Dissertation•
A Pragmatic View of Proper Name Reference
01 Jan 2016-
TL;DR: The authors argue that the reference of a proper name is not determined by the semantics of the name, but is determined by pragmatic factors on an occasion of use, such as the context of utterance.
Abstract: I argue, in this thesis, that proper name reference is a wholly pragmatic phenomenon. The reference of a proper name is neither constitutive of, nor determined by, the semantic content of that name, but is determined, on an occasion of use, by pragmatic factors. The majority of views in the literature on proper name reference claim that reference is in some way determined by the semantics of the name, either because their reference simply constitutes their semantics (which generally requires a very fine-grained individuation of names), or because names have an indexical-like semantics that returns a referent given certain specific contextual parameters. I discuss and criticize these views in detail, arguing, essentially, in both cases, that there can be no determinate criteria for reference determination—a claim required by both types of semantic view. I also consider a less common view on proper name reference: that it is determined wholly by speakers’ intentions. I argue that the most plausible version of this view—a strong neo-Gricean position whereby all utterance content is determined by the communicative intentions of the speaker—is implausible in light of psychological data. In the positive part of my thesis, I develop a pragmatic view of proper name reference that is influenced primarily by the work of Charles Travis. I argue that the reference of proper names can only be satisfactorily accounted for by claiming that reference occurs not at the level of word meaning, but at the pragmatic level, on an occasion of utterance. I claim that the contextual mechanisms that determine the reference of a name on an occasion are the same kinds of thing that determine the truth-values of utterances according to Travis. Thus, names are, effectively, occasionsensitive in the way that Travis claims predicates and sentences (amongst other expressions) are. Finally, I discuss how further research might address how my pragmatic view of reference affects traditional issues in the literature on names, and the consequences of the view for the
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01 Jan 1985
TL;DR: In this paper, a new model of metarepresentational development was used to predict a cognitive deficit in children with autism, which could explain a crucial component of the social impairment in childhood autism.
Abstract: Abstract We use a new model of metarepresentational development to predict a cognitive deficit which could explain a crucial component of the social impairment in childhood autism. One of the manifestations of a basic metarepresentational capacity is a ‘theory of mind’. We have reason to believe that autistic children lack such a ‘theory’. If this were so, then they would be unable to impute beliefs to others and to predict their behaviour. This hypothesis was tested using Wimmer and Perner's puppet play paradigm. Normal children and those with Down's syndrome were used as controls for a group of autistic children. Even though the mental age of the autistic children was higher than that of the controls, they alone failed to impute beliefs to others. Thus the dysfunction we have postulated and demonstrated is independent of mental retardation and specific to autism.
6,007 citations
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TL;DR: A meta-analysis found that when organized into a systematic set of factors that vary across studies, false-belief results cluster systematically with the exception of only a few outliers, and is consistent with theoretical accounts that propose that understanding of belief, and, relatedly, understanding of mind, exhibit genuine conceptual change in the preschool years.
Abstract: Research on theory of mind increasingly encompasses apparently contradictory findings. In particular, in initial studies, older preschoolers consistently passed false-belief tasks—a so-called “definitive” test of mentalstate understanding—whereas younger children systematically erred. More recent studies, however, have found evidence of false-belief understanding in 3-year-olds or have demonstrated conditions that improve children’s performance. A meta-analysis was conducted ( N � 178 separate studies) to address the empirical inconsistencies and theoretical controversies. When organized into a systematic set of factors that vary across studies, false-belief results cluster systematically with the exception of only a few outliers. A combined model that included age, country of origin, and four task factors (e.g., whether the task objects were transformed in order to deceive the protagonist or not) yielded a multiple R of .74 and an R 2 of .55; thus, the model accounts for 55% of the variance in false-belief performance. Moreover, false-belief performance showed a consistent developmental pattern, even across various countries and various task manipulations: preschoolers went from below-chance performance to above-chance performance. The findings are inconsistent with early competence proposals that claim that developmental changes are due to tasks artifacts, and thus disappear in simpler, revised false-belief tasks; and are, instead, consistent with theoretical accounts that propose that understanding of belief, and, relatedly, understanding of mind, exhibit genuine conceptual change in the preschool years.
3,493 citations
01 Jan 2013
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors apply results of the four previous chapters in order to elucidate main traits of the PI, and explain the role of an old remark (PI, §372) in the new context of PI.
Abstract: In this chapter, I intend to apply results of the four previous chapters in order to elucidate main traits of the PI. I do not intend to give an account of the whole book, nor get into the details of the sections discussed. In parts 1–3, I focus on PI, §§1–136, where the genetic method, embedded in an anthropological view, is applied to the T. These sections give us the “right light” in which the book is to be read, i.e., “by contrast and against the background of [Wittgenstein’s] older way of thinking” (PI, preface). In part 4, I explain the role of an old remark (PI, §372) in the new context of the PI. This I do in order to avoid the misleading view according to which the ‘old grammar’ of the BT is still in place in the PI, and to elucidate the role of “grammatical remarks.”
2,215 citations