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Journal ArticleDOI

A simple mechanism for the efficient provision of public goods - experimental evidence

TL;DR: In this paper, a series of experiments designed to investigate the factor of incentive mechanisms in the case of private provisions of public goods is presented. But the results showed that the proposed incentive mechanism is very promising.
Abstract: The author reports on a series of experiments designed to investigate the factor of incentive mechanisms in the case of private provisions of public goods. In the Control treatment, there was no mechanism so that subjects faced strong free-riding incentives. In the so-called Falkinger mechanism treatment, the author implemented the Falkinger mechanism. The studies explored the impact of the mechanism in different economic environments. Results showed that the proposed incentive mechanism is very promising. Section I of the paper introduces the mechanism to be examined. Section II discusses the experimental design. Empirical results are provided in Section III, and Section IV interprets these results followed by a summary.

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Summary

  • In the Control treatment, there was no mechanism so that subjects faced strong free-riding incentives.
  • The studies explored the impact of the mechanism in different economic environments.
  • Results showed that the proposed incentive mechanism is very promising.
  • Empirical results are provided in Section III, and Section IV interprets these results followed by a summary.

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University of Zurich
Zurich Open Repository and Archive
Winterthurerstr. 190
CH-8057 Zurich
http://www.zora.unizh.ch
Year: 2000
A simple mechanism for the efficient provision of public goods:
experimental evidence
Falkinger, Josef; Fehr, Ernst; Gächter, Simon; Winter-Ebmer, Rudolf
Falkinger, Josef; Fehr, Ernst; Gächter, Simon; Winter-Ebmer, Rudolf. A simple mechanism for the efficient
provision of public goods: experimental evidence. American Economic Review 2000, 90(1):247-264.
Postprint available at:
http://www.zora.unizh.ch
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich.
http://www.zora.unizh.ch
Originally published at:
American Economic Review 2000, 90(1):247-264
Falkinger, Josef; Fehr, Ernst; Gächter, Simon; Winter-Ebmer, Rudolf. A simple mechanism for the efficient
provision of public goods: experimental evidence. American Economic Review 2000, 90(1):247-264.
Postprint available at:
http://www.zora.unizh.ch
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich.
http://www.zora.unizh.ch
Originally published at:
American Economic Review 2000, 90(1):247-264

A simple mechanism for the efficient provision of public goods:
experimental evidence
Abstract
The author reports on a series of experiments designed to investigate the factor of incentive mechanisms
in the case of private provisions of public goods. In the Control treatment, there was no mechanism so
that subjects faced strong free-riding incentives. In the so-called Falkinger mechanism treatment, the
author implemented the Falkinger mechanism. The studies explored the impact of the mechanism in
different economic environments. Results showed that the proposed incentive mechanism is very
promising. Section I of the paper introduces the mechanism to be examined. Section II discusses the
experimental design. Empirical results are provided in Section III, and Section IV interprets these results
followed by a summary.




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Abstract: This is the revision of the classic text in the field, adding two new chapters and thoroughly updating all others. The original structure is retained, and the book continues to serve as a combined text/reference.

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