A Model of Social Identity with an Application to Political Economy: Nation, Class, and Redistribution
01 May 2009-American Political Science Review (Cambridge University Press)-Vol. 103, Iss: 02, pp 147-174
TL;DR: In this article, the authors define social identification as a steady state where each individual's behavior is consistent with his or her social identity, social identities are consistent with the social environment, and the behavior of the individuals is determined by the individuals.
Abstract: rium (SIE) is a steady state where (1) each individual’s behavior is consistent with his or her social identity, (2) social identities are consistent with the social environment, and (3) the social environment is determined by the behavior of the individuals. Social identification is defined in terms of preferences: to identify with different groups means to have different preferences over outcomes. Preferences involve two novel components. The first is the status of the various groups that exist in society. Group status is the relative position of a group on valued dimensions of comparisons (e.g., wealth, occupational status, educationalachievement).Thus,ifweassumethatindividuals value consumption, then a group characterized by high levels of consumption will have a higher status than a group characterized by low levels, other things equal. The second component is the perceived similarity between an individual and the other members of the group. This component is modeled using the notion of distance in conceptual space from cognitive psychology. Each agent is characterized by a vector of attributes. The perceived distance from a given group is then simply a weighted Euclidean distance between the agent and the prototype of that group, with the weights reflecting the relative salience of the various
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TL;DR: A discussion forum based around Thomas Piketty's book, Capital in the twenty-first century, with a number of economists from academia, public sector bodies and private sector institutions was held at the Centre for Economic Policy Research and the Bank of England.
Abstract: On 19 December 2014, the Centre for Economic Policy Research and the Bank of England hosted a discussion forum based around Thomas Piketty’s book, Capital in the twenty-first century, with a number of economists from academia, public sector bodies and private sector institutions. Four speakers presented research on various issues relating to inequality, including: access to education; wealth and taxation policy; and the role of governance and institutions. This article presents each speaker’s key arguments, and includes a summary of the open-floor debate that followed.
1,286 citations
Cites background from "A Model of Social Identity with an ..."
...(4) There is a small but expanding literature on these topics, such as Shayo (2009)....
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TL;DR: A theory of moral behavior, individual and collective, based on a general model of identity in which people care about “who they are” and infer their own values from past choices is developed, shedding light on many empirical puzzles inconsistent with earlier approaches.
Abstract: We develop a theory of moral behavior, individual and collective, based on a general model of identity in which people care about “who they are” and infer their own values from past choices. The model sheds light on many empirical puzzles inconsistent with earlier approaches. Identity investments respond nonmonotonically to acts or threats, and taboos on mere thoughts arise to protect beliefs about the “priceless” value of certain social assets. High endowments trigger escalating commitment and a treadmill effect, while competing identities can cause dysfunctional capital destruction. Social interactions induce both social and antisocial norms of contribution, sustained by respectively shunning free riders or do-gooders.
780 citations
Cites background from "A Model of Social Identity with an ..."
...In an influential set of papers, Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 2002, 2005), emphasize how, in a wide range of contexts, agents’ preferences are structured by their choices of a social category (see also Shayo 2009 on redistributive politics and Basu 2006)....
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TL;DR: The present research finds that it is possible to eliminate the negative effect of system justification on environmentalism by encouraging people to regard pro-environmental change as patriotic and consistent with protecting the status quo (i.e., as a case of “system-sanctioned change”).
Abstract: Despite extensive evidence of climate change and environmental destruction, polls continue to reveal widespread denial and resistance to helping the environment It is posited here that these responses are linked to the motivational tendency to defend and justify the societal status quo in the face of the threat posed by environmental problems The present research finds that system justification tendencies are associated with greater denial of environmental realities and less commitment to pro-environmental action Moreover, the effects of political conservatism, national identification, and gender on denial of environmental problems are explained by variability in system justification tendencies However, this research finds that it is possible to eliminate the negative effect of system justification on environmentalism by encouraging people to regard pro-environmental change as patriotic and consistent with protecting the status quo (ie, as a case of "system-sanctioned change") Theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed
514 citations
Cites background from "A Model of Social Identity with an ..."
...…and therefore with the motivation to perceive prevailing institutions and arrangements as legitimate, stable, and generally benevolent (e.g., Banfield, Kay, Cutright, Wu, & Fitzsimons, 2009; Laurin, Kay, & Shepherd, 2009; O’Brien & Major, 2005; Shayo, 2009; Van der Toorn, Tyler, & Jost, 2009)....
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...Not too surprisingly, people who are more highly identified with their country and are more invested in its success are especially motivated to perceive the socioeconomic system of that country as fair and legitimate (cf. Shayo, 2009; Laurin et al., 2009)....
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...All other things being equal, we expect that being highly identified with one’s country would be positively associated with feeling connected to and dependent on the system, and therefore with the motivation to perceive prevailing institutions and arrangements as legitimate, stable, and generally benevolent (e.g., Banfield, Kay, Cutright, Wu, & Fitzsimons, 2009; Laurin, Kay, & Shepherd, 2009; O’Brien & Major, 2005; Shayo, 2009; Van der Toorn, Tyler, & Jost, 2009)....
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TL;DR: The authors found that a larger immigrant population leads to less support for redistribution in the form of preferred social benet levels, especially for respondents with high income and wealth, and they also established that OLS estimators that do not properly deal with endogeneity problems are likely to yield positively biased (i.e., less negative) eects of ethnic heterogeneity on preferences for redistribution.
Abstract: In recent decades, the immigration of workers and refugees to Europe has increased substantially, and the composition of the population in many countries has consequently become much more heterogeneous in terms of ethnic background. If people exhibit in-group bias in the sense of being more altruistic to one’s own kind, such increased heterogeneity will lead to reduced support for redistribution among natives. This paper exploits a nationwide program placing refugees in municipalities throughout Sweden during the period 1985{94 to isolate exogenous variation in immigrant shares. We match data on refugee placement to panel survey data on inhabitants of the receiving municipalities to estimate the causal eects of increased immigrant shares on preferences for redistribution. The results show that a larger immigrant population leads to less support for redistribution in the form of preferred social benet levels. This reduction in support is especially pronounced for respondents with high income and wealth. We also establish that OLS estimators that do not properly deal with endogeneity problems|as in earlier studies|are likely to yield positively biased (i.e., less negative) eects of ethnic heterogeneity on preferences for redistribution.
395 citations
Cites background from "A Model of Social Identity with an ..."
...This paper has shed further light on the direct effect on natives’ preferences for redistribution of an increased ethnic diversity, following the theoretical argument as laid out in, for example, Shayo (2009)....
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...1 An extensive theoretical framework for this idea is laid out by Shayo (2009), who, in addition to modeling distaste for cognitive distance to other agents, also endogenizes group identity....
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References
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09 Jan 2004
TL;DR: A theory of intergroup conflict and some preliminary data relating to the theory is presented in this article. But the analysis is limited to the case where the salient dimensions of the intergroup differentiation are those involving scarce resources.
Abstract: This chapter presents an outline of a theory of intergroup conflict and some preliminary data relating to the theory. Much of the work on the social psychology of intergroup relations has focused on patterns of individual prejudices and discrimination and on the motivational sequences of interpersonal interaction. The intensity of explicit intergroup conflicts of interests is closely related in human cultures to the degree of opprobrium attached to the notion of "renegade" or "traitor." The basic and highly reliable finding is that the trivial, ad hoc intergroup categorization leads to in-group favoritism and discrimination against the out-group. Many orthodox definitions of "social groups" are unduly restrictive when applied to the context of intergroup relations. The equation of social competition and intergroup conflict rests on the assumptions concerning an "ideal type" of social stratification in which the salient dimensions of intergroup differentiation are those involving scarce resources.
14,812 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, a self-categorization theory is proposed to discover the social group and the importance of social categories in the analysis of social influence, and the Salience of social Categories is discussed.
Abstract: 1. Introducing the Problem: Individual and Group 2. Rediscovering the Social Group 3. A Self-Categorization Theory 4. The Analysis of Social Influence 5. Social Identity 6. The Salience of Social Categories 7. Social Identity and Group Polarization 8. Crowd Behaviour as Social Action 9. Conclusion.
8,872 citations
"A Model of Social Identity with an ..." refers methods in this paper
...Following Turner et al. (1987), I propose to adopt this approach to the process of categorizing oneself into a group....
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TL;DR: This paper showed that if some people care about equity, the puzzles can be resolved and that the economic environment determines whether the fair types or the selesh types dominate equilibrium behavior in cooperative games.
Abstract: There is strong evidence that people exploit their bargaining power in competitivemarkets butnot inbilateral bargainingsituations. Thereisalsostrong evidence that people exploit free-riding opportunities in voluntary cooperation games. Yet, when they are given the opportunity to punish free riders, stable cooperation is maintained, although punishment is costly for those who punish. This paper asks whether there is a simple common principle that can explain this puzzling evidence. We show that if some people care about equity the puzzles can be resolved. It turns out that the economic environment determines whether the fair types or the selesh types dominate equilibrium behavior.
8,783 citations
TL;DR: This article showed that if a fraction of the people exhibit inequality aversion, stable cooperation is maintained although punishment is costly for those who punish, and they also showed that when they are given the opportunity to punish free riders, stable cooperations are maintained.
Abstract: There is strong evidence that people exploit their bargaining power in competitive markets but not in bilateral bargaining situations. There is also strong evidence that people exploit free-riding opportunities in voluntary cooperation games. Yet, when they are given the opportunity to punish free riders, stable cooperation is maintained although punishment is costly for those who punish. This paper asks whether there is a simple common principle that can explain this puzzling evidence. We show that if a fraction of the people exhibits inequality aversion the puzzles can be resolved.
6,919 citations
"A Model of Social Identity with an ..." refers background in this paper
...10 In a similar vein, the model can capture an important aspect of inequality aversion (Bolton and Ockenfels 2000; Fehr and Schmidt 1999)....
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TL;DR: The authors demonstrate that people are motivated by both their pecuniary payoff and their relative payoff standing, and demonstrate that a simple model, constructed on the premise that people were motivated by either their payoff or their relative standing, organizes a large and seemingly disparate set of laboratory observations as one consistent pattern, which explains observations from games where equity is thought to be a factor, such as ultimatum and dictator, games where reciprocity is played a role and games where competitive behavior is observed.
Abstract: We demonstrate that a simple model, constructed on the premise that people are motivated by both their pecuniary payoff and their relative payoff standing, organizes a large and seemingly disparate set of laboratory observations as one consistent pattern The model is incomplete information but nevertheless posed entirely in terms of directly observable variables The model explains observations from games where equity is thought to be a factor, such as ultimatum and dictator, games where reciprocity is thought to play a role, such as the prisoner's dilemma and gift exchange, and games where competitive behavior is observed, such as Bertrand markets (JEL C78, C90, D63, D64, H41)
5,391 citations