A National Lawyer Takes Stock: Professor Ross' Textbook and Other Forays into International Law
01 Sep 2003-European Journal of International Law (Oxford University Press)-Vol. 14, Iss: 4, pp 675-702
TL;DR: In the field of international law, a fine study of the general conditions of international lawyers as well as of the basis for international law can be found in Ross' Textbook of International Law as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: In Denmark, Professor Alf Ross was the legal icon of the twentieth century. His sharp and daring intellect made his eloquent writings stimulating reading and attracted many readers abroad. His astute and uncompromising style of analysis, carrying principles and assumptions to their ultimate conclusion, made Ross' writings in the field of international law a fine study of the general conditions of international lawyers as well as of the basis of international law. This was the case, even though Ross was not primarily an international lawyer; indeed, it might have been precisely for this reason that Ross was so thought- provoking. Ross' key interest was to study the concept of law when removed from the context of national law. But far more than a 'realist' theory of law, his writings provide witness to the possible impact of national legal thinking on international law. Ross' Textbook of International Law, in which he took stock of international law, offers a good illustration of a more complicated relationship between national and international law, and between national and international lawyers — then as well as today.
Citations
More filters
Book•
07 Feb 2005TL;DR: The Permanent Court of International Justice as discussed by the authors has been a project of international justice since 1922 and has been used for international legal argument in the Permanent Court since 1914. But it has not yet been used in the application of international law.
Abstract: Foreword Acknowledgements Table of cases Table of treaties List of abbreviations Part I. The Permanent Court of International Justice: 1. A project of international justice Part II. International Legal Argument: 2. The basis of international law 3. The double structure of international legal argument Part III. International Legal Argument in the Permanent Court of International Justice: 4. Revisiting the Permanent Court 5. The foundational period, 1922-1924 6. An international lawyer's approach, 1925-1930 7. A national lawyer's approach, 1931-1940 Part IV. General Conclusions: 8. The legacy of the Permanent Court Appendix List of Advisory Opinions, Judgments and Orders of the Permanent Court of International Justice Bibliography.
35 citations
TL;DR: For over three decades, it has been the International Law Commission's position that the circumstance of consent involves something other than the consent which, through the rule pacta sunt servanda, imparts objective force to international agreements.
Abstract: For over three decades, it has been the International Law Commission's position that the circumstance of consent involves something other than the consent which, through the rule pacta sunt servanda, imparts objective force to international agreements. During the tenure of the second Special Rapporteur on the law of state responsibility, Roberto Ago, the Commission adopted the view that the former suspends the international obligations which are incumbent on states whereas the latter functions to create, modify, or extinguish the rules whence such obligations stem forth. However, as the result of the study carried out by its last Special Rapporteur, James Crawford, the Commission has now come to distinguish between the circumstance of consent defined as a justification for non-performance of subsisting obligations, and consent defined as a requirement for the application of obligations. In this contribution, it is argued that both analyses are problematic. The former gives succour to a mistaken view of the sources of international law. The latter is based on a misunderstanding of the primary-rule–secondary-rule terminology; it justifies itself by referring to an ill-conceived definition of the notion of peremptory norms, and no less importantly undermines the purposefully cumbersome mechanism envisaged in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties for suspension of multilateral treaties as between certain of the contracting parties only.
9 citations
01 Jan 2005
TL;DR: The Permanent Court of Arbitration as discussed by the authors was the first permanent international court of a permanent character, at least nominally, which was established at the First World War's Geneva Conference on International Law.
Abstract: Conceptions of the state Back in 1899, only a few of the positions now occupied by international lawyers had been provided for. Yet 1899 was a significant year. Governments met at the First Peace Conference at The Hague to set an example of codifying international law in treaties. They reached agreement on the establishment of the first international court of a permanent character, at least nominally – the Permanent Court of Arbitration. The nineteenth century had witnessed a remarkable growth in the number of treaties, and their subject matters, many of which were also governed by national law. In the same period constitutional democracy had spread widely. While it remained a government prerogative to represent the state internationally, for example when consenting to be bound by a treaty, parliamentary bodies had become centres of national law-making processes. In 1899, Professor Heinrich Triepel in Volkerrecht und Landesrecht addressed the topical issue of the relationship between international and national law. It is one of the few nineteenth-century books on international law that was quoted, or at least cited, throughout the twentieth century. Triepel has been seen as the main exponent of the dualist theory, according to which national and international law are separate legal systems. One consequence of this view is that acts contrary to international law may be valid under national law, and vice versa . The systems were described by Triepel as circles that perhaps touched but never overlapped.
4 citations
01 Jan 2005
3 citations
01 Jan 2005
2 citations