Book ChapterDOI
A Theory of Cooperation in International Business
Peter J. Buckley,Mark Casson +1 more
- pp 41-67
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TLDR
In international business the term cooperative venture is often used merely to signify some alternative to 100 per cent equity ownership of a foreign affiliate; it may indicate a joint venture (JV), an industrial collaboration agreement, licensing, franchising, subcontracting, or even a management contract or countertrade agreement as mentioned in this paper.Abstract:
To what extent are cooperative ventures really cooperative? What exactly is meant by cooperation in this context? In international business the term cooperative venture is often used merely to signify some alternative to 100 per cent equity ownership of a foreign affiliate; it may indicate a joint venture (JV), an industrial collaboration agreement, licensing, franchising, subcontracting, or even a management contract or countertrade agreement. It is quite possible, of course, to regard such arrangements as cooperative by definition, but this fudges the substantive issue of just how cooperative these arrangements really are.read more
Citations
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Journal ArticleDOI
Trust and TAM in online shopping: an integrated model
TL;DR: Research on experienced repeat online shoppers shows that consumer trust is as important to online commerce as the widely accepted TAM use-antecedents, perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use, and provides evidence that online trust is built through a belief that the vendor has nothing to gain by cheating.
Journal ArticleDOI
Competition for competence and interpartner learning within international strategic alliances
TL;DR: In this paper, a detailed analysis of nine international alliances yielded a fine-grained understanding of the determinants of interpartner learning, concluding that not all partners are equally adept at learning, that asymmetries in learning alter the relative bargaining power of partners, stability and longevity may be inappropriate metrics of partnership success, and partners may have competitive, as well as collaborative aims, vis-a-vis each other.
Journal ArticleDOI
Joint ventures: Theoretical and empirical perspectives
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors compare the perspectives of transaction costs and strategic behavior in explaining the motivation to joint venture and propose a theory of joint ventures as an instrument of organizational learning.
Journal ArticleDOI
Between Trust and Control: Developing Confidence in Partner Cooperation in Alliances
T. K. Das,Bing-Sheng Teng +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine the notion of confidence in partner cooperation in alliances and suggest that it comes from two distinct sources: trust and control, and make the argument that their relationship is of a supplementary character in generating confidence.
Journal ArticleDOI
Strategic Alliance Structuring: A Game Theoretic and Transaction Cost Examination of Interfirm Cooperation
TL;DR: In this paper, game theoretic structural dimensions and institutional responses to perceived opportunism in the study of voluntary interfirm cooperation are examined in 111 inter-irm alliances and found that some alliance structures are inherently more likely than others to be associated with high opportunity to cheat, high behavioral uncertainty, and poor stability, longevity and performance.
References
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Book
The Evolution of Cooperation
TL;DR: In this paper, a model based on the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy in the context of the Prisoner's Dilemma game was developed for cooperation in organisms, and the results of a computer tournament showed how cooperation based on reciprocity can get started in an asocial world, can thrive while interacting with a wide range of other strategies, and can resist invasion once fully established.
Journal ArticleDOI
The Economic Institutions of Capitalism
TL;DR: The Economic Institutions of Capitalism as mentioned in this paper is a seminal work in the field of economic institutions of capitalism. Journal of Economic Issues: Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 528-530.
Journal ArticleDOI
The Evolution of Cooperation
R. B. Greene,Robert Axelrod +1 more
TL;DR: A model is developed based on the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy in the context of the Prisoner's Dilemma game to show how cooperation based on reciprocity can get started in an asocial world, can thrive while interacting with a wide range of other strategies, and can resist invasion once fully established.
Posted Content
The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that economic organization is shaped by transaction cost economizing decisions and that any issue that arises, or can be recast as a matter of contracting, is usefully examined in terms of transaction costs.
Book ChapterDOI
The economic institutions of capitalism : firms, markets, relational contracting
Abstract: This study is based on the belief that economic organization is shaped by transaction cost economizing decisions. It sets out the basic principles of transaction cost economics, applies the basic arguments to economic institutions, and develops public policy implications. Any issue that arises, or can be recast as a matter of contracting, is usefully examined in terms of transaction costs. Transaction cost economics maintains that governance of contractual relations is mainly achieved through institutions of private ordering instead of legal centralism. This approach is based on behavioral assumptions of bounded rationalism and opportunism, which reflect actual human nature. These assumptions underlie the problem of economic organization: to create contract and governance structures that economize on bounded rationality while safeguarding transactions against the hazards of opportunism. The book first summarizes the transaction cost economics approach to the study of economic organization. It develops the underlying behavioral assumptions and the types of transactions; alternative approaches to the world of contracts are presented. Assuming that firms are best regarded as a governance structure, a comparative institutional approach to the governance of contractual relations is set out. The evidence, theory, and policy of vertical integration are discussed, on the basis that the decision to integrate is paradigmatic to transaction cost analysis. The incentives and bureaucratic limits of internal organization are presented, including the dilemma of why a large firm can't do everything a collection of small firms can do. The economics of organization in presented in terms of transaction costs, showing that hierarchy also serves efficiency and permits a variety of predictions about the organization of work. Efficient labor organization is explored; on the assumption that an authority relation prevails between workers and managers, what governance structure supports will be made in response to various types of job attributes are discussed, and implications for union organization are developed. Considering antitrust ramifications of transaction cost economics, the book summarizes transaction cost issues that arise in the context of contracting, merger, and strategic behavior, and challenges earlier antitrust preoccupation with monopoly. (TNM)