TL;DR: In the attraction effect, adding a dominated third option to a choice set of two options can reverse the preference for the original two options, and even increase one of the option's choice share as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: In the attraction effect, adding a dominated third option to a choice set of two options can reverse the preference for the original two options, and even increase one of the option’s choice share. This constitutes a violation of the axioms of regularity and independence from irrelevant alternatives, which are core properties of any choice model in which the utility of each option is stable across choice sets. Consequently, in the past 20 years, the attraction effect has driven the development of a set of influential models of multiattribute choice. However, Frederick, Lee, and Baskin (2014) have recently claimed that the attraction effect is only limited to options with numerical attributes, and does not hold for choices between naturalistic options (e.g., snacks, movies) — a claim which would severely undermine its theoretical importance. Huber, Payne, and Puto (2014) criticised Frederick et al.’s experiments, laying down a set of criteria that should be met by any experiment wishing to test for the attraction effect in real-world consumer choices. This article presents the first experiment that meets these criteria. The results show a precisely zero attraction effect.
This can constitute a violation of the axioms of regularity and independence from irrelevant alternatives, which are core properties of any choice model in which the utility of each option is stable across choice sets.
In the past 20 years, the attraction effect has driven the development of a set of influential models of multiattribute choice.
Two studies (Frederick et al., 2014; Yang & Lynn, 2014) involving a series of experiments with naturalistic choice options (e.g., snacks, movies) found no evidence for the attraction effect in choice contexts where alternatives are represented without objectively defined (e.g., numerical) attribute dimensions—a finding that would severely undermine its theoretical importance.
The results show a precisely zero attraction effect.
The Attraction Effect
Imagine that you are having a nice meal in a restaurant, and you are looking at the two dessert options available on the menu: cheesecake and pecan pie.
The introduction of the apple pie to the choice set makes you more likely to choose the pecan pie over the cheesecake .
This article has been published under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/3.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Choice options that are represented along two attribute dimensions (perceptual or numerical) can be relatively easily manipulated within a choice experiment, but most real-world choices involve complex, naturalistic objects with a large number of underlying attributes that often cannot be represented in a stylized format.
The authors describe a rigorous test of the attraction effect with complex, naturalistic choice options, using a carefully developed experimental methodology that addresses all of the critical conditions discussed by Huber et al. (2014).
Testing the Attraction Effect With Real-World Stimuli
The goal of this experiment was to test the attraction effect with naturalistic stimuli.
When the stimuli are represented with welldefined attribute dimensions, it is straightforward to construct choice triplets with a target, competitor, and decoy option.
First, such stimuli can have a high number of attribute dimensions that might vary across individuals.
They chose pairs of movies that are part of the same series or are starring the same actor to create target– decoy pairs.
Figure 1 shows an example of two choice triplets created from one such quadruplet of movies (in the experiment participants were presented with real movie posters).
Candidate Choice Set Selection
To determine the choice sets used in the experiment, the first step was to create a set of quadruplets, each consisting of two movies that are very similar (for the two target–decoy pairs; i.e., A–A,= B–B=), while making sure that the two pairs are sufficiently different from each other (for the target–competitor pair; i.e., A–B).
To obtain the set of 400 movies, the authors first retrieved 40 of the most popular movies from each of 10 distinct genre categories (romance, drama, sci-fi, thriller, comedy, horror, animation, fantasy, crime, action) from IMDb.
The authors selected a movie pair as target–decoy candidate if, for a given target candidate movie, the number of overlapping genres with a candidate decoy was equal to the maximum overlap seen for that target across all candidate decoy movies.
Participants to rate the similarity of a randomly chosen group of movie pairs, obtaining 10 independent similarity ratings for each of the 1,242 target– decoy candidates.
Therefore, the authors decided to pair up the least similar 253 target– decoy pairs (where similarity is captured by genre overlap) to create the quadruplets.
Experimental Procedures
The experiment consisted of three stages: rating stage, choice stage, and a similarity rating stage.
Before the choice stage, the authors created a bespoke set of movie triplets for each participant using their ratings from the rating stage.
First, based on each participant’s preference ratings, the authors identified the subset of quadruplets where (a) the target and competitor were both rated 4, both rated 5, both rated 6, or both rated 7 and (b) the two decoy movies were rated at least 3 points lower than the two target candidates.
The authors recruited 297 English-speaking participants from Prolific Academic who were paid €8 per hour.
Out of the 179 participants who were invited back, 152 took part in the choice stage of the experiment.
Exclusion Criteria
To conduct a rigorous test of the attraction effect, it is crucial that people take the task seriously and reveal their true preferences.
Given that individually rating 231 movies can seem somewhat mundane, the authors specified a set of exclusion criteria to filter those people out who did not take the rating task sufficiently seriously.
The authors excluded people who fell into the fastest 5% of the reaction time (RT) distribution, the lowest 5% of the entropy distribution, and the upper and lower 5% of the autocorrelation distribution.
Thus, this procedure filtered out response patterns where people (a) spent an unusually short time completing the task, (b) did not use the whole of the ratings scale, (c) often gave the same ratings for consecutive movies, or (d) were giving ratings randomly.
When testing for the attraction effect, the authors have also removed all trials where the decoy was chosen.
Results
The median number of choice trials per participant was 16 (range: 6–54), and 84% of participants were presented with at least 8 choice trials.
In addition, 72% of participants never chose the decoy, and only 2% chose it in more than 25% of the trials.
As Figure 6 shows, the overwhelming majority of target–competitor pairs were perceived as not similar, while the majority of target–decoy pairs were perceived as similar, exactly as the authors intended.
Using Model 1, the authors calculate that the overall probability of choosing the target is .50, 95% CI [.48, .52], the same as what they see in the mean over subject proportions from Figure 5.
None of the ratings modulate the strength of the attraction effect.
Further Analyses
During the peer-review process, the authors also completed the following exploratory analyses.
Faced with two subsequent choices involving two equally highly rated A–B movie pairs and two different but undesirable decoys, it is possible that the first choice is “sticky” and will be repeated.
When all of the covariates are included (Model 8), the authors still do not find evidence for the attraction effect, although the effect is less precisely estimated.
Overall, while the results indicate that overall genre preferences slightly influenced choices between the target and competitor, the authors found no evidence that this had any effect on the strength of the attraction effect.
While the authors have not found any evidence suggesting that the target– decoy rating difference influenced the strength of the attraction effect (see Model 2 in Table 1), a nonlinear association between target–decoy preference and the attraction effect might still exist.
General Discussion
The authors tested for the attraction effect in a choice task with naturalistic choice options.
The decoy was only chosen in 4.3% of the trials, which clearly shows that participants were able to spot and avoid the dominated option.
Finally, in their analysis, the authors controlled for familiarity with the choice options, perceived similarity of the target– decoy and target– competitor pair, and preference difference between the target and the decoy, but they found that none of these modulated or revealed an attraction effect.
Attribute information is spatially separate in a numerical matrix form presentation, but attribute information occurs in the same spatial location for movie thumbnails.
TL;DR: The authors showed that the decoy effect is a transitory phenomenon that emerges only in the early stages of the choice process to later disappear, and that participants are fast then slow to choose the dominant option to avoid the dominated decoy and then progressively revise their choices until choice shares come to correspond to price differences only.
Abstract: In this paper we provide choice-process experimental evidence that the attraction effect is a short-term phenomenon, that disappears when individuals are given time and incentives to revise their choices.The attraction (or decoy) effect is the most prominent example of context effects, and it appears when adding a dominated option to a choice set increases the choice share of the now dominant option at the expense of other options. While widely replicated, the attraction effect is usually tested in hypothetical or payoff-irrelevant situations and without following the choice process. We run a laboratory experiment where we incentivize choice, vary the difference in utility between options and track which option participants consider best over time. We find that the effect is a transitory phenomenon that emerges only in the early stages of the choice process to later disappear. Participants are fast then slow: they first choose the dominant option to avoid the dominated decoy and then progressively revise their choices until choice shares come to correspond to price differences only. We expand our analysis by considering differences in utility among options and differences in the presentation of options (numerical or graphical). We also consider differences in the choice processes followed by individuals (intuitive vs. deliberative). This allows us to ascribe more precisely the role of fast and slow cognitive process in the emergence and disappearance of the attraction effect.
7 citations
Cites background from "A Zero Attraction Effect in Natural..."
...The AE also failed to replicate in a recent large experiment with real-world consumer choices (Trendl et al., 2018) that complied with all the conditions laid down by the original authors to allow successful replication (Huber et al., 2014)....
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...The AE also failed to replicate in a recent large experiment with real-world consumer choices (Trendl et al., 2018) that complied with all the conditions laid down by the original authors to allow successful replication (Huber et al....
TL;DR: The authors found strong evidence for status quo bias and no evidence for the decoy effect in a between-subjects lab experiment that featured a single decision over two or three money lotteries.
Abstract: Inertia and context-dependent choice effects are well-studied classes of behavioural phenomena. While much is known about these effects in isolation, little is known about whether one of them "dominates" the other when both can potentially be present. Knowledge of any such dominance is relevant for effective choice architecture and descriptive modelling. We initiate this empirical investigation with a between-subjects lab experiment that featured a single decision over two or three money lotteries. Our experiment was designed to test for dominance between *status quo bias* and the *decoy effect*. We find strong evidence for status quo bias and no evidence for the decoy effect. We also find that status quo bias is powerful enough so that, at the aggregate level, a fraction of subjects switch from being risk-averse to being risk-seeking. Survey evidence suggests that this is due to subjects focusing on the maximum possible amount when the risky lottery is the default and on the probability of winning more than the smallest amount when there is no default lottery. The observed reversal in risk attitudes is explainable by a large class of reference-dependent preferences.
TL;DR: The decoy effect refers to the phenomenon whereby an inferior, unpreferable option reverses people's preferences and increases the choice share of a targeted option as discussed by the authors, which is called decoy bias.
Abstract: The decoy effect refers to the phenomenon whereby an inferior, unpreferable option reverses people’s preferences and increases the choice share of a targeted option. In two pre-registered experimen...
TL;DR: The authors found that offering an inferior and rarely chosen third (decoy) option to decision makers choosing between two options has a paradoxical effect: it increases the choice share of the option most similar to the decoy.
Abstract: Offering an inferior and rarely chosen third (decoy) option to decision makers choosing between two options has a paradoxical effect: It increases the choice share of the option most similar to the decoy. This attraction effect is robust when options are numeric but rarely occurs in humans when options are visual, even though it occurs in animals. Building on psychophysics, we examined two types of visual attributes: quantitative and qualitative. Quantitative visual attributes (e.g., different bottle volumes) can be perceived as magnitudes. Qualitative visual attributes (e.g., different colors), however, do not fall onto a magnitude scale. One can perceive that a bottle’s volume is twice that of another bottle but not that a green bottle’s color is twice that of a red bottle. We observed robust attraction effects for quantitative visual attributes (4,602 adults, 237 college-age participants), which reversed to repulsion effects when the visual attributes were qualitative (6,005 adults).
"A Zero Attraction Effect in Natural..." refers background in this paper
...In addition, the attraction effect can violate the regularity condition, which states that an option’s choice probability cannot increase when the choice set is extended (Luce, 1977; Tversky, 1972)....
TL;DR: A computational model of value-based binary choice in which fixations guide the comparison process and it is found that the model can quantitatively explain complex relationships between fixation patterns and choices, as well as several fixation-driven decision biases.
Abstract: Most organisms facing a choice between multiple stimuli will look repeatedly at them, presumably implementing a comparison process between the items' values. Little is known about the nature of the comparison process in value-based decision-making or about the role of visual fixations in this process. We created a computational model of value-based binary choice in which fixations guide the comparison process and tested it on humans using eye-tracking. We found that the model can quantitatively explain complex relationships between fixation patterns and choices, as well as several fixation-driven decision biases.
1,018 citations
"A Zero Attraction Effect in Natural..." refers background in this paper
...…decision field theory, Roe et al., 2001; leaky competing accumulators, Usher & McClelland, 2004; multialternative attentional drift–diffusion model, Krajbich et al., 2010; rangenormalization model, Soltani et al., 2012; associative accumulation model, Bhatia, 2013; multiattribute linear ballistic…...
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors interpret decision field theory (J. R. Busemeyer and J. T. Townsend, 1993) as a connectionist network and extend it to accommodate multialternative preferential choice situations.
Abstract: The authors interpret decision field theory (J. R. Busemeyer & J. T. Townsend, 1993) as a connectionist network and extend it to accommodate multialternative preferential choice situations. This article shows that the classic weighted additive utility model (see R. L. Keeney & H. Raiffa, 1976) and the classic Thurstone preferential choice model (see L. L. Thurstone, 1959) are special cases of this new multialternative decision field theory (MDFT), which also can emulate the search process of the popular elimination by aspects (EBA) model (see A. Tversky, 1969). The new theory is unique in its ability to explain several central empirical results found in the multialternative preference literature with a common set of principles. These empirical results include the similarity effect, the attraction effect, and the compromise effect, and the complex interactions among these three effects. The dynamic nature of the model also implies strong testable predictions concerning the moderating effect of time pressure on these three effects.
616 citations
"A Zero Attraction Effect in Natural..." refers background in this paper
...…with a significant number of various theoretical accounts being developed over the past 20 years (e.g., multialternative decision field theory, Roe et al., 2001; leaky competing accumulators, Usher & McClelland, 2004; multialternative attentional drift–diffusion model, Krajbich et al., 2010;…...
TL;DR: A survey of the choice axiom and its application in psychophysical theory can be found in this paper, with a focus on the use of choice models in the context of psychophysics.
Abstract: This survey is divided into three major sections. The first concerns mathematical results about the choice axiom and the choice models that devoIve from it. For example, its relationship to Thurstonian theory is satisfyingly understood; much is known about how choice and ranking probabilities may relate, although little of this knowledge seems empirically useful; and there are certain interesting statistical facts. The second section describes attempts that have been made to test and apply these models. The testing has been done mostly, though not exclusively, by psychologists; the applications have been mostly in economics and sociology. Although it is clear from many experiments that the conditions under which the choice axiom holds are surely delicate, the need for simple, rational underpinnings in complex theories, as in economics and sociology, leads one to accept assumptions that are at best approximate. And the third section concerns alternative, more general theories which, in spirit, are much like the choice axiom. Perhaps I had best admit at the outset that, as a commentator on this scene, I am qualified no better than many others and rather less well than some who have been working in this area recently, which I have not been. My pursuits have led me along other, somewhat related routes. On the one hand, I have contributed to some of the recent, purely algebraic aspects of fundamental measurement (for a survey of some of this material, see Krantz, Lute, Suppes, & Tversky, 1971). And on the other hand, I have worked in the highly probabilistic area of psychophysical theory; but the empirical materials have led me away from axiomatic structures, such as the choice axiom, to more structural, neural models which are not readily axiomatized at the present time. After some attempts to apply choice models to psychophysical phenomena (discussed below in its proper place), I was led to conclude that it is not a very promising approach to, these data, and so I have not been actively studying any aspect of the choice axiom in over 12 years. With that understood, let us begin.
535 citations
"A Zero Attraction Effect in Natural..." refers background in this paper
...In addition, the attraction effect can violate the regularity condition, which states that an option’s choice probability cannot increase when the choice set is extended (Luce, 1977; Tversky, 1972)....