A Novel Double Auction Mechanism Based Resource Allocation in the Grid

TLDR: This paper designs a novel double auction mechanism which is appropriate for allocation of multi-unit homogenous and divisible resources in the Grid and proves that the mechanism not only can achieve incentive compatibility and individual rationality for risk-averse resource consumers and resource providers, but also can be weekly budget balance.

Abstract: In order to achieve high performance of Grid computing, an efficient resource allocation protocol needs to be carefully chosen and applied. Using auction mechanism design theory, this paper designs a novel double auction mechanism which is appropriate for allocation of multi-unit homogenous and divisible resources in the Grid. In the Grid, there are multiple resource consumers and resource providers. Futhermore, various transaction-related costs will be incurred when a resource consumer trades with a resource provider. We prove that the mechanism not only can achieve incentive compatibility and individual rationality for risk-averse resource consumers and resource providers, but also can be weekly budget balance. The numeral results show that the mechanism achieves high efficiency.