Q2. What future works have the authors mentioned in the paper "A field study on cooperativeness and impatience in the tragedy of the commons" ?
For example, the fishermen could commit ( e. g., by signing a contract with an environmental agency ) to exchange their fishnets with small mesh size for fishnets with bigger mesh size in the future if a specified majority of the other fishermen were also willing to commit to this policy. This proposal takes advantage of the conditional nature of fishermen ’ s willingness to cooperate and furthermore reduces the perception of the cost of cooperation by shifting the fishnet exchange into the future.
Q3. How many of the 114 shrimpers prefer to wait for three pralines?
2461.45% are patient and prefer waiting approximately two hours until the end of the experimental session to get three pralines, while the remaining 38.55% are impatient and prefer receiving two pralines immediately.
Q4. What was the possibility of seeing the village leaders give the mineral water?
Participating fishermen also had the possibility of seeing the experimenters give the village leaders the mineral water for distribution on the next day.
Q5. What are the reasons why fishermen are less likely to use the CPR?
Economic theories of other-regarding preferences predict that individuals who exhibita higher propensity to cooperate in the public goods experiment in the laboratory (i.e. those who demonstrate cooperativeness) and those who show more patience in the time preference experiment should use fishing instruments that are less likely to exploit the CPR for the following reasons: (i) a higher current exploitation reduces other fishermen's current yield.
Q6. Why is the TPE not predictive of cooperativeness?
Because there are no intertemporal spillovers in the PGE, measured impatience in the TPE should not predict cooperativeness in the laboratory.
Q7. What is the effect of the additional control for cognitive skills on hole size?
The additional control for cognitive skills also leaves the effect of individual contribution levels and impatience on hole size largely unchanged (coefficient for cooperativeness=0.0097, p=0.028; coefficient for impatience=-0.0615, p=0.023 in model 4, for example).
Q8. What is the effect of years in profession on the size of the shrimp trap?
Years in profession is negatively related to hole size, suggesting that policies aiming at mitigating CPR exploitation should be targeted towards more experienced fishermen in particular.
Q9. How did the participants receive a code to ensure anonymity?
Participants received a code to ensure anonymity for the laboratoryThe authors selected community agglomerations that can be considered astraditional fishing villages and which were accessible by car.
Q10. How long does it take to collect objective data on shrimp traps?
As the shrimpers do not record their catch quantity or their catch composition over time, it is impossible to collect objective data on these variables over longer time periods (i.e. several months).