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Journal ArticleDOI

A simple mechanism for the efficient provision of public goods - experimental evidence

TL;DR: In this paper, a series of experiments designed to investigate the factor of incentive mechanisms in the case of private provisions of public goods is presented. But the results showed that the proposed incentive mechanism is very promising.
Abstract: The author reports on a series of experiments designed to investigate the factor of incentive mechanisms in the case of private provisions of public goods. In the Control treatment, there was no mechanism so that subjects faced strong free-riding incentives. In the so-called Falkinger mechanism treatment, the author implemented the Falkinger mechanism. The studies explored the impact of the mechanism in different economic environments. Results showed that the proposed incentive mechanism is very promising. Section I of the paper introduces the mechanism to be examined. Section II discusses the experimental design. Empirical results are provided in Section III, and Section IV interprets these results followed by a summary.

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Summary

  • In the Control treatment, there was no mechanism so that subjects faced strong free-riding incentives.
  • The studies explored the impact of the mechanism in different economic environments.
  • Results showed that the proposed incentive mechanism is very promising.
  • Empirical results are provided in Section III, and Section IV interprets these results followed by a summary.

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University of Zurich
Zurich Open Repository and Archive
Winterthurerstr. 190
CH-8057 Zurich
http://www.zora.unizh.ch
Year: 2000
A simple mechanism for the efficient provision of public goods:
experimental evidence
Falkinger, Josef; Fehr, Ernst; Gächter, Simon; Winter-Ebmer, Rudolf
Falkinger, Josef; Fehr, Ernst; Gächter, Simon; Winter-Ebmer, Rudolf. A simple mechanism for the efficient
provision of public goods: experimental evidence. American Economic Review 2000, 90(1):247-264.
Postprint available at:
http://www.zora.unizh.ch
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich.
http://www.zora.unizh.ch
Originally published at:
American Economic Review 2000, 90(1):247-264
Falkinger, Josef; Fehr, Ernst; Gächter, Simon; Winter-Ebmer, Rudolf. A simple mechanism for the efficient
provision of public goods: experimental evidence. American Economic Review 2000, 90(1):247-264.
Postprint available at:
http://www.zora.unizh.ch
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich.
http://www.zora.unizh.ch
Originally published at:
American Economic Review 2000, 90(1):247-264

A simple mechanism for the efficient provision of public goods:
experimental evidence
Abstract
The author reports on a series of experiments designed to investigate the factor of incentive mechanisms
in the case of private provisions of public goods. In the Control treatment, there was no mechanism so
that subjects faced strong free-riding incentives. In the so-called Falkinger mechanism treatment, the
author implemented the Falkinger mechanism. The studies explored the impact of the mechanism in
different economic environments. Results showed that the proposed incentive mechanism is very
promising. Section I of the paper introduces the mechanism to be examined. Section II discusses the
experimental design. Empirical results are provided in Section III, and Section IV interprets these results
followed by a summary.




Citations
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors experimentally study how selective (favorable or unfavorable) information about past cooperativeness of unrelated groups affects cooperation in problems of collective action and find that cooperation relies on pre-play information, coinciding with a change in initial beliefs.
Abstract: Information has a long history of being used with the intention to influence people's behavior, particularly in situations where people are likely to condition their own behavior on what they expect most others to do. We experimentally study how selective (favorable or unfavorable) information about past cooperativeness of unrelated groups affects cooperation in problems of collective action. We find cooperation to crucially depend on pre-play information, coinciding with a change in initial beliefs. In addition, we find unfavorable information to substantially reduce the effectiveness of peer punishment. This prevents groups that start off on the wrong foot from recovering over time. The impact of information does not rely on information being public or private. Yet it critically relies on the information being surprising. In a cooperative environment, it is unfavorable information that matters; in an uncooperative environment, it is favorable information.

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References
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TL;DR: This article presents bootstrap methods for estimation, using simple arguments, with Minitab macros for implementing these methods, as well as some examples of how these methods could be used for estimation purposes.
Abstract: This article presents bootstrap methods for estimation, using simple arguments. Minitab macros for implementing these methods are given.

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TL;DR: This is the revision of the classic text in the field, adding two new chapters and thoroughly updating all others as discussed by the authors, and the original structure is retained, and the book continues to serve as a combined text/reference.
Abstract: This is the revision of the classic text in the field, adding two new chapters and thoroughly updating all others. The original structure is retained, and the book continues to serve as a combined text/reference.

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TL;DR: Z-Tree as mentioned in this paper is a toolbox for ready-made economic experiments, which allows programming almost any kind of experiments in a short time and is stable and easy to use.
Abstract: z-Tree (Zurich Toolbox for Ready-made Economic Experiments) is a software for developing and conducting economic experiments. The software is stable and allows programming almost any kind of experiments in a short time. In this article, I present the guiding principles behind the software design, its features, and its limitations.

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Abstract: There is strong evidence that people exploit their bargaining power in competitivemarkets butnot inbilateral bargainingsituations. Thereisalsostrong evidence that people exploit free-riding opportunities in voluntary cooperation games. Yet, when they are given the opportunity to punish free riders, stable cooperation is maintained, although punishment is costly for those who punish. This paper asks whether there is a simple common principle that can explain this puzzling evidence. We show that if some people care about equity the puzzles can be resolved. It turns out that the economic environment determines whether the fair types or the selesh types dominate equilibrium behavior.

8,783 citations

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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors propose a method to use the information of the user's interaction with the service provider in order to improve the quality of the service provided to the user.
Abstract: Классическая работа лаурета Нобелевской премии по экономике Пола Самуэльсона, заложившая основу современной теории общественных благ. В статье формулируются условия выбора оптимального объема предоставления общественного блага, ныне присутствующие в любом учебнике микроэкономики и экономики общественного сектора.

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