A Class Action Model for Antitrust Damages Litigation in the European Union

Abstract: La regulation de la concurrence est dualiste en France et au Canada. D’un cote, des autorites publiques de regulation encadrent le marche et sanctionnent le cas echeant les pratiques contraires aux dispositions legislatives en vigueur, et, d’un autre cote, les victimes de pratiques anticoncurrentielles, c'est-a-dire les consommateurs et les entreprises, peuvent intenter des poursuites privees sur le fondement d’une action en responsabilite civile afin d’obtenir la reparation du prejudice concurrentiel subi. Il s’agit respectivement de l’action publique et de l’action privee en matiere de concurrence, qualifiees aussi de public enforcement et de private enforcement du droit de la concurrence. Cependant, dans l’Union europeenne, et en France particulierement, le prejudice concurrentiel reste sans reparation effective. En effet, en France, les consommateurs n’avaient pas, jusqu’a l’adoption de l’action de groupe, de moyen procedural d’acceder au juge de la reparation. De plus, le droit civil francais se montre trop rigide pour permettre l’indemnisation d’un prejudice economique aussi complexe que le prejudice concurrentiel. Pour alimenter sa reflexion a ce sujet, le legislateur francais s’est souvent tourne vers les modeles canadien et quebecois pour reformer son droit civil bicentenaire. En effet, le droit civil quebecois se montre particulierement souple dans les litiges lies au droit de la concurrence. De plus, la Loi sur la concurrence canadienne offre un droit a reparation adapte aux contraintes des victimes de pratiques anticoncurrentielles. L’auteur a ainsi cherche a comprendre comment fonctionne le mecanisme canadien de private enforcement pour evaluer si ce modele, par le truchement du droit civil quebecois, pourrait inspirer une reforme du modele civiliste francais adopte par le legislateur notamment lors de l’introduction de l’action de groupe. L’analyse se situe principalement en droit civil pour permettre une lecture de l’action privee qui s’eloigne des stereotypes classiques tires de l’experience americaine dans ce domaine. L’objectif ultime de cette comparaison est de rendre effectif le recours prive des entreprises et des consommateurs en droits francais et canadien a la suite d’un prejudice decoulant d’une violation du droit des pratiques anticoncurrentielles.

Abstract: textIn this thesis, insights of the law and economics literature were collected in order to develop the features of an optimal group litigation concerning the deterrence of European Competition Law violation and these were then compared to the proposals of the European Commission in the White Paper on damages actions. Chapter 1 and 2 provide the basis for the analysis conducted in remainder of this thesis. Chapter 1 provides an overview of the enforcement of European Competition law including the rationale of European Competition Law, the debate about private versus public enforcement in general, and the discussed legal changes to enhance private enforcement. Chapter 2 provides the economic and legal framework used to analyse the efficiency of group litigation mechanisms with regard to deterrence of competition law infringements. This structure is mainly based on economic insights and knowledge developed in the Law and Economics literature. Such an economics based approach entails a choice as to the goal to be pursued by private enforcement to be that of deterrence of unlawful conduct, in this specific case, the (inefficient) breach of competition law and the focus on total welfare. Therefore the insights of the theories on optimal deterrence are applied to the setting of private enforcement of competition law. Using the economic framework laid out in Chapters 1 and 2, in Chapter 3 turns to two necessarily slightly abstract forms of existing group litigation mechanisms, i.e.. collective actions and representative actions. These different actions were analysed with regard to their potential to achieve deterrence. Outcomes resulting from an initial analysis showed that the optimal group litigation mechanisms from the point of view of society at large (total welfare approach), would be a stand-alone action brought in the form of a mandatory group litigation, including all losses caused to society at large. The main arguments for that outcome are that to reach optimal deterrence, the penalty imposed on the infringer, in the form of damages to be paid, should be based on total harm caused to society, and therefore include all losses caused to all different members of society. This leads to the conclusion that the optimal group litigation should incorporate all individual losses in one proceeding, to be (cost-) efficient. Therefore, and because free riding problems can be eliminated, the optimal system would be a mandatory one, rather than opt-in or opt-out mechanism. It is shown that stand alone actions are to be preferred over follow-on actions from an efficient deterrence perspective, as only the former increase the rate of detection. This is important as it is increased detection that decreases the amount of the optimal sanction, which otherwise may be prohibitively large, and also when the availability bias leads to a greater value of the risk of detection compared to an increase in the damage awards, i.e. the imposed monetary penalties. Follow-on actions merely contribute to the amount of sanction faced by the infringer when public fines are too low to deter. However, it would be more (cost) efficient in such cases, where the public fine is too low, that the public fine be instead raised sufficiently. Therefore, the analysis continued focusing on mandatory stand-alone group actions. In the analysis of the two abstract forms of existing group litigation systems of collective and representative actions, problems and obstacles to private litigation for damages specific to certain types of breaches of European Competition Law were taken into account. The analysis suggests that neither collective nor representative actions will be the optimal group litigation mechanism in the sense of the best group litigation to reach the goal of efficient deterrence, unless the existing systems were to be substantially altered. Problems specific to collective actions, such as the necessity of one of the victims (lead plaintiff) to become active on behalf of himself and other victims of the infringement, render that particular system of bundling similar claims into one procedure less efficient. This is especially so in those cases where the information asymmetry on the side of the victims is large. One way to reduce such problems would be to motivate the lawyer representing the group of victims to become the actual driving force and the active party. However, as the analysis shows, problems and large inefficiencies occur when the collective action is not adequately and explicitly designed to have a lead lawyer, rather than a lead plaintiff. Similar outcomes result in the analysis of representative actions brought by associations on behalf of the victims. One particular necessity crystallised out of this analysis: the incentives given to the acting agent need to be adequately taken into account and designed in any form of group litigation. In cases where typically individual victims (such as end consumers) will not be the acting agent themselves, this insight has large implications for other goals which one may pursue, such as complete compensation of individual losses of these victims. This important insight is the corner stone of the idea of a market based approach to private enforcement, where agents compete with each other for detection and litigation of competition law infringements. As has been shown, such a market may heal many of the problems and inefficiencies that would remain in the two stylised forms of existing mechanisms described before. Such a market with competing enforcement agents would, however, face similar problems as those unearthed in the discussion of the economic analysis of competition in research and development. Both are characterised by large upfront investments that are necessary in order to gain profits that are highly uncertain. Therefore, under a first-come, first-served mechanism, there will be many resources wasted in the competitive process. Solutions to these market failures presented included the use of auctions for the right to litigate after detection of a certain infringement has taken place. This solution would not only increase the efficiency of the market idea in general, but also those of other systems of collective actions or representative actions when characterised by strong competition and races to the courts. After the features of the theoretical optimal system of group litigation with regard to deterrence were determined, the insights gained are used in Chapter 4 to compare and discuss the efficiency of the Commission’s proposal against this benchmark. The analysis shows that the proposed mechanisms do not reach the potential efficiency of the theoretical optimal solution developed in the previous Chapter. This result was no surprise, as the starting point or goal to be achieved though private enforcement in the Commission’s point of view, is presumably not deterrence - at least not the dominating one. Moreover, while the theoretical analysis in Chapter 3 focuses on stand-alone actions, the Commission wants to encourage follow-on actions in addition to stand-alone actions. The examination nevertheless highlights the inefficiencies, necessary trade-offs, and some of the costs imposed on society should those particular mechanisms suggested by the Commission be chosen. These considerations are also relevant for follow-on actions and for achieving other goals. A discussion of the goals other than deterrence also shows that even these goals may not be achieved to the highest degree possible. After all, the choices made by the Commission can be interpreted to stem from compromises made in the issues (e.g. the goals) themselves and in the political arena (e.g. taking harmonisation and implementation costs into account). The fifth Chapter illustrates the basic features of three selected legal systems, i.e., the group litigation mechanisms as developed in the US, UK and Germany. These are then compared to the features of the theoretical optimal solution developed in Chapter 3. As these existing mechanisms deviate substantially from the theoretical benchmark, they are unlikely to achieve the optimal deterrence results the optimal group litigation mechanisms are argued to achieve. However, the stark differences between the developed systems and their experienced effectiveness and difficulties provide some partial support to the insights gained in the theoretical part of Chapter 3. In very broad terms, it seems that less attention was paid to the question of who would actually have incentives to become active under the current systems, and which problems might occur and what possible regulative remedies to these might be enacted, the less effective the systems turned out to be. This outcome would also hold, if the goal to be achieved would be anything other than deterrence, for example corrective justice as compensation of individual victims. If the incentives structures that the economic analysis highlights are neglected neither deterrence not compensation can be achieved in any efficient or even just effective way.

Abstract: El principal objetivo de esta tesis es determinar que medidas serian necesarias para garantizar una aplicacion privada eficaz de las normas de defensa de la competencia en la Union Europea y realizar propuestas sobre su forma de ejecucion. En el estado actual de la legislacion i.e., con anterioridad a la trasposicion de la Directiva, las normas procesales nacionales en esta materia son muy diversas, y tales divergencias procesales incrementan el riesgode diferencias de trato y generan inseguridad juridica en la medida en que resulta mas dificil, tanto para los perjudicados como para los demandados, prdecir cual va a ser el resultado de un proceso. Ademas, el reducido numero de acciones indemnizatorias interpuestas hasta la fecha en la Union Europea, en particular por consumidores, sugiere que el sistema actual de aplicacion privada no esta funcionando de modo satisfactorio.si, el primer objetivo de esta tesis es determinar las normas procesales que deben ser objeto de modificacion para subsanar el actual deficit de aplicacion privada de las normas de defensa de la competencia. Por tanto, la primera parte de la tesis se dirige al analisis de los obstaculos a la aplicacion privada que existen actualmente en la Union Europea en general y en el Reino Unido, Alemania, Francia, Espana, Suecia y Finlandia en particular.La presente tesis tambien determina que aunque el objetivo primordial de la aplicacion privada deberia ser la reparacion del dano derivado de las conductas anticompetitivas, cualquier obligacion de indemnizacion generara potencialmente efectos disuasorios para las empresas. Tanto la aplicacion publica como privada son por tanto necesarias para asegurar el cumplimiento de las normas de defensa de la competencia.El segundo objetivo es analizar los recientes instrumentos legislativos europeos dirigidos a potenciar la aplicacion privada: la Directiva sobre Accione de Indemnizacion por Danos en materia de Defensa de la Competencia y la Recomendacion sobre Mecanismos de Recurso Colectivo. El proposito de esta analisis es demostrar los defectos y las limitaciones de la reforma y determinar los aspectos adicionales que requeririan de armonizacion o aproximacion legislativa.Dado que la aplicacion privada de las normas de defensa de la competencia tiene un papel notablemente mas relevante en Estados Unidos y esta igualmente aumentado en Canada, el tercer objetivo de esta tesis es examinar especificamente que lecciones pueden extraerse de las experiencias norteamericana y canadiense en materia de aplicacion privada del derecho de defensa de la competencia. En este ambito se hara enfasis en el papel de las demandas colectivas (class actions), los pactos de cuota litis y la politica en materia de acceso a pruebas discovery a efectos del reforzamiento de la aplicacion privada, en la medida en que todas ellas son caracteristicas distintivas del modelo vigente en los Estados Unidos, asi como en Canada.El ultimo objetivo de esta tesis es determinar cual es el modo optimo de potenciar la aplicacion privada. En este sentido, la ultima parte de esta tesis se centra en examinar que aspectos adicionales a los incluidos en la Directiva deben regularse de modo uniforme y como debe llevarse a efecto su amortizacion. Concluye que las demandas colectivas (class actions) y otro tipo de herramientas procesales existentes en los ordenamientos estadounidenses y canadiense para potenciar la aplicacion privada son necesarias para mejorar el derecho a compensacion sobre todo por consumidores aunque deben ser adaptadas a los ordenamientos y tradiciones juridicas europeos.La tesis demuestra que la nueva Directiva sobre acciones de Indemnizacion por Danos en materia de Defensa de la Competencia ha sido una oportunidad perdida de mejorar el acceso a la justicia en los supuestos de infraccion del Derecho de defensa de la competencia de la Union Europea y que las reglas comunes porpuestas no seran suficientes para asegurar una aplicacion efectiva

Abstract: I took the distance learning Postgraduate Diploma and MA at King’s College London during the academic years 2007/2009. My dissertation considered the interaction between public and private enforcement of the competition rules, and in particular the implications for private actions of alternative enforcement procedures – i.e. leniency programmes, commitments and settlement procedures. In the drafting of what would become Directive 2014/104/EU on antitrust damages actions, this issue raised complex policy problems: the European Commission was, in principle, in favour of more private claims for damages, and did not want a system of settlements to render private actions more difficult. In 2009, this dissertation took part to the debate: it surveyed a range of evidential, procedural and substantive issues, and expressed opinions on how best to reconcile the settlements procedure and the position of claimants in civil litigation. In the first part, the dissertation analyses the context in which the studied interaction materializes by: underlining the main goals and characteristics of the three alternative enforcement procedures; emphasizing briefly the main goals and current issues of damages actions; presenting the key recommendations of the Commission White Paper; and assessing the tension between alternative enforcement procedures and . In the second part, the dissertation analyses and assesses the solutions offered by the Commission White Paper to find a balance between alternative enforcement procedures and private enforcement by: identifying the theoretical and practical obstacles to damages actions that alternative enforcement procedures imply; and assessing, in relation with alternative enforcement procedures, the solutions identified in the Commission White Paper. The proposed solutions were often insufficient to remove obstacles to the development of damages actions This research was presented and discussed with DG COMP and to university professors. Member States needed to implement Directive 2014/104/EU on antitrust damages actions in their legal systems by 27 December 2016. In 2017, the impact of alternative enforcement procedures on damages actions is still being discussed and I have been asked to publish this dissertation to help feeding the reflexion of competition law specialists. I would be delighted if such was the case.

Abstract: La regulation de la concurrence est dualiste en France et au Canada. D’un cote, des autorites publiques de regulation encadrent le marche et sanctionnent le cas echeant les pratiques contraires aux dispositions legislatives en vigueur, et, d’un autre cote, les victimes de pratiques anticoncurrentielles, c'est-a-dire les consommateurs et les entreprises, peuvent intenter des poursuites privees sur le fondement d’une action en responsabilite civile afin d’obtenir la reparation du prejudice concurrentiel subi. Il s’agit respectivement de l’action publique et de l’action privee en matiere de concurrence, qualifiees aussi de public enforcement et de private enforcement du droit de la concurrence. Cependant, dans l’Union europeenne, et en France particulierement, le prejudice concurrentiel reste sans reparation effective. En effet, en France, les consommateurs n’avaient pas, jusqu’a l’adoption de l’action de groupe, de moyen procedural d’acceder au juge de la reparation. De plus, le droit civil francais se montre trop rigide pour permettre l’indemnisation d’un prejudice economique aussi complexe que le prejudice concurrentiel. Pour alimenter sa reflexion a ce sujet, le legislateur francais s’est souvent tourne vers les modeles canadien et quebecois pour reformer son droit civil bicentenaire. En effet, le droit civil quebecois se montre particulierement souple dans les litiges lies au droit de la concurrence. De plus, la Loi sur la concurrence canadienne offre un droit a reparation adapte aux contraintes des victimes de pratiques anticoncurrentielles. L’auteur a ainsi cherche a comprendre comment fonctionne le mecanisme canadien de private enforcement pour evaluer si ce modele, par le truchement du droit civil quebecois, pourrait inspirer une reforme du modele civiliste francais adopte par le legislateur notamment lors de l’introduction de l’action de groupe. L’analyse se situe principalement en droit civil pour permettre une lecture de l’action privee qui s’eloigne des stereotypes classiques tires de l’experience americaine dans ce domaine. L’objectif ultime de cette comparaison est de rendre effectif le recours prive des entreprises et des consommateurs en droits francais et canadien a la suite d’un prejudice decoulant d’une violation du droit des pratiques anticoncurrentielles.

Abstract: textIn this thesis, insights of the law and economics literature were collected in order to develop the features of an optimal group litigation concerning the deterrence of European Competition Law violation and these were then compared to the proposals of the European Commission in the White Paper on damages actions. Chapter 1 and 2 provide the basis for the analysis conducted in remainder of this thesis. Chapter 1 provides an overview of the enforcement of European Competition law including the rationale of European Competition Law, the debate about private versus public enforcement in general, and the discussed legal changes to enhance private enforcement. Chapter 2 provides the economic and legal framework used to analyse the efficiency of group litigation mechanisms with regard to deterrence of competition law infringements. This structure is mainly based on economic insights and knowledge developed in the Law and Economics literature. Such an economics based approach entails a choice as to the goal to be pursued by private enforcement to be that of deterrence of unlawful conduct, in this specific case, the (inefficient) breach of competition law and the focus on total welfare. Therefore the insights of the theories on optimal deterrence are applied to the setting of private enforcement of competition law. Using the economic framework laid out in Chapters 1 and 2, in Chapter 3 turns to two necessarily slightly abstract forms of existing group litigation mechanisms, i.e.. collective actions and representative actions. These different actions were analysed with regard to their potential to achieve deterrence. Outcomes resulting from an initial analysis showed that the optimal group litigation mechanisms from the point of view of society at large (total welfare approach), would be a stand-alone action brought in the form of a mandatory group litigation, including all losses caused to society at large. The main arguments for that outcome are that to reach optimal deterrence, the penalty imposed on the infringer, in the form of damages to be paid, should be based on total harm caused to society, and therefore include all losses caused to all different members of society. This leads to the conclusion that the optimal group litigation should incorporate all individual losses in one proceeding, to be (cost-) efficient. Therefore, and because free riding problems can be eliminated, the optimal system would be a mandatory one, rather than opt-in or opt-out mechanism. It is shown that stand alone actions are to be preferred over follow-on actions from an efficient deterrence perspective, as only the former increase the rate of detection. This is important as it is increased detection that decreases the amount of the optimal sanction, which otherwise may be prohibitively large, and also when the availability bias leads to a greater value of the risk of detection compared to an increase in the damage awards, i.e. the imposed monetary penalties. Follow-on actions merely contribute to the amount of sanction faced by the infringer when public fines are too low to deter. However, it would be more (cost) efficient in such cases, where the public fine is too low, that the public fine be instead raised sufficiently. Therefore, the analysis continued focusing on mandatory stand-alone group actions. In the analysis of the two abstract forms of existing group litigation systems of collective and representative actions, problems and obstacles to private litigation for damages specific to certain types of breaches of European Competition Law were taken into account. The analysis suggests that neither collective nor representative actions will be the optimal group litigation mechanism in the sense of the best group litigation to reach the goal of efficient deterrence, unless the existing systems were to be substantially altered. Problems specific to collective actions, such as the necessity of one of the victims (lead plaintiff) to become active on behalf of himself and other victims of the infringement, render that particular system of bundling similar claims into one procedure less efficient. This is especially so in those cases where the information asymmetry on the side of the victims is large. One way to reduce such problems would be to motivate the lawyer representing the group of victims to become the actual driving force and the active party. However, as the analysis shows, problems and large inefficiencies occur when the collective action is not adequately and explicitly designed to have a lead lawyer, rather than a lead plaintiff. Similar outcomes result in the analysis of representative actions brought by associations on behalf of the victims. One particular necessity crystallised out of this analysis: the incentives given to the acting agent need to be adequately taken into account and designed in any form of group litigation. In cases where typically individual victims (such as end consumers) will not be the acting agent themselves, this insight has large implications for other goals which one may pursue, such as complete compensation of individual losses of these victims. This important insight is the corner stone of the idea of a market based approach to private enforcement, where agents compete with each other for detection and litigation of competition law infringements. As has been shown, such a market may heal many of the problems and inefficiencies that would remain in the two stylised forms of existing mechanisms described before. Such a market with competing enforcement agents would, however, face similar problems as those unearthed in the discussion of the economic analysis of competition in research and development. Both are characterised by large upfront investments that are necessary in order to gain profits that are highly uncertain. Therefore, under a first-come, first-served mechanism, there will be many resources wasted in the competitive process. Solutions to these market failures presented included the use of auctions for the right to litigate after detection of a certain infringement has taken place. This solution would not only increase the efficiency of the market idea in general, but also those of other systems of collective actions or representative actions when characterised by strong competition and races to the courts. After the features of the theoretical optimal system of group litigation with regard to deterrence were determined, the insights gained are used in Chapter 4 to compare and discuss the efficiency of the Commission’s proposal against this benchmark. The analysis shows that the proposed mechanisms do not reach the potential efficiency of the theoretical optimal solution developed in the previous Chapter. This result was no surprise, as the starting point or goal to be achieved though private enforcement in the Commission’s point of view, is presumably not deterrence - at least not the dominating one. Moreover, while the theoretical analysis in Chapter 3 focuses on stand-alone actions, the Commission wants to encourage follow-on actions in addition to stand-alone actions. The examination nevertheless highlights the inefficiencies, necessary trade-offs, and some of the costs imposed on society should those particular mechanisms suggested by the Commission be chosen. These considerations are also relevant for follow-on actions and for achieving other goals. A discussion of the goals other than deterrence also shows that even these goals may not be achieved to the highest degree possible. After all, the choices made by the Commission can be interpreted to stem from compromises made in the issues (e.g. the goals) themselves and in the political arena (e.g. taking harmonisation and implementation costs into account). The fifth Chapter illustrates the basic features of three selected legal systems, i.e., the group litigation mechanisms as developed in the US, UK and Germany. These are then compared to the features of the theoretical optimal solution developed in Chapter 3. As these existing mechanisms deviate substantially from the theoretical benchmark, they are unlikely to achieve the optimal deterrence results the optimal group litigation mechanisms are argued to achieve. However, the stark differences between the developed systems and their experienced effectiveness and difficulties provide some partial support to the insights gained in the theoretical part of Chapter 3. In very broad terms, it seems that less attention was paid to the question of who would actually have incentives to become active under the current systems, and which problems might occur and what possible regulative remedies to these might be enacted, the less effective the systems turned out to be. This outcome would also hold, if the goal to be achieved would be anything other than deterrence, for example corrective justice as compensation of individual victims. If the incentives structures that the economic analysis highlights are neglected neither deterrence not compensation can be achieved in any efficient or even just effective way.

Abstract: El principal objetivo de esta tesis es determinar que medidas serian necesarias para garantizar una aplicacion privada eficaz de las normas de defensa de la competencia en la Union Europea y realizar propuestas sobre su forma de ejecucion. En el estado actual de la legislacion i.e., con anterioridad a la trasposicion de la Directiva, las normas procesales nacionales en esta materia son muy diversas, y tales divergencias procesales incrementan el riesgode diferencias de trato y generan inseguridad juridica en la medida en que resulta mas dificil, tanto para los perjudicados como para los demandados, prdecir cual va a ser el resultado de un proceso. Ademas, el reducido numero de acciones indemnizatorias interpuestas hasta la fecha en la Union Europea, en particular por consumidores, sugiere que el sistema actual de aplicacion privada no esta funcionando de modo satisfactorio.si, el primer objetivo de esta tesis es determinar las normas procesales que deben ser objeto de modificacion para subsanar el actual deficit de aplicacion privada de las normas de defensa de la competencia. Por tanto, la primera parte de la tesis se dirige al analisis de los obstaculos a la aplicacion privada que existen actualmente en la Union Europea en general y en el Reino Unido, Alemania, Francia, Espana, Suecia y Finlandia en particular.La presente tesis tambien determina que aunque el objetivo primordial de la aplicacion privada deberia ser la reparacion del dano derivado de las conductas anticompetitivas, cualquier obligacion de indemnizacion generara potencialmente efectos disuasorios para las empresas. Tanto la aplicacion publica como privada son por tanto necesarias para asegurar el cumplimiento de las normas de defensa de la competencia.El segundo objetivo es analizar los recientes instrumentos legislativos europeos dirigidos a potenciar la aplicacion privada: la Directiva sobre Accione de Indemnizacion por Danos en materia de Defensa de la Competencia y la Recomendacion sobre Mecanismos de Recurso Colectivo. El proposito de esta analisis es demostrar los defectos y las limitaciones de la reforma y determinar los aspectos adicionales que requeririan de armonizacion o aproximacion legislativa.Dado que la aplicacion privada de las normas de defensa de la competencia tiene un papel notablemente mas relevante en Estados Unidos y esta igualmente aumentado en Canada, el tercer objetivo de esta tesis es examinar especificamente que lecciones pueden extraerse de las experiencias norteamericana y canadiense en materia de aplicacion privada del derecho de defensa de la competencia. En este ambito se hara enfasis en el papel de las demandas colectivas (class actions), los pactos de cuota litis y la politica en materia de acceso a pruebas discovery a efectos del reforzamiento de la aplicacion privada, en la medida en que todas ellas son caracteristicas distintivas del modelo vigente en los Estados Unidos, asi como en Canada.El ultimo objetivo de esta tesis es determinar cual es el modo optimo de potenciar la aplicacion privada. En este sentido, la ultima parte de esta tesis se centra en examinar que aspectos adicionales a los incluidos en la Directiva deben regularse de modo uniforme y como debe llevarse a efecto su amortizacion. Concluye que las demandas colectivas (class actions) y otro tipo de herramientas procesales existentes en los ordenamientos estadounidenses y canadiense para potenciar la aplicacion privada son necesarias para mejorar el derecho a compensacion sobre todo por consumidores aunque deben ser adaptadas a los ordenamientos y tradiciones juridicas europeos.La tesis demuestra que la nueva Directiva sobre acciones de Indemnizacion por Danos en materia de Defensa de la Competencia ha sido una oportunidad perdida de mejorar el acceso a la justicia en los supuestos de infraccion del Derecho de defensa de la competencia de la Union Europea y que las reglas comunes porpuestas no seran suficientes para asegurar una aplicacion efectiva

Abstract: This essay sketches a new approach to ameliorating the problem of coordinating the use of private class actions and public policing to enforce American antitrust law. Achieving the optimal joint level of enforcement from any system that teams public and private law enforcers requires a coordination mechanism to assure not only that each makes the appropriately motivated and proportionate investment of resources and effort, but also that their respective contributions are properly synchronized and combined. Our proposal addresses this double-sided coordination problem. Its key elements are (i) mandatory-litigation class action; (ii) total enforcement license initially vested with the public enforcer; (iii) auction of private license to enforce class action; (iv) auction proceeds deposited with and distributed by the court for compensatory purposes; and (v) public enforcer option to buy back the private license at the winning bid price. We suggest that our approach is superior to the current practice of judicial coordination (through, for example, statutory interpretation, pre-emption, and class action prerequisites), which suffers from high information costs, and to proposals for reform that give public enforcers the option of "first refusal" or of intervening to take some control over the class action, which regulate only private enforcers.