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A systems approach to stealth on the ground revisited

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In this paper, a new security development is expected to increase interest fromNorthern European states in supporting the development of conceptually newstealthy ground platforms, incorporating a decade of adv...
Abstract
This new security development is expected to increase interest fromNorthern European states in supporting the development of conceptually newstealthy ground platforms, incorporating a decade of adv ...

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This is the published version of a paper presented at Target and Background Signatures, 23–24
September 2015, Toulouse, France.
Citation for the original published paper:
Andersson, K., Kariis, H., Hult, G. (2015)
A systems approach to stealth on the ground revisited.
In: Karin U. Stein & Ric H. M. A. Schleijpen (ed.), Target and Background Signatures SPIE -
International Society for Optical Engineering
SPIE Proceedings
https://doi.org/10.1117/12.2194844
N.B. When citing this work, cite the original published paper.
Copyright: 2015 Society of Photo Optical Instrumentation Engineers. One print or electronic copy
may be made for personal use only. Systematic reproduction and distribution, duplication of any
material in this paper for a fee or for commercial purposes, or modification of the content of the paper
are prohibited.
Permanent link to this version:
http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:fhs:diva-5645

A Systems Approach to Stealth on the Ground Revisited
Kent E Andersson
*a
, Hans Kariis
b
, Gunnar Hult
a
a
Swedish Defence University, Box 278 05, SE-115 93 Stockholm, Sweden
b
Swedish Defence Research Agency, SE-581 11 Linköping, Sweden
ABSTRACT
This new security development is expected to increase interest from Northern European states in supporting the
development of conceptually new stealthy ground platforms, incorporating a decade of advances in technology and
experiences from stealth platforms at sea and in the air. The scope of this case study is to draw experience from where
we left off. At the end of the 1990s there was growing interest in stealth for combat vehicles in Sweden. An ambitious
technology demonstrator project was launched. One of the outcomes was a proposed Systems Engineering process
tailored for signature management presented to SPIE in 2002.(Olsson et.al, A systems approach…, Proc. SPIE 4718 )
The process was used for the Swedish/BAE Systems Hägglunds AB development of a multirole armored platform (The
Swedish acronym is SEP). Before development was completed there was a change of procurement policy in Sweden
from domestic development towards Governmental Off-The-Shelf, preceded by a Swedish Armed Forces change of
focus from national defense only, towards expeditionary missions. Lessons learned, of value for future development, are
presented. They are deduced from interviews of key-personnel, on the procurer and industry sides respectively, and from
document reviews.
Keywords: Stealth, Low observable technology, Signature Management, Camouflage, Military Utility, Military-
Technology, Systems Engineering, Combat vehicle, SEP
1. INTRODUCTION
The worsening security environment in Northern and Eastern Europe increases the need to give priority to national
defense tasks. This in turn increases interest in high-end technology. The procurement of new army materiel during the
first decade of this century has been characterized by states purchasing off-the-shelf products, and thereby sponsoring
only incremental development. The focus of armed forces has been on force protection in asymmetric warfare. Hence,
although there has been great development in sensor technology, thereby increasing the potential threat, and in materials
science, thereby increasing the possibilities to reduce signatures, the interest in signature management and camouflage
for combat vehicles has been modest. However, the emergence of highly capable and possibly adversarial systems in the
vicinity of Northern and Eastern Europe highlights the need to look at new concepts for low-signature land platforms,
partly by leveraging results from low-signature naval and air systems .
Up until the end of the ‘Cold war’ Swedish doctrine was tuned to national defense. Significant competence and
experience in signature management for combat vehicles was gathered in development projects like the S-tank (Strv 103)
and the CV90
and also in tests and trials in connection with procuring the Leopard main battle tank (Lindström, 2015).
Then in 1996 a joint service program, ‘SAT/Mark’
was initiated and was managed within the Swedish Defence Materiel
*
kent.andersson@fhs.se; phone 46 8 55342836; fax 46 8 553 425 98
Combat Vehicle 90 is a family of Swedish tracked combat vehicles designed by FMV, Hägglunds and Bofors during the mid-1980s
and early 1990s (Wikipedia)
Swedish for Low Observable Technology/Ground
Invited Paper
Target and Background Signatures, edited by Karin U. Stein, Ric H. M. A. Schleijpen, Proc. of SPIE Vol. 9653, 965302
© 2015 SPIE · CCC code: 0277-786X/15/$18 · doi: 10.1117/12.2194844
Proc. of SPIE Vol. 9653 965302-1
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Agency’s (FMV) R&D organization. It was an integrated effort to consolidate knowledge in low observable technology
(LOT) from all services. The initiative was supported by the Swedish Armed Forces (SwAF), the Swedish Defence
Research Agency (FOI) and industry representatives. The program included establishing competence networks,
enhancing design and system integration skills, developing joint defense standards and coordinating national resources in
the signature field. In two technology demonstrator projects the signature management concepts and low observable
technologies were tested in practice. The second SAT/Mark demonstrator (See Figure 1) was developed with signature
requirements influencing design already from basic construction and was developed by four companies as a joint project.
Hägglunds Vehicle AB had responsibility for the chassis, electro-optic sights and environmental situational awareness.
Saab Barracuda AB developed the signature reduction coating and an inflatable camouflage system. Bofors Defence AB
was responsible for the turret and the weapon system and Saab Tech Systems AB was responsible for the sensor systems.
The experiences of both FMV and industry from the development of the SAT/Mark demonstrator also resulted in a
proposed ´Systems approach´ to developing stealth on the ground, presented to SPIE in 2002
1
.
Figure 1. The second low observable technology demonstrator. On the left the characteristic low radar signature
shape of the vehicle is prominent. The picture on the right demonstrates the visual signature at a more tactically
relevant distance. Photos courtesy of BAE Hägglunds AB and of Saab Barracuda AB respectively.
For the first time since then, the Systems approach has been implemented in the ‘SEP’ program. SEP is a Swedish
abbreviation for Multirole Armored Platform. The FMV project started in 1994 as a pre-study and was terminated in
2008 without entering series production. The reason for the project was a need identified to replace 7-8000 vehicles in
the Swedish Armed Forces (SwAF) during the period 2005 to 2015, ranging from troop transporters to combat vehicles
in mechanized units. The SEP concept meant pursuing a solution to replace all these different types of vehicles with a
modular concept designed to meet a total of 24 different roles. One of the fundamental design requirements was
exchangeable wheeled and tracked chassis. The development originated from an idea that “new technology should bring
improvements in cost-effectiveness and performance, initially in the following areas: net load, internal volume,
flexibility in conjunction with a high degree of family relationship, signature and survivability, internal environment and
system cost.”
2
The technologies of special interest to support these development targets were identified at an early stage
as: electric transmission, continuous rubber track, decoupled running gear, composite fiber hull , add-on ballistic
protection and lastly, multispectral signature adaptation, especially IR and radar. During the study and concept analysis
phases there were eight test-rigs built for proof of concepts. The SAT/Mark demonstrators are seen as two of them. In
2006 Hägglunds Vehicles AB (later BAE Systems Hägglunds AB) was awarded a contract for the first phase
development of SEP. See Figure 2. In the meantime there was a change of procurement strategy
3
towards off-the-shelf or
development only with international partners. In 2008 it became clear that the Swedish government was not going to find
a partner and the project was terminated.
4
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Figure 2. This is one of four pre-series SEP vehicles produced by BAE Systems Hägglunds AB in 2009. Photo
courtesy of Rickard O. Lindström.
However, SEP is regarded here as a unique combat vehicle development project from a signature management point of
view. There were ambitious requirements of the signature from the beginning and an ambition to balance these with
requirements for other attributes, drawing on experiences from the technology demonstrator programs. It is some time
since the project was terminated in 2008, but since signature management is assessed to be of increasing importance to
survivability of ground forces in future conflicts, it is important not to lose sight of the lessons identified. Hence, the
scope of this paper is to collect possible new lessons and possibly to complement the systems approach to developing
stealth on the ground.
In the second section of the paper the systems approach to development is presented with the aim of capturing key
features and earlier lessons. In the subsequent section the interview study method is presented. In the following section
results, in the form of statements from the respondents, are presented and discussed. Finally conclusions are drawn and a
list of lessons is presented.
2. THE SYSTEMS APPROACH TO STEALTH ON THE GROUND
A literature search on survivability indicates a lot of research into aircraft and ship survivability, but considerably less on
ground combat vehicles. This was also one of the main drivers behind the LOT
§
demonstrator program, SAT/Mark,
reported on. Therefore, our theoretical basis for using signature management technology to increase survivability is the
work presented by Robert E. Ball on The fundamentals of aircraft combat survivability analysis and design
5
. Ball states
that the interdependence between attributes of a platform due to survivability enhancement features has been the
motivation for developing a survivability discipline in systems engineering - thereby advocating a systems approach to
development. These points, emphasized as the most important in aircraft combat survivability analysis and design, can
easily be transferred to systems engineering in other vehicle domains.
“The design should be properly, not necessarily evenly, balanced…” between features reducing the probability of
being killed given a hit (vulnerability), and features reducing the probability of being hit (susceptibility).
“Remember the goals of survivability are to increase the cost effectiveness of the aircraft as a weapon system and to
§
Low Observable Technology
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Proc. of SPIE Vol. 9653 965302-4
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References
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The fundamentals of aircraft combat survivability analysis and design

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Frequently Asked Questions (13)
Q1. What have the authors contributed in "A systems approach to stealth on the ground revisited" ?

The scope of this case study is to draw experience from where the authors left off. 

The technologies of special interest to support these development targets were identified at an early stage as: electric transmission, continuous rubber track, decoupled running gear, composite fiber hull , add-on ballistic protection and lastly, multispectral signature adaptation, especially IR and radar. 

A third respondent advocates ‘Time to classification’ as an important parameter since, in sophisticated sensor threat scenarios, it is difficult to delay detection at short range. 

Ball states that the interdependence between attributes of a platform due to survivability enhancement features has been the motivation for developing a survivability discipline in systems engineering - thereby advocating a systems approach to development. 

although there has been great development in sensor technology, thereby increasing the potential threat, and in materials science, thereby increasing the possibilities to reduce signatures, the interest in signature management and camouflage for combat vehicles has been modest. 

The ‘Time to detection’ measure of performance was often found to be more important than detection range as the tactical parameter from which to derive vehicle system requirements. 

because the cones were directed in so many directions, they mirrored each other resulting in a very deep color, one respondent explains. 

The purpose of the low observable technology demonstrator was to push stealth performance in a combat vehicle; hence, when stating the signature levels for a supposedly operational vehicle like the SEP, there has to be some trade-offs. 

The first iteration of allocating system requirements to subsystems is done by breaking them down into subsystem guidelines and subsystem requirements, but within the ambition for the overall design to meet all system level requirements. 

There is, of course, a risk that traceability to stakeholder needs degenerates with time and that needs are not easily communicated to the whole project. 

If the platform survives the first seconds of the threat sensor scanning its surrounding terrain, before it goes into high resolution mode, then the time to detection is extended considerably. 

Measuring the BRDF value of a large enough surface sample is one method proposed for linking sub-system requirements to what a threat sensor operator experiences in the field, as touched upon earlier (Olsson et al, 2002). 

Since the signature management requirements for SEP were largely adopted from the demonstrator program (with some exceptions to be noted later), the requirements analysis process, – starting with the identification of dimensioning typical situations, described above and developed during the concept stage – appears to have been validated in the SEP program.