A Survey of Game Theory Applications in Electrical Power Micro-Grid Systems
17 Feb 2020-International Journal of Computer Applications (Foundation of Computer Science (FCS), NY, USA)-Vol. 177, Iss: 37, pp 25-34
TL;DR: The fundamental concepts of game theory are streamlined, an overview on the applications of game theoretical concepts in various microgrid optimization problems are presented, and some future opportunities that are expected to solve some of the technical challenges facing micro-grid technology are introduced.
Abstract: The technology of Smart Grid is believed to be the future of power system networks. Smart Grid (SG) gains its importance due to its proven ability to improve stability, efficiency and robustness of electrical power grids. SG system consists mainly of two components which are electrical distribution system and communication layer. In the electrical distribution system, the generated energy comes from a network of distributed energy resources \"DERs\", which is called microgrid. In most cases, these DERs are recommended to be renewable energy sources \"RESs\" to reduce emissions and harmful environmental effects. One of the main drawbacks of renewable energy sources is that their availability varies with time and so that the micro-grid technology faces various technical challenges which motivate many researchers to adopt techniques to overcome these challenges. In this regard and due to its capability of studying complex interactions between independent rational players, game theory is expected to have a great contribution in the phase of design and analysis of micro-grids. In this paper, the fundamental concepts of game theory are streamlined, an overview on the applications of game theoretical concepts in various microgrid optimization problems are presented, a novel classification of research points covered by researchers are provided. Finally, some future opportunities that are expected to solve some of the technical challenges facing micro-grid technology are introduced.
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01 Jan 1977
TL;DR: In the Hamadryas baboon, males are substantially larger than females, and a troop of baboons is subdivided into a number of ‘one-male groups’, consisting of one adult male and one or more females with their young.
Abstract: In the Hamadryas baboon, males are substantially larger than females. A troop of baboons is subdivided into a number of ‘one-male groups’, consisting of one adult male and one or more females with their young. The male prevents any of ‘his’ females from moving too far from him. Kummer (1971) performed the following experiment. Two males, A and B, previously unknown to each other, were placed in a large enclosure. Male A was free to move about the enclosure, but male B was shut in a small cage, from which he could observe A but not interfere. A female, unknown to both males, was then placed in the enclosure. Within 20 minutes male A had persuaded the female to accept his ownership. Male B was then released into the open enclosure. Instead of challenging male A , B avoided any contact, accepting A’s ownership.
2,364 citations
TL;DR: In this paper , a comprehensive review of single objective and multi-objective optimization methods is performed by considering the practical and technical constraints, uncertainty, and intermittency of renewable energies sources.
Abstract: Community Microgrid offers effective energy harvesting from distributed energy resources and efficient energy consumption by employing an energy management system (EMS). Therefore, the collaborative microgrids are essentially required to apply an EMS, underlying an operative control strategy in order to provide an efficient system. An EMS is apt to optimize the operation of microgrids from several points of view. Optimal production planning, optimal demand-side management, fuel and emission constraints, the revenue of trading spinning and non-spinning reserve capacity can effectively be managed by EMS. Consequently, the importance of optimization is explicit in microgrid applications. In this paper, the most common control strategies in the microgrid community with potential pros and cons are analyzed. Moreover, a comprehensive review of single objective and multi-objective optimization methods is performed by considering the practical and technical constraints, uncertainty, and intermittency of renewable energies sources. The Pareto-optimal solution as the most popular multi-objective optimization approach is investigated for the advanced optimization algorithms. Eventually, feature selection and neural network-based clustering algorithms in order to analyze the Pareto-optimal set are introduced.
32 citations
Journal Article•
TL;DR: Vincent and Brown as mentioned in this paper take a broad view of what constitutes a "game" and place natural selection itself within a game-theoretic framework, and demonstrate how to model many of the complexities in evolving systems including simultaneous selection on multiple traits, the effect of resource availability and distributions on selection, co-evolution among species, and evolution in the context of multiple life history stages.
Abstract: While many books have been written about evolutionary game theory over the last couple of decades, Thomas Vincent and Joel Brown’s recent book, a culmination of their collaboration over almost two decades, is especially ambitious in both breadth and depth. In terms of breadth the authors address a much wider array of biological phenomena (both evolutionary and ecological) than is typical. In addition, whereas classic evolutionary game theory limits itself to behavioral interactions and phenotypes, this book takes a very broad view of what constitutes a “game” and places natural selection itself firmly within a game-theoretic framework. In terms of depth, the authors heartily embrace (and demonstrate how to model) many of the complexities in evolving systems. These include simultaneous selection on multiple traits, the effect of resource availability and distributions on selection, co-evolution among species, and evolution in the context of multiple life history stages. Of course this depth requires more mathematical complexity. Thankfully, the book is well organized such that each chapter, especially those that develop the core of the authors’ techniques (Ch. 4–7), introduces concepts with well written verbal descriptions, then with simple examples, and finally with a progression of more complicated and mathematically sophisticated cases. This allows readers of varying mathematical sophistication to go as far into each chapter as desired, while still gaining enough of the overall message to progress to subsequent chapters. Game theory originated in economics (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947) as a tool for reasoning about how rational individuals (players) should behave in various kinds of “conflict of interest” situations in order to maximize benefit (utility) to themselves. Quickly adapted by other social sciences, game theory proved useful in analyzing phenomena as diverse as Cold War nuclear conflict scenarios, marital strife, and cooperation among unrelated humans in rural
8 citations
02 Sep 2021
1 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the performance of a solar-based power trading scheme is investigated in a shortage-prone context, Beirut City, and the authors resort to a game-theoretic approach to model power trading as a repeated game between buildings at the urban scale.
Abstract: The integration of distributed energy resources and the transition to smart cities are shifting the urban energy sector to a decentralized operating system. Blockchain-based microgrids, where small-scale operators trade electricity among each others, have gained remarkable attention recently. However, most of the proposed schemes study smart grids in prosperous cities. In this study, the performance of a solar-based power trading scheme is investigated in a shortage-prone context, Beirut City. Thus, we resort to a game-theoretic approach to model power trading as a repeated game between buildings at the urban scale. Results show that solar energy can cover up to 25% of the city electricity needs, depending on the rooftops area coverage. On the other hand, we found that deploying a peer-to-peer trading scheme has marginal impact since the energy demand in the city exceeds the supply and most buildings would prioritize self-consumption.
1 citations
References
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TL;DR: A concept of an n -person game in which each player has a finite set of pure strategies and in which a definite set of payments to the n players corresponds to each n -tuple ofpure strategies, one strategy being taken for each player.
Abstract: One may define a concept of an n -person game in which each player has a finite set of pure strategies and in which a definite set of payments to the n players corresponds to each n -tuple of pure strategies, one strategy being taken for each player. For mixed strategies, which are probability distributions over the pure strategies, the pay-off functions are the expectations of the players, thus becoming polylinear forms …
7,047 citations
"A Survey of Game Theory Application..." refers background in this paper
...In 1950, Nash introduced the equilibrium concept named for him as a stable strategic solution for non-cooperative games in [8] and [9]....
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01 Jan 1977
TL;DR: In the Hamadryas baboon, males are substantially larger than females, and a troop of baboons is subdivided into a number of ‘one-male groups’, consisting of one adult male and one or more females with their young.
Abstract: In the Hamadryas baboon, males are substantially larger than females. A troop of baboons is subdivided into a number of ‘one-male groups’, consisting of one adult male and one or more females with their young. The male prevents any of ‘his’ females from moving too far from him. Kummer (1971) performed the following experiment. Two males, A and B, previously unknown to each other, were placed in a large enclosure. Male A was free to move about the enclosure, but male B was shut in a small cage, from which he could observe A but not interfere. A female, unknown to both males, was then placed in the enclosure. Within 20 minutes male A had persuaded the female to accept his ownership. Male B was then released into the open enclosure. Instead of challenging male A , B avoided any contact, accepting A’s ownership.
2,364 citations
Book•
01 Jan 1985TL;DR: In this article, the relationship between the static axiomatic theory of bargaining and the sequential strategic approach to bargaining is established and the results provide a guide for the application of the Nash bargaining solution in economic modelling.
Abstract: This article establishes the relationship between the static axiomatic theory of bargaining and the sequential strategic approach to bargaining. We consider two strategic models of alternating offers. The models differ in the source of the incentive of the bargaining parties to reach agreement: the bargainers' time preference and the risk of breakdown of negotiations. Each of the models has a unique perfect equilibrium. When the motivation to reach agreement is made negligible, in each model the unique perfect equilibrium outcome approaches the Nash bargaining solution with utilities that reflect the incentive to settle and with the proper disagreement point chosen. The results provide a guide for the application of the Nash bargaining solution in economic modelling.
2,214 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, it is shown that under four axioms that describe the behavior of players, there is a unique solution to the two-player bargaining problem, which is different from those suggested by Nash.
Abstract: A two-person bargaining problem is considered. It is shown that under four axioms that describe the behavior of players there is a unique solution to such a problem. The axioms and the solution presented are different from those suggested by Nash. Also, families of solutions which satisfy a more limited set of axioms and which are continuous are discussed. WE CONSIDER a two-person bargaining problem mathematically formulated as follows. To every two-person game we associate a pair (a, S), where a is a point in the plane and S is a subset of the plane. The pair (a, S) has the following intuitive interpretation: a = (a1, a2) where ai is the level of utility that player i receives if the two players do not cooperate with each other. Every point x = (x1, x2) e S represents levels of utility for players 1 and 2 that can be reached by an outcome of the game which is feasible for the two players when they do cooperate. We are interested in finding an outcome in S which will be agreeable to both players. This problem was considered by Nash [3] and his classical result was that under certain axioms there is a unique solution. However, one of his axioms of independence of irrelevant alternatives came under criticism (see [2, p. 128]). In this paper we suggest an alternative axiom which leads to another unique solution. Also, it was called to our attention by the referee that experiments conducted by H. W. Crott [1] led to the solution implied by our axioms rather than to Nash's solution. We also consider the class of continuous solutions which are required to satisfy only the axioms of Nash which are usually accepted. We give examples of families of such solutions.
1,709 citations
775 citations