Q1. What have the authors contributed in "A participatory budget model under uncertainty" ?
In this paper, the authors propose a model for participatory budgeting under uncertainty based on stochastic programming.
A participatory budget model under uncertainty
TL;DR: This paper proposes a model for participatory budgeting under uncertainty based on stochastic programming, and suggests that this approach seems lacking, especially in times of crisis when public funding suffers high volatility and widespread cuts.
About: This article is published in European Journal of Operational Research.The article was published on 2016-02-16 and is currently open access. It has received 16 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Participatory budgeting.
Summary (1 min read)
Jump to: [1. Introduction] – [3. The case of a single participant] – [4.1.1. Posting under uncertainty] – [Stop;] – [4.3. Arbitration under uncertainty] and [5. An example]
1. Introduction
- Most countries have a strict legal framework that regulates budgetary processes.
- Furthermore, the elaboration of flexible budgets requires the use of multiple tools and methods such as Monte Carlo simulation, forecasting or game theory models (Verbeeten, 2006) Section 5 illustrates their methodology with a simple example.
3. The case of a single participant
- Β would typically be stated by the technical staff supporting the process after listening to the problem owners concerning uncertainty aversion, with sensitivity analysis performed to assess its impact.
- The selection of this parameter is critical, since it will affect the number of choices available.
- In general, the lower β is, the bigger the number of feasible portfolios would be available but, also, the bigger chances of not meeting the specified targets.
4.1.1. Posting under uncertainty
- The authors assume that projects are ordered according to their expected utility and a simple bookkeeping mechanism is available to avoid repeating portfolios already declined.
- A participant may propose the portfolio ϝ where projects are gradually included when the proportion of samples satisfying the corresponding constraints is greater than β.
Stop;
- (c) Approximate K(S, x) through the nondominated portfolio closest to the straight line joining x and B(S, x).
- The authors just need to replace the corresponding steps in Algorithm 7 (and eliminate its first line) to obtain a much more affordable algorithm.
4.3. Arbitration under uncertainty
- Method assumes an initial inefficient solution and suggests at each iteration, as new solution, a Pareto improvement with respect to the previous offer, see Raiffa et al. (2002) .
- The process ends when no further Pareto improvements are possible.
- Again, this assumes that uncertainty has been previously resolved after applying Algorithms 1-4.
- As this may be expensive computationally, the authors could apply a similar approach to the BIM under uncertainty algorithm in Section 4.1.2.
5. An example
- The final budget therefore includes the following five projects:.
- Bike lane, Park, School, Theater and Trees.
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Citations
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TL;DR: A fuzzy technique is proposed for order preference based on the similarity to an ideal solution for the personalized ranking of projects in a participatory budget (PB) based on an empirical example from a Poznan PB project ( Poland).
93 citations
Cites background from "A participatory budget model under ..."
...Theoretical studies have focused on communication, deliberation, and decision making [5], modeling under uncertainty [6], designing general frameworks [7], and experimental solutions [8], [9], but most of these existing solutions only consider support for administrative tasks related to PBs, rather than the actual decisionmaking process....
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TL;DR: In this paper, a model to support governmental local managers in public budget optimization, based on an integration of methods, is presented to fill the gap related to weights definition in problematic, commonly performed subjective assessments.
Abstract: Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to present a model to support governmental local managers in public budget optimization, based on an integration of methods. It was constructed to fill the gap related to weights definition in problematic, commonly performed subjective assessments. This model supports the decision making in budget distribution identifying the importance of sectors in local governments, captured by historical data.
Design/methodology/approach
The model was developed following three steps: the first step included the exploitation of the characteristics of local sectors represented by city departments and the data collection procedure using time series (TS). In the second one, the weights regarding the importance of each city department were calculated by the UTASTAR method and based on historical data from the first step. Finally, an objective function was formulated using linear programming and constraints based on law specifications, and as a result, an optimized projection for public budget distribution was performed.
Findings
The results demonstrated that the model can be more efficient to weights definition, considering the behavior of preferences by historical data and supporting local public resources optimization, also to comply with the legislation, being able to predict or project future values available on the budget.
Research limitations/implications
The theoretical and practical implications are related with a novelty in recognizing the weights for criteria by a historical behavior of preferences. It can be bringing important directions for budget distribution. The main limitation detected in this study was the difficulty to formulate an assessment involving an integrated opinion from local managers and the population.
Practical implications
First of all, with the correct allocation of resources, the government has a greater advantage to capture investments from the negotiation with development entities and banks. Second, an efficient local government management can promote compliance with legislation and more transparent public policies.
Social implications
The correct distribution of resources affects the life quality for citizens, since the government acts as a provider of essential services for the population like education, safety, health, particularly for citizens who depend exclusively on the services offered by the local government. Moreover, it can also affect the environment as resources for garbage collection, disposal services and sanitation and, finally, affect the city development such as infrastructure, taxes, etc.
Originality/value
It might be considered an original contribution mainly by the development of a procedure to capture values for weights by TS and meeting the manager’s requirements, based on analytical, statistical and mathematical tools integrated.
15 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors analyse participatory budgeting in two Indonesian indigenous communities, illustrating how the World Bank sponsored neo-liberal model of "technical rational" PB is overshadowed by local values and wisdom, consisting of sophisticated, pre-existing rationalities for public participation.
Abstract: This paper analyses participatory budgeting (PB) in two Indonesian indigenous communities, illustrating how the World Bank sponsored neo-liberal model of “technical rational” PB is overshadowed by local values and wisdom, consisting of sophisticated, pre-existing rationalities for public participation.,Adopting a qualitative and interpretive case study approach, the study draws on data from semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders and periods of participant observation. The paper utilises Weber's characterisations of rationality to analyse the PB process in indigenous communities.,The co-existence of both formal (technical) and substantive rationalities leads two Indonesian indigenous communities to execute participatory budgeting pragmatically. The formal budgetary mechanisms (Musrenbang), cascaded down from central and local governments, are melded with, and co-exist alongside, a tradition of public participation deriving from local cultural values and wisdom (Rembug warga). Reciprocal relationships and trust based on a pre-existing substantive rationality result in community members adapting budget practices while also preserving their local culture and resisting the encroachment of neo-liberal initiatives. The paper offers deeper analysis of the unintended consequences of attempting to implement technical rational accounting reforms and practices in indigenous settings.,The paper provides important insights into the way the interplay between formal and substantive rationality impacts on accounting and budgeting practices in indigenous communities. Our study also presents a unique case in emerging economy contexts in which neoliberal initiatives have been outmanoeuvred in the process of preserving indigenous values and wisdom. The informal participatory mechanism (Rembug warga) retained the community trust that neoliberalism systematically erodes.
13 citations
TL;DR: A negotiation support system (NSS) with a theoretical modeling that considers the aspects of human personality and negotiator’s behavior to assist the decision-making of public managers and stakeholders in democratic bargaining processes and support social-efficient outcomes is introduced.
Abstract: Purpose
This paper aims to introduce a negotiation support system (NSS) with a theoretical modeling that considers the aspects of human personality and negotiator’s behavior to assist the decision-making of public managers and stakeholders in democratic bargaining processes and support social-efficient outcomes.
Design/methodology/approach
A game theoretical modeling of public participatory negotiations characterized by complete and perfect information is explored with the inclusion of personality aspects and negotiation styles. The importance of the negotiation knowledge disclosure in the sequential bargains of participative budgeting is highlighted by an experiment with 162 state-owned companies’ managers and graduate students to present the contribution of the system’s applicability.
Findings
A considerable number of Pareto-efficient deliberation agreements are obtained with few interactions when the negotiation strategies and the personality aspects of opponents and stakeholders are freely available (a symmetry in the public negotiation knowledge). In addition to the set of Pareto-efficient agreements, those with the best social outcome (i.e. that maximize the group satisfaction despite individual losses) are observed when the informational tool for personality and negotiation style inference is enabled.
Originality/value
Many scholars argue for Pareto-efficient allocation instead of equal divisions of resources within participative democracies and public governance. This work provides a new system with an empirical application and theoretical modeling which may support those arguments based on the nonverbal negotiation aspects.
10 citations
References
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TL;DR: The paper presents a method of attack which splits the problem into two non-linear or linear programming parts, i determining optimal probability distributions, ii approximating the optimal distributions as closely as possible by decision rules of prescribed form.
Abstract: A new conceptual and analytical vehicle for problems of temporal planning under uncertainty, involving determination of optimal sequential stochastic decision rules is defined and illustrated by means of a typical industrial example. The paper presents a method of attack which splits the problem into two non-linear or linear programming parts, i determining optimal probability distributions, ii approximating the optimal distributions as closely as possible by decision rules of prescribed form.
2,477 citations
"A participatory budget model under ..." refers background in this paper
...Two clasic versions of chance-constrained problems are the individual chance onstraints (Charnes & Cooper, 1959; Wets, 1989) and the joint chance onstraints (Miller & Warner, 1965), which we adopt here: we place a ower bound β on the probability that each stochastic constraint will e jointly…...
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Book•
01 Jan 1972
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present an overview of cost terms and their application in the management of cost in the context of accounting, including flexible budgets, variable budgets, and management control.
Abstract: 1. The Accountant's Role in the Organization. 2. An Introduction to Cost Terms and Purposes. 3. Cost-Volume Profit Analysis. 4. Job Costing. 5. Activity-Based Costing and Activity-Based Management. 6. Master Budget and Responsibility Accounting. 7. Flexible Budgets, Variances, and Management Control: I 8. Flexible Budgets, Variances, and Management Control: II. 9. Inventory Costing and Capacity Analysis. 10. Determining How Costs Behave. 11. Decision Making and Relevant Information. 12. Pricing Decisions and Cost Management. 13. Strategy, Balanced Scorecard, and Strategic Profitability Analysis. 14. Cost Allocation, Customer-Profitability Analysis, and Sales-Variance Analysis. 15. Allocation of Support Department Costs, Common Costs and Revenues. 16. Cost Allocation: Joint Products and Byproducts. 17. Process Costing. 18. Spoilage Rework, and Scrap. 19. Quality, Time, and the Theory of Constraints. 20. Inventory Management, Just-in-Time, and Backflush Costing. 21. Capital Budgeting and Cost Analysis. 22. Management Control Systems, Transfer Pricing, and Multinational Considerations. 23. Performance Measurement, Compensation, and Multinational Considerations.
1,863 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, it is shown that under four axioms that describe the behavior of players, there is a unique solution to the two-player bargaining problem, which is different from those suggested by Nash.
Abstract: A two-person bargaining problem is considered. It is shown that under four axioms that describe the behavior of players there is a unique solution to such a problem. The axioms and the solution presented are different from those suggested by Nash. Also, families of solutions which satisfy a more limited set of axioms and which are continuous are discussed. WE CONSIDER a two-person bargaining problem mathematically formulated as follows. To every two-person game we associate a pair (a, S), where a is a point in the plane and S is a subset of the plane. The pair (a, S) has the following intuitive interpretation: a = (a1, a2) where ai is the level of utility that player i receives if the two players do not cooperate with each other. Every point x = (x1, x2) e S represents levels of utility for players 1 and 2 that can be reached by an outcome of the game which is feasible for the two players when they do cooperate. We are interested in finding an outcome in S which will be agreeable to both players. This problem was considered by Nash [3] and his classical result was that under certain axioms there is a unique solution. However, one of his axioms of independence of irrelevant alternatives came under criticism (see [2, p. 128]). In this paper we suggest an alternative axiom which leads to another unique solution. Also, it was called to our attention by the referee that experiments conducted by H. W. Crott [1] led to the solution implied by our axioms rather than to Nash's solution. We also consider the class of continuous solutions which are required to satisfy only the axioms of Nash which are usually accepted. We give examples of families of such solutions.
1,709 citations
"A participatory budget model under ..." refers methods in this paper
...BIM under uncertainty BIM is an iterative multilateral negotiation support method, based n the discrete balanced increment solution, see Raiffa et al. (2002). tarting from the disagreement point d, the method iteratively ofers (Kalai & Smorodinsky, 1975) solutions to participants....
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Book•
01 Jan 1986
836 citations
"A participatory budget model under ..." refers methods in this paper
...We assume that we may model each participant’s preferences hrough a multiattribute utility function uj, j = 1, . . . , n, whose xpected value should be maximized, see e.g. French (1986)....
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31 Mar 2007
TL;DR: In this paper, four approaches to decision making are presented: decision analysis, negotiation analysis, template design and template evaluation, and consensus on how to achieve a shared agreement for all the parties.
Abstract: Preface Part I. Fundamentals 1. Decision Perspectives On four approaches to decision making 2. Decision Analysis On how individuals should and could decide 3. Behavioral Decision Theory On the psychology of decisions on how real people do decide 4. Game Theory On how rational beings should decide separately in interactive situations 5. Negotiation Analysis On how you should and could collaborate with others Part II. Two-Party Distributive (Win-Lose) Negotiations 6. Elmtree House On setting the stage for adversarial bargaining 7. Distributive Negotiations: The Basic Problem On the essence of noncooperative, win-lose negotiations 8. Introducing Complexities: Uncertainty On deciding to settle out of court and other problems of choice under uncertainty 9. Introducing Complexities: Time On entrapments and downward escalation on real and virtual strikes 10. Auctions and Bids On comparing different auction and competitive bidding procedures Part III. Two-Party Integrative (Win-Win) Negotiations 11. Template Design On brainstorming alone and together on deciding what must be decided 12. Template Evaluation On deciding what you need and want 13. Template Analysis (I) On finding a joint compromise for a special simple case 14. Template Analysis (II) On finding a joint compromise for the general case 15. Behavioral Realities On learning how people do negotiate in the laboratory and the real world 16. Noncooperative Others On how to tackle noncooperative adversaries Part IV. External Help 17. Mostly Facilitation and Mediation On helping with people problems 18. Arbitration: Conventional and Nonconventional On how a neutral joint analyst might help 19. What Is Fair? On principles for deciding joint outcomes 20. Parallel Negotiations On negotiating without Negotiating Part V. Many Parties 21. Group Decisions On organizing and managing groups 22. Consensus On how to achieve a shared agreement for all 23. Coalitions On the dynamics of splitting and joining subgroups 24. Voting On anomalies of collective action based on voting schemes 25. Pluralistic Parties On dealing with parties fractured by internal conflict 26. Multiparty Interventions On the role of external helpers in multiparty negotiations 27. Social Dilemmas On the conflict between self-interest and group interest References Note on Sources Index
654 citations
"A participatory budget model under ..." refers background or methods in this paper
...For a general discussion on the role of uncertainty in negotiations see Raiffa, Richardson, and Metcalfe (2002), Neale and Fragale (2006) or Moon, Yao, and Park (2011)....
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...BIM under uncertainty BIM is an iterative multilateral negotiation support method, based n the discrete balanced increment solution, see Raiffa et al. (2002). tarting from the disagreement point d, the method iteratively ofers (Kalai & Smorodinsky, 1975) solutions to participants....
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...…Calculate bt = bt−1 − Ct ; xt = B−1(S, bt) and K̂t = K(S, xt); if K̂t = K̂t−1 then Offer alternative associated with K̂t ; ethod assumes an initial inefficient solution and suggests at each teration, as new solution, a Pareto improvement with respect to the revious offer, see Raiffa et al. (2002)....
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