Kent Academic Repository
Full text document (pdf)
Copyright & reuse
Content in the Kent Academic Repository is made available for research purposes. Unless otherwise stated all
content is protected by copyright and in the absence of an open licence (eg Creative Commons), permissions
for further reuse of content should be sought from the publisher, author or other copyright holder.
Versions of research
The version in the Kent Academic Repository may differ from the final published version.
Users are advised to check http://kar.kent.ac.uk for the status of the paper. Users should always cite the
published version of record.
Enquiries
For any further enquiries regarding the licence status of this document, please contact:
researchsupport@kent.ac.uk
If you believe this document infringes copyright then please contact the KAR admin team with the take-down
information provided at http://kar.kent.ac.uk/contact.html
Citation for published version
Shan, Yafeng (2019) A New Functional Approach to Scientific Progress. Philosophy of Science,
86 (4). (In press)
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1086/704980
Link to record in KAR
https://kar.kent.ac.uk/76188/
Document Version
Author's Accepted Manuscript
1
A New Functional Approach to Scientific Progress
Yafeng Shan
The Cohn Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Ideas, Tel Aviv
University, Tel Aviv, Israel
ys1@mail.tau.ac.il
Abstract
This paper develops and defends a new functional approach to scientific progress. I begin
with a review of the problems of the traditional functional approach. Then I propose a new
functional account of scientific progress, in which scientific progress is defined in terms of
the usefulness of the problem-defining and problem-solving. I illustrate and defend my
account by applying to the history of genetics. Finally, I highlight the advantages of my
new functional approach over the epistemic and semantic approaches and dismiss some
potential objections to my approach.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Jonathon Hricko and two anonymous reviewers for the helpful
comments.
Manuscript
Copyright The Philosophy of Science Association 2019. Preprint (not copyedited or formatted).
Please use DOI when citing or quoting. DOI: 10.1086/704980
This content downloaded from 031.050.017.136 on June 18, 2019 13:59:09 PM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
2
1. Introduction
Alexander Bird (2007) distinguishes three approaches to characterising scientific progress:
the epistemic approach, the semantic approach, and the functional-internalist approach.
The epistemic approach defines progress in terms of knowledge. The semantic approach
defines progress in terms of truth or verisimilitude. The functional-internalist approach
construes progress in terms of the function of scientific practice. Correspondingly, the
epistemic account of scientific progress is that an episode of history of science is
progressive if it shows the accumulation of scientific knowledge. According to the
semantic account, an episode of the history of science is progressive if either it shows the
accumulation of true scientific beliefs or it shows increasing approximation of true
scientific beliefs. According to the functional-internalist account, an episode of the history
of science is progressive if it shows the success of the fulfilment of a certain function (for
example, problem-solving), where the fulfilment of the function can be judged by
scientists at that time. The recent debate (Rowbottom 2008; 2010; 2015; Cevolani and
Tambolo 2013; Niiniluoto 2014) focuses on the epistemic and semantic approaches. The
functional approach seems to be taken for granted indefensible. However, this view is
unfair and unjustified. This paper aims to develop and defend a new functional approach to
scientific progress. In section 2, I shall identify four problems of the traditional functional
approach. In section 3, I shall propose a new functional account of scientific progress, in
which scientific progress is defined in terms of the usefulness of the problem-defining and
problem-solving and show how the old problems can be solved by this new approach. In
section 4, I shall illustrate and defend my account by applying to the history of genetics. In
Copyright The Philosophy of Science Association 2019. Preprint (not copyedited or formatted).
Please use DOI when citing or quoting. DOI: 10.1086/704980
This content downloaded from 031.050.017.136 on June 18, 2019 13:59:09 PM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
3
section 5, I shall highlight the advantages of my new functional approach over the
epistemic and semantic approaches and dismiss some potential objections to my approach.
2. The Problems of the Kuhn-Laudan Functional Approach
The most influential functional approach is first proposed by Thomas Kuhn (Kuhn 1962,
1970a), and mainly developed by Larry Laudan (1977, 1981)
1
. This approach emphasises
the significance of problem-solving. Kuhn (1970b, 164) argues that the nature of scientific
progress is the increase of “both the effectiveness and the efficiency with the group as a
whole solves new problems.” Laudan (1981, 145) is also explicit on the point that “science
progresses just in case successive theories solve more problems than their predecessors.”
Kuhn and Laudan differ in the explication of problem-solving, though. For Kuhn (1970b,
189–91), a problem P is solved if its solution is sufficiently similar to a relevant
paradigmatic problem-solution. For Laudan (1977, 22–23), a problem P is solved by a
theory T if T entails an approximate statement of P. Nevertheless, both Kuhn and Laudan
maintain that scientific progress is nothing to do with truth or knowledge if truth or
knowledge is construed in a classical way. More specifically, whether a problem is solved
is independent of whether the paradigmatic solution assumes any paradigm-dependent
truth (for Kuhn), or whether the background theory is true (for Laudan). As the acceptance
1
Another representative of the functional approach is proposed and developed by Imre Lakatos.
According to Lakatos (1978, 33–34), a research programme is progressive if it generates novel and
well corroborated predictions. As the aim of this paper is to develop the Kuhn-Laudan functional
approach, I shall not delve into the detailed discussion on Lakatos’ account. However, it does not
downplay its significance.
Copyright The Philosophy of Science Association 2019. Preprint (not copyedited or formatted).
Please use DOI when citing or quoting. DOI: 10.1086/704980
This content downloaded from 031.050.017.136 on June 18, 2019 13:59:09 PM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
4
of a problem solution is determined independently of external factors like truth or
knowledge, whether a progress is achieved can be judged by the scientific community
itself. Thus, the central tenets of the Kuhn-Laudan functional account of scientific progress
can be summarised as follows.
T1. Scientific progress is solely determined by the problem-solving power.
T2. The problem-solving power is assessed by the amount and significance of the
problems solved.
T3. The problem-solving power is independent of whether the solution is true or
knowledge.
T4. Scientific progress is judged and known by the scientific community.
There are two obvious problems of the Kuhn-Laudan functional approach. One is the
problem of sufficiency. For Kuhn and Laudan, if a scientific community is working better
and better on the effectiveness and efficiency of problem solving, it implies scientific
progress. On the contrary, if the effectiveness and efficiency of problem-solving decreases,
then it marks a regress in science. The problem of sufficiency can be illustrated with a
thought experiment proposed by Bird (2007, 69–70). Suppose there is a widely accepted
but false theory. The scientific community accumulates the solutions to the problems
derived from the false theory suggests the progress, according to Laudan’s approach.
However, it seems implausible for many to accept that there is an ongoing progress in
science, as the false solution statements (derived from the false theory) accumulate. What
Copyright The Philosophy of Science Association 2019. Preprint (not copyedited or formatted).
Please use DOI when citing or quoting. DOI: 10.1086/704980
This content downloaded from 031.050.017.136 on June 18, 2019 13:59:09 PM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).