A Compositional Model of Consciousness Based on Consciousness-Only.

Abstract: In the search for a sound model of consciousness, we aim at introducing new concepts: closure, compositionality, biobranes and autobranes. This is important to overcome reductionism and to bring life back into the neuroscience of consciousness. Using these definitions, we conjecture that consciousness co-arises with the non-trivial composition of biological closure in the form of biobranes and autobranes: conscious processes generate closed activity at various levels and are, in turn, themselves, supported by biobranes and autobranes. This approach leads to a non-reductionist biological and simultaneously phenomenological theory of conscious experience, giving new perspectives for a science of consciousness. Future works will implement experimental definitions and computational simulations to characterize these dynamical biobranes interacting.

Abstract: Models of consciousness aim to inspire new experimental protocols and aid interpretation of empirical evidence to reveal the structure of conscious experience. Nevertheless, no current model is univocally accepted on either theoretical or empirical grounds. Moreover, a straightforward comparison is difficult for conceptual reasons. In particular, we argue that different models explicitly or implicitly subscribe to different notions of what constitutes a satisfactory explanation, use different tools in their explanatory endeavours and even aim to explain very different phenomena. We thus present a framework to compare existing models in the field with respect to what we call their ‘explanatory profiles’. We focus on the following minimal dimensions: mode of explanation, mechanisms of explanation and target of explanation. We also discuss the empirical consequences of the discussed discrepancies among models. This approach may eventually lead to identifying driving assumptions, theoretical commitments, experimental predictions and a better design of future testing experiments. Finally, our conclusion points to more integrative theoretical research, where axiomatic models may play a critical role in solving current theoretical and experimental contradictions.

Abstract: ZX-calculus is graphical language for quantum computing which usually focuses on qubits. In this paper, we generalise qubit ZX-calculus to qudit ZX-calculus in any finite dimension by introducing suitable generators, especially a carefully chosen triangle node. As a consequence we obtain a set of rewriting rules which can be seen as a direct generalisation of qubit rules, and a normal form for any qudit vectors. Based on the qudit ZX-calculi, we propose a graphical formalism called qufinite ZX-calculus as a unified framework for all qudit ZX-calculi, which is universal for finite quantum theory due to a normal form for matrix of any finite size. As a result, it would be interesting to give a fine-grained version of the diagrammatic reconstruction of finite quantum theory [Selby2021reconstructing] within the framework of qufinite ZX-calculus.

Abstract: We cast aspects of consciousness in axiomatic mathematical terms, using the graphical calculus of general process theories (a.k.a symmetric monoidal categories and Frobenius algebras therein). This calculus exploits the ontological neutrality of process theories. A toy example using the axiomatic calculus is given to show the power of this approach, recovering other aspects of conscious experience, such as external and internal subjective distinction, privacy or unreadability of personal subjective experience, and phenomenal unity, one of the main issues for scientific studies of consciousness. In fact, these features naturally arise from the compositional nature of axiomatic calculus.

Abstract: The study of the brain9s dynamical activity is opening a valuable source of assistance for the clinical diagnosis of patients with disorders of consciousness (DOC). For example, dysfunctional spread of naturalistic and synthetic stimuli has proven useful to characterize hampered consciousness. However, understanding of the mechanisms behind loss of consciousness following brain injury is still missing. Here, we study the propagation of endogenous and in-silico exogenous perturbations in patients with DOC, based upon directed and causal interactions estimated from resting-state fMRI. We found that patients with DOC suffer decreased capacity for neural propagation and responsiveness to events. Particularly, that loss of consciousness is related to the malfunctioning of two neural circuits: the posterior cortical regions failing to convey information, in conjunction with reduced broadcasting of information from subcortical, temporal, parietal and frontal regions. These results seed light on the mechanisms behind DOC, thus opening new possibilities for clinical applications.

Abstract: Consciousness is what makes the mind-body problem really intractable. Perhaps that is why current discussions of the problem give it little attention or get it obviously wrong. The recent wave of reductionist euphoria has produced several analyses of mental phenomena and mental concepts designed to explain the possibility of some variety of materialism, psychophysical identification, or reduction. But the problems dealt with are those common to this type of reduction and other types, and what makes the mind-body problem unique, and unlike the water-H2O problem or the Turing machine-IBM machine problem or the lightning-electrical discharge problem or the gene-DNA problem or the oak tree-hydrocarbon problem, is ignored.

Abstract: The reductionist hypothesis may still be a topic for controversy among philosophers, but among the great majority of active scientists I think it is accepted without question. The workings of our minds and bodies, and of all the animate or inanimate matter of which we have any detailed knowledge, are assumed to be controlled by the same set of fundamental laws, which except under certain extreme conditions we feel we know pretty well. It seems inevitable to go on uncritically to what appears at first sight to be an obvious corollary of reductionism: that if everything obeys the same fundamental laws, then the only scientists who are studying anything really fundamental are those who are working on those laws. In practice, that amounts to some astrophysicists, some elementary particle physicists, some logicians and other mathematicians, and few others. This point of view, which it is the main purpose of this article to oppose, is expressed in a rather wellknown passage by Weisskopf (1):

Abstract: This paper starts with one of Chalmers' basic points: first-hand experience is an irreducible field of phenomena. I claim there is no 'theoretical fix' or 'extra ingredient' in nature that can possibly bridge this gap. Instead, the field of conscious phenomena requires a rigorous method and an explicit pragmatics for its exploration and analysis. My proposed approach, inspired by the style of inquiry of phenomenology, I have called neurophenomenol- ogy. It seeks articulations by mutual constraints between phenomena present in experience and the correlative field of phenomena established by the cognitive sciences. It needs to expand into a widening research community in which the method is cultivated further. This paper responds to the issues raised by D.J. Chalmers (1995) by offering a research direction which is quite radical in the way in which some basic methodological principles are linked to the scientific studies of consciousness. Neuro-phenomenology is the name I am using here to designate a quest to marry modern cognitive science and a disciplined approach to human experience, thus placing myself in the lineage of the continental tradition of phenomenology. 1 My claim is that the so-called hard problem that animates these Special Issues of the Journal of Consciousness Studies can only be addressed productively by gathering a research community armed with new pragmatic tools ena- bling them to develop a science of consciousness. I will claim that no piecemeal empirical correlates, nor purely theoretical principles, will really help us at this stage. We need to turn to a systematic exploration of the only link between mind and consciousness that seems both obvious and natural: the structure of human experience itself. In what follows I open my proposal by briefly examining the current debate about consciousness in the light of Chalmers' hard problem. Next, I outline the (neuro)pheno- menological strategy. I conclude by discussing some of the main difficulties and conse- quences of this strategy.

Abstract: Preface. 1. Hemirings and semirings: definitions and examples. 2. Sets and relations with values in a semiring. 3. Building new semirings from old. 4. Some conditions on semirings. 5. Complemented elements in semirings. 6. Ideals in semirings. 7. Prime and semiprime ideals in semirings. 8. Factor semirings. 9. Morphisms of semirings. 10. Kernels of morphisms. 11. Semirings of fractions. 12. Euclidean semirings. 13. Additively-regular semirings. 14. Semimodules over semirings. 15. Factor semimodules. 16. Some constructions for semimodules. 17. Free, projective, and injective semimodules. 18. Localization of semimodules. 19. Linear algebra over a semiring. 20. Partially-ordered semirings. 21. Lattice-ordered semirings. 22. Complete semirings. 23. Complete semimodules. 24. CLO-semirings. 25. Fixed points of affine maps. References. Index of applications. Index of terminology.