A Theory of Conditionals
01 Jan 1968-pp 41-55
TL;DR: A conditional sentence expresses a proposition which is a function of two other propositions, yet not one which is truth function of those propositions as mentioned in this paper, which has given rise to a number of philosophical problems.
Abstract: A conditional sentence expresses a proposition which is a function of two other propositions, yet not one which is a truth function of those propositions I may know the truth values of “Willie Mays played in the American League” and “Willie Mays hit four hundred” without knowing whether or not Mays, would have hit four hundred if he had played in the American League This fact has tended to puzzle, displease, or delight philosophers, and many have felt that it is a fact that calls for some comment or explanation It has given rise to a number of philosophical problems; I shall discuss three of these
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01 Jan 2011
TL;DR: To understand the central claims of evolutionary psychology the authors require an understanding of some key concepts in evolutionary biology, cognitive psychology, philosophy of science and philosophy of mind.
Abstract: Evolutionary psychology is one of many biologically informed approaches to the study of human behavior. Along with cognitive psychologists, evolutionary psychologists propose that much, if not all, of our behavior can be explained by appeal to internal psychological mechanisms. What distinguishes evolutionary psychologists from many cognitive psychologists is the proposal that the relevant internal mechanisms are adaptations—products of natural selection—that helped our ancestors get around the world, survive and reproduce. To understand the central claims of evolutionary psychology we require an understanding of some key concepts in evolutionary biology, cognitive psychology, philosophy of science and philosophy of mind. Philosophers are interested in evolutionary psychology for a number of reasons. For philosophers of science —mostly philosophers of biology—evolutionary psychology provides a critical target. There is a broad consensus among philosophers of science that evolutionary psychology is a deeply flawed enterprise. For philosophers of mind and cognitive science evolutionary psychology has been a source of empirical hypotheses about cognitive architecture and specific components of that architecture. Philosophers of mind are also critical of evolutionary psychology but their criticisms are not as all-encompassing as those presented by philosophers of biology. Evolutionary psychology is also invoked by philosophers interested in moral psychology both as a source of empirical hypotheses and as a critical target.
4,670 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, a number of families of nonmonotonic consequence relations, defined in the style of Gentzen [13], are studied from both proof-theoretic and semantic points of view.
1,452 citations
Posted Content•
TL;DR: The preferential models proposed here are a much stronger tool than Adams' probabilistic semantics, and are defined and characterized by representation theorems, relating the two points of view.
Abstract: Many systems that exhibit nonmonotonic behavior have been described and studied already in the literature. The general notion of nonmonotonic reasoning, though, has almost always been described only negatively, by the property it does not enjoy, i.e. monotonicity. We study here general patterns of nonmonotonic reasoning and try to isolate properties that could help us map the field of nonmonotonic reasoning by reference to positive properties. We concentrate on a number of families of nonmonotonic consequence relations, defined in the style of Gentzen. Both proof-theoretic and semantic points of view are developed in parallel. The former point of view was pioneered by D. Gabbay, while the latter has been advocated by Y. Shoham in. Five such families are defined and characterized by representation theorems, relating the two points of view. One of the families of interest, that of preferential relations, turns out to have been studied by E. Adams. The "preferential" models proposed here are a much stronger tool than Adams' probabilistic semantics. The basic language used in this paper is that of propositional logic. The extension of our results to first order predicate calculi and the study of the computational complexity of the decision problems described in this paper will be treated in another paper.
1,450 citations
TL;DR: The authors provide an overview of confounding and related concepts based on a counterfactual model for causation, and special attention is given to definitions of confounding, problems in control of confound- ing, the relation of confounding to exchangeability and collapsibility, and the importance of distinguishing confounding from noncollapsibility.
Abstract: Consideration of confounding is fundamental to the design and analysis of studies of causal effects. Yet, apart from confounding in experimental designs, the topic is given little or no discussion in most statistics texts. We here provide an overview of confounding and related concepts based on a counterfactual model for causation. Special attention is given to definitions of confounding, problems in control of confound- ing, the relation of confounding to exchangeability and collapsibility, and the importance of distinguishing confounding from noncollapsibility.
820 citations
Cites background from "A Theory of Conditionals"
...The statement “if xk had been administered, the response Yi of unit i would have been yik” is called a counterfactual conditional (Lewis, 1973b; Stalnaker, 1968); it asserts that Yi would have equaled yik if xk had been administered to unit i, even if xk had not in fact been administered to unit i....
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01 Jan 1989
TL;DR: The authors compare what they see as the chief contemporary rivals in the theory of explanation, to understand their affiliations to the covering-law models and their efforts to address the troubles of those models, and evaluate their success in doing so.
Abstract: The modern study of scientific explanation dates from 1948, the year of the publication of the pioneering article by C. G. Hempel and Paul Oppenheim. Nearly forty years later, philosophers rightly continue to appreciate the accomplishments of the covering-law models of explanation and the classic sequence of papers in which Hempel articulated his view. Even though it has become clear that the Hempelian approach to explanation faces difficulties of a number of types, the main contemporary approaches to explanation attempt to incorporate what they see as Hempelian insights (with distinct facets of the covering-law models being preserved in different cases), and they usually portray themselves as designed to accommodate one or more of the main problems that doomed the older view. My aim in this essay is to compare what I see as the chief contemporary rivals in the theory of explanation, to understand their affiliations to the covering-law models and their efforts to address the troubles of those models, and to evaluate their success in doing so. Ecumenical as this may sound, the reader should be forewarned that I shall also be interested in developing further, and defending, an approach to explanation that I have championed in previous essays (1981, 1985c).
820 citations
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Book•
01 Jan 1955
TL;DR: Goodman's second book as mentioned in this paper is a reprint of the well-known paper, "The Prob lem of Counterfactual Conditionals", which he delivered at the University of London in 1953, is small in volume but rich in content.
Abstract: liELsoN Goodman's second book,1 which represents?excepting the first chapter, a reprint of the well-known paper, "The Prob lem of Counterfactual Conditionals"?the "Special Lectures in Philosophy" he delivered at the University of London in 1953, is small in volume but rich in content. There is a clear thread run ning through its four chapters: counterf actual conditionals (which in recent years have given such headaches to several ana lytic philosophers) speak about possible non-actual 2 events. But Goodman cannot accept talk about possible events or entities in good philosophical conscience; according to his "actualist" onto logy, as we might call it, there are no possibilities, just as for a nominalist there are no classes and other abstract entities. To put it in the formal mode of speech: he wants to find a way of trans lating all modal talk into a non-modal language. Guided by this motivation, he proceeds to examine the distinction between "law like" and "accidental" statements and, after an impressive display of analytical acumen, comes to the conclusion that the solution of this problem of explication is one with the solution of the problem of induction: what is the criterion of reasonableness of an inductive inference? How are warranted predictions to be dis tinguished from unwarranted ones? There seem to me, however, to be serious flaws in Goodman's intricate chain of argument, which I wish to examine in some detail.
2,072 citations
TL;DR: In this article, a semantical analysis of modal logic ii and non-normal modal propositional calculi is presented, and the tableaux that leads to a decision procedure for the propositional calculus is considered.
Abstract: Publisher Summary This chapter discusses semantical analysis of modal logic ii and non-normal modal propositional calculi. The proof of sufficiency, which is omitted by many, proceeds by constructing a normal characteristic matrix by Lindenbaum's method. The tableaux that leads to a decision procedure for the propositional calculi is considered.
1,174 citations
01 Jan 1931
TL;DR: M Mellor as discussed by the authors used the page numbers and pencilled alterations made by R. B. Braithwaite after Ramsey's death in 1930, in preparing it for publication.
Abstract: This file contains a photograph of Ramsey's original manuscript, written in 1929. The page numbers and pencilled alterations were made by R. B. Braithwaite after Ramsey's death in 1930, in preparing it for publication. The article, which is now out of copyright, is republished in two later collections of Ramsey's papers: Foundations: Essays in Philosophy, Logic, Mathematics and Economics, edited by D. H. Mellor, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978, pp. 133-51; and in F. P. Ramsey: Philosophical Papers, edited by D. H. Mellor, Cambridge: Cambridge Unversity Press, 1990, pp. 145-63.
448 citations
Book•
01 Dec 2012TL;DR: In this article, a formal calculus analogous to the propositional calculus for symbolizing conditional statements and their truth-functional components is presented, and rules for determining the formal validity of inferences symbolized within the calculus.
Abstract: Publisher Summary This chapter provides a rigorous mathematical foundation for a theory of the logic of conditionals based on probabilistic concepts that are informally presented by Adams. This theory involves a formal calculus analogous to the propositional calculus for symbolizing conditional statements and their truth-functional components, and it gives rules for determining the formal validity of inferences symbolized within the calculus. The objective of setting up this calculus is to give a more adequate representation of inferences involving conditionals than does the propositional calculus. The main philosophical idea upon which the theory is based is stated in the chapter. An adequate understanding of inferences involving conditionals must take into consideration other things besides their truth conditions. This is connected with the fact that in ordinary parlance, the words “true” and “false” have no unambiguous sense as applied to conditional statements whose antecedents prove to be false.
311 citations