A key management scheme for wireless sensor networks using deployment knowledge
07 Mar 2004-Vol. 1, pp 586-597
TL;DR: It is shown that the performance of sensor networks can be substantially improved with the use of the proposed random key pre-distribution scheme, which exploits deployment knowledge and avoids unnecessary key assignments.
Abstract: To achieve security in wireless sensor networks, it is important to he able to encrypt messages sent among sensor nodes. Keys for encryption purposes must he agreed upon by communicating nodes. Due to resource constraints, achieving such key agreement in wireless sensor networks is nontrivial. Many key agreement schemes used in general networks, such as Diffie-Hellman and public-key based schemes, are not suitable for wireless sensor networks. Pre-distribution of secret keys for all pairs of nodes is not viable due to the large amount of memory used when the network size is large. Recently, a random key pre-distribution scheme and its improvements have been proposed. A common assumption made by these random key pre-distribution schemes is that no deployment knowledge is available. Noticing that in many practical scenarios, certain deployment knowledge may be available a priori, we propose a novel random key pre-distribution scheme that exploits deployment knowledge and avoids unnecessary key assignments. We show that the performance (including connectivity, memory usage, and network resilience against node capture) of sensor networks can he substantially improved with the use of our proposed scheme. The scheme and its detailed performance evaluation are presented in this paper.
Citations
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TL;DR: Some of the major results in random graphs and some of the more challenging open problems are reviewed, including those related to the WWW.
Abstract: We will review some of the major results in random graphs and some of the more challenging open problems. We will cover algorithmic and structural questions. We will touch on newer models, including those related to the WWW.
7,116 citations
27 Oct 2003
TL;DR: This paper proposes a new key pre-distribution scheme, which substantially improves the resilience of the network compared to the existing schemes, and exhibits a nice threshold property: when the number of compromised nodes is less than the threshold, the probability that any nodes other than these compromised nodes are affected is close to zero.
Abstract: To achieve security in wireless sensor networks, it is important to be able to encrypt and authenticate messages sent among sensor nodes. Keys for encryption and authentication purposes must be agreed upon by communicating nodes. Due to resource constraints, achieving such key agreement in wireless sensor networks is non-trivial. Many key agreement schemes used in general networks, such as Diffie-Hellman and public-key based schemes, are not suitable for wireless sensor networks. Pre-distribution of secret keys for all pairs of nodes is not viable due to the large amount of memory used when the network size is large. To solve the key pre-distribution problem, two elegant key pre-distribution approaches have been proposed recently [11, 7].In this paper, we propose a new key pre-distribution scheme, which substantially improves the resilience of the network compared to the existing schemes. Our scheme exhibits a nice threshold property: when the number of compromised nodes is less than the threshold, the probability that any nodes other than these compromised nodes is affected is close to zero. This desirable property lowers the initial payoff of smaller scale network breaches to an adversary, and makes it necessary for the adversary to attack a significant proportion of the network. We also present an in depth analysis of our scheme in terms of network resilience and associated overhead.
1,200 citations
Cites methods from "A key management scheme for wireles..."
...Du et al. proposed a method to improve the Eschenauer-Gligor scheme using ap riorideployment knowledge [ 9 ]....
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TL;DR: A new key predistribution scheme is proposed which substantially improves the resilience of the network compared to previous schemes, and an in-depth analysis of the scheme in terms of network resilience and associated overhead is given.
Abstract: To achieve security in wireless sensor networks, it is important to be able to encrypt and authenticate messages sent between sensor nodes. Before doing so, keys for performing encryption and authentication must be agreed upon by the communicating parties. Due to resource constraints, however, achieving key agreement in wireless sensor networks is nontrivial. Many key agreement schemes used in general networks, such as Diffie-Hellman and other public-key based schemes, are not suitable for wireless sensor networks due to the limited computational abilities of the sensor nodes. Predistribution of secret keys for all pairs of nodes is not viable due to the large amount of memory this requires when the network size is large.In this paper, we provide a framework in which to study the security of key predistribution schemes, propose a new key predistribution scheme which substantially improves the resilience of the network compared to previous schemes, and give an in-depth analysis of our scheme in terms of network resilience and associated overhead. Our scheme exhibits a nice threshold property: when the number of compromised nodes is less than the threshold, the probability that communications between any additional nodes are compromised is close to zero. This desirable property lowers the initial payoff of smaller-scale network breaches to an adversary, and makes it necessary for the adversary to attack a large fraction of the network before it can achieve any significant gain.
1,123 citations
27 Oct 2003
TL;DR: The Localized Encryption and Authentication Protocol (LEAP) as discussed by the authors is a key management protocol for sensor networks that is designed to support in-network processing, while at the same time restricting the security impact of a node compromise to the immediate network neighborhood of the compromised node.
Abstract: In this paper, we describe LEAP (Localized Encryption and Authentication Protocol), a key management protocol for sensor networks that is designed to support in-network processing, while at the same time restricting the security impact of a node compromise to the immediate network neighborhood of the compromised node. The design of the protocol is motivated by the observation that different types of messages exchanged between sensor nodes have different security requirements, and that a single keying mechanism is not suitable for meeting these different security requirements. LEAP supports the establishment of four types of keys for each sensor node -- an individual key shared with the base station, a pairwise key shared with another sensor node, a cluster key shared with multiple neighboring nodes, and a group key that is shared by all the nodes in the network. The protocol used for establishing and updating these keys is communication- and energy-efficient, and minimizes the involvement of the base station. LEAP also includes an efficient protocol for inter-node traffic authentication based on the use of one-way key chains. A salient feature of the authentication protocol is that it supports source authentication without precluding in-network processing and passive participation. We analyze the performance and the security of our scheme under various attack models and show our schemes are very efficient in defending against many attacks.
1,097 citations
TL;DR: The security of LEAP+ under various attack models is analyzed and it is shown that it is very effective in defending against many sophisticated attacks, such as HELLO flood attacks, node cloning attacks, and wormhole attacks.
Abstract: We describe LEAPp (Localized Encryption and Authentication Protocol), a key management protocol for sensor networks that is designed to support in-network processing, while at the same time restricting the security impact of a node compromise to the immediate network neighborhood of the compromised node. The design of the protocol is motivated by the observation that different types of messages exchanged between sensor nodes have different security requirements, and that a single keying mechanism is not suitable for meeting these different security requirements. LEAPp supports the establishment of four types of keys for each sensor node: an individual key shared with the base station, a pairwise key shared with another sensor node, a cluster key shared with multiple neighboring nodes, and a global key shared by all the nodes in the network. LEAPp also supports (weak) local source authentication without precluding in-network processing. Our performance analysis shows that LEAPp is very efficient in terms of computational, communication, and storage costs. We analyze the security of LEAPp under various attack models and show that LEAPp is very effective in defending against many sophisticated attacks, such as HELLO flood attacks, node cloning attacks, and wormhole attacks. A prototype implementation of LEAPp on a sensor network testbed is also described.
968 citations
Cites background from "A key management scheme for wireles..."
...In addition, deployment knowledge has been explored for pairwise key establishment [Du et al. 2004; Liu and Ning 2003b]....
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References
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TL;DR: This paper suggests ways to solve currently open problems in cryptography, and discusses how the theories of communication and computation are beginning to provide the tools to solve cryptographic problems of long standing.
Abstract: Two kinds of contemporary developments in cryptography are examined. Widening applications of teleprocessing have given rise to a need for new types of cryptographic systems, which minimize the need for secure key distribution channels and supply the equivalent of a written signature. This paper suggests ways to solve these currently open problems. It also discusses how the theories of communication and computation are beginning to provide the tools to solve cryptographic problems of long standing.
14,980 citations
"A key management scheme for wireles..." refers background in this paper
...There are three types of general key agreement schemes: trusted-server scheme, self-enforcing scheme, and key pre-distribution scheme....
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TL;DR: An encryption method is presented with the novel property that publicly revealing an encryption key does not thereby reveal the corresponding decryption key.
Abstract: An encryption method is presented with the novel property that publicly revealing an encryption key does not thereby reveal the corresponding decryption key. This has two important consequences: (1) Couriers or other secure means are not needed to transmit keys, since a message can be enciphered using an encryption key publicly revealed by the intented recipient. Only he can decipher the message, since only he knows the corresponding decryption key. (2) A message can be “signed” using a privately held decryption key. Anyone can verify this signature using the corresponding publicly revealed encryption key. Signatures cannot be forged, and a signer cannot later deny the validity of his signature. This has obvious applications in “electronic mail” and “electronic funds transfer” systems. A message is encrypted by representing it as a number M, raising M to a publicly specified power e, and then taking the remainder when the result is divided by the publicly specified product, n, of two large secret primer numbers p and q. Decryption is similar; only a different, secret, power d is used, where e * d ≡ 1(mod (p - 1) * (q - 1)). The security of the system rests in part on the difficulty of factoring the published divisor, n.
14,659 citations
TL;DR: The current state of the art of sensor networks is captured in this article, where solutions are discussed under their related protocol stack layer sections.
Abstract: The advancement in wireless communications and electronics has enabled the development of low-cost sensor networks. The sensor networks can be used for various application areas (e.g., health, military, home). For different application areas, there are different technical issues that researchers are currently resolving. The current state of the art of sensor networks is captured in this article, where solutions are discussed under their related protocol stack layer sections. This article also points out the open research issues and intends to spark new interests and developments in this field.
14,048 citations
"A key management scheme for wireles..." refers background in this paper
...I. INTRODUCTION Recent advances in electronic and computer technologies have paved the way for the proliferation of wireless sensor networks (WSN)....
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TL;DR: Some of the major results in random graphs and some of the more challenging open problems are reviewed, including those related to the WWW.
Abstract: We will review some of the major results in random graphs and some of the more challenging open problems. We will cover algorithmic and structural questions. We will touch on newer models, including those related to the WWW.
7,116 citations
"A key management scheme for wireles..." refers methods in this paper
...When node distribution and key sharing are uniform, global connectivity can be estimated using the local connectivity and other network parameters using Erd ős random graph theorem [23], just like what has been done in [9], [10]....
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18 Nov 2002
TL;DR: A key-management scheme designed to satisfy both operational and security requirements of DSNs is presented, which relies on probabilistic key sharing among the nodes of a random graph and uses simple protocols for shared-key discovery and path-key establishment, and for key revocation, re-keying, and incremental addition of nodes.
Abstract: Distributed Sensor Networks (DSNs) are ad-hoc mobile networks that include sensor nodes with limited computation and communication capabilities. DSNs are dynamic in the sense that they allow addition and deletion of sensor nodes after deployment to grow the network or replace failing and unreliable nodes. DSNs may be deployed in hostile areas where communication is monitored and nodes are subject to capture and surreptitious use by an adversary. Hence DSNs require cryptographic protection of communications, sensor-capture detection, key revocation and sensor disabling. In this paper, we present a key-management scheme designed to satisfy both operational and security requirements of DSNs. The scheme includes selective distribution and revocation of keys to sensor nodes as well as node re-keying without substantial computation and communication capabilities. It relies on probabilistic key sharing among the nodes of a random graph and uses simple protocols for shared-key discovery and path-key establishment, and for key revocation, re-keying, and incremental addition of nodes. The security and network connectivity characteristics supported by the key-management scheme are discussed and simulation experiments presented.
3,900 citations
"A key management scheme for wireles..." refers background or methods in this paper
...The Eschenauer-Gligor scheme [9] have been described earlier in this section....
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...Another key pre-distribution scheme is to let each sensor carry N − 1 secret pairwise keys, each of which is known only to this sensor and one of the other N−1 sensors (assuming N is the total number of sensors)....
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...We will show how this knowledge can help improve the random key pre-distribution scheme proposed by Eschenauer and Gligor in [9]....
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...In this paper, we exploit deployment knowledge in the random key pre-distribution scheme [9], such that the probability p can be maximized while the other performance metrics (such as security and memory usage) are not degraded....
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...With this general model, the existing key pre-distribution schemes for sensor networks are special cases: they all assume that fi(x, y) = 1XY for x ∈ [0,X], y ∈ [0, Y ] and 1 ≤ i ≤ N , i.e., all sensor nodes are uniformly distributed over the whole deployment region....
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