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Journal ArticleDOI

A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus

01 Jan 2009-British Journal of Political Science (Cambridge University Press)-Vol. 39, Iss: 1, pp 1-23
TL;DR: In this article, the authors claim that European integration has become politicized in elections and referendums, and as a result, the preferences of the general public and of national political parties have become decisive for jurisdictional outcomes.
Abstract: Preferences over jurisdictional architecture are the product of three irreducible logics: efficiency, distribution and identity. This article substantiates the following claims: (a) European integration has become politicized in elections and referendums; (b) as a result, the preferences of the general public and of national political parties have become decisive for jurisdictional outcomes; (c) identity is critical in shaping contestation on Europe.
Citations
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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that the EU's legitimacy is mainly defined by output effectiveness for the people and input participation by the people, and they define and discuss this third normative criterion as well as the interaction effects of all three normative criteria.
Abstract: Scholars of the European Union have analyzed the EU's legitimacy mainly in terms of two normative criteria: output effectiveness for the people and input participation by the people. This article argues that missing from this theorization is what goes on in the ‘black box’ of governance between input and output, or ‘throughput’. Throughput consists of governance processes with the people, analyzed in terms of their efficacy, accountability, transparency, inclusiveness and openness to interest consultation. This article defines and discusses this third normative criterion as well as the interaction effects of all three normative criteria. It does so by considering EU scholars' institutional and constructivist analyses of EU legitimacy as well as empirical cases of and proposed solutions to the EU's democracy problems. The article also suggests that unlike input and output, which affect public perceptions of legitimacy both when they are increased or decreased, throughput tends to be most salient when negat...

796 citations


Cites background from "A Postfunctionalist Theory of Europ..."

  • ...Most of the scholarly literature, in fact, separates these two kinds of analyses, focusing attention either on the logics of institutional form and decision-making practices or on the ideational constructions and discursive interactions of identity and community.2 But both are necessary to assess…...

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  • ...This analytic framework is more concerned with sentient (thinking and speaking) agents who convey ideas through discourse according to an interactive “logic of communication” in political institutions that embody meaning-based structures and constructs (Habermas 1996, 2001; Risse 2010; Schmidt…...

    [...]

Posted Content
TL;DR: In this article, the authors analyzed two strategically different options of EU regional policy: place-neutral versus place-based policies for economic development and found that in many EU regions, the placeneutral policies may not be the best policy response to facing new challenges posed by deeper economic integration and globalisation.
Abstract: EU regional policy is an investment policy. It supports job creation, competitiveness, economic growth, improved quality of life and sustainable development. These investments support the delivery of the Europe 2020 strategy. The present paper analysis two strategically different options of EU regional policy: place-neutral versus place-based policies for economic development. Our results suggest that in many EU regions the place-neutral policies may no be the best policy response to facing new challenges posed by deeper economic integration and globalisation.

789 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors found that the divide between winners and losers of globalization was a key driver of the British EU exit, particularly among less-educated, poorer and older voters, and those who expressed concerns about immigration and multi-culturalism.
Abstract: The outcome of the British referendum on European Union (EU) membership sent shockwaves through Europe. While Britain is an outlier when it comes to the strength of Euroscepticism, the anti-immigration and anti-establishment sentiments that produced the referendum outcome are gaining strength across Europe. Analysing campaign and survey data, this article shows that the divide between winners and losers of globalization was a key driver of the vote. Favouring British EU exit, or ‘Brexit’, was particularly common among less-educated, poorer and older voters, and those who expressed concerns about immigration and multi-culturalism. While there is no evidence of a short-term contagion effect with similar membership referendums in other countries, the Brexit vote nonetheless poses a serious challenge to the political establishment across Europe.

677 citations


Cites background from "A Postfunctionalist Theory of Europ..."

  • ...…European integration is not only, or even primarily, about trade and the single market, but also about a pooling of sovereignty that potentially erodes national self-determination and blurs boundaries between distinct national communities (Carey 2002; Hooghe and Marks 2005, 2009; McLaren 2006)....

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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors argue that the perforation of national states by immigration, integration and trade may signify a critical juncture in the political development of Europe no less consequential for political parties and party systems than the previous junctures that Lipset and Rokkan detect in their classic article.
Abstract: This article argues that the perforation of national states by immigration, integration and trade may signify a critical juncture in the political development of Europe no less consequential for political parties and party systems than the previous junctures that Lipset and Rokkan detect in their classic article. We present evidence suggesting that (1) party systems are determined in episodic breaks from the past; (2) political parties are programmatically inflexible; and, (3) as a consequence, party system change comes in the form of rising parties.

676 citations


Cites background from "A Postfunctionalist Theory of Europ..."

  • ...…for 2014 from the CHES trend file. awakened in an era of constraining dissensus when attitudes over Europe are expressed in national elections, European elections and national referendum campaigns which escape mainstream party control (Grande and Hutter 2016: 40; Hooghe and Marks 2009; Treib 2014)....

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  • ...Functional efficiency in the provision of public goods calls for multilevel governance, both below and above the central state (Hooghe and Marks 2009, 2015)....

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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the variation of anti-corruption and anti-elite saliency in party positioning across Europe was studied. And it was shown that while anticorruption salience is primarily related to the (regional) context in which a party operates, anti-ELite salience was primarily a function of party ideology, and extreme left and extreme conservative (TAN) parties are significantly more likely to emphasize antielite views.
Abstract: This article addresses the variation of anti-corruption and anti-elite salience in party positioning across Europe. It demonstrates that while anti-corruption salience is primarily related to the (regional) context in which a party operates, anti-elite salience is primarily a function of party ideology. Extreme left and extreme conservative (TAN) parties are significantly more likely to emphasize anti-elite views. Through its use of the new 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey wave, this article also introduces the dataset.

533 citations

References
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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors focus on the relationship between neofunctional reasoning and the study of collective identities and show that socialization into European identity works not so much through transnational processes or through exposure to European institutions, but on the national levels in a process whereby Europeanness or "becoming European" is gradually being embedded in understandings of national identities.
Abstract: This article concentrates on the relationship between neofunctionalist reasoning and the study of collective identities. Recent research confirms what Ernst B. Haas already knew in 1958, namely, that transferring loyalty to Europe and the EU is possible without giving up one's national (or regional or local or gender) identities. But preliminary results challenge the assumption that the transfer of loyalties on to the European level simply followed from the material benefits received through European integration. At the same time, the evidence suggests that socialization into European identity works not so much through transnational processes or through exposure to European institutions, but on the national levels in a process whereby Europeanness or ‘becoming European’ is gradually being embedded in understandings of national identities. This latter reasoning also sheds light on the double puzzle of European integration, i.e. the persistent balance in the EU's constitution-building between supra...

226 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
Geoffrey Evans1
TL;DR: This paper used the British Election Panel Study to assess the impact of voters' and party positions vis-a-vis European integration on Conservative electoral support between 1992 and 1996, finding that Conservative divisions over Europe helped turn this potential electoral asset into a liability, leaving the party further from individual voters' own positions than were either of the other two main political contenders.
Abstract: This article uses the British Election Panel Study to assess the impact of voters' and party positions vis-a-vis European integration on Conservative electoral support between 1992 and 1996. Over this period levels of public support for European integration declined markedly, so that by 1996 the Conservative party was even closer to aggregate public opinion, when compared with its main competitors, than it had been at the time of the 1992 election. However, an analysis of the proximity between individuals' positions on integration and the positions they then attributed to the parties indicates that Conservative divisions over Europe helped turn this potential electoral asset into a liability, leaving the party further from individual voters' own positions than were either of the other two main political contenders. Moreover, as issue proximity on integration predicts voting even when past vote and proximity on other issues are controlled for, it is likely that the European question will have resulted in electoral costs rather than the benefits it could have produced. One implication of these findings is that if the Conservatives hope to do well on this issue they will need to adopt a consistent Eurosceptic line, but such a strategy is unlikely to be easily maintained.

154 citations

Posted Content
TL;DR: The authors empirically test three of the most significant theories about the emergence of a European identity: cultural theory, instrumental theory and civic theory, and find that national and European identities are compatible.
Abstract: In this paper we empirically test three of the most significant theories about the emergence of a European identity. The three approaches considered here are, respectively: First, a cultural theory, which understands identities as being based on ethno-cultural factors generated through a long-term (historical) process; second, an instrumental theory, which conceives of identities as being based on self-interested calculation (whether economic or political); and a third, civic theory, which understands identities as being based on agreement over rules for peaceful political co-existence. Our empirical test of these theories exploits Eurobarometer data. In recent years, many researchers have become increasingly dissatisfied with the way these surveys poll attitudes towards the EU. We have contributed to this debate by designing special new questions to measure national and European identities which were included in Eurobarometer 57.2 and are used here for this analysis. Our results provide only partial support for the theories mentioned above. We find that national and European identities are compatible. This is, in part, because while national identities are largely cultural, European identities are primarily instrumental. However, we also find that there is a sufficient European common cultural ground for a European identity to emerge. We have also confirmed that, because national and European identities are different, the development of a European identity does not necessarily imply the transfer of loyalties from the national to the supranational level. In all the countries analysed here, attachment to the nation remains strong, and certainly greater than attachment to Europe. We also show that it is harder for a European identity to develop in countries with a strong sense of national pride.

73 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigate the challenges that political parties face in referendums, and find that efficacious voters are likely to disregard the recommendation of their preferred party, while politically disinterested voters are more likely to follow the party endorsement.
Abstract: This article investigates the challenges that political parties face in referendums. While political parties are still key actors in a referendum campaign, a number of factors weaken their position. Ambiguous cueing, internal dissidence, electoral volatility and limited impact on citizens’ prime information sources reduce the influence of political parties. Large, centrist political parties have the worst performance record in terms of getting their voters to follow the recommendation of the party, while smaller, ideologically strongly profiled parties are more successful in aligning their voters with party policy. At the individual level, we find that, in particular, efficacious voters are likely to disregard the recommendation of their preferred party, while politically disinterested voters are more likely to follow the party endorsement. The article concludes with a discussion of the contingent nature of party control over referendums.

54 citations