Abstract: HIGHLY PATHOGENIC INFLUENZA A(H5N1) IS ENdemic in avian populations in Southeast Asia, with serious outbreaks now in Africa, Europe, and the Middle East. Human cases, although rare, continue to increase, with high reported case-fatality rates. Industrialized countries place great emphasis on scientific solutions. The White House strategic plan and congressional appropriation both devote more than 90% of pandemic influenza spending to vaccines and antiviral medications. Yet, medical countermeasures, discussed in a previous JAMA Commentary, will not impede pandemic spread: experimental H5N1 vaccines may not be effective against a novel human subtype, neuraminidase inhibitors may become resistant, and medical countermeasures will be extremely scarce. This Commentary focuses on traditional public health interventions, drawing lessons from past influenza pandemics and the outbreaks of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) (TABLE). Public health strategies are difficult to evaluate. First, evidence of effectiveness is often historical or anecdotal, with few randomized trials or systematic studies. Adequate resources for population-based research are urgently needed. Second, an intervention’s effectiveness depends on the transmission pattern, which cannot be fully understood in advance. Key issues include viral shedding (infectivity during presymptomatic and postsymptomatic stages); mode and efficiency of transmission (large droplet, aerosol, contaminated hands and surfaces); incubation period; and serial interval between cases. Third, the usefulness of an intervention depends on the pandemic phase. In the pandemic alert period, surveillance, medical prophylaxis, and isolation are important tools. Yet, during a pandemic, the focus shifts to delaying spread through population-based measures. Thus, the key question is which measure, or combination of measures, works best at each stage of the pandemic? Multiple, targeted approaches are likely to be most effective but can have deep adverse consequences for the economy and civil liberties. The Public Health System: Surveillance Surveillance is the backbone of public health, providing essential data to understand the epidemic and inform the public. Surveillance strategies include rapid diagnosis, screening, reporting, case contact investigations, and monitoring trends. Currently, influenza A(H5N1) is not reportable in the United States, which requires reform of state law. The US public health infrastructure is deficient in laboratories, workforce, and data systems. Congress recently appropriated only $350 million to upgrade state and local capacity— approximately 9% of a total of $3.8 billion for pandemic influenza. Furthermore, this limited funding will be significantly eroded by a $105 million cut in federal support for state public health and an unfunded mandate for states to purchase antiviral drugs. The new international health regulations (IHR) require countries to develop core public health capacities to detect, assess, and notify the World Health Organization (WHO) of health emergencies with international significance. The mandate, however, is vacant without adequate resources for poor countries, which lack the capacity for human or animal surveillance and containment of outbreaks. Recently, donor countries pledged $1.9 billion to meet the costs estimated by the World Bank to contain avian influenza. Surveillance poses privacy risks as government collects sensitive health information from patients, travelers, and other vulnerable populations. The IHR require states to keep data “confidential and processed anonymously as required by national law.” The United States and the European Union have data protection statutes, but both make exceptions for surveillance. The United States and other countries should enact public health information privacy laws to prohibit wrongful disclosures—for example, to employers, insurers, and immigration or criminal justice authorities.