voice, and loyalty to party-union relations in Mexico, Spain, and Venezuela.
Abstract: Market reform has dealt a serious blow to traditional alliances between governing parties and labor unions. This article examines the fate of these alliances by applying a revised version of Albert Hirschman's schema of exit, voice, and loyalty to party-union relations in Mexico, Spain, and Venezuela. After refining the concept of loyalty, the author argues that it is embedded in the principles and norms on which these alliances are based. Market reform places party-affiliated labor leaders in a "loyalty dilemma" in which they have no choice but to behave disloyally toward one set of claimants. Their propensity to respond with either voice or exit depends on their vulnerability to reprisals for disloyal behavior and the party's capacity to retain their loyalty even in the face of sacrifices imposed on workers and unions. Both variables are linked to the authority structures in which labor and party leaders find themselves. In the short to medium run the alliances most likely to survive are those in which labor leaders have significant autonomy from their bases and/or in which the party is able and willing to challenge its own executive. In the long run, however, even these alliances may be vulnerable to collapse because of popular frustrations with the inadequacy of interest representation and the multiple pressures on political organizations to adapt to a more fluid and uncertain environment.
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors present evidence from parallel elite/mass surveys conducted in Russia in 1992-93 and 1995 of a considerable gap between elite and mass worldviews and argue that variation in ideological orientations is largely a function of the postcommunist structure of economic opportunity.
Abstract: Strong showings by antireform parties in elections in Russia and
other East European nations in the early and mid-1990s raised
concerns about the long-term prospects for democracy in the
region. Some interpret these votes as expressions of public protest
over the costs of economic reform, while others argue that they
reflected public skepticism of the liberalism of reformist elites. The
authors present evidence from parallel elite/mass surveys
conducted in Russia in 1992-93 and 1995 of a considerable gap
between elite and mass worldviews. They argue that variation in
ideological orientations--both between elite and mass and within the
mass public--is largely a function of the postcommunist structure of
economic opportunity. Analysis of the survey data provides
substantial support for the effects of economic opportunity structure
on individual ideological orientation and system preference. Thus,
what accounts for the Russian elite's embrace of liberalism and its
nonacceptance by portions of the Russian mass public is not
simply economic decline but the differential impact of restructuring
on long-term material prospects. The findings suggest that students
of democratic change should focus more fully on the structural
factors that constrain what is politically possible.
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TL;DR: In this article, a close inspection of two newly consolidated democracies (Poland and Hungary) shows that despite radically altered institutional arrangements, legal structures, and political-economic incentives, the most important determinants of the models of democracy emerging today derive from pretransition conceptual frames and informal political settlements.
Abstract: Studies of democratic consolidation tend to highlight the same factors previously used to explain countries' transitional dynamics. Yet one cannot properly understand success or failure in democratic consolidation—much less discern significant qualitative differences among consolidated democracies—by focusing exclusively on formal institutions, modes of transition, incentive structures, or exogenous factors. Close inspection of two newly consolidated democracies—Poland and Hungary—shows that despite radically altered institutional arrangements, legal structures, and political-economic incentives, the most important determinants of the models of democracy emerging today derive from pretransition conceptual frames and informal political settlements. Specifically, the core conflicts between ruling elites and society in communist Poland and Hungary, as well as the patterns of political accommodation that evolved in the management of those conflicts, continue to structure the political agenda and order debate in both countries. In Poland overlapping ethical-ideological cleavages and failures of political accommodation under the ancien regime have resulted in a confrontational-pluralist model of democracy. In contrast, Hungary's compromise-corporatist model stems from early informal accommodation between the party-state and society that recast most conflicts as “economic” in nature. These long-standing conflicts and political patterns explain striking contemporary differences in social mobilization, party competition, and constitutional development. The article concludes with a discussion of how these models are likely to shape each country's prospects for sustained governability and increased democratic legitimacy.