A region of their making:visions of regional orders and paths to peace making in northeast Asia
01 Jan 2006-
About: The article was published on 2006-01-01 and is currently open access. It has received 17 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Vision.
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TL;DR: Gries as discussed by the authors argues from a social psychological point of view that Chinese identity "evolves in dynamic relationship with other nations and the past" and "involves both the Chinese people and other passions".
Abstract: China's New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy, by Peter Hayes Gries. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004. x + 215 pp. US$24.95/£15.95 (hardcover). The aim of this book, as stated in the Introduction, is to present a balanced view of "China's new nationalism", "one that acknowledges its legitimate grievances and recognizes its potential dangers" (p. 12). It argues from a social psychological point of view that Chinese identity "evolves in dynamic relationship with other nations and the past" and "involves both the Chinese people and other passions" (p. 19). These interrelated arguments are intended not only to challenge what the author calls "the dominant Western interpretation of Chinese nationalism" and the "West's state-centric view of Chinese nationalism" but also to draw attention to the dangers of China-bashing in the US and America-bashing in China. "Nationalism" in this book refers to "any behavior designed to restore, maintain, or advance public images" of a national community (p. 9). What seems to make "China's new nationalism" new is its "genuine popularity" and "independent existence". This conclusion is based on the evidence that Chinese nationalism increasingly challenges the Party-state; that the Chinese, like all peoples, have deep-seated emotional attachments to their national identity; and that Chinese public opinion now plays a role in national politics. Another new feature of today's Chinese nationalism is the way in which it constructs narratives of a "century of humiliation". The national narrative of heroism and victory that served the requirements of Communist revolutionaries and nation-building goals under Mao are now superseded by a new and popular victimization narrative that blames the West, including Japan, for China's suffering. It is not immediately clear in the book why long-suppressed memories of past suffering resurfaced in the 1990s, but this seems to have much to do with a psychological need to return continually to unresolved traumas in the hope of mastering them. These themes are developed through an examination of nationalist writings-mostly by Chinese intellectuals-and the official and popular responses to a number of well-known events in the 1990s and more recently. Chapter 1 looks at the protests in 1999 in the wake of the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. Chapter 2 discusses the ways that Chinese national identity is shaped in a dialogic process of comparison with and distinction from the US and Japan. Chapter 3 turns to the effect of Chinese visions of the "century of humiliation" on their self-image, as well as the impact of changes to their national identity on Chinese views of the century. Chapters 4 and 5 revisit Chinese views of the US and Japan, although this time the focus shifts to writings about past and future Sino-American and Sino-Japanese relations. In Chapter 6-probably the most substantive and interesting chapter-Gries explores the motivation of Chinese nationalists, focusing on China's apology diplomacy. Chapters 7 and 8 can be thought of as a conclusion in two parts, in that they pull together and highlight once again some of the book's main themes. The book does an admirable job in demonstrating that the way US policymakers and commentators talk about China dangerously distorts US interpretations of, and responses to, Chinese policies and actions, and influences Chinese understandings of the US. It also shows convincingly that anti-American and anti-Chinese polemics easily spiral into mutual dehumanization and demonization and thus lay the foundations for violent conflict. A no less significant contribution the book makes is its perspective on Chinese nationalism. Central to Gries' perception is the concept of face-so much so that he has consistently italicized the word in the book. What he means by face is not simply the figurative self shown to others but also a prerequisite for maintaining authority and the ability to pursue instrumental goals. …
89 citations
Journal Article•
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors ask whether it is more likely that China's economy will grow to be as large as the US economy or the US will always stay larger than China's.
Abstract: Questionnaire Q1. Do you think that it is more likely that someday China's economy will grow to be as large as the US economy or that the US economy will always stay larger than China's? China's economy will grow as large as the US economy The US economy will always stay larger than China's Not sure/ Decline (%) (%) Q2. If China's economy were to grow to be as large as the US economy, do you think that would be mostly positive, mostly negative, or equally positive and negative?
85 citations
73 citations
Book•
22 May 2014
TL;DR: The contribution of the ASEAN/Chinese way to the long peace of East Asia Developmentalism and the prevention of the onset of conflicts is discussed in this article. But the main argument is not the long-term stability of the region.
Abstract: Contents: Preface Aim and concepts Theoretical premises of the argument The phenomenon to be explained: the long peace of East Asia The main argument: the contribution of the ASEAN/Chinese way to the long peace of East Asia Developmentalism and the prevention of the onset of conflicts Non-intervention and the prevention of the escalation of conflicts into wars Face saving and the termination of conflicts Generation of the successful ASEAN/Chinese approach Will the long peace survive? How could it be made broader, positive and more sustainable? What can the East Asian experience offer to theories of international relations, peace and conflicts? Bibliography Index
48 citations
Journal Article•
46 citations
References
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TL;DR: Theories of international politics and security depend on assumptions about emotion that are rarely articulated and which may not be correct as mentioned in this paper, and it is no wonder that postconoict peacebuilding efforts too frequently fail and wars re-reurupt because peace settlements and peacebuilding policies play with emotional are that practitioners scarcely understand but nevertheless seek to manipulate.
Abstract: Theories of international politics and security depend on assumptions about emotion that are rarely articulated and which may not be correct. Deterrence theory may be fundamentally oawed because its assumptions and policy prescriptions do not fully acknowledge and take into account reasonable human responses to threat and fear. Similarly, liberal theories of cooperation under anarchy and the formation of security communities that stress actors’ rational calculation of the beneats of communication and coordination are deacient to the extent that they do not include careful consideration of emotion and emotional relationships. Further, it is no wonder that postconoict peacebuilding efforts too frequently fail and wars reerupt because peace settlements and peacebuilding policies play with emotional are that practitioners scarcely understand but nevertheless seek to manipulate. Systematic analysis of emotion may have important implications for international relations theory and the practices of diplomacy, negotiation, and postconoict peacebuilding. International relations theory has lately tended to ignore explicit consideration of “the passions.”1 Even realists, who highlight insecurity (fear) and nationalism (love and hate), have not systematically studied emotion. Why this ostensible neglect?2 First, the assumption of rationality is ubiquitous in inter-
454 citations
TL;DR: For example, surprise remains one of the few things one can count on, and very few princes have succeeded in avoiding it, however assiduous the efforts of their respective wizards, medicine men, counselors, advisers, and think tank consultants to ward it off as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: I Pr inces have always sought out soothsayers of one kind or another for the purpose of learning what the future holds. These hired visionaries have found portents in the configurations of stars, the entrails of animals, and most indicators in between. The results, on the whole, have been disappointing. Surprise remains one of the few things one can count on, and very few princes have succeeded in avoiding it, however assiduous the efforts of their respective wizards, medicine men, counselors, advisers, and think tank consultants to ward it off. Surprise is still very much with us. The abrupt end of the Cold War, an unanticipated hot war in the Persian Gulf, and the sudden disintegration of the Soviet Union astonished almost everyone, whether in government, the academy, the media, or the think tanks. Although there was nothing inherently implausible about these eventsthe Cold War did have to end sometime, war had always been a possibility in the Middle East, and communism’s failures had been obvious for years-the fact that they arose so unexpectedly suggests that deficiencies persist in the means by which contemporary princes and the soothsayers they employ seek to discern the future course of world affairs. No modern soothsayer, of course, would aspire to total clairvoyance. We have no equivalent of Isaac Asimov’s famous character, the mathematician Hari Seldon, whose predictive powers were so great that he was able to leave precise holographic instructions for his followers, to be consulted at successive intervals decades after his death.’ But historians, political scientists, economists, psychologists, and even mathemati-
400 citations
TL;DR: There is a deep epistemological rift over the extent to and ways in which we can know our subject as mentioned in this paper, and it has become one of the great debates in the discipline of International Relations (IR).
Abstract: Within the community of academic students of international politics today there is a deep epistemological rift over the extent to and ways in which we can know our subject. Speaking very broadly, on one side stand what have become known as 'positivists', who think we can get closer to the truth about international politics, but only if we follow the methods which have proven so successful in the natural sciences. And on the other side stand ‘post-positivists’, who think we do not have privileged access to the truth about international politics, and least of all through the methods of natural science. Although it can seem far removed, this epistemological disagreement actually matters quite a lot to our collective efforts to make sense of the real world, since we cannot avoid taking some position on it, and those positions affect the questions we ask, the methods we use to answer those questions, and ultimately the kinds of knowledge that we produce. Perhaps for this reason what may seem more a dispute for philosophers than political scientists has become one of the ‘Great Debates’ (the Third) in the discipline of International Relations (IR), and, indeed, it arguably underlay the ‘Second’ Debate between behaviouralists and traditionalists in the 1960s as well.
380 citations
TL;DR: In this article, it is argued that the development trajectory of Japan will be replicated in a succession of sectors and countries, but this approach fails to capture the complexities of the contemporary regionalization of industrial production.
Abstract: Product cycle theory as expressed in the analogy of flying geese has become a widely accepted way of conceptualizing industrial diffusion across East Asia. As the product cycle is repeated for increasingly sophisticated products, so, it is argued, the development trajectory of Japan will be replicated in a succession of sectors and countries. This approach fails, however, to capture the complexities of the contemporary regionalization of industrial production. East Asian industrial production should not be seen as a tightly coupled process in which the rise of national economies parallels successive product cycles. Rather than Japan's development trajectory being replicated in country after country, industrial diffusion has been characterized by shifting hierarchical networks of production and partial diffusion into diverse politicoeconomic contexts at differing historical junctures. It has also resulted in a triangulation of the region's trade patterns that has generated large imbalances in trade both within the region and between the region and the United States.
374 citations
TL;DR: The future character of the relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China is likely to be marked by convergence toward deepening cooperation, stability, and stability as discussed by the authors, and will be characterized by convergence towards deepening cooperation and stability.
Abstract: What is likely to be the future character of the relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China? Will it be marked by convergence toward deepening cooperation, stability,...
369 citations