scispace - formally typeset

Journal ArticleDOI

A Legal History of the EU’s International Investment Policy

28 Sep 2016-The journal of world investment and trade (Brill)-Vol. 17, Iss: 5, pp 743-772
Topics: European union (62%), European integration (58%), International law (55%), Treaty (54%), Entrepreneurship (51%)

Summary (4 min read)

1. Introduction

  • The entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 2009 brought the regulation of foreign direct investment (FDI) under the scope of the Common Commercial Policy (CCP).
  • This article traces these debates and the evolution of the EU’s legal competences in international investment policy-making from the Spaak Report (1956) until the Treaty of Lisbon (2009) in order to explain how and why the EU acquired the exclusive competence over FDI regulation.
  • The analysis focuses on four factors, which are likely to have shaped the EU’s competences in international 1.
  • The article intends to make a threefold contribution.
  • Finally, it shows that business may be less of driver of international investment policy-making than conventionally thought.

2. First Steps – The EU and International Investment Regulation from the 1950s to the 1980s

  • It was only in the 1980s that international investment became an important economic phenomenon.
  • Hence, it was only at that point that intense policy debates on the role and competences of the EU and the Member States in this domain started.
  • It is, however, worth mentioning that European policymakers touched twice on this issue in the early years of European Integration when preparing the Treaty of Rome and in discussions on Opinion 1/75 on the need to harmonise Member States’ export policies.

2.1 The Treaty of Rome

  • The Treaty of Rome did not provide the EU with legal competences in the regulation of international investment flows.
  • The report cautioned that the liberalisation of capital movements among the Member States would, however, require the establishment of a common external capital regime dealing with extra-EU 2 Comité intergouvernemental créé par la conférence de Messine, MAE 120 f/56, 1956, <http://www.unizar.es/euroconstitucion/library/historic%20documents/Rome/preparation/Spaak%20report%20fr .pdf.> accessed on 4 June 2016.
  • The governments of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg and the Netherlands convened between June 1956 and March 1957 to draft the Treaty of Rome.
  • As explained in Section 3.2, it was only with the demise of Keynesianism and the emergence of the neoliberal paradigm in the 1980s that the Member States started advancing the free movement of capital within the Common Market.

2.2 Opinion 1/75 – the Commission Pushes for a European BIT Program

  • The EU’s role in the regulation of international investment policy became again the subject of debates in the 1970s.
  • In late 1972 and 1975, the Commission published two draft regulations, which sought to establish a European export policy as an integral part of the CCP.6.
  • The investment guarantees should insure European investors against non-commercial investment risks in third countries.
  • The EU was entitled to harmonise national policies, but did not hold the necessary competences to become a proper actor in this domain.

3. The Treaty of Maastricht

  • Lasting in-depth debates on the EU’s competences in international investment policy began with the Uruguay Round in the GATT and the IGC on the Maastricht Treaty.
  • The Maastricht IGC touched on the EU’s legal competences in international investment policy in the context of the negotiations on the Treaty chapters on the CCP and the free movement of capital.
  • The Member States convened for the IGC on the Treaty of Maastricht between December 1991 and February 1992.
  • Hence, the scope of the CCP – as intermediary between the Single Market and the GATT regime – had to evolve in line with the agenda of GATT negotiations.
  • The consecutively discussed draft treaties illustrate the Member States’ opposition to the Commission’s proposal and in particular to an extension of the CCP to international investment regulation.

3.2 Competence by Spill-Over – A Common External Capital Regime and Investment Market

  • Access The Treaty of Maastricht did not reform the CCP.
  • The Treaty of Maastricht, however, established a common external capital regime governing capital flows between the Member State and third countries.
  • As part of its Single Market Program, it managed to convince the Member States to enact the milestone directive 88/361/EEC 18 in 1988, which instantaneously liberalised all capital movements within the Single Market.
  • While it had not been the intention of the Member States, the creation of an external capital regime inevitably gave the EU a role in regulating investment market access.

4. Court Battles over the Scope of the Common Commercial Policy

  • During the IGC on the Maastricht Treaty, the Member States had brushed off the Commission’s attempt to ‘clarify’ the allegedly highly comprehensive scope of the CCP.
  • As the following section shows, the Commission remained determined to have the Member States recognise the EU’s exclusive competence under the CCP to regulate all new trade issues of the Uruguay Round, including international investment.
  • The Commission sought to enforce its views through legal review in Opinions 1/94 and 2/92.
  • The Commission’s strategic recourse to the CJEU was, however, only little successful as the Court was unwilling to override the opposition of the Member States.

4.1 Opinion 1/94 – The Commission Seeks to Revisit the Maastricht Failure

  • Opinion 1/9422 was, in essence, a continuation of the IGC debates on the CCP.
  • The WTO Agreement and its annexes covered investment liberalisation (GATS) and post-establishment treatment (GATS, TRIMs & TRIPs Agreements), which accordingly had to fall under exclusive Union competence.
  • Free trade agreements (FTAs), moreover, gradually came to include ambitious investment chapters since the 1990s.
  • Community …The Community was to be exclusively represented by the Commission in its relations with non-member countries and international organizations and at international conferences ….
  • The CJEU ruling did not examine in detail the Union’s competences in international investment policy, but it advanced a literal, narrow interpretation of the CCP.

4.2 Opinion 2/92 – The Commission Claims Competence over Post-Establishment Treatment

  • The Commission and the Member States disagreed over the competence basis for the EU’s adhesion to the Third Revised Decision.30 27 CJEU (n 22) I-15306.
  • Since the main purpose of the CCP arguably was to ensure the effective international representation of European interests and the Single Market at the international level, the scope of the CCP had to evolve in line with trade-related negotiations in the GATT or OECD.
  • Their submissions complement in many regards missing information on detailed Member State positions from the IGC on the Maastricht Treaty.
  • Second, it found that the Third Revised Decision was a measure affecting intra-EU trade and investment as regards the participation of foreign-owned enterprises in trade and investment within the internal market.

5. The Treaty of Amsterdam

  • The debates on the scope of the EU’s legal competences in international investment policy continued in the IGC on the so-called Treaty of Amsterdam.
  • The Commission problematized once again the EU’s legal competences in foreign economic relations, in general, and in international investment policy, in particular.
  • The Member States possessed the necessary legal competences to negotiate NAFTA-like state-of-theart international investment agreements covering investment liberalisation, post-establishment treatment and protection.
  • The Member States showed only marginal interest in a reform of the CCP during the IGC debates in 1996 and early 1997.
  • Drawing on the above-examined Opinions 1/94 and 2/92, one may safely conclude that most Member States met the Commission’s proposal to extend the scope of the CCP to investment regulation with considerable hesitation.

6. The Treaty of Nice

  • But despite the Member States’ opposition to extend the EU’s competence in the realm of international investment regulation, the Treaty of Nice, nevertheless, provided the EU with first exclusive legal competences under the CCP to regulate certain aspects of international investment activities.
  • Soon after the conclusion of the IGC on the Treaty of Nice, academics46 started discussing whether the notion of trade in services in the revised Treaty provisions was congruent with the notion of trade in services under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).
  • 43 Conference of the representatives of the governments of the Member States, ‘Progress Report on the Intergovernmental Conference on Institutional Reform (CONFER 4790/00)’ 2000, 39-42.

7. The Treaty of Lisbon

  • The Treaty of Nice, much like the Treaty of Amsterdam, was considered a failure.
  • It decided to use the so-called ‘Convention method’ to revise the European Treaties.
  • As the following Section demonstrates, the procedural particularities of the Convention method decisively facilitated the Commission’s long-standing policy entrepreneurship to extend the CCP to international investment regulation.
  • It then assesses how the Member States unsuccessfully opposed these developments and how European business was divided over the merits of a EU international investment policy.

7.1 Commission Entrepreneurship in the Open and Behind the Scenes of the Convention

  • The Praesidium proposed in its draft CCP articles to extend Union competences and qualified majority voting to the regulation of ‘FDI’.
  • 2 The Member State Delegates Seek the Deletion of the ‘FDI’ Reference Following the drafting exercise of the Praesidium, the delegates of the Convention reconvened for plenary sessions to discuss the Praesidium’s draft text of the ‘external action’ chapter.
  • The large number of amendments on the ‘external action’ chapter overwhelmed the Praesidium.

7.3 Business Preferences – Ambivalent and Divided

  • European business seemed generally little interested in the debates on a reform of the CCP.
  • Many national member federations seemed much less interested and partly even opposed 58 Interview with Convention participant, Brussels, 12 October 2011. 59 ibid. 60 Union des Industries de la Communauté Européenne , ‘Commission White Paper on European Governance - position’ 2002, 6. the proposed extension of the CCP to FDI regulation.
  • The UNICE Secretariat understood that the shifting of international investment policy-making from the national to the European level would strengthen its position and influence vis-à-vis member federations.
  • 68 Interview with business representative, Brussels, 25 September 2013.

Did you find this useful? Give us your feedback

...read more

Content maybe subject to copyright    Report

Roberts Basedow
A legal history of the EU’s international
investment policy
Article (Accepted version)
(Refereed)
Original citation:
Basedow, Robert (2016) A legal history of the EU’s international investment policy. Journal of
World Investment and Trade, 17 (5). pp. 743-772. ISSN 1660-7112
DOI: 10.1163/22119000-12340011
© 2016 Koninklijke Brill NV
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/86423/
Available in LSE Research Online: January 2018
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research.
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE
Research Online website.
This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be
differences between this version and the published version. You are advised to consult the
publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it.

1
A Legal History of the EU’s International Investment Policy
Roberts Basedow
European University Institute
jrb@posteo.net
Abstract
The article traces the evolution of the legal competences of the European Union (EU) in international investment
regulation from the Spaak Report (1956) to the Lisbon Treaty (2009). It focuses on the question why and how
the EU gradually acquired legal competences in this key domain of global economic governance. The analysis
suggests that Commission entrepreneurship and spill-overs from other EU policies were the most important
factors fuelling the extension of the EU’s legal competences. The Member States, on the other hand, sought to
prevent a competence transfer. European business arguably the main stakeholder was mostly uninterested or
divided regarding the EU’s role in international investment policy. The findings have implications for our
perception of business lobbying in international investment policy and potentially for the legal interpretation and
delimitation of the EU’s new competences.
Keywords
European Union, Lisbon Treaty, European Integration, Commission entrepreneurship
1. Introduction
The entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 2009 brought the regulation of foreign
direct investment (FDI) under the scope of the Common Commercial Policy (CCP). The European
Union (EU)
1
is now exclusively competent to regulate FDI. The Member States have by and large lost
the necessary competences to pursue their own international investment policies. Hence, international
investment policy-making now takes place at the EU level. International investment policy is here
defined to encompass the regulation of investment liberalisation, post-establishment treatment
standards and investment protection through international investment agreements (IIAs). The EU’s
role and competences in international investment policy have been a controversial topic for many
decades. While the Commission persistently pushed for an extension of the EU’s role and
competences in this key domain of global economic governance since the 1970s, the Member States
have constantly sought to resist such calls.
This article traces these debates and the evolution of the EU’s legal competences in international
investment policy-making from the Spaak Report (1956) until the Treaty of Lisbon (2009) in order to
explain how and why the EU acquired the exclusive competence over FDI regulation. The analysis
focuses on four factors, which are likely to have shaped the EU’s competences in international
1
For the sake of clarity, the article refers to today’s EU and all its precursor organisations such as the European
Economic Communities or the European Communities as EU. It is not assumed that these organizations had the
same legal and political attributes as today’s EU.

2
investment policy: 1) Commission preferences, 2) Member State preferences, 3) business preferences,
and 4) spill-overs from other EU policies. It finds that policy entrepreneurship by the Commission as
well as spill-overs were the main factors shaping the EU’s legal competences in this domain. While
business was little interested in debates on the distribution of competences, the Member States mostly
opposed an extension of Union competences in this domain. This article is primarily of empirical
ambition. From a political science perspective, the findings nonetheless clearly lend support to neo-
functional and institutionalist thinking on European Integration.
The article uses analytical process tracing as its main method. It builds on archival research, secondary
literature and 42 anonymised interviews with European and national officials as well as business
representatives. The article reconstructs policy debates in the context of intergovernmental
conferences (IGCs) and proceedings in front of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) to
assess why the EU gradually acquired legal competences to regulate international investment flows.
The article intends to make a threefold contribution. First, it closes an empirical gap in the literature on
the EU’s political and legal genesis as an actor in the international investment regime. Second, the
article contributes to better delimit the exact scope of the EU’s new exclusive competences by
shedding some light on the rationale behind the competence transfer. Finally, it shows that business
may be less of driver of international investment policy-making than conventionally thought.
2. First Steps The EU and International Investment Regulation from the 1950s to the 1980s
It was only in the 1980s that international investment became an important economic phenomenon.
Hence, it was only at that point that intense policy debates on the role and competences of the EU and
the Member States in this domain started. It is, however, worth mentioning that European policy-
makers touched twice on this issue in the early years of European Integration when preparing the
Treaty of Rome and in discussions on Opinion 1/75 on the need to harmonise Member Statesexport
policies.
2.1 The Treaty of Rome
The Treaty of Rome did not provide the EU with legal competences in the regulation of international
investment flows. The preparatory debates and the so-called Spaak Report
2
of April 1956 nevertheless
touched on the EU’s role in regulating FDI flows. Intergovernmental discussions did not touch on the
EU’s role in this domain when evaluating the future CCP but the free movement of capital. According
to the Spaak Report, the envisaged Common Market should inter alia provide for the free movement
of capital. The report cautioned that the liberalisation of capital movements among the Member States
would, however, require the establishment of a common external capital regime dealing with extra-EU
2
Comité intergouvernemental créé par la conférence de Messine, MAE 120 f/56, 1956,
<http://www.unizar.es/euroconstitucion/library/historic%20documents/Rome/preparation/Spaak%20report%20fr
.pdf.> accessed on 4 June 2016.

3
capital flows including FDI. Otherwise a regulatory gap would emerge since capital could enter and
leave the Common Market through Member States with liberal capital regimes and then flow into
Member States with more protectionist capital regimes. As the Spaak Report stated:
Le… obstacle, c’est la possibilité que les capitaux passent d’un pays vers un autre, non
pour s’y investir mais pour échapper vers l’extérieur au bénéfice d’une inégalité dans la
rigueur des contrôles. La liberté de la circulation des capitaux à l’intérieur du marché
commun appelle donc dans les relations avec les pays tiers à une certaine attitude
commune qui au stade finale, aboutirait à une égale liberté ou à un dégrée de contrôle
équivalent.
3
The governments of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg and the Netherlands convened
between June 1956 and March 1957 to draft the Treaty of Rome. Despite the Spaak Report’s
recommendation to liberalise intra-EU capital movements, they adopted a cautious approach. Article
69 EEC
4
stated that the free movement of capital was only a subordinate treaty freedom. The
liberalisation of capital movements should only proceed through secondary legislation and to the
extent necessary for the functioning of the Common Market for goods and services.
5
In consequence,
the need for a common external capital regime did not arise. As explained in Section 3.2, it was only
with the demise of Keynesianism and the emergence of the neoliberal paradigm in the 1980s that the
Member States started advancing the free movement of capital within the Common Market.
Keynesianism postulated far-reaching state intervention in the economy and in particular control over
cross-border capital flows to enable governments to use monetary policy and interest rates for
macroeconomic steering. Only when policy-makers turned toward neo-liberalism in the 1980s, which
foresaw the strengthening of market mechanisms for an efficient allocation of resources within and
across economies, they showed willing to dismantle capital controls within the Common Market.
2.2 Opinion 1/75 the Commission Pushes for a European BIT Program
The EU’s role in the regulation of international investment policy became again the subject of debates
in the 1970s. In late 1972 and 1975, the Commission published two draft regulations, which sought to
establish a European export policy as an integral part of the CCP.
6
One draft regulation foresaw the
3
ibid 9394.
4
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Communities (EEC) [1957] Eur-lex 11957E.
5
Age Bakker, The Liberalization of Capital Movements in Europe - The Monetary Committee and Financial
Integration, 1958-1994 (Kluwer 1996) 42-44; Christoph Ohler, Europäische Kapital- und
Zahlungsverkehrsfreiheit: Kommentar zu den Artikeln 56 bis 60 EGV, der Geldwäscherichtlinie und
Überweisungsrichtlinie (Springer 2002) 1-3; Johan Usher, ‘Capital Movements and the Treaty on European
Union’ (1992) 12 Yearbook of European Law 3557.
6
Deutscher Bundestag, Unterrichtung durch die Bundesregierung “Vorschlag einer Verordnung (EWG) des
Rates zur Errichtung einer Europäischen Ausfuhrbank“ (Drucksache 7/4882 1976); Leif Johannsen, ‘Die

4
creation of a European investment guarantee agency. The investment guarantees should insure
European investors against non-commercial investment risks in third countries. Access to common
investment guarantees should be conditional on the existence or conclusion of bilateral investment
treaties (BITs) between the EU and the concerned third countries.
7
The Commission’s draft regulation
referred to Article 113 EEC
8
as the competence basis for the creation of the EU investment guarantee
agency and the conclusion of EU BITs.
The Member States met the draft regulations with great hesitation.
9
The Council criticised that the
harmonisation of national export policy had priority over the creation of a complementary EU policy.
The German government stressed that national export policies provided sufficient coverage to all
European investment and export projects. The German Bundestag warned that the creation of a EU
investment guarantee scheme would bear incalculable financial risks for German taxpayers. The
French government sought to protect its competences and sovereignty. The EU was entitled to
harmonise national policies, but did not hold the necessary competences to become a proper actor in
this domain. In order to force the Member States to accept its draft regulations, the Commission had
recourse to legal review in Opinion 1/75.
10
The Opinion examined and recognised the EU’s legal
competence to harmonise national export policies. The Opinion did not, however, provide a basis to
push for a European BIT program.
3. The Treaty of Maastricht
Lasting in-depth debates on the EU’s competences in international investment policy began with the
Uruguay Round in the GATT and the IGC on the Maastricht Treaty. The Maastricht IGC touched on
the EU’s legal competences in international investment policy in the context of the negotiations on the
Treaty chapters on the CCP and the free movement of capital. While the Commission was
unsuccessful in its attempt to assert competences over international investment regulation in
negotiations about the CCP, the EU accidentally acquired legal fringe competences regarding
investment liberalisation under the revised chapter on capital movements.
3.1 The Commission Fails to Update’ the Common Commercial Policy
Kompetenz der Europäischen Union für ausländische Direktinvestitionen nach dem Vertrag von Lissabon‘
(2009) 90 Beiträge zum Transnationalem Wirtschaftsrecht 5-6; Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern, Versicherung
nichtkommerzieller Risiken und die Europäische Gemeinschaft (Carl Heymanns 1977) 54-59.
7
Johannsen (n 6) 5-6; Seidl-Hohenveldern (n 6) 54-59.
8
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Communities (n 4).
9
For this and the following see Johannsen (n 6) 5-6 and Seidl-Hohenveldern (n 6) 56 -59.
10
CJEU, Opinion 1/75, Opinion of the Court of 11 November 1975 Given Pursuant to Article 228 (6) of the EEC
Treaty [1975] ECR 1355.

Citations
More filters

Book ChapterDOI
Abstract: In the context of a rising number of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) that include investment protection provisions traditionally found in bilateral investment treaties (BITs), this chapter has a double purpose. First, based on an empirical analysis of 158 post-North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) PTAs, we conclude that three categories of countries/regional economic integration organisations (REIOs) exist: those that regularly include investment chapters into their PTAs (Japan, the United States, Canada, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Australia and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM)), those that are finding their voice in international investment law and increasingly include such chapters (India, China, the European Union and Chile) and those that have an adverse position towards it (Brazil and the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR)) or defer the inclusion of such provisions to further negotiations (African Plurilaterals, Morocco and South Africa). Second, we look at the drivers behind including/excluding investment protection provisions in/from PTAs. Some drivers will be readily apparent from the data collected for the purpose of answering the first question, while other drivers will need a more detailed discussion. These drivers are: (a) the weaker party accepts/uses templates of more powerful states; (b) states/REIOs wish to pursue more comprehensive and resource-friendly negotiations; (c) states/REIOs want to achieve a more coherent application of international economic law.

9 citations


Cites background from "A Legal History of the EU’s Interna..."

  • ...32 2007 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ C 326/47 (‘TFEU’), Article 207; see Basedow 2016....

    [...]


Book
Volker Roeben1
25 Jan 2018
Abstract: The European Union is poised to establish a genuine European Energy Union with the new powers conferred on it by the Lisbon Treaty. Since 2014, it has been developing and implementing an energy strategy that responds to the three overarching priorities of climate change, political security, and economic competitiveness by 2030. The European Energy Union aims to provide secure, sustainable and affordable energy throughout the cycle of production, transport and consumption. This book outlines the legal regime underpinning this regulatory strategy, which integrates EU law with international law and with the law of the member states and affiliated states. It analyses and explains the increasing interaction between these legal orders in achieving the shared objective of transforming the European and global energy systems. This book will appeal to scholars and students of energy law and policy at both European and international levels.

8 citations


01 Jan 2017
Abstract: Does European business lobby for international investment agreements? In the public debate, international investment policymaking has become almost synonymous with a policy domain subject to an undue influence of business on policy outcomes. This paper argues that business preferences and lobbying have little effect on outcomes in international investment policy. The perceived beneficial effects of international investment agreements are small, distant and uncertain, which results in limited business lobbying. Instead, bureaucratic politics seems to decisively shape international investment policymaking in Europe. The paper confirms these hypotheses by means of a detailed assessment of German and EU international investment policymaking before and after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, in-depth case studies of major international investment negotiations and an evaluation of the changing design of European international investment agreements. It concludes with a discussion of the TTIP negotiations as an important outlier to the generally observed passivity of European business in this domain.

8 citations


Book ChapterDOI
01 Jan 2019
Abstract: Does European business lobby in international investment policy and notably for the conclusion of international investment agreements? The chapter argues that business is little involved in this policy domain due to limited perceived welfare effects. Theories of public choice and bureaucratic politics may better account for policy outcomes. The chapter verifies these hypotheses in case studies of international investment policy-making in Germany and the European Union. Finally, the chapter raises the question of whether the exceptional, vocal involvement of European business in the debates on investment regulation under the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) might be the result of policy-maker influence on the business community. The findings imply that policy-makers may be freer in reforming their approach to international investment policy and international investment agreements than assumed.

1 citations


Book ChapterDOI
01 Jan 2019
Abstract: The first chapter explained how human rights next to other substantive and organizational principles and objectives should inform the making and implementation of EU foreign policies. This chapter is concerned with the role that the EU can actually play in shaping the international investment regime. It delineates the regulatory reach of the EU with regards to international investment relations in order to subsequently determine which areas should be governed by the EU human rights framework. This chapter first explains the importance of this thorough analysis, that is highlighting the flexibility of current definitions and making the argument that the human rights framework goes beyond the confines of EU exclusive competence (Sect. 3.1). In order to outline the newly gained and existing powers of the EU in view of the powers needed to cover the traditional practice of international investment relations, this chapter elucidates briefly the traditional scope of international investment regulation (Sect. 3.2). As a next step, it analyses to what extent these powers are covered by exclusive competence of CCP, implied external competences and other expressed Treaty competences or remain under the competence of the Member States (Sects. 3.3–3.8). Ever since the inclusion of foreign direct investment (FDI) into CCP, the scope of the EU competence over investment regulation has been highly debated amongst scholars and between the Commission, the EP and the Member States. Each section therefore outlines the answers given by the Court in the landmark decision Opinion 2/15 in comparison to the diverging opinions in the literature. In a last step, it is explored what different policy options remain if one aims for covering the state of the art investment regulation (Sect. 3.8), while discussing what the different policy options mean for the application of the human rights framework (Sect. 3.9).

Frequently Asked Questions (1)
Q1. What have the authors contributed in "A legal history of the eu’s international investment policy" ?

The article traces the evolution of the legal competences of the European Union ( EU ) in international investment regulation from the Spaak Report ( 1956 ) to the Lisbon Treaty ( 2009 ). The analysis suggests that Commission entrepreneurship and spill-overs from other EU policies were the most important factors fuelling the extension of the EU ’ s legal competences. The findings have implications for their perception of business lobbying in international investment policy and potentially for the legal interpretation and delimitation of the EU ’ s new competences.