Q1. What have the authors contributed in "A participatory budget model under uncertainty" ?
In this paper, the authors propose a model for participatory budgeting under uncertainty based on stochastic programming.
A participatory budget model under uncertainty
TL;DR: This paper proposes a model for participatory budgeting under uncertainty based on stochastic programming, and suggests that this approach seems lacking, especially in times of crisis when public funding suffers high volatility and widespread cuts.
About: This article is published in European Journal of Operational Research.The article was published on 2016-02-16 and is currently open access. It has received 16 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Participatory budgeting.
Summary (1 min read)
Jump to: [1. Introduction] – [3. The case of a single participant] – [4.1.1. Posting under uncertainty] – [Stop;] – [4.3. Arbitration under uncertainty] and [5. An example]
1. Introduction
- Most countries have a strict legal framework that regulates budgetary processes.
- Furthermore, the elaboration of flexible budgets requires the use of multiple tools and methods such as Monte Carlo simulation, forecasting or game theory models (Verbeeten, 2006) Section 5 illustrates their methodology with a simple example.
3. The case of a single participant
- Β would typically be stated by the technical staff supporting the process after listening to the problem owners concerning uncertainty aversion, with sensitivity analysis performed to assess its impact.
- The selection of this parameter is critical, since it will affect the number of choices available.
- In general, the lower β is, the bigger the number of feasible portfolios would be available but, also, the bigger chances of not meeting the specified targets.
4.1.1. Posting under uncertainty
- The authors assume that projects are ordered according to their expected utility and a simple bookkeeping mechanism is available to avoid repeating portfolios already declined.
- A participant may propose the portfolio ϝ where projects are gradually included when the proportion of samples satisfying the corresponding constraints is greater than β.
Stop;
- (c) Approximate K(S, x) through the nondominated portfolio closest to the straight line joining x and B(S, x).
- The authors just need to replace the corresponding steps in Algorithm 7 (and eliminate its first line) to obtain a much more affordable algorithm.
4.3. Arbitration under uncertainty
- Method assumes an initial inefficient solution and suggests at each iteration, as new solution, a Pareto improvement with respect to the previous offer, see Raiffa et al. (2002) .
- The process ends when no further Pareto improvements are possible.
- Again, this assumes that uncertainty has been previously resolved after applying Algorithms 1-4.
- As this may be expensive computationally, the authors could apply a similar approach to the BIM under uncertainty algorithm in Section 4.1.2.
5. An example
- The final budget therefore includes the following five projects:.
- Bike lane, Park, School, Theater and Trees.
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Citations
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TL;DR: A fuzzy technique is proposed for order preference based on the similarity to an ideal solution for the personalized ranking of projects in a participatory budget (PB) based on an empirical example from a Poznan PB project ( Poland).
93 citations
Cites background from "A participatory budget model under ..."
...Theoretical studies have focused on communication, deliberation, and decision making [5], modeling under uncertainty [6], designing general frameworks [7], and experimental solutions [8], [9], but most of these existing solutions only consider support for administrative tasks related to PBs, rather than the actual decisionmaking process....
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TL;DR: In this paper, a model to support governmental local managers in public budget optimization, based on an integration of methods, is presented to fill the gap related to weights definition in problematic, commonly performed subjective assessments.
Abstract: Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to present a model to support governmental local managers in public budget optimization, based on an integration of methods. It was constructed to fill the gap related to weights definition in problematic, commonly performed subjective assessments. This model supports the decision making in budget distribution identifying the importance of sectors in local governments, captured by historical data.
Design/methodology/approach
The model was developed following three steps: the first step included the exploitation of the characteristics of local sectors represented by city departments and the data collection procedure using time series (TS). In the second one, the weights regarding the importance of each city department were calculated by the UTASTAR method and based on historical data from the first step. Finally, an objective function was formulated using linear programming and constraints based on law specifications, and as a result, an optimized projection for public budget distribution was performed.
Findings
The results demonstrated that the model can be more efficient to weights definition, considering the behavior of preferences by historical data and supporting local public resources optimization, also to comply with the legislation, being able to predict or project future values available on the budget.
Research limitations/implications
The theoretical and practical implications are related with a novelty in recognizing the weights for criteria by a historical behavior of preferences. It can be bringing important directions for budget distribution. The main limitation detected in this study was the difficulty to formulate an assessment involving an integrated opinion from local managers and the population.
Practical implications
First of all, with the correct allocation of resources, the government has a greater advantage to capture investments from the negotiation with development entities and banks. Second, an efficient local government management can promote compliance with legislation and more transparent public policies.
Social implications
The correct distribution of resources affects the life quality for citizens, since the government acts as a provider of essential services for the population like education, safety, health, particularly for citizens who depend exclusively on the services offered by the local government. Moreover, it can also affect the environment as resources for garbage collection, disposal services and sanitation and, finally, affect the city development such as infrastructure, taxes, etc.
Originality/value
It might be considered an original contribution mainly by the development of a procedure to capture values for weights by TS and meeting the manager’s requirements, based on analytical, statistical and mathematical tools integrated.
15 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors analyse participatory budgeting in two Indonesian indigenous communities, illustrating how the World Bank sponsored neo-liberal model of "technical rational" PB is overshadowed by local values and wisdom, consisting of sophisticated, pre-existing rationalities for public participation.
Abstract: This paper analyses participatory budgeting (PB) in two Indonesian indigenous communities, illustrating how the World Bank sponsored neo-liberal model of “technical rational” PB is overshadowed by local values and wisdom, consisting of sophisticated, pre-existing rationalities for public participation.,Adopting a qualitative and interpretive case study approach, the study draws on data from semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders and periods of participant observation. The paper utilises Weber's characterisations of rationality to analyse the PB process in indigenous communities.,The co-existence of both formal (technical) and substantive rationalities leads two Indonesian indigenous communities to execute participatory budgeting pragmatically. The formal budgetary mechanisms (Musrenbang), cascaded down from central and local governments, are melded with, and co-exist alongside, a tradition of public participation deriving from local cultural values and wisdom (Rembug warga). Reciprocal relationships and trust based on a pre-existing substantive rationality result in community members adapting budget practices while also preserving their local culture and resisting the encroachment of neo-liberal initiatives. The paper offers deeper analysis of the unintended consequences of attempting to implement technical rational accounting reforms and practices in indigenous settings.,The paper provides important insights into the way the interplay between formal and substantive rationality impacts on accounting and budgeting practices in indigenous communities. Our study also presents a unique case in emerging economy contexts in which neoliberal initiatives have been outmanoeuvred in the process of preserving indigenous values and wisdom. The informal participatory mechanism (Rembug warga) retained the community trust that neoliberalism systematically erodes.
13 citations
TL;DR: A negotiation support system (NSS) with a theoretical modeling that considers the aspects of human personality and negotiator’s behavior to assist the decision-making of public managers and stakeholders in democratic bargaining processes and support social-efficient outcomes is introduced.
Abstract: Purpose
This paper aims to introduce a negotiation support system (NSS) with a theoretical modeling that considers the aspects of human personality and negotiator’s behavior to assist the decision-making of public managers and stakeholders in democratic bargaining processes and support social-efficient outcomes.
Design/methodology/approach
A game theoretical modeling of public participatory negotiations characterized by complete and perfect information is explored with the inclusion of personality aspects and negotiation styles. The importance of the negotiation knowledge disclosure in the sequential bargains of participative budgeting is highlighted by an experiment with 162 state-owned companies’ managers and graduate students to present the contribution of the system’s applicability.
Findings
A considerable number of Pareto-efficient deliberation agreements are obtained with few interactions when the negotiation strategies and the personality aspects of opponents and stakeholders are freely available (a symmetry in the public negotiation knowledge). In addition to the set of Pareto-efficient agreements, those with the best social outcome (i.e. that maximize the group satisfaction despite individual losses) are observed when the informational tool for personality and negotiation style inference is enabled.
Originality/value
Many scholars argue for Pareto-efficient allocation instead of equal divisions of resources within participative democracies and public governance. This work provides a new system with an empirical application and theoretical modeling which may support those arguments based on the nonverbal negotiation aspects.
10 citations
References
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TL;DR: The challenges that have to be addressed and overcome if e-participation is to be a valid tool within a modern democracy are discussed and a program of research and debate is outlined in which the professional decision analysis community should engage.
Abstract: Decision analytic methods are being increasingly used to help to articulate and structure debate and deliberations among citizens and stakeholders in societal decisions. Methods vary, but, essentially, a public authority or agency, when faced with a significant set of issues, may organise one or more workshops with stakeholders and citizens as participants. Such methods of public engagement and participation are, by and large, conducted face to face. However, the advent of the World Wide Web brings the possibility of conducting citizen and stakeholder interactions in a distributed, possibly asynchronous fashion. In this paper we discuss the challenges that have to be addressed and overcome if such e-participation is to be a valid tool within a modern democracy. The difficulties are many and varied, but the pressures towards e-government, and better regulation in general, mean that such methods will be used in the near future. Thus, we outline a program of research and debate in which we believe that the professional decision analysis community should engage.
56 citations
"A participatory budget model under ..." refers background in this paper
...…mplementing intuitively simple preference elicitation interfaces for on-sophisticated users and tailored to the needs of different user roups as discussed by French, Ríos Insua, and Ruggeri (2007), with ethods that do not require specialized training for participants, see cott et al. (2001)....
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TL;DR: This work outlines a framework to develop user-friendly, yet rigorous, participatory decision support methods based on interactive Pareto frontier visualization combined with expression of preferences in terms of feasible goals and using feasible goal-based arbitration.
48 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the arbitrator's task of arbitrator selection is viewed as the selection of a single, fair, Pareto optimal outcome of a game, and it may be especially difficult if arbitrator lacks crucial information about the structure of the game or the preferences of its players.
Abstract: One may view the task of an arbitrator to be the selection of a single, fair, Pareto optimal outcome of a game. This task may be especially difficult if the arbitrator lacks crucial information about the structure of the game or the preferences of its players. In addition to the mechanical problems associated with information gathering, there may arise situations in which the arbitrator must rely on the players themselves to provide certain information. If the players can predict the effect of their responses on the arbitrator's selection, they may have incentives to provide false information. The purpose of this paper is to explore the effects of possible courses of action which the arbitrator may pursue in such situations. The bulk of the game-theoretic literature on bargaining and arbitration assumes complete information about the game. In Harsanyi and Selten (1972) a model of bargaining was first introduced in which the two players possessed incomplete information about the game. Subsequently, Kalai and Rosenthal (forthcoming) treated a situation in which the two players possessed complete information and the arbitrator was ignorant. They showed that the arbitrator could create incentives for truth-telling by using each player's report as a check on the other's report and by severely punishing both players in the case of conflicting reports. This scheme relies very heavily on the assumption of complete information on the part of the players. In what follows, we deal with a model for two-party disputes in which all participants (both players and the arbitrator) may possess incomplete information. We examine possible arbitration schemes with respect to three criteria: that truthful revelation should be in equilibrium, that the arbitrated outcome should be Pareto optimal relative to the information available to the players and the arbitrator taken together, and that the arbitrated outcome should be individuaLly rational in the sense that neither player could expect to do better by refusing to submit to binding arbitration. We show that there exist games for which no arbitration scheme can satisfy all three criteria; we provide sufficient conditions under which a scheme similar to that proposed in Kalai and Rosenthal (forthcoming) satisfies all three criteria; and we examine the effects of requiring each set of two of the criteria. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the model and the criteria are specified and discussed. An example is given to illustrate the concepts. In Section 3 an example is presented for which the three criteria are inconsistent. In Section 4 sufficient conditions are established for the consistency of the three criteria. Pairwise combinations of the three criteria are treated in Section 5. Section 6 is devoted to a discussion of some related points.
47 citations
"A participatory budget model under ..." refers background in this paper
...Rosenthal (1978), Babcock and Taylor (1996) or ollen, Euwema, and Müller (2010) discuss issues in relation with aritration under uncertainty....
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Book•
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TL;DR: The bulk of research in the field concentrates mainly on technologies to facilitate or automate standard democratic instruments, such as e-voting, which essentially refer only to facilitating voting through electronic means.
Abstract: We are all aware of political imperatives towards e-government and public participation which, together with pressures from the information and communications industry to sell their wares, mean that e-participation and e-democracy are coming, and coming fast, whether or not the processes involved are meaningful and valid. Indeed, the bulk of research in the field concentrates mainly on technologies to facilitate or automate standard democratic instruments. Typical examples include technologies of e-voting, which essentially refer only to facilitating voting through electronic means, and techno
44 citations
"A participatory budget model under ..." refers background in this paper
...For this reason, instituions worldwide are promoting various participatory initiatives, see íos Insua and French (2010) for reviews....
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01 Jan 1989
TL;DR: The stochastic programming model can be viewed as an extension of the linear and nonlinear programming models to decision models where the coefficients that are not known with certainty have been given a probabilistic representation as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: Publisher Summary This chapter focuses on stochastic programming. The stochastic programming model can be viewed as an extension of the linear and nonlinear programming models to decision models where the coefficients that are not known with certainty have been given a probabilistic representation. In the context of the mathematical programming models, some versions of this model were introduced and there had been a number of simple stochastic programming models, which had been formulated in inventory theory—micro-economics and system maintenance. The chapter reviews the useful properties of expectation functionals and analyzes the type of constraints and objective functions that arise in various stochastic programming. The questions of sensitivity and stability of the solution with respect to perturbations of the underlying probability measure, and the implications of these results for stochastic programs are presented in the chapter.
37 citations
"A participatory budget model under ..." refers background in this paper
...Two clasic versions of chance-constrained problems are the individual chance onstraints (Charnes & Cooper, 1959; Wets, 1989) and the joint chance onstraints (Miller & Warner, 1965), which we adopt here: we place a ower bound β on the probability that each stochastic constraint will e jointly…...
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