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Journal Article•DOI•

A comment on "School choice: An experimental study" [J. Econ. Theory 127 (1) (2006) 202-231]

Caterina Calsamiglia1, Guillaume Haeringer1, Flip Klijn2•
Autonomous University of Barcelona1, Spanish National Research Council2
01 Jan 2011-Journal of Economic Theory (Academic Press)-Vol. 146, Iss: 1, pp 392-396
TL;DR: It is shown that one of the main results in Chen and Sonmez (2006, 2008) does no longer hold when the number of recombinations is sufficiently increased to obtain reliable conclusions.
About: This article is published in Journal of Economic Theory.The article was published on 2011-01-01 and is currently open access. It has received 15 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Robustness (economics).
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Citations
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Journal Article•DOI•
Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study

[...]

Guillaume Haeringer1, Caterina Calsamiglia2, Flip Klijn2•
Baruch College1, Autonomous University of Barcelona2
17 Jul 2009-Social Science Research Network
TL;DR: In this paper, a constrained list of schools is used to reduce the proportion of subjects playing a dominated strategy in a preference list, which reduces the number of subjects manipulating their preferentes.
Abstract: The literature on school choice assumes that families can submit a preference list over all the schools they want to be assigned to. However, in many real-life instances families are only allowed to submit a list containing a limited number of schools. Subjects' incentives are drastically affected, as more individuals manipulate their preferentes. Including a safety school in the constrained list explains most manipulations. Competitiveness across schools plays an important role. Constraining choices increases segregation and affects the stability and efficiency of the final allocation. Remarkably, the constraint reduces significantly the proportion of subjects playing a dominated strategy.

205 citations

Journal Article•DOI•
Blowing the whistle

[...]

Daniel A Meisel
30 Sep 2000-The Lancet

205 citations

Journal Article•DOI•
Constrained school choice: an experimental study

[...]

Caterina Calsamiglia, Guillaume Haeringer, Flip Klijn1•
Spanish National Research Council1
01 Sep 2010-The American Economic Review
TL;DR: In this paper, a trabajo publicado como articulo en American Economic Review 100(4): 1860-1874 (2010) was used for articulación.
Abstract: 31 pages, 18 tables.-- JEL classification: C72, C78, D78, I20.-- Trabajo publicado como articulo en American Economic Review 100(4): 1860-1874 (2010).-- http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.100.4.1860

165 citations

Journal Article•DOI•
Boston versus deferred acceptance in an interim setting: An experimental investigation

[...]

Clayton R. Featherstone1, Muriel Niederle2•
University of Pennsylvania1, Stanford University2
01 Nov 2016-Games and Economic Behavior
TL;DR: This work shows that even in simple environments with ample feedback and repetition, agents fail to reach non-truthtelling equilibria, and offers another way forward: implementing truth-telling as an ordinal Bayes–Nash equilibrium rather than as a dominant strategy equilibrium, showing that this weaker solution concept can allow for more efficient mechanisms in theory and in practice.

64 citations

From Boston to Chinese parallel to deferred acceptance: theory and experiments on a family of school choice mechanisms

[...]

Yan Chen, Kesten Onur
01 Jan 2013
TL;DR: The authors characterize a parametric family of application-rejection school choice mechanisms, including the Boston and deferred acceptance mechanisms as special cases, and spanning the parallel mechanisms for Chinese college admissions, the largest centralized matching in the world.
Abstract: We characterize a parametric family of application-rejection school choice mechanisms, including the Boston and Deferred Acceptance mechanisms as special cases, and spanning the parallel mechanisms for Chinese college admissions, the largest centralized matching in the world. Moving from one extreme member to the other results in systematic changes in manipulability, stability and welfare properties. Neither the ex-post dominance of the DA over the Boston equilibria, nor the ex-ante dominance of the Boston equilibria over the DA in stylized settings extends to the parallel mechanisms. In the laboratory, participants are most likely to reveal their preferences truthfully under the DA mechanism, followed by the Chinese parallel and then the Boston mechanisms. Furthermore, while the DA is significantly more stable than the Chinese parallel mechanism, which is more stable than Boston, efficiency comparisons vary across environments.

51 citations

References
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Journal Article•DOI•
School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach

[...]

Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Tayfun Sönmez
01 May 2003-The American Economic Review
TL;DR: In this article, the authors formulate the school choice problem as a mechanism design problem and analyze some of the existing school choice plans including those in Boston, Columbus, Minneapolis, and Seattle, and offer two alternative mechanisms each of which may provide a practical solution to some critical school choice issues.
Abstract: A central issue in school choice is the design of a student assignment mechanism. Education literature provides guidance for the design of such mechanisms but does not offer specific mechanisms. The flaws in the existing school choice plans result in appeals by unsatisfied parents. We formulate the school choice problem as a mechanism design problem and analyze some of the existing school choice plans including those in Boston, Columbus, Minneapolis, and Seattle. We show that these existing plans have serious shortcomings, and offer two alternative mechanisms each of which may provide a practical solution to some critical school choice issues.

1,446 citations

Journal Article•DOI•
The Boston Public School Match

[...]

Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Parag A. Pathak, Alvin E. Roth, Tayfun Sönmez
01 May 2005-The American Economic Review
TL;DR: The Boston Public Schools (BPS) system for assigning students to schools is described in this paper, where the authors describe some of the difficulties with the current assignment mechanism and some elements of the design and evaluation of possible replacement mechanisms.
Abstract: After the publication of “School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach” by Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez (2003), a Boston Globe reporter contacted us about the Boston Public Schools (BPS) system for assigning students to schools. The Globe article highlighted the difficulties that Boston’s system may give parents in strategizing about applying to schools. Briefly, Boston tries to give students their firstchoice school. But a student who fails to get her first choice may find her later choices filled by students who chose them first. So there is a risk in ranking a school first if there is a chance of not being admitted; other schools that would have been possible had they been listed first may also be filled. Valerie Edwards, then Strategic Planning Manager at BPS, and her colleague Carleton Jones invited us to a meeting in October 2003. BPS agreed to a study of their assignment system and provided us with micro-level data sets on choices and characteristics of students in the grades at which school choices are made (K, 1, 6, and 9), and school characteristics. Based on the pending results of this study, the Superintendent has asked for our advice on the design of a new assignment mechanism. This paper describes some of the difficulties with the current mechanism and some elements of the design and evaluation of possible replacement mechanisms. School choice in Boston has been partly shaped by desegregation. In 1974, Judge W. Arthur Garrity ordered busing for racial balance. In 1987, the U.S. Court of Appeals freed BPS to adopt a new, choice-based assignment plan. In 1999 BPS eliminated racial preferences in assignment and adopted the current mechanism.

580 citations

Journal Article•DOI•
School choice: an experimental study

[...]

Yan Chen1, Tayfun Sönmez2•
University of Michigan1, Koç University2
01 Mar 2006-Journal of Economic Theory
TL;DR: The results suggest that replacing the Boston mechanism with either Gale-Shapley or Top Trading Cycles mechanism might significantly improve efficiency, however, the efficiency gains are likely to be more profound when parents are educated about the incentive compatibility of these mechanisms.

350 citations

"A comment on "School choice: An exp..." refers result in this paper

  • ...We show that one of the main results in Chen and Sönmez (2006, 2008) [6,7] does no longer hold when the number of recombinations is sufficiently increased to obtain reliable conclusions....

    [...]

Journal Article•DOI•
Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study

[...]

Guillaume Haeringer1, Caterina Calsamiglia2, Flip Klijn2•
Baruch College1, Autonomous University of Barcelona2
17 Jul 2009-Social Science Research Network
TL;DR: In this paper, a constrained list of schools is used to reduce the proportion of subjects playing a dominated strategy in a preference list, which reduces the number of subjects manipulating their preferentes.
Abstract: The literature on school choice assumes that families can submit a preference list over all the schools they want to be assigned to. However, in many real-life instances families are only allowed to submit a list containing a limited number of schools. Subjects' incentives are drastically affected, as more individuals manipulate their preferentes. Including a safety school in the constrained list explains most manipulations. Competitiveness across schools plays an important role. Constraining choices increases segregation and affects the stability and efficiency of the final allocation. Remarkably, the constraint reduces significantly the proportion of subjects playing a dominated strategy.

205 citations

Journal Article•DOI•
Blowing the whistle

[...]

Daniel A Meisel
30 Sep 2000-The Lancet

205 citations

Related Papers (5)
School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach

[...]

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Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Tayfun Sönmez
The Boston Public School Match

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Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Parag A. Pathak, Alvin E. Roth, Tayfun Sönmez 
School choice: an experimental study

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01 Mar 2006-Journal of Economic Theory
Yan Chen, Tayfun Sönmez
School choice and information: An experimental study on matching mechanisms

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01 Sep 2008-Games and Economic Behavior
Joana Pais, Ágnes Pintér
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The authors show that one of the main results in Chen and Sönmez ( 2006, 2008 ) does no longer hold when the number of recombinations is sufficiently increased to obtain reliable conclusions. 

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